1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
51 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
52 use util::config::UserConfig;
53 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
54 use util::{byte_utils, events};
55 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
56 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
57 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
58 use util::errors::APIError;
63 use core::cell::RefCell;
65 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
66 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
67 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use util::crypto::sign;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
156 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
157 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
162 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
163 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
164 /// are part of the same payment.
165 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
166 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
167 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
170 struct ClaimableHTLC {
171 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
174 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
178 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
179 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
180 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
181 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
183 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
184 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
189 impl Readable for PaymentId {
190 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
191 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
195 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
196 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
197 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
198 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
199 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
202 session_priv: SecretKey,
203 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
204 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
205 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
206 payment_id: PaymentId,
207 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
208 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
211 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
212 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
213 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
215 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
217 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
219 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
222 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
223 payment_id.hash(hasher);
224 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
225 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
226 payment_params.hash(hasher);
231 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
234 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
235 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
237 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
239 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
240 payment_secret: None,
241 payment_params: None,
246 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
247 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
249 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
257 struct ReceiveError {
263 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
264 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
266 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
271 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
273 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
274 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
275 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
276 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
277 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
279 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
280 err: msgs::LightningError,
281 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
282 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
284 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
286 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
288 err: LightningError {
290 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
291 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
298 shutdown_finish: None,
302 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
304 err: LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
314 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
317 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
319 err: LightningError {
321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
322 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
328 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
329 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
333 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
336 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
338 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
339 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
343 log_level: Level::Warn,
346 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
348 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
350 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
352 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
353 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
359 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
362 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
370 shutdown_finish: None,
375 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
376 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
377 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
378 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
379 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
381 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
382 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
383 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
384 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
385 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
386 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
387 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
389 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
393 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
394 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
395 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
396 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
397 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
398 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
399 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
400 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
402 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
403 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
404 /// and via the classic SCID.
406 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
407 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
408 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
409 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
410 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
411 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
412 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
414 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
415 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
416 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
417 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
420 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
421 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
422 /// quite some time lag.
423 enum BackgroundEvent {
424 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
425 /// commitment transaction.
426 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
429 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
430 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
432 latest_features: InitFeatures,
435 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
436 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
438 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
441 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
442 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
443 struct PendingInboundPayment {
444 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
445 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
446 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
447 /// this payment being removed.
449 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
450 user_payment_id: u64,
451 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
452 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
453 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
456 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
457 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
458 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
460 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
463 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
464 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
465 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
466 pending_amt_msat: u64,
467 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
468 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
469 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
471 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
472 starting_block_height: u32,
474 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
475 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
476 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
478 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
479 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
481 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
482 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
483 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
484 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
485 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
487 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
489 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
490 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
494 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
495 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
501 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
507 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
513 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
520 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
529 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
530 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
531 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
533 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
538 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
539 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
542 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
543 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
544 let our_payment_hash;
545 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
551 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
555 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
559 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
560 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
561 let remove_res = match self {
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
566 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
570 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
571 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
572 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
573 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
574 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
575 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
582 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
583 let insert_res = match self {
584 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
585 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
586 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
592 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
593 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
594 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
595 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
596 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
603 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
608 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
615 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
616 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
617 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
618 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
619 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
620 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
621 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
623 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
626 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
627 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
628 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
629 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
630 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
631 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
632 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
633 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
635 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
636 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
638 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
639 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
641 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
642 /// to individual Channels.
644 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
645 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
646 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
647 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
649 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
650 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
651 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
652 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
653 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
654 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
655 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
657 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
658 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
659 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
660 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
663 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
664 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
665 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
666 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
667 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
669 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
670 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
671 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
672 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
673 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
674 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
675 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
676 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
677 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
678 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
681 default_configuration: UserConfig,
682 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
688 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
690 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
691 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
693 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
694 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
695 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
696 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
698 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
699 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
700 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
701 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
702 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
703 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
705 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
706 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
707 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
708 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
709 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
710 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
711 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
712 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
714 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
716 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
717 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
719 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
720 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
721 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
722 /// active channel list on load.
723 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
725 our_network_key: SecretKey,
726 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
728 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
730 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
731 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
732 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
734 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
735 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
737 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
738 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
739 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
741 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
742 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
743 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
744 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
746 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
747 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
748 /// are currently open with that peer.
749 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
750 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
753 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
754 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
756 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
757 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
758 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
759 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
760 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
761 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
762 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
763 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
764 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
766 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
773 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
775 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
776 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
777 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
778 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
779 pub struct ChainParameters {
780 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
781 pub network: Network,
783 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
785 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
786 pub best_block: BestBlock,
789 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
795 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
796 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
797 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
798 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
799 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
800 /// updates are ready for persistence).
802 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
803 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
804 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
805 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
806 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
808 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
809 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
812 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
813 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
814 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
817 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
818 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
820 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
821 persistence_notifier: notifier,
822 should_persist: persist_check,
823 _read_guard: read_guard,
828 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
830 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
831 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
836 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
837 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
839 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
842 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
843 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
844 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
845 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
847 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
848 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
850 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
852 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
853 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
854 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
855 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
856 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
857 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
858 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
860 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
861 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
863 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
864 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
865 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
866 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
868 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
869 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
870 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
871 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
872 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
873 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
876 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
878 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
879 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
882 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
884 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
885 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
886 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
888 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
889 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
891 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
892 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
893 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
894 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
895 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
896 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
897 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
898 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
899 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
900 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
901 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
904 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
905 /// to better separate parameters.
906 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
907 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
908 /// The node_id of our counterparty
909 pub node_id: PublicKey,
910 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
911 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
912 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
913 pub features: InitFeatures,
914 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
915 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
916 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
918 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
920 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
921 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
922 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
923 /// payments to us through this channel.
924 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
927 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
928 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
929 pub struct ChannelDetails {
930 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
931 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
932 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
933 /// lifetime of the channel.
934 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
935 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
936 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
937 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
938 /// our counterparty already.
940 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
941 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
942 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
943 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
945 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
946 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
947 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
948 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
950 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
951 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
953 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
954 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
955 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
956 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
957 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
958 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
959 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
961 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
962 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
964 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
965 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
966 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
967 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
968 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
969 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
970 /// this value on chain.
972 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
974 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
976 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
977 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
978 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
979 pub user_channel_id: u64,
980 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
981 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
982 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
984 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
985 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
986 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
987 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
989 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
990 pub balance_msat: u64,
991 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
992 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
993 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
994 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
996 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
998 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
999 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1000 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1001 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1002 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1003 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1004 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1005 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1006 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1008 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1009 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1010 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1011 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1012 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1013 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1014 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1015 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1016 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1018 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1020 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1021 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1022 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1023 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1024 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1025 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1026 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1027 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1028 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1030 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1031 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1032 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1033 pub is_outbound: bool,
1034 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1035 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1036 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1037 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1038 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1040 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1041 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1042 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1043 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1045 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1046 pub is_usable: bool,
1047 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1048 pub is_public: bool,
1051 impl ChannelDetails {
1052 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1053 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1054 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1056 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1057 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1058 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1059 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1063 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1064 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1065 /// states for more.
1066 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1067 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1068 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1069 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1070 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1071 ParameterError(APIError),
1072 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1073 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1074 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1075 /// payment in full.
1077 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1079 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1080 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1081 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1082 /// paths than the ones selected).
1083 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1084 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1085 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1086 /// in over-/re-payment.
1088 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1089 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1090 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1092 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1093 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1094 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1095 /// with the latest update_id.
1097 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1098 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1099 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1100 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1101 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1102 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1103 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1104 payment_id: PaymentId,
1108 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1110 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1112 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1113 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1114 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1115 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1117 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1118 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1119 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1122 macro_rules! handle_error {
1123 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1126 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1127 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1129 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1130 // entering the macro.
1131 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1132 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1135 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1137 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1138 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1139 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1140 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1144 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1145 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1146 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1147 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1152 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1153 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1155 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1156 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1157 action: err.action.clone()
1161 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1162 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1165 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1172 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1173 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1174 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1175 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1177 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1178 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1179 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1180 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1181 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1183 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1184 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1186 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1190 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1191 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1192 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1194 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1195 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1197 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1198 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1200 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1201 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1202 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1203 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1204 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1205 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1207 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1208 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1209 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1210 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1211 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1212 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1218 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1219 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1223 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1225 $entry.remove_entry();
1233 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1234 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1238 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1240 $entry.remove_entry();
1248 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1249 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1251 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1252 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1258 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1259 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1261 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1262 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1263 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1264 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1265 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1266 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1267 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1268 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1269 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1270 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1271 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1272 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1273 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1274 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1277 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1278 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1279 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1280 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1281 match $action_type {
1282 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1283 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1285 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1286 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1288 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1289 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1290 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1291 if !$resend_commitment {
1292 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1295 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1297 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1298 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1302 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1303 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1305 $entry.remove_entry();
1309 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1310 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1311 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1313 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1314 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1316 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1317 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1319 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1320 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1324 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1325 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1326 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1328 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1329 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1333 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1334 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1335 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1336 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1337 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1340 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1345 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1346 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1347 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1348 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1349 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1351 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1352 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1353 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1354 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1355 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1356 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1357 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1358 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1359 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1364 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1365 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1366 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1367 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1368 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1370 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1371 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1372 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1374 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1375 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1376 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1377 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1380 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1381 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1382 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1383 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1384 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1385 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1386 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1387 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1388 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1389 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1390 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1391 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1394 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1395 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1396 // before it should be allowed to.
1397 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1398 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1400 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1401 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1402 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1407 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1408 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1409 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1410 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1411 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1412 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1413 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1414 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1415 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1416 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1417 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1418 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1419 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1420 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1421 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1422 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1423 let mut order = $order;
1425 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1427 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1431 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1432 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1433 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1434 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1439 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1440 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1441 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1442 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1443 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1448 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1452 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1457 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1458 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1459 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1464 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1465 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1466 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1467 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1468 assert!(res.is_ok());
1471 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1475 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1476 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1477 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1479 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1481 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1482 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1487 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1488 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1489 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1490 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1494 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1496 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1497 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1499 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1501 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1503 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1504 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1505 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1506 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1507 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1508 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1509 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1510 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1512 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1513 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1514 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1518 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1520 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1521 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1522 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1523 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1524 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1525 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1527 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1528 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1529 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1531 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1532 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1535 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1536 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1538 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1539 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1541 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1543 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1544 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1545 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1546 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1554 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1555 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1556 &self.default_configuration
1559 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1560 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1561 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1564 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1565 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1567 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1569 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1573 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1578 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1580 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1582 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1583 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1584 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1587 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1588 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1590 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1591 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1592 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1594 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1595 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1596 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1597 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1598 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1599 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1601 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1602 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1603 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1604 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1605 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1606 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1611 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1612 Some(peer_state) => {
1613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1614 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1615 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1616 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1617 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1618 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1619 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1623 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1628 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1631 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1634 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1635 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1637 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1638 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1639 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1644 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1650 node_id: their_network_key,
1653 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1656 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1657 let mut res = Vec::new();
1659 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1660 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1661 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1662 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1663 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1664 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1665 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1666 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1667 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1668 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1669 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1670 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1671 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1672 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1674 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1675 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1676 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1677 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1678 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1679 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1680 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1681 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1683 inbound_capacity_msat,
1684 outbound_capacity_msat,
1685 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1686 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1687 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1688 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1689 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1690 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1691 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1696 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1697 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1698 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1704 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1705 /// more information.
1706 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1707 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1710 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1711 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1713 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1714 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1716 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1717 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1718 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1719 // really wanted anyway.
1720 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1723 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1724 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1725 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1726 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1727 Some(transaction) => {
1728 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1732 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1733 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1734 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1735 reason: closure_reason
1739 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1742 let counterparty_node_id;
1743 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1744 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1746 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1749 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1751 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1752 Some(peer_state) => {
1753 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1754 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1755 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1757 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1759 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1761 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1762 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1763 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1764 let (result, is_permanent) =
1765 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1767 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1773 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1774 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1778 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1779 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1780 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1781 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1785 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1793 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1797 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1801 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1802 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1803 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1805 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1806 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1808 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1809 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1810 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1811 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1813 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1815 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1816 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1817 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1818 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1819 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1822 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1823 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1824 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1826 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1827 /// the channel being closed or not:
1828 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1829 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1830 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1831 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1832 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1833 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1834 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1836 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1838 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1839 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1840 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1841 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1842 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1846 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1847 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1848 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1849 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1850 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1852 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1853 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1854 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1855 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1856 // ignore the result here.
1857 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1861 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1862 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1863 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1866 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1867 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1868 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1869 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1870 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1873 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1874 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1875 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1878 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1880 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1882 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1885 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1886 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1887 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1888 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1889 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1894 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1897 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1898 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1899 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1900 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1901 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1902 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1903 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1904 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1905 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1906 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1907 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1917 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1918 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1919 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1920 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1921 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1925 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1926 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1928 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1929 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1930 return Err(ReceiveError {
1931 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
1933 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
1936 // final_expiry_too_soon
1937 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1938 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1939 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1940 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1941 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1942 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1943 return Err(ReceiveError {
1945 err_data: Vec::new(),
1946 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
1949 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
1950 return Err(ReceiveError {
1952 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
1953 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
1957 let routing = match hop_data.format {
1958 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
1959 return Err(ReceiveError {
1960 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
1961 err_data: Vec::new(),
1962 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
1965 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
1966 return Err(ReceiveError {
1967 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1968 err_data: Vec::new(),
1969 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
1972 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1973 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1974 return Err(ReceiveError {
1975 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1976 err_data: Vec::new(),
1977 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
1979 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1980 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1982 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1983 phantom_shared_secret,
1985 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1986 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1987 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1988 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1989 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1990 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1991 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1992 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
1993 return Err(ReceiveError {
1994 err_code: 0x4000|22,
1995 err_data: Vec::new(),
1996 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2000 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2002 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2005 return Err(ReceiveError {
2006 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2007 err_data: Vec::new(),
2008 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2013 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2016 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2017 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2018 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2022 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2023 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2024 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2026 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2027 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2028 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2029 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2030 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2031 failure_code: $err_code,
2032 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2037 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2038 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2041 let shared_secret = {
2042 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2043 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2047 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2048 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2049 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2050 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2051 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2052 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2053 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2054 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2057 let mut channel_state = None;
2058 macro_rules! return_err {
2059 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2061 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2062 if channel_state.is_none() {
2063 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2065 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2066 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2067 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2068 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2069 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2074 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2076 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2077 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2079 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2080 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2084 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2085 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2087 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2089 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2090 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2091 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2092 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2093 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2095 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2098 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2099 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2101 let blinding_factor = {
2102 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2103 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2104 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2105 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2108 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2110 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2112 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2115 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2116 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2119 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2120 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2121 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2122 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2123 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2127 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2128 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2129 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2132 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2133 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2134 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2135 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2140 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2141 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2142 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2143 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2144 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2145 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2146 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2147 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2148 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2149 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2150 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2152 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2155 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2158 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2160 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2161 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2162 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2163 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2164 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2165 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2166 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2168 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2169 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2170 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2171 // we don't have the channel here.
2172 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2174 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2176 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2177 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2178 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2179 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2180 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2181 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2182 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2184 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2185 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2187 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2188 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2189 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2190 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2191 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2193 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2194 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2196 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2197 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2199 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2200 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2201 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2202 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2203 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2204 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2206 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2207 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2209 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2210 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2211 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2212 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2213 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2214 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2215 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2216 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2217 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2218 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2224 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 8 + 2));
2225 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2226 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2227 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2229 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2230 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2232 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2233 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2234 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2236 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2237 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2239 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2244 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2247 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2248 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2249 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2251 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2252 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2253 if !chan.should_announce() {
2254 return Err(LightningError {
2255 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2260 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2263 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2264 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2265 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2266 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2267 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2268 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2270 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2271 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2275 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2277 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2279 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2281 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2282 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2284 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2285 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2286 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2287 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2288 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2289 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2290 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2291 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2294 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2295 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2297 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2303 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2304 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2305 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2306 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2307 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2308 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2310 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2311 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2312 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2313 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2314 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2316 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2318 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2320 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2321 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2323 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2324 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2325 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2326 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2327 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2328 err: "Payment already completed"
2333 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2334 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2335 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2338 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2340 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2341 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2342 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2343 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2344 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2345 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2346 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2347 total_msat: total_value,
2349 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2354 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2356 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2357 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2359 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2360 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2362 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2363 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2365 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2366 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2368 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2369 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2370 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2371 channel_state, chan)
2373 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2374 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2375 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2376 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2377 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2378 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2379 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2380 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2381 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2382 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2384 insert_outbound_payment!();
2386 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2387 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2388 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2389 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2390 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2391 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2392 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2393 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2399 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2401 } else { unreachable!(); }
2405 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2406 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2408 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2413 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2415 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2416 /// fields for more info.
2418 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2419 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2420 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2421 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2422 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2423 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2425 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2427 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2428 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2429 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2431 /// In general, a path may raise:
2432 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2433 /// node public key) is specified.
2434 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2435 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2437 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2438 /// relevant updates.
2440 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2441 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2442 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2444 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2445 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2446 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2447 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2449 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2450 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2451 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2452 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2453 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2456 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2457 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2458 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2460 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2461 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2462 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2463 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2464 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2466 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2467 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2469 let mut total_value = 0;
2470 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2471 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2472 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2473 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2474 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2475 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2476 continue 'path_check;
2478 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2479 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2480 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2481 continue 'path_check;
2484 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2485 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2487 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2488 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2490 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2491 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2492 total_value = amt_msat;
2495 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2496 let mut results = Vec::new();
2497 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2498 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2500 let mut has_ok = false;
2501 let mut has_err = false;
2502 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2503 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2504 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2505 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2506 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2507 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2508 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2512 } else if res.is_err() {
2513 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2514 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2517 if has_err && has_ok {
2518 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2521 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2522 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2523 Some(RouteParameters {
2524 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2525 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2526 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2532 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2533 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2534 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2535 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2541 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2543 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2544 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2545 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2546 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2547 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2549 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2550 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2551 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2552 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2553 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2554 if path.len() == 0 {
2555 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2556 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2561 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2562 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2563 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2565 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2566 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2568 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2569 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2570 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2571 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2574 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2576 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2577 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2578 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2581 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2582 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2583 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2586 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2587 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2588 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2593 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2594 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2598 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2601 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2603 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2604 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2605 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2606 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2608 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2609 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2610 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2612 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2613 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2614 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2615 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2618 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2619 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2620 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2621 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2622 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2624 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2632 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2633 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2634 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2635 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2636 /// never reach the recipient.
2638 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2640 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2641 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2643 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2645 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2646 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2647 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2649 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2651 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2652 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2653 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2658 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2659 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2660 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2661 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2663 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2665 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2667 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2668 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2669 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2670 } else { unreachable!(); })
2673 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2675 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2676 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2679 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2680 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2685 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2687 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2692 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2702 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2703 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2704 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2708 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2710 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2711 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2713 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2714 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2716 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2717 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2718 /// keys per-channel).
2720 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2721 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2722 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2724 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2725 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2726 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2728 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2729 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2730 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2733 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2734 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2736 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2740 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2741 let mut output_index = None;
2742 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2743 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2744 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2745 if output_index.is_some() {
2746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2747 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2750 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2751 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2752 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2755 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2758 if output_index.is_none() {
2759 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2760 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2763 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2768 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2769 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2770 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2772 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2775 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2776 // smaller than 500:
2777 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2779 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2780 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2781 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2782 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2783 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2784 /// our network addresses.
2786 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2787 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2789 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2790 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2791 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2792 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2794 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2796 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2797 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2800 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2801 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2804 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2805 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2806 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2808 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2809 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2810 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2811 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2812 rgb, alias, addresses,
2813 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2814 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2816 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2817 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2819 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2820 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2822 let mut announced_chans = false;
2823 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2824 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2825 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2827 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2832 announced_chans = true;
2834 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2835 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2836 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2840 if announced_chans {
2841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2842 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2843 signature: node_announce_sig,
2844 contents: announcement
2850 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2852 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2853 /// Will likely generate further events.
2854 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2855 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2857 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2858 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2859 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2860 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2863 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2865 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2866 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2867 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2868 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2870 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2871 match forward_info {
2872 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2873 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2874 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2875 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2876 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2878 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2879 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2880 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2881 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2882 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2883 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2884 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2886 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2887 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2893 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2894 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2895 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2896 let phantom_shared_secret = {
2897 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2898 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap())[..]);
2901 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2903 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2904 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2905 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2906 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2907 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2909 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2911 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2912 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2916 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2917 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2918 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2919 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2925 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2928 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2931 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2932 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2933 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2934 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2935 // problem, not ours.
2942 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2943 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2944 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2945 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2946 match forward_info {
2947 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2948 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2950 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2951 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2953 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2954 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2955 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2956 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2957 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2958 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
2959 phantom_shared_secret: None,
2961 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2963 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2966 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2968 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
2969 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2970 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
2976 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2978 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2979 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2980 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2981 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2982 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2983 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2984 // this channel currently :/.
2990 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2991 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2993 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2994 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2995 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2997 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3000 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3002 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3003 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3004 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3007 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3009 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3010 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3011 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3012 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3013 // messages when we can.
3014 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3015 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3016 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3023 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3024 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3027 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3028 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3029 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3030 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3031 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3032 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3034 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3036 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3037 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3038 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3040 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3042 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3046 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3047 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3050 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3051 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3053 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3054 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3055 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3056 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3057 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3058 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3060 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3068 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3069 match forward_info {
3070 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3071 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3072 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3073 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3074 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } =>
3075 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret),
3076 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3077 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3079 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3082 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3083 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3084 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3085 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3086 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3087 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3088 phantom_shared_secret,
3090 value: amt_to_forward,
3096 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3098 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3099 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3100 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3102 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3103 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3104 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3105 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3106 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3107 phantom_shared_secret,
3109 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3114 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3115 ($payment_data_total_msat: expr, $payment_secret: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3116 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3117 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3118 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3119 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3120 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3121 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3122 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3126 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3127 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3128 total_value += htlc.value;
3129 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3130 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
3131 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != $payment_data_total_msat {
3132 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3133 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data_total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
3134 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3136 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3138 _ => unreachable!(),
3141 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data_total_msat {
3142 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3143 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data_total_msat);
3144 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3145 } else if total_value == $payment_data_total_msat {
3146 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3147 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3149 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3150 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3151 payment_secret: $payment_secret,
3155 payment_received_generated = true;
3157 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3158 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3160 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3162 payment_received_generated
3166 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3167 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3168 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3169 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3170 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3171 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3172 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3173 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3174 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3175 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3176 OnionPayload::Invoice(ref payment_data) => {
3177 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3178 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3180 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3184 let payment_data_total_msat = payment_data.total_msat;
3185 let payment_secret = payment_data.payment_secret.clone();
3186 check_total_value!(payment_data_total_msat, payment_secret, payment_preimage);
3188 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3189 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3190 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3191 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3192 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3194 amt: amt_to_forward,
3195 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3200 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3208 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3212 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3215 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3216 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3217 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3218 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3220 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3223 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data.total_msat, payment_data.payment_secret, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3224 if payment_received_generated {
3225 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3231 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3232 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3240 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3243 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3245 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3246 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3249 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3250 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3251 events.append(&mut new_events);
3254 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3256 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3257 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3259 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3260 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3261 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3262 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3263 if background_events.is_empty() {
3267 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3269 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3270 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3271 // monitor updating completing.
3272 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3279 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3280 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3281 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3282 self.process_background_events();
3285 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3286 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3287 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3288 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3290 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3291 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3293 if !chan.is_live() {
3294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3295 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3296 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3299 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3301 let mut retain_channel = true;
3302 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3305 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3306 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3310 let ret_err = match res {
3311 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3312 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3313 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3314 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3318 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3319 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3320 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3321 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3322 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3323 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3324 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3334 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3338 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3339 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3340 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3341 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3342 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3343 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3344 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3346 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3348 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3350 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3352 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3353 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3354 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3355 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3356 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3358 handle_errors.push(err);
3368 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3370 /// This currently includes:
3371 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3372 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3373 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3376 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3377 /// estimate fetches.
3378 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3379 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3380 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3381 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3383 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3385 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3386 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3388 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3389 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3390 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3391 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3392 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3393 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3394 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3395 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3397 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3399 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3401 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3402 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3403 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3404 if needs_close { return false; }
3407 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3408 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3409 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3410 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3411 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3412 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3413 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3414 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3418 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3419 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3421 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3422 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3427 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3428 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3436 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3437 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3438 // This should be unreachable
3439 debug_assert!(false);
3442 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref final_hop_data) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3443 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3444 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3445 if final_hop_data.total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3447 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3448 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3449 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3451 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3459 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3460 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3463 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3464 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3470 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3471 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3472 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3473 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3474 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3475 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3478 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3479 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3480 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3481 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3482 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3483 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3484 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3485 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3486 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3487 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3488 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3494 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3495 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3497 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3499 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3500 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3501 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3502 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3503 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3504 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3505 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3507 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3509 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3510 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3512 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3517 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3518 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3519 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3520 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3521 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3522 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 4));
3523 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3524 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3525 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3527 (upd.serialized_length() as u16).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3528 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3529 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3531 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3532 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3533 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3534 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3535 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3539 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3540 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3541 // be surfaced to the user.
3542 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3543 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3545 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3546 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3547 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3549 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3553 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3555 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3557 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3558 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3559 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3560 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3561 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3562 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3563 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3564 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3565 Some(RouteParameters {
3566 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3567 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3568 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3571 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3572 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3573 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3575 rejected_by_dest: false,
3576 network_update: None,
3577 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3579 short_channel_id: None,
3586 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3587 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3589 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3602 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3603 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3604 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3605 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3606 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3607 /// still-available channels.
3608 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3609 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3610 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3611 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3614 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3615 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3616 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3618 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3619 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3620 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3621 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3622 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3623 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3624 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3625 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3626 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3629 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3633 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3634 all_paths_failed = true;
3635 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3636 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3638 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3644 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3647 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3648 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3649 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3650 Some(RouteParameters {
3651 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3652 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3653 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3658 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3659 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3661 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3663 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3664 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3665 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3666 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3667 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3668 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3669 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3670 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3677 error_code: onion_error_code,
3679 error_data: onion_error_data
3682 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3688 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3689 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3690 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3691 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3693 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3694 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3695 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3696 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3697 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3698 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3699 network_update: None,
3702 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3705 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3707 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3711 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3712 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3713 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3715 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3716 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3717 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3718 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3719 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3720 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3721 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3722 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3724 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3725 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3728 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3729 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3730 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3734 let mut forward_event = None;
3735 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3736 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3738 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3739 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3740 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3743 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3746 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3747 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3748 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3749 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3750 time_forwardable: time
3757 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3758 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3760 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3761 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3762 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3763 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3765 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3766 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3768 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3769 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3770 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3771 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3772 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3773 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3777 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3778 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3779 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3780 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3782 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3783 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3784 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3785 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3787 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3788 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3789 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3790 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3791 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3793 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3794 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3795 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3801 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3802 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3803 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3805 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3806 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3807 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3808 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3810 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3811 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3813 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3814 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3815 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3816 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3817 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3818 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3819 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3820 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3822 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3823 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3824 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3825 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3826 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3827 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3829 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3834 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3835 // which were generated.
3836 channel_state.take();
3838 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3839 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3840 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3847 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3848 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3849 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3850 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3851 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3853 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3858 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3859 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3860 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3861 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3862 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3863 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3864 payment_preimage, e);
3865 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3866 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3867 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3868 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3871 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3872 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3873 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3874 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3875 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3876 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3877 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3878 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3879 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3880 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3886 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3888 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3891 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3892 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3893 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3894 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3895 payment_preimage, e);
3897 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3898 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3900 chan.remove_entry();
3902 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3905 } else { unreachable!(); }
3908 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3909 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3910 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3911 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3912 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3913 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3914 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3915 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3916 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3917 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3918 pending_events.push(
3919 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3921 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3926 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3934 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3936 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3937 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3938 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3939 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3940 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3942 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3943 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3944 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3945 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3946 pending_events.push(
3947 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3948 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3954 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3958 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3959 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3960 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3962 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3963 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3964 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3965 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3966 pending_events.push(
3967 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3975 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3980 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3983 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3984 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3985 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3986 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3987 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3988 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3989 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3992 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3993 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3994 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3995 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3996 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3999 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4000 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4001 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4002 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4003 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4004 payment_preimage, e);
4006 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4007 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4008 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4009 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4012 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4013 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4014 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4015 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4019 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4020 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4021 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4024 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4026 let source_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4027 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4030 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4038 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4039 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4040 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4043 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4046 let chan_restoration_res;
4047 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4048 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4049 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4050 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4054 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4058 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4059 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4060 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4061 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4062 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4063 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4065 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4066 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4067 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4072 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4073 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4074 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4076 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4078 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4079 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4080 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4081 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4085 /// Called to accept a request to open a channel after [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`] has been
4088 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted.
4090 /// For inbound channels, the `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4091 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4092 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel` call.
4094 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4095 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4096 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4097 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4099 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4101 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4102 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4103 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4104 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4106 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4107 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4108 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4112 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4118 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4119 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4120 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4123 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4124 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4127 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4128 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4129 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4130 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4133 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4134 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4138 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4140 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4142 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4143 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4146 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4148 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4149 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4152 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4153 pending_events.push(
4154 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4155 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4156 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4157 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4158 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4159 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4164 entry.insert(channel);
4170 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4171 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4172 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4174 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4175 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4176 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4180 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4182 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4185 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4186 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4187 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4188 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4190 user_channel_id: user_id,
4195 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4196 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4197 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4198 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4202 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4205 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4210 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4211 // lock before watch_channel
4212 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4214 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4215 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4216 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4217 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4218 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4219 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4220 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4221 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4222 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4223 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4226 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4227 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4228 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4229 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4230 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4231 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4235 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4236 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4237 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4242 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4243 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4252 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4254 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4255 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4256 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4257 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4259 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4262 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4263 Ok(update) => update,
4264 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4266 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4267 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4268 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4269 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4270 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4271 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4272 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4273 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4283 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4284 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4288 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4289 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4290 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4293 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4296 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4297 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4298 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4299 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4301 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4302 msg: announcement_sigs,
4304 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4305 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4306 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4307 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4308 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4309 // announcement_signatures.
4310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4311 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4312 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4313 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4320 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4324 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4325 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4326 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4327 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4328 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4330 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4332 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4336 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4337 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4338 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4339 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4342 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4343 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4345 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4346 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4347 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4348 let (result, is_permanent) =
4349 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4351 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4357 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4358 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4359 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4369 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4370 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4373 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4377 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4378 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4381 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4382 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4383 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4384 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4386 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4387 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4389 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4394 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4395 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4396 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4397 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4398 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4399 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4400 } else { (tx, None) }
4402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4405 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4406 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4407 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4409 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4410 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4411 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4412 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4416 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4421 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4422 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4423 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4424 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4426 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4427 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4428 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4429 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4431 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4432 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4436 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4440 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4441 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4442 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4443 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4444 match pending_forward_info {
4445 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4446 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4447 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4448 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4450 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4452 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4453 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4454 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4457 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4459 _ => pending_forward_info
4462 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4469 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4470 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4471 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4472 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4473 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4474 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4475 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4476 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4478 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4480 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4483 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4487 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4488 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4490 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4492 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4493 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4495 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4497 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4502 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4503 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4504 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4505 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4507 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4510 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4511 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4512 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4514 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4521 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4522 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4523 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4524 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4526 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4527 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4529 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4530 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4531 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4532 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4533 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4534 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4535 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4540 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4541 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4543 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4544 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4545 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4547 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4549 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4550 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4551 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4552 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4553 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4554 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4556 commitment_signed: msg,
4562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4567 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4568 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4569 let mut forward_event = None;
4570 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4571 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4572 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4573 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4575 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4576 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4577 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4578 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4579 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4581 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4582 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4583 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4585 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4586 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4587 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4592 match forward_event {
4594 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4595 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4596 time_forwardable: time
4604 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4605 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4607 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4608 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4609 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4611 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4612 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4614 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4615 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4616 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4617 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4618 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4619 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4620 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4621 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4622 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4623 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4624 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4626 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4627 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4628 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4629 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4630 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4632 } else { unreachable!(); }
4635 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4636 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4637 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4641 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4642 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4643 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4644 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4645 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4650 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4652 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4653 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4655 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4656 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4658 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4659 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4666 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4667 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4669 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4671 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4674 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4681 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4685 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4686 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4687 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4688 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4690 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4691 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4694 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4695 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4696 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4697 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4698 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4699 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4707 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4708 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4709 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4710 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4711 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4712 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4714 // It's not a local channel
4715 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4718 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4720 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4721 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4722 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4723 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4724 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4725 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4727 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4729 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4730 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4731 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4732 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4739 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4742 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4743 let chan_restoration_res;
4744 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4746 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4750 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4751 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4753 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4754 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4755 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4756 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4757 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4758 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4759 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4760 let mut channel_update = None;
4761 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4762 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4763 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4766 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4767 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4768 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4769 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4770 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4771 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4772 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4777 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4778 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4779 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4780 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4781 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4782 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4784 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4789 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4790 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4792 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4793 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4798 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4799 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4800 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4801 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4802 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4803 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4804 match monitor_event {
4805 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4806 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4808 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4811 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4814 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4815 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4816 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4817 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4818 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4819 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4820 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4821 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4822 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4823 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4824 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4828 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4829 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4831 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4833 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4834 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4835 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4836 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4837 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4842 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4843 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4848 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4849 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4852 has_pending_monitor_events
4855 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4856 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4857 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4859 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4860 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4863 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4864 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4865 /// update was applied.
4867 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4868 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4869 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4870 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4871 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4872 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4873 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4874 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4877 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4878 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4879 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4880 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4882 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4883 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4884 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4885 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4886 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4888 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4889 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4890 has_monitor_update = true;
4891 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
4892 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4893 if close_channel { return false; }
4895 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4896 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4897 updates: commitment_update,
4904 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4905 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4906 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4913 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4914 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4915 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4918 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4919 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4925 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4926 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4927 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4928 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4929 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4930 let mut has_update = false;
4932 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4933 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4934 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4935 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4936 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4938 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4939 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4940 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4941 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4943 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4944 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4947 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4948 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4949 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4950 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4951 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4956 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4958 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4959 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4960 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
4966 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4967 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4974 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4975 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4981 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4982 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4984 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4985 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4986 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4987 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4988 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4989 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4990 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4991 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4992 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4993 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4994 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4995 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4996 assert!(should_broadcast);
4997 } else { unreachable!(); }
4998 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5000 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5004 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5005 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5007 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5011 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5013 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5014 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5015 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5017 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5018 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5019 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5020 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5021 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5022 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5023 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5024 // never fail a payment too early.
5025 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5027 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5030 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5035 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5038 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5039 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5041 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5042 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5043 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5045 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5047 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5048 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5052 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5053 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5055 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5057 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5058 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5059 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5060 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5061 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5062 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5065 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5066 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5068 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5071 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5073 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5075 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5076 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5077 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5078 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5079 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5082 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5083 /// stored external to LDK.
5085 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5086 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5087 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5089 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5090 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5093 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5094 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5095 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5096 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5098 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5099 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5100 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5101 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5102 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5104 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5105 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5106 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5107 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5108 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5110 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5111 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5113 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5114 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5118 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5119 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5121 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5123 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5124 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5125 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5126 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5129 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5130 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5132 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5135 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5137 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5139 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5140 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5143 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5144 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5146 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5147 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5148 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5151 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5152 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5154 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5155 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5156 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5157 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5159 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5160 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5161 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5162 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5168 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5170 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5171 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5173 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5174 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5175 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5179 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5180 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5181 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5182 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5183 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5188 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5189 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5193 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5194 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5198 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5199 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5201 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5202 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5205 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5206 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5207 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5208 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5210 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5211 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5212 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5213 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5216 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5217 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5219 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5223 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5224 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5225 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5227 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5228 events.replace(pending_events);
5237 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5239 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5241 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5245 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5247 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5248 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5250 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5251 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5252 /// restarting from an old state.
5253 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5254 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5255 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5257 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5258 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5259 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5260 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5263 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5264 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5265 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5268 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5269 handler.handle_event(&event);
5277 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5279 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5280 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5281 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5282 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5285 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5287 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5288 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5289 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5290 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5291 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5294 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5295 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5296 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5299 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5301 let new_height = height - 1;
5303 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5304 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5305 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5306 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5307 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5308 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5311 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5315 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5317 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5318 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5319 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5323 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5324 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5325 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5326 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5328 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5329 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5332 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5333 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5335 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5336 if height < last_best_block_height {
5337 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5338 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5342 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5343 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5344 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5345 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5347 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5348 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5352 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5354 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5356 macro_rules! max_time {
5357 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5359 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5360 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5361 // having an explicit local time source.
5362 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5363 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5364 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5365 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5366 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5372 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5373 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5374 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5375 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5376 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5379 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5381 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5382 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5383 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5384 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5385 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5386 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5387 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5395 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5396 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5397 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5398 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5399 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5400 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5406 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5408 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5409 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5410 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5411 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5412 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5413 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5418 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5420 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5421 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5422 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5423 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5426 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5427 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5429 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5430 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5431 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5432 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5433 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5435 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5436 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5438 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5439 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5440 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5441 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5442 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5443 let res = f(channel);
5444 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5445 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5446 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5447 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5451 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5452 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5453 if channel.is_usable() {
5454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5455 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5456 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5457 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5465 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5468 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5469 msg: announcement_sigs,
5471 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5472 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5473 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5475 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5476 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5477 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5482 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5483 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5484 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5485 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5486 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5487 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5488 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5492 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5493 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5495 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5496 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5497 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5498 data: reason_message,
5506 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5507 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5508 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5509 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5510 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5511 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5512 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5513 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5514 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5515 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5516 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5517 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5518 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5523 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5528 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5530 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5535 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5536 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5537 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5540 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5541 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5542 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5543 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5546 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5547 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5549 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5550 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5553 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5554 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5555 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5556 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5557 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5561 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5562 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5563 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5564 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5568 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5569 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5570 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5571 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5572 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5573 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5576 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5577 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5578 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5581 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5583 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5586 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5587 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5588 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5591 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5596 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5597 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5598 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5601 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5603 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5606 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5608 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5611 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5612 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5613 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5616 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5617 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5618 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5621 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5622 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5623 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5626 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5628 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5631 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5633 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5636 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5637 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5638 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5641 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5643 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5646 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5648 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5651 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5652 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5653 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5656 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5661 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5663 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5666 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5667 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5668 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5669 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5673 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5674 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5675 if no_connection_possible {
5676 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5677 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5678 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5679 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5680 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5681 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5686 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5693 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5694 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5695 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5696 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5697 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5698 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5699 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5702 no_channels_remain = false;
5708 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5711 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5713 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5714 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5715 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5716 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5717 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5718 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5719 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5720 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5721 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5722 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5723 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5725 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5727 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5729 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5733 if no_channels_remain {
5734 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5737 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5738 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5742 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5743 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5748 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5749 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5751 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5752 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5756 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5761 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5762 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5763 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5764 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5765 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5766 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5767 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5768 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5769 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5773 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5774 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5775 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5781 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5784 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5787 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5788 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5789 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5790 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5791 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5796 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5797 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5798 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5799 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5802 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5804 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5812 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5813 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5818 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5819 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5820 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5821 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5822 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5823 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5826 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5829 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5835 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5836 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5841 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5842 let result = *guard;
5850 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5851 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5852 let current_time = Instant::now();
5854 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5855 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5860 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5861 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5862 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5863 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5864 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5866 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5867 let result = *guard;
5868 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5872 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5873 None => return result,
5879 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5881 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5882 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5883 *persistence_lock = true;
5884 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5889 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5890 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5892 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5893 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5894 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5895 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
5898 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
5899 (2, node_id, required),
5900 (4, features, required),
5901 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
5902 (8, forwarding_info, option),
5905 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
5906 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
5907 (2, channel_id, required),
5908 (3, channel_type, option),
5909 (4, counterparty, required),
5910 (6, funding_txo, option),
5911 (8, short_channel_id, option),
5912 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
5913 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
5914 (14, user_channel_id, required),
5915 (16, balance_msat, required),
5916 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
5917 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
5918 (22, confirmations_required, option),
5919 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
5920 (26, is_outbound, required),
5921 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
5922 (30, is_usable, required),
5923 (32, is_public, required),
5926 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
5927 (2, channels, vec_type),
5928 (4, phantom_scid, required),
5929 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
5932 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5934 (0, onion_packet, required),
5935 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5938 (0, payment_data, required),
5939 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
5940 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5942 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5943 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5944 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5948 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5949 (0, routing, required),
5950 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5951 (4, payment_hash, required),
5952 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5953 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5957 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5960 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5962 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5963 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5964 reason.write(writer)?;
5966 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5967 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5970 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5971 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5972 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5973 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5980 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5981 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5982 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5985 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5986 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5987 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5988 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5992 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5993 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5994 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5995 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5996 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5999 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6000 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6001 // messages contained in the variants.
6002 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6003 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6004 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6006 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6007 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6008 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6009 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6010 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6013 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6014 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6015 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6016 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6017 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6019 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6024 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6029 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6030 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6031 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6032 (2, outpoint, required),
6033 (4, htlc_id, required),
6034 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6037 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6038 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6039 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6040 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
6043 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6044 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
6045 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6050 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
6051 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6052 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6058 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6059 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6060 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6062 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6063 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6064 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6068 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
6069 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6070 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6072 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6074 if payment_data.is_some() {
6075 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6077 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6080 if payment_data.is_none() {
6081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6083 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
6087 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6096 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6097 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6098 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6101 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6102 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6103 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6104 let mut payment_id = None;
6105 let mut payment_secret = None;
6106 let mut payment_params = None;
6107 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6108 (0, session_priv, required),
6109 (1, payment_id, option),
6110 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6111 (3, payment_secret, option),
6112 (4, path, vec_type),
6113 (5, payment_params, option),
6115 if payment_id.is_none() {
6116 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6118 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6120 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6121 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6122 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6123 path: path.unwrap(),
6124 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6129 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6130 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6135 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6136 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6138 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6140 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6141 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6142 (0, session_priv, required),
6143 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6144 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6145 (3, payment_secret, option),
6146 (4, path, vec_type),
6147 (5, payment_params, option),
6150 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6152 field.write(writer)?;
6159 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6160 (0, LightningError) => {
6164 (0, failure_code, required),
6165 (2, data, vec_type),
6169 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6171 (0, forward_info, required),
6172 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6173 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6174 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6177 (0, htlc_id, required),
6178 (2, err_packet, required),
6182 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6183 (0, payment_secret, required),
6184 (2, expiry_time, required),
6185 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6186 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6187 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6190 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6192 (0, session_privs, required),
6195 (0, session_privs, required),
6196 (1, payment_hash, option),
6199 (0, session_privs, required),
6200 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6201 (2, payment_hash, required),
6202 (4, payment_secret, option),
6203 (6, total_msat, required),
6204 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6205 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6208 (0, session_privs, required),
6209 (2, payment_hash, required),
6213 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6214 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6216 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6217 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6221 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6223 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6225 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6227 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6228 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6229 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6232 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6233 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6234 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6235 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6236 unfunded_channels += 1;
6239 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6240 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6241 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6242 channel.write(writer)?;
6246 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6247 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6248 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6249 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6250 for forward in pending_forwards {
6251 forward.write(writer)?;
6255 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6256 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6257 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6258 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6259 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6260 htlc.write(writer)?;
6264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6265 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6266 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6267 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6268 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6269 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6272 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6273 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6274 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6275 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6276 for event in events.iter() {
6277 event.write(writer)?;
6280 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6281 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6282 for event in background_events.iter() {
6284 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6286 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6287 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6292 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6293 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6295 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6296 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6297 hash.write(writer)?;
6298 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6301 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6302 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6303 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6304 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6305 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6308 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6309 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6311 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6312 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6313 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6314 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6317 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6318 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6322 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6323 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6324 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6326 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6327 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6328 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6333 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6334 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6335 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6336 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6337 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6344 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6346 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6348 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6349 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6350 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6351 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6352 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6353 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6354 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6355 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6356 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6357 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6358 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6359 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6360 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6362 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6363 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6365 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6366 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6368 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6369 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6370 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6371 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6372 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6373 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6375 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6376 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6377 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6378 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6379 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6380 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6383 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6384 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6386 pub keys_manager: K,
6388 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6390 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6391 pub fee_estimator: F,
6392 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6394 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6395 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6396 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6397 pub chain_monitor: M,
6399 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6400 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6401 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6402 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6403 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6404 /// deserialization.
6406 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6407 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6408 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6410 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6411 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6413 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6414 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6415 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6416 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6418 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6421 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6422 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6425 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6426 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6427 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6428 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6429 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6430 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6433 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6434 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6435 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6436 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6437 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6439 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6440 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6445 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6446 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6447 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6448 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6449 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6450 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6451 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6455 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6456 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6457 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6461 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6462 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6463 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6464 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6465 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6466 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6469 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6470 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6472 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6478 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6480 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6481 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6482 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6483 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6484 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6485 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6486 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6487 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6488 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6489 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6490 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6491 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6492 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6493 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6494 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6495 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6496 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6497 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6498 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6499 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6500 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6501 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6502 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6503 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6504 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6505 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6506 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6507 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6508 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6509 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6510 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6511 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6512 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6513 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6514 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6515 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6516 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6519 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6520 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6521 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6523 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6526 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6527 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6528 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6529 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6530 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6531 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6535 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6536 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6537 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6538 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6542 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6543 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6544 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6545 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6546 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6549 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6550 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6552 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6555 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6557 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6558 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6559 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6560 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6561 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6562 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6564 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6567 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6569 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6570 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6571 let peer_state = PeerState {
6572 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6574 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6577 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6578 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6579 for _ in 0..event_count {
6580 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6581 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6585 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6586 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6587 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6588 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6589 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6590 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6591 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6592 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6596 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6597 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6598 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6599 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6600 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6601 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6605 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6610 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6611 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6612 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6616 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6617 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6618 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6619 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6620 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6622 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6624 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6625 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6629 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6630 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6631 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6632 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6633 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6634 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6635 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6636 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6637 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6638 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6640 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6641 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6644 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6645 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6646 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6647 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6648 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6649 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6651 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6653 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6654 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6655 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6656 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6657 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6658 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6659 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6661 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6662 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6663 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6664 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6665 if path.is_empty() {
6666 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6667 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6669 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6670 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6671 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6672 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6674 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6675 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6676 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6679 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6680 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6681 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6682 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6684 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6685 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6686 total_msat: path_amt,
6687 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6689 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6690 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6699 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6700 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6702 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6703 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6706 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6708 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6710 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6711 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6712 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6713 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6714 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6718 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6719 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6720 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6721 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6723 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6724 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6725 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6727 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6728 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6729 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6730 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6731 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6734 if chan.is_usable() {
6735 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6736 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6737 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6738 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6739 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6744 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6745 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6746 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6748 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6749 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6750 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6752 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6754 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6759 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6761 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6762 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6763 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6765 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6766 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6772 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6773 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6775 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6777 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6778 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6779 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6780 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6782 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6783 logger: args.logger,
6784 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6787 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6788 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6791 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6792 //connection or two.
6794 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6800 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6801 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6802 use core::time::Duration;
6803 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6804 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6805 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6806 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6807 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6808 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6810 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6811 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6812 use util::errors::APIError;
6813 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6814 use util::test_utils;
6815 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6817 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6819 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6820 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6822 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6825 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6826 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6828 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6829 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6830 thread::spawn(move || {
6832 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6833 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6834 *persistence_lock = true;
6837 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6843 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6844 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6846 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6849 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6854 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6856 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6859 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6866 fn test_notify_limits() {
6867 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6868 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6872 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6874 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6875 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6876 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6877 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6878 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6880 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6882 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6883 // to connect messages with new values
6884 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6885 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6886 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6887 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6889 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6890 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6891 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6892 // ... but the last node should not.
6893 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6894 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6895 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6896 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6898 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6899 // about the channel.
6900 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6901 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6902 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6904 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6906 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6907 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6908 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6909 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6910 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6911 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6913 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6914 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6917 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6918 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6919 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6920 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6921 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6922 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6924 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6925 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6926 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6928 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6929 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6930 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6931 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6933 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6934 // the channel info has updated.
6935 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6937 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6938 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6939 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6940 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6944 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6945 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6947 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6951 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6953 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6954 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6955 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6956 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6957 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6958 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6959 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6961 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6962 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6963 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6965 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6966 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6968 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6970 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6971 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6972 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6974 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6976 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6977 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6978 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6979 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6980 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6981 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6982 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6983 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6984 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6985 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6986 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6988 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6989 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6991 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6993 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6995 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6996 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6997 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6998 // lightning messages manually.
6999 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7001 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7002 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7003 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7005 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7006 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7008 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7009 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7011 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7012 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7013 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7015 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7016 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7017 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7019 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7021 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7023 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7024 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7027 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7028 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7029 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7030 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7032 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7033 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7034 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7035 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7040 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7041 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7042 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7043 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7048 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7049 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7050 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7051 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7058 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7059 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7060 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7061 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7062 // fails as expected.
7063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7066 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7068 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7069 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7071 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7072 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7073 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7075 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7076 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7077 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7078 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7079 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7081 let route = find_route(
7082 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7083 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7085 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7087 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7089 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7090 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7091 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7093 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7095 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7097 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7098 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7099 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7100 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7101 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7102 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7103 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7105 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7107 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7108 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7110 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7111 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7112 let route = find_route(
7113 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7114 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7116 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7119 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7120 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7121 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7122 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7124 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7125 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7126 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7128 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7129 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7130 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7131 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7132 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7134 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7138 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7139 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7140 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7141 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7142 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7143 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7144 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7146 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7148 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7153 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7154 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7155 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7159 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7161 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7162 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7163 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7164 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7166 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7167 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7168 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7169 final_value_msat: 10000,
7170 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7172 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7173 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7174 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7175 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7176 let route = find_route(
7177 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7178 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7181 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7182 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7183 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7186 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7187 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7188 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7189 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7190 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7191 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7192 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7194 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7198 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7199 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7203 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7205 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7206 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7207 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7208 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7210 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7211 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7212 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7213 final_value_msat: 10000,
7214 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7216 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7217 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7218 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7219 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7220 let route = find_route(
7221 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7222 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7225 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7226 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7227 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7228 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7231 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7232 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7233 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7234 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7235 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7236 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7237 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7239 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7243 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7247 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7249 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7250 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7251 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7252 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7254 // Marshall an MPP route.
7255 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7256 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7257 route.paths.push(path);
7258 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7259 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7260 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7261 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7262 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7263 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7265 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7266 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7267 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7268 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7273 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7274 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7278 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7280 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7281 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7283 total_msat: 100_000,
7286 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7287 // payment verification fails as expected.
7288 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7289 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7290 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, payment_data.clone(), nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7291 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7293 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7297 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7298 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7302 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7305 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7306 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7307 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7308 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7309 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7310 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7311 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7312 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7313 use util::test_utils;
7314 use util::config::UserConfig;
7315 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7317 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7318 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7319 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7321 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7325 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7326 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7327 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7328 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7329 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7330 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7331 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7336 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7337 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7340 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7341 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7342 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7344 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7345 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7347 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7348 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7350 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7351 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7353 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7354 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7355 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7356 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7357 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7359 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7361 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7363 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7364 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7365 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7366 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7367 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7369 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7371 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7373 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7374 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7375 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7376 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7377 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7380 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7381 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7382 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7384 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7385 } else { panic!(); }
7387 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7388 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7390 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7393 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7396 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7397 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7399 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7400 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7401 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7402 match msg_events[0] {
7403 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7404 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7405 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7409 match msg_events[1] {
7410 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7414 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7416 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7417 macro_rules! send_payment {
7418 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7419 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7420 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7421 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7422 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7423 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7424 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7425 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7426 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7427 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7429 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7430 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7432 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7433 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7435 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7436 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7437 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7438 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7439 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7440 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7441 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7442 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7444 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7445 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7446 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7448 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7449 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7450 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7451 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7452 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7454 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7457 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7458 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7459 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7460 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7462 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7467 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7468 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);