1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
54 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
55 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
56 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
57 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
58 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
60 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
61 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
62 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
63 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use crate::prelude::*;
68 use core::cell::RefCell;
70 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
71 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
72 use core::time::Duration;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
97 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
106 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
107 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
113 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
114 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
115 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
116 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
117 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
135 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
138 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
139 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
142 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
143 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
146 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
149 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
150 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
153 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
157 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
158 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
159 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 short_channel_id: u64,
163 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
164 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
166 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
167 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
172 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
174 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
175 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
176 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
179 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
182 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
183 struct ClaimableHTLC {
184 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
186 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
188 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
190 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
194 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
195 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
196 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
197 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
199 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
200 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
205 impl Readable for PaymentId {
206 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
207 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
212 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
213 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
214 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
215 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
217 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
218 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
223 impl Readable for InterceptId {
224 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
225 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
230 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
231 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
232 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
233 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
236 session_priv: SecretKey,
237 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
238 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
239 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
240 payment_id: PaymentId,
241 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
242 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
245 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
246 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
247 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
249 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
251 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
253 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
256 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
257 payment_id.hash(hasher);
258 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
259 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
260 payment_params.hash(hasher);
265 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
268 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
269 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
271 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
272 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
273 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
274 payment_secret: None,
275 payment_params: None,
280 struct ReceiveError {
286 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
287 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
289 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
294 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
296 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
297 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
298 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
299 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
300 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
302 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
303 err: msgs::LightningError,
304 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
305 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
307 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
309 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
311 err: LightningError {
313 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
314 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
327 err: LightningError {
329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
332 shutdown_finish: None,
336 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
337 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
340 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
342 err: LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
351 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
352 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
356 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
359 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
362 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
366 log_level: Level::Warn,
369 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
371 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
373 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
375 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
376 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 shutdown_finish: None,
389 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
390 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
391 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
392 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
393 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
395 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
396 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
397 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
398 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
399 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
400 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
401 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
403 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
407 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
408 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
409 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
410 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
411 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
412 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
415 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
416 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
417 /// quite some time lag.
418 enum BackgroundEvent {
419 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
420 /// commitment transaction.
421 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
424 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
425 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
427 latest_features: InitFeatures,
430 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
431 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
433 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
436 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
437 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
438 struct PendingInboundPayment {
439 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
440 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
441 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
442 /// this payment being removed.
444 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
445 user_payment_id: u64,
446 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
447 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
448 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
451 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
452 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
453 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
455 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
458 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
459 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
460 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
461 pending_amt_msat: u64,
462 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
463 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
464 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
466 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
467 starting_block_height: u32,
469 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
470 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
471 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
473 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
474 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
475 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
477 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
478 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
479 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
480 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
481 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
483 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
485 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
486 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
490 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
491 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
493 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
497 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
503 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
510 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
519 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
520 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
521 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
522 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
523 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
524 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
525 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
528 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
529 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
532 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
533 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
534 let our_payment_hash;
535 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
541 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
549 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
550 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
551 let remove_res = match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
554 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
556 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
560 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
561 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
562 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
563 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
564 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
565 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
572 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
573 let insert_res = match self {
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
576 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
578 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
579 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
582 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
583 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
584 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
585 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
586 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
593 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
598 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
605 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
606 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
607 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
608 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
609 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
610 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
611 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
613 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
614 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
616 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
617 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
618 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
619 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
620 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
621 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
622 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
623 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
625 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
626 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
628 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
629 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
631 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
632 /// to individual Channels.
634 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
635 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
636 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
637 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
639 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
640 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
641 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
642 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
643 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
644 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
645 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
647 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
648 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
649 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
650 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
653 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
654 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
655 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
656 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
657 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
659 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
660 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
661 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
662 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
663 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
666 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
667 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
668 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
669 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
670 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
674 // `total_consistency_lock`
676 // |__`forward_htlcs`
678 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
680 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
682 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
684 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
686 // | |__`channel_state`
690 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
692 // | |__`per_peer_state`
694 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
698 // | |__`pending_events`
700 // | |__`pending_background_events`
702 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
703 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
704 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
705 K::Target: KeysInterface,
706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
709 default_configuration: UserConfig,
710 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
711 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
715 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
717 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
719 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
724 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
725 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
726 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
728 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
729 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
730 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
731 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
736 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
737 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
738 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
739 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
740 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
741 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
742 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
743 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
745 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
750 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
752 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
753 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
754 /// and via the classic SCID.
756 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
757 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
763 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
764 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
765 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
770 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
771 /// failed/claimed by the user.
773 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
774 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
776 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
777 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
779 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
780 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
781 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
782 /// active channel list on load.
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
787 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
789 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
790 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
791 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
793 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
794 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
795 /// the handling of the events.
798 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
799 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
800 /// would break backwards compatability.
801 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
802 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
803 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
808 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
810 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
811 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
812 /// confirmation depth.
814 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
815 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
816 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
822 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
824 our_network_key: SecretKey,
825 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
827 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
829 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
830 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
831 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
833 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
834 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
836 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
837 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
838 /// keeping additional state.
839 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
841 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
842 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
843 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
844 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
846 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
847 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
848 /// are currently open with that peer.
849 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
850 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
856 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
857 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
858 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
859 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
860 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
861 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
862 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
863 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
864 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
865 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
866 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
868 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
875 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
877 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
878 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
879 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
880 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
881 pub struct ChainParameters {
882 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
883 pub network: Network,
885 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
887 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
888 pub best_block: BestBlock,
891 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
897 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
898 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
899 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
900 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
901 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
902 /// updates are ready for persistence).
904 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
905 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
906 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
907 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
908 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
910 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
911 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
914 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
915 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
916 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
919 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
920 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
922 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
923 persistence_notifier: notifier,
924 should_persist: persist_check,
925 _read_guard: read_guard,
930 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
932 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
933 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
938 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
939 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
941 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
944 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
945 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
946 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
947 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
949 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
950 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
952 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
954 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
955 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
956 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
957 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
958 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
959 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
960 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
961 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
962 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
963 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
964 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
965 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
966 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
968 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
969 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
971 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
972 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
973 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
974 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
976 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
977 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
978 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
979 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
980 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
981 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
984 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
986 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
987 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
990 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
992 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
993 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
995 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
996 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
997 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
998 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1000 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1001 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1002 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1003 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1004 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1005 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1006 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1007 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1008 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1009 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1010 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1013 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1014 /// to better separate parameters.
1015 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1016 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1017 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1018 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1019 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1020 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1021 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1022 pub features: InitFeatures,
1023 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1024 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1025 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1027 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1029 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1030 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1031 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1032 /// payments to us through this channel.
1033 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1034 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1035 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1036 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1037 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1038 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1039 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1042 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1043 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1044 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1045 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1046 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1047 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1048 /// lifetime of the channel.
1049 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1050 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1051 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1052 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1053 /// our counterparty already.
1055 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1056 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1057 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1058 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1060 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1061 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1062 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1063 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1065 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1066 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1068 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1069 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1071 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1072 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1073 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1074 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1075 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1076 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1077 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1078 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1079 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1082 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1084 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1085 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1086 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1087 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1088 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1089 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1090 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1092 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1093 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1095 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1096 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1097 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1098 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1099 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1100 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1101 /// this value on chain.
1103 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1105 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1107 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1108 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1109 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1110 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1112 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1113 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1114 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1115 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1117 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1118 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1119 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1120 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1122 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1123 pub balance_msat: u64,
1124 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1125 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1126 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1127 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1129 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1131 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1132 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1133 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1134 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1135 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1136 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1137 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1138 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1140 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1141 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1142 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1143 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1144 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1145 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1146 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1148 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1149 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1150 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1151 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1152 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1153 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1154 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1155 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1156 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1158 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1160 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1161 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1162 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1163 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1164 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1166 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1167 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1168 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1169 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1170 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1171 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1172 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1174 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1175 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1176 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1177 pub is_outbound: bool,
1178 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1179 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1180 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1181 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1182 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1184 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1185 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1186 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1187 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1189 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1190 pub is_usable: bool,
1191 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1192 pub is_public: bool,
1193 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1194 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1195 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1196 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1197 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1198 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1200 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1201 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1204 impl ChannelDetails {
1205 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1206 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1207 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1209 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1210 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1211 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1212 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1215 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1216 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1217 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1219 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1220 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1221 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1222 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1226 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1227 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1228 /// states for more.
1229 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1230 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1231 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1232 /// send the payment at all.
1234 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1236 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1237 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1238 /// for this payment.
1239 ParameterError(APIError),
1240 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1241 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1243 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1245 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1248 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1249 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1250 /// for this payment.
1251 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1252 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1253 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1254 /// paths than the ones selected).
1256 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1257 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1258 /// for this payment.
1259 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1260 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1261 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1262 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1264 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1266 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1267 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1268 /// in over-/re-payment.
1270 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1271 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1272 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1274 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1275 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1276 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1277 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1279 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1280 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1281 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1282 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1283 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1284 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1285 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1286 payment_id: PaymentId,
1290 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1292 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1294 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1295 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1296 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1297 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1299 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1300 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1301 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1304 macro_rules! handle_error {
1305 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1308 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1309 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1311 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1312 // entering the macro.
1313 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1314 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1317 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1319 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1320 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1321 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1322 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1326 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1327 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1328 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1329 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1334 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1335 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1337 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1338 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1339 action: err.action.clone()
1343 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1344 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1347 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1354 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1355 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1356 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1357 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1358 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1359 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1361 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1362 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1363 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1364 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1365 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1367 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1368 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1370 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1374 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1375 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1376 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1378 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1379 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1382 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1384 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1385 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1386 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1387 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1388 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1389 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1395 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1396 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1400 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1402 $entry.remove_entry();
1410 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1411 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1415 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1417 $entry.remove_entry();
1425 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1426 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1428 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1429 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1435 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1436 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1438 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1439 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1440 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1441 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1442 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1443 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1444 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1445 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1446 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1447 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1448 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1449 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1450 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1451 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1454 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1455 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1456 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1457 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1458 match $action_type {
1459 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1460 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1462 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1463 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1465 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1466 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1467 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1468 if !$resend_commitment {
1469 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1472 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1474 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1475 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1477 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1482 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1483 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1485 $entry.remove_entry();
1489 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1490 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1491 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1493 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1494 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1496 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1497 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1499 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1500 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1502 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1503 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1507 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1508 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1509 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1510 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1511 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1513 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1514 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1515 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1516 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1517 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1518 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1519 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1520 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1521 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1522 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1527 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1528 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1529 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1531 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1532 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1533 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1534 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1535 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1536 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1539 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1544 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1545 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1546 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1547 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1548 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1551 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1553 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1554 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1556 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1558 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1559 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1560 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1561 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1562 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1563 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1564 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1565 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1567 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1568 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1569 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1573 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1575 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1576 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1577 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1579 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1580 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1581 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1582 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1583 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1584 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1585 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1586 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1588 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1589 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1592 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1593 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1595 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1597 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1599 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1601 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1602 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1603 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1604 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1612 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1613 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1614 &self.default_configuration
1617 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1618 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1619 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1622 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1623 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1625 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1627 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1631 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1636 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1638 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1639 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1640 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1641 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1642 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1644 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1645 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1647 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1648 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1649 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1651 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1652 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1653 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1654 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1655 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1656 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1658 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1660 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1661 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1662 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1663 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1668 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1669 Some(peer_state) => {
1670 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1671 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1672 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1673 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1674 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1675 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1676 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1680 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1685 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1688 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1691 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1692 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1694 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1695 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1699 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1701 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1706 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1707 node_id: their_network_key,
1710 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1713 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1714 let mut res = Vec::new();
1716 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1717 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1718 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1719 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1720 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1721 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1722 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1723 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1724 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1725 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1726 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1727 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1728 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1729 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1730 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1731 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1732 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1733 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1734 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1735 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1736 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1737 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1739 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1740 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1741 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1742 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1743 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1744 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1745 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1746 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1747 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1748 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1749 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1750 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1751 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1752 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1753 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1754 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1755 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1756 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1757 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1758 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1759 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1760 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1761 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1762 config: Some(channel.config()),
1766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1767 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1768 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1769 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1775 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1776 /// more information.
1777 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1778 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1781 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1782 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1784 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1785 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1788 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1789 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1790 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1791 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1792 // really wanted anyway.
1793 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1796 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1797 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1798 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1799 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1800 Some(transaction) => {
1801 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1805 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1806 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1807 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1808 reason: closure_reason
1812 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1815 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1816 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1821 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1824 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1825 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1826 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1827 Some(peer_state) => {
1828 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1829 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1830 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1832 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1835 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1837 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1838 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1839 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1840 let (result, is_permanent) =
1841 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1843 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1848 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1849 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1853 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1854 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1855 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1856 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1860 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1868 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1869 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1870 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1871 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1874 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1878 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1879 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1880 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1882 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1883 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1885 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1886 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1887 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1888 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1890 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1892 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1893 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1894 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1895 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1896 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1899 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1900 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1901 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1903 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1904 /// the channel being closed or not:
1905 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1906 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1908 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1909 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1910 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1911 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1913 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1915 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1916 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1917 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1918 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1919 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1923 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1924 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1925 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1926 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1927 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1928 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1932 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1933 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1934 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1935 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1936 // ignore the result here.
1937 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1941 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1942 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1943 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1944 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1946 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1947 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1948 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1949 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1950 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1952 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1953 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1955 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1957 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1959 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1962 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1963 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1964 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1965 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1966 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1971 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1974 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1975 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1976 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1977 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1978 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1979 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1980 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1982 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1992 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1993 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1994 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1996 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1997 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1998 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2001 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2002 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2003 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2005 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2006 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2007 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2008 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2009 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2012 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2013 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2014 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2015 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2016 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2020 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2021 /// local transaction(s).
2022 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2023 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2024 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2028 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2029 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2031 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2032 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2033 return Err(ReceiveError {
2034 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2036 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2039 // final_expiry_too_soon
2040 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2041 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2042 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2043 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2044 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2045 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2046 return Err(ReceiveError {
2048 err_data: Vec::new(),
2049 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2052 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2053 return Err(ReceiveError {
2055 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2056 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2060 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2061 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2062 return Err(ReceiveError {
2063 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2064 err_data: Vec::new(),
2065 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2068 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2069 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2070 return Err(ReceiveError {
2071 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2072 err_data: Vec::new(),
2073 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2075 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2076 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2078 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2079 phantom_shared_secret,
2081 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2082 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2083 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2084 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2085 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2086 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2087 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2088 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2091 err_data: Vec::new(),
2092 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2096 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2098 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2101 return Err(ReceiveError {
2102 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2103 err_data: Vec::new(),
2104 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2109 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2112 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2113 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2114 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2115 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2119 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2120 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2121 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2123 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2124 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2125 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2126 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2127 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2128 failure_code: $err_code,
2134 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2135 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2138 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2140 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2141 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2142 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2143 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2144 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2145 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2146 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2147 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2149 macro_rules! return_err {
2150 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2152 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2153 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2154 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2155 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2156 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2162 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2164 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2165 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2167 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2168 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2172 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2173 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2175 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2177 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2178 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2179 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2180 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2181 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2183 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2186 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2187 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2188 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2190 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2191 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2192 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2195 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2196 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2197 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2198 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2202 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2203 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2204 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2207 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2208 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2209 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2210 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2211 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2216 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2217 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2218 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2219 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2220 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2221 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2222 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2223 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2224 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2225 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2226 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2227 // phantom or an intercept.
2228 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2229 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2230 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2234 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2237 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2239 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2240 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2242 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2243 // no consistency guarantees.
2244 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2248 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2249 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2250 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2251 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2252 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2254 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2255 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2256 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2257 // we don't have the channel here.
2258 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2260 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2262 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2263 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2264 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2265 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2266 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2267 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2268 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2270 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2271 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2273 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2274 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2278 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2280 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2287 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2288 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2289 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2290 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2291 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2292 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2294 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2295 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2297 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2298 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2299 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2300 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2301 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2302 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2303 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2304 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2305 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2306 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2312 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2313 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2314 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2315 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2317 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2318 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2320 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2321 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2322 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2324 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2325 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2326 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2328 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2333 pending_forward_info
2336 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2337 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2338 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2340 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2341 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2342 if !chan.should_announce() {
2343 return Err(LightningError {
2344 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2345 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2348 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2349 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2352 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2355 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2356 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2357 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2358 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2359 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2360 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2362 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2363 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2367 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2369 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2370 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2371 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2373 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2374 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2376 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2377 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2378 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2379 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2380 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2381 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2382 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2383 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2386 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2387 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2389 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2395 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2396 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2398 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2399 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2401 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2402 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2403 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2404 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2405 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2407 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2411 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2412 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2413 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2414 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2417 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2419 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2421 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2422 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2424 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2425 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2427 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2428 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2430 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2431 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2433 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2434 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2435 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2438 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2439 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2440 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2442 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2443 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2445 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2446 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2447 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2448 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2449 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2450 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2451 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2452 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2453 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2454 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2456 _ => unreachable!(),
2459 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2461 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2462 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2463 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2464 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2465 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2475 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2476 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2477 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2478 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2483 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2484 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2486 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2491 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2493 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2494 /// fields for more info.
2496 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2497 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2498 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2499 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2502 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2503 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2504 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2505 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2506 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2508 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2509 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2511 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2512 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2513 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2515 /// In general, a path may raise:
2516 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2517 /// node public key) is specified.
2518 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2519 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2521 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2522 /// relevant updates.
2524 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2525 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2526 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2528 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2529 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2530 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2531 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2534 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2535 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2536 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2538 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2539 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2540 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2541 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2542 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2546 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2547 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2550 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2551 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2552 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2553 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2556 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2557 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2558 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2559 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2560 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2561 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2562 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2563 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2566 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2567 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2570 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2571 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2574 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2579 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2580 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2581 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2583 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2584 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2586 let mut total_value = 0;
2587 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2588 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2589 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2590 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2591 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2592 continue 'path_check;
2594 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2595 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2596 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2597 continue 'path_check;
2600 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2601 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2603 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2604 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2606 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2607 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2608 total_value = amt_msat;
2611 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2612 let mut results = Vec::new();
2613 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2614 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2615 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2618 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2619 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2620 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2621 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2624 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2625 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2626 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2627 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2629 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2630 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2634 results.push(path_res);
2636 let mut has_ok = false;
2637 let mut has_err = false;
2638 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2639 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2640 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2641 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2642 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2643 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2644 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2648 } else if res.is_err() {
2649 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2650 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2653 if has_err && has_ok {
2654 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2657 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2658 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2659 Some(RouteParameters {
2660 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2661 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2662 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2668 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2669 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2670 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2671 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2672 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2678 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2680 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2681 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2682 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2683 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2684 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2686 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2687 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2688 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2689 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2690 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2691 if path.len() == 0 {
2692 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2693 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2698 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2699 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2700 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2703 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2704 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2705 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2707 let res = match payment {
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2709 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2711 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2712 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2713 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2714 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2717 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2719 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2720 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2721 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2724 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2725 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2726 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2729 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2730 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2731 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2735 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2736 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2741 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2742 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2746 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2749 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2751 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2752 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2753 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2754 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2756 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2757 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2758 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2760 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2761 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2762 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2763 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2766 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2768 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2769 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2770 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2772 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2780 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2781 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2782 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2783 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2784 /// never reach the recipient.
2786 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2787 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2789 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2790 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2792 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2794 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2795 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2796 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2798 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2800 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2801 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2803 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2804 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2809 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2810 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2811 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2812 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2813 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2815 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2818 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2819 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2823 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2824 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2826 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2827 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2832 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2834 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2835 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2836 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2839 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2840 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2841 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2842 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2843 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2844 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2847 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2848 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2849 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2850 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2851 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2853 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2855 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2857 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2858 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2859 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2860 } else { unreachable!(); })
2863 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2865 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2866 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2869 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2870 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2875 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2876 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2877 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2882 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2884 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2885 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2886 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2887 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2896 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2897 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2898 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2902 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2904 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2905 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2907 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2908 /// across the p2p network.
2910 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2911 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2913 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2914 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2915 /// keys per-channel).
2917 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2918 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2919 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2921 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2922 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2923 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2925 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2926 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2927 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2928 /// for more details.
2930 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2931 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2932 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2935 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2936 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2938 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2943 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2944 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2945 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2946 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2947 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2949 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2953 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2954 let mut output_index = None;
2955 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2956 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2957 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2958 if output_index.is_some() {
2959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2960 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2963 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2964 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2965 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2968 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2971 if output_index.is_none() {
2972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2973 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2976 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2980 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2982 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2983 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2984 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2985 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2987 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2988 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2990 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2991 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2993 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2995 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2996 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2997 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2998 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2999 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3000 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3001 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3002 pub fn update_channel_config(
3003 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3004 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3005 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3007 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3012 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3015 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3017 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3018 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3019 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3020 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3022 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3023 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3024 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3025 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3029 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3030 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3031 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3034 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3036 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3037 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3038 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3047 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3048 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3050 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3051 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3053 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3054 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3055 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3056 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3057 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3059 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3060 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3062 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3065 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3066 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3067 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3068 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3069 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3072 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3074 if !chan.is_usable() {
3075 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3076 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3079 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3081 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3082 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not found", next_hop_channel_id)
3086 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3087 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3088 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {:?} not found", intercept_id.0)
3091 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3092 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3093 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3095 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3097 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3098 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3101 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3102 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3103 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3104 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3105 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3107 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3111 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3112 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3114 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3117 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3118 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3121 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3122 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3123 err: format!("Payment with InterceptId {:?} not found", intercept_id)
3126 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3127 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3128 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3129 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3130 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3131 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3132 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3135 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3136 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3137 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3138 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3143 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3145 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3146 /// Will likely generate further events.
3147 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3150 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3151 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3152 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3153 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3155 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3156 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3158 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3159 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3160 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3162 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3163 match forward_info {
3164 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3165 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3166 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3167 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3168 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3171 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3172 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3173 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3175 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3176 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3177 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3178 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3179 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3180 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3183 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3184 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3186 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3189 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3190 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3196 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3197 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3199 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3203 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3204 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3206 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3210 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3211 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3212 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3213 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3214 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3216 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3217 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3218 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3219 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3220 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3222 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3224 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3225 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3229 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3230 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3231 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3232 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3238 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3241 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3244 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3245 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3246 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3247 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3248 // problem, not ours.
3254 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3255 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3257 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3265 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3268 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3269 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3270 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3271 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3272 match forward_info {
3273 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3274 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3275 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3276 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3277 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3281 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3282 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3283 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3284 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3285 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3286 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3287 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3289 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3291 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3294 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3296 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3297 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3298 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3299 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3305 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3307 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3308 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3309 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3310 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3311 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3312 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3313 // this channel currently :/.
3319 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3320 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3322 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3324 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3326 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3329 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3331 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3332 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3333 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3336 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3338 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3339 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3340 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3341 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3342 // messages when we can.
3343 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3344 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3345 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3352 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3353 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3356 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3357 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3358 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3359 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3360 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3361 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3365 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3366 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3367 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3370 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3374 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3375 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3377 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3381 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3382 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3383 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3384 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3385 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3386 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3387 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3388 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3389 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3391 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3398 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3399 match forward_info {
3400 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3401 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3402 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3403 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3406 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3407 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3408 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3409 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3411 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3412 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3414 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3417 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3418 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3419 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3420 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3421 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3422 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3423 phantom_shared_secret,
3425 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3427 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3432 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3433 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3434 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3435 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3436 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3438 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3439 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3440 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3441 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3442 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3443 phantom_shared_secret,
3445 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3446 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3450 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3451 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3452 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3453 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3454 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3457 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3458 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3459 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3461 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3462 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3463 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3466 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3467 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3468 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3469 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3470 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3471 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3472 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3476 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3477 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3478 total_value += htlc.value;
3479 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3480 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3481 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3483 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3484 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3486 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3488 _ => unreachable!(),
3491 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3493 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3494 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3495 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3496 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3497 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3498 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3499 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3502 amount_msat: total_value,
3503 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3504 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3506 payment_received_generated = true;
3508 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3509 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3511 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3513 payment_received_generated
3517 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3518 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3519 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3520 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3521 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3522 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3523 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3524 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3526 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3527 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3528 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3529 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3530 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3532 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3536 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3538 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3539 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3541 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3542 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3543 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3544 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3545 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3547 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3549 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3550 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3555 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3561 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3562 if payment_data.is_none() {
3563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3564 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3567 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3568 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3570 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3571 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3573 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3574 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3576 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3577 if payment_received_generated {
3578 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3584 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3585 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3593 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3596 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3598 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3599 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3602 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3603 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3604 events.append(&mut new_events);
3607 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3609 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3610 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3612 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3613 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3614 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3615 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3616 if background_events.is_empty() {
3620 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3622 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3623 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3624 // monitor updating completing.
3625 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3632 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3633 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3634 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3635 self.process_background_events();
3638 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3639 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3640 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3641 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3642 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3643 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3644 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3646 if !chan.is_live() {
3647 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3648 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3649 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3652 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3654 let mut retain_channel = true;
3655 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3658 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3659 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3663 let ret_err = match res {
3664 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3665 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3666 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3668 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3669 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3670 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3671 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3672 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3673 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3674 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3681 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3682 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3690 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3694 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3695 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3696 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3697 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3698 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3699 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3700 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3702 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3704 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3706 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3707 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3708 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3709 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3710 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3711 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3713 handle_errors.push(err);
3723 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3724 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3725 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3726 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3727 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3728 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3729 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3731 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3732 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3733 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3734 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3735 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3736 if no_remaining_entries {
3737 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3739 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3740 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3741 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3742 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3743 no_remaining_entries = false;
3751 if no_remaining_entries {
3752 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3753 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3755 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3762 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3764 /// This currently includes:
3765 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3766 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3767 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3769 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3770 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3772 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3773 /// estimate fetches.
3774 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3775 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3776 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3777 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3779 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3781 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3782 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3785 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3786 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3787 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3788 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3789 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3790 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3792 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3794 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3796 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3797 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3798 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3799 if needs_close { return false; }
3802 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3803 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3804 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3805 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3806 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3807 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3808 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3809 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3813 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3814 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3816 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3817 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3818 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3822 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3823 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3828 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3834 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3835 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3836 // This should be unreachable
3837 debug_assert!(false);
3840 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3841 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3842 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3843 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3845 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3846 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3847 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3849 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3856 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3857 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3858 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3859 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3860 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3863 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3864 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3867 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3873 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3874 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3875 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3877 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3878 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3879 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3880 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3882 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3883 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3884 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3885 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3886 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3889 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3890 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3891 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3892 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3893 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3894 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3895 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3896 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3897 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3898 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3903 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3904 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3906 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3908 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3909 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3910 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3911 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3912 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3913 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3914 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3916 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3918 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3919 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3921 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3926 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3927 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3928 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3929 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3930 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3931 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3932 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3933 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3934 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3935 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3937 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3938 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3939 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3940 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3942 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3943 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3944 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3945 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3946 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3950 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3951 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3952 // be surfaced to the user.
3953 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3954 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3955 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3957 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3958 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3959 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3960 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3965 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3966 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3967 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3968 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3972 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3973 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3974 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3975 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3977 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3978 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3979 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3980 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3981 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3984 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3985 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3986 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3989 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3990 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3991 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3993 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3994 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3995 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3996 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3997 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3998 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3999 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4000 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4004 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4005 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4008 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4009 all_paths_failed = true;
4010 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4011 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4012 payment_id: *payment_id,
4013 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4019 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4022 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4023 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4024 Some(RouteParameters {
4025 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4026 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4027 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4032 let path_failure = {
4034 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
4036 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_error.decode_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source);
4038 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4039 if !payment_retryable {
4040 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4041 payment_id: *payment_id,
4042 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4046 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4047 payment_id: *payment_id,
4048 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4054 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4055 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4056 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4057 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4058 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4060 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4061 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4062 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4063 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4070 error_code: onion_error_code,
4072 error_data: onion_error_data
4076 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4077 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4078 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4080 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4082 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4084 let mut forward_event = None;
4085 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4086 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4087 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4089 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4091 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4094 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4097 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4098 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4099 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4100 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4101 time_forwardable: time
4104 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4105 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4106 failed_next_destination: destination,
4112 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4113 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4115 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4116 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4117 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4119 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4120 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4121 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4122 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4124 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4125 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4126 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4127 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4128 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4129 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4130 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4131 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4133 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4135 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4136 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4137 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4139 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4140 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4141 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4142 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4144 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4145 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4146 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4147 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4148 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4150 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4151 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4152 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4153 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4154 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4155 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4156 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4157 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4158 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4159 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4160 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4167 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4172 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4173 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4174 debug_assert!(false);
4178 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4179 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4180 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4181 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4182 if sources.len() != 1 {
4183 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4184 debug_assert!(false);
4189 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4190 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4191 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4192 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4193 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4196 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4198 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4199 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4202 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4203 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4204 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4208 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4209 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4210 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4211 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4212 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4213 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4214 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4215 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4216 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4218 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4219 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4220 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4221 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4222 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4223 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4225 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4229 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4231 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4232 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4233 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4234 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4235 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4236 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4237 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4238 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4242 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4243 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4246 purpose: payment_purpose,
4247 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4251 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4252 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4253 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4254 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4259 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4260 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4262 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4263 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4264 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4265 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4266 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4267 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4268 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4271 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4272 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4273 payment_preimage, e);
4274 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4275 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4276 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4277 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4281 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4282 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4283 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4285 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4286 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4287 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4288 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4289 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4290 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4296 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4298 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4301 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4302 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4303 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4305 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4306 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4307 payment_preimage, e);
4310 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4311 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4313 chan.remove_entry();
4315 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4318 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4321 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4322 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4323 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4324 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4326 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4327 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4328 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4329 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4330 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4331 pending_events.push(
4332 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4334 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4344 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4347 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4348 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4349 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4350 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4351 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4352 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4353 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4354 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4355 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4356 pending_events.push(
4357 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4358 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4364 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4368 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4369 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4370 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4372 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4373 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4374 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4375 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4376 pending_events.push(
4377 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4389 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4390 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4391 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4392 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4393 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4394 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4395 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4398 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4399 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4400 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4401 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4402 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4405 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4406 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4407 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4408 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4409 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4410 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4411 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4412 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4413 // again on restart.
4414 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4415 payment_preimage, update_res);
4417 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4418 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4419 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4420 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4423 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4424 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4425 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4426 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4430 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4431 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4432 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4435 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4436 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4437 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4439 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4441 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4451 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4452 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4453 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4456 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4457 /// update completion.
4458 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4459 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4460 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4461 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4462 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4463 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4464 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4466 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4467 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4468 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4469 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4472 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4473 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4475 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4476 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4477 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4482 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4484 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4485 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4486 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4487 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4492 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4493 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4494 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4495 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4496 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4501 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4505 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4511 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4512 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4513 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4519 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4520 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4523 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4524 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4525 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4526 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4527 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4530 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4534 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4535 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4536 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4537 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4538 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4539 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4540 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4542 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4543 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4544 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4549 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4550 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4551 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4554 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4556 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4557 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4559 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4560 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4561 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4562 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4566 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4568 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4569 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4572 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4573 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4574 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4576 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4577 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4578 /// used to accept such channels.
4580 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4581 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4582 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4583 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4586 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4587 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4589 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4590 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4591 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4593 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4594 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4596 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4597 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4599 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4600 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4602 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4603 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4604 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4605 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4608 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4611 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4615 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4616 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4618 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4619 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4622 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4623 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4624 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4625 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4626 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4627 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4631 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4632 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4635 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4636 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4637 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4641 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4647 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4648 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4649 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4652 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4656 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4657 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4658 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4660 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4661 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4662 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4663 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4666 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4671 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4672 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4673 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4675 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4676 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4679 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4680 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4683 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4684 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4685 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4688 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4689 pending_events.push(
4690 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4691 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4692 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4693 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4694 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4695 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4700 entry.insert(channel);
4706 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4707 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4708 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4709 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4710 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4712 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4713 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4715 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4716 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4721 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4722 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4723 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4724 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4725 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4727 user_channel_id: user_id,
4732 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4733 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4734 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4735 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4736 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4739 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4742 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4744 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4747 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4748 // lock before watch_channel
4749 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4750 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4751 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4752 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4753 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4754 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4755 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4756 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4757 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4758 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4759 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4760 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4761 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4763 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4764 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4765 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4766 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4767 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4768 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4769 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4774 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4776 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4778 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4779 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4780 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4781 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4783 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4784 funding_msg.channel_id))
4786 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4787 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4790 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4791 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4794 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4795 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4803 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4805 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4806 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4810 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4813 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4814 Ok(update) => update,
4815 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4817 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4818 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4820 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4821 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4822 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4823 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4824 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4825 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4826 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4832 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4833 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4840 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4841 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4845 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4846 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4853 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4854 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4855 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4856 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4857 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4858 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4859 msg: announcement_sigs,
4861 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4862 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4863 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4864 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4865 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4866 // announcement_signatures.
4867 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4868 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4869 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4870 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4876 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4884 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4885 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4886 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4887 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4890 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4892 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4896 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4897 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4898 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4899 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4902 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4903 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4905 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4906 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4907 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4908 let (result, is_permanent) =
4909 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4911 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4916 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4918 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4928 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4930 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4931 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4934 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4938 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4940 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4941 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4944 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4947 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4948 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4950 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4955 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4956 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4957 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4958 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4959 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4960 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4961 } else { (tx, None) }
4963 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4966 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4967 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4968 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4970 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4971 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4972 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4973 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4977 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4982 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4983 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4984 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4985 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4987 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4988 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4989 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4990 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4992 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4993 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4996 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4998 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4999 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5002 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5003 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5004 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5005 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5006 match pending_forward_info {
5007 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5008 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5009 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5010 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5012 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5014 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5015 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5016 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5019 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5021 _ => pending_forward_info
5024 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5026 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5031 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5032 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5033 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5034 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5035 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5037 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5040 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5045 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5049 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5050 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5051 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5052 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5054 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5055 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5057 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5064 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5065 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5066 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5067 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5068 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5069 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5070 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5072 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5073 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5074 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5076 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5079 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5083 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5084 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5085 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5088 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5091 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5092 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5093 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5094 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5095 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5096 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5097 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5102 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5103 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5107 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5108 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5109 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5111 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5113 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5114 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5115 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5116 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5117 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5118 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5120 commitment_signed: msg,
5126 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5131 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5132 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5133 let mut forward_event = None;
5134 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5135 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5136 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5137 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5138 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5139 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5140 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5141 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5143 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5144 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5146 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5147 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5148 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5150 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5151 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5154 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5155 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5157 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5158 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5159 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5161 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5162 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5163 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5164 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5165 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5168 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5169 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5173 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5174 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5175 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5176 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5177 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5178 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5181 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5182 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5183 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5188 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5189 // payments are being processed.
5190 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5191 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5193 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5194 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5201 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5202 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5205 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5206 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5207 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5210 match forward_event {
5212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5213 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5214 time_forwardable: time
5222 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5223 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5225 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5226 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5227 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5229 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5230 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5232 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5233 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5234 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5235 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5236 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5237 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5238 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5239 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5240 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5241 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5242 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5243 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5245 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5246 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5247 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5248 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5249 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5250 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5252 } else { unreachable!(); }
5254 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5256 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5260 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5261 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5262 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5263 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5264 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5265 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5270 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5272 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5273 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5275 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5276 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5277 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5279 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5280 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5287 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5288 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5290 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5292 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5293 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5295 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5297 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5302 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5304 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5306 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5307 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5308 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5309 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5311 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5312 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5315 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5316 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5317 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5318 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5319 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5320 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5323 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5328 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5329 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5330 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5331 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5333 // It's not a local channel
5334 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5339 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5341 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5342 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5343 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5344 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5345 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5346 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5348 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5350 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5351 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5352 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5353 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5355 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5356 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5361 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5364 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5366 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5367 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5368 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5370 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5372 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5373 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5375 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5376 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5377 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5378 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5379 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5380 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5381 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5382 let mut channel_update = None;
5383 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5384 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5385 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5388 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5389 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5390 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5391 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5392 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5393 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5394 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5399 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5400 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5401 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5402 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5403 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5412 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5413 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5416 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5417 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5422 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5423 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5424 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5425 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5426 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5427 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5428 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5429 match monitor_event {
5430 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5431 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5433 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5436 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5437 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5441 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5442 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5443 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5444 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5445 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5446 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5447 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5448 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5449 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5450 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5451 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5455 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5456 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5458 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5460 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5461 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5462 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5463 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5464 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5469 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5470 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5476 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5477 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5480 has_pending_monitor_events
5483 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5484 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5485 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5487 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5488 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5491 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5492 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5493 /// update was applied.
5495 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5496 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5497 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5498 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5499 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5500 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5501 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5502 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5504 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5505 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5506 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5507 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5509 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5510 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5511 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5512 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5514 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5516 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5519 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5520 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5521 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5522 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5523 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5524 updates: commitment_update,
5528 has_monitor_update = true;
5529 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5530 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5531 if close_channel { return false; }
5538 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5539 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5540 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5547 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5548 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5549 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5552 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5553 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5559 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5560 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5561 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5562 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5563 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5564 let mut has_update = false;
5566 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5567 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5568 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5569 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5571 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5572 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5573 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5574 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5576 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5577 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5580 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5581 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5582 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5583 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5584 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5589 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5591 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5592 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5593 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5599 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5600 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5607 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5608 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5614 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5615 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5617 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5618 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5619 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5620 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5621 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5622 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5623 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5624 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5625 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5626 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5627 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5628 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5629 assert!(should_broadcast);
5630 } else { unreachable!(); }
5631 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5633 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5637 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5638 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5640 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5641 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5644 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5647 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5648 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5650 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5651 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5652 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5653 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5654 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5655 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5656 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5657 // never fail a payment too early.
5658 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5660 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5668 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5671 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5672 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5674 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5675 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5676 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5678 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5680 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5681 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5685 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5686 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5688 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5690 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5691 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5692 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5693 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5694 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5695 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5698 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5699 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5701 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5704 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5706 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5708 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5709 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5710 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5711 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5712 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5715 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5716 /// stored external to LDK.
5718 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5719 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5720 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5722 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5723 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5726 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5727 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5728 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5729 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5731 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5732 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5733 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5734 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5735 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5737 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5738 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5739 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5740 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5741 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5743 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5744 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5746 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5747 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5751 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5752 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5754 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5756 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5757 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5758 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5759 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5762 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5763 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5765 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5768 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5770 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5772 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5773 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5776 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5777 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5779 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5780 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5781 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5784 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5785 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5787 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5788 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5789 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5790 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5792 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5793 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5794 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5795 Some(_) => continue,
5796 None => return scid_candidate
5801 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5803 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5804 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5806 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5807 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5808 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5812 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5813 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5814 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5816 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5817 /// times to get a unique scid.
5818 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5819 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5820 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5822 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5823 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5824 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5825 return scid_candidate
5829 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5830 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5831 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5832 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5834 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5835 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5836 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5837 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5846 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5847 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5848 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5849 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5854 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5855 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5859 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5860 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5863 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5864 /// using the given event handler.
5866 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5867 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5870 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5871 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5872 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5874 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5876 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5877 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5878 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5879 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5882 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5883 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5884 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5887 for event in pending_events {
5888 handler(event).await;
5891 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5892 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5897 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5898 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5899 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5900 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5901 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5904 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5905 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5906 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5907 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5909 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5910 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5911 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5912 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5915 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5916 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5918 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5919 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5922 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5923 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5924 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5926 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5927 events.replace(pending_events);
5936 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5938 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5939 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5940 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5941 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5944 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5946 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5947 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5948 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5949 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5950 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5952 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5953 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5954 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5955 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5958 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5959 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5960 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5963 for event in pending_events {
5964 handler.handle_event(event);
5972 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5974 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5975 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5976 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5977 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5980 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5982 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5983 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5984 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5985 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5986 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5989 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5990 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5993 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5995 let new_height = height - 1;
5997 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5998 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5999 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6000 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6001 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6002 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6005 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6009 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6011 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6012 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6013 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6017 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6018 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6019 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6020 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6022 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6023 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6026 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6027 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6029 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6030 if height < last_best_block_height {
6031 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6032 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6036 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6037 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6038 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6039 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6041 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6042 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6046 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6048 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6050 macro_rules! max_time {
6051 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6053 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6054 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6055 // having an explicit local time source.
6056 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6057 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6058 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6059 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6060 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6066 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6067 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6068 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6069 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6073 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6074 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6075 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6076 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6077 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6078 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6084 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6086 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6087 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6088 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6089 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6090 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6091 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6096 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6100 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6101 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6104 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6105 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6107 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6108 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6109 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6110 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6111 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6113 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6114 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6116 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6117 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6118 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6119 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6120 let res = f(channel);
6121 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6122 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6123 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6124 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6125 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6127 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6128 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6129 if channel.is_usable() {
6130 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6131 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6132 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6133 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6138 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6142 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6144 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6146 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6147 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6148 msg: announcement_sigs,
6150 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6151 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6152 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6154 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6155 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6156 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6161 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6162 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6163 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6164 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6165 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6166 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6167 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6168 // is always consistent.
6169 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6170 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6171 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6172 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6173 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6176 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6177 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6178 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6179 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6180 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6181 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6182 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6186 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6187 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6189 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6190 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6191 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6192 data: reason_message,
6201 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6202 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6203 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6204 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6205 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6206 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6207 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6208 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6209 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6210 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6212 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6213 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6214 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6218 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6221 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6222 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6223 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6224 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6225 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6226 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6227 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6228 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6229 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6232 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6233 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6234 _ => unreachable!(),
6236 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6237 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6238 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6239 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6245 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6247 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6252 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6253 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6254 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6255 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6257 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6259 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6260 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6261 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6262 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6263 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6264 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6267 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6268 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6269 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6271 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6272 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6273 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6274 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6277 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6278 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6279 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6280 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6281 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6284 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6285 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6286 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6289 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6290 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6291 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6292 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6296 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6297 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6298 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6299 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6300 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6301 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6304 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6314 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6315 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6316 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6319 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6321 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6324 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6329 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6331 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6334 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6339 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6344 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6349 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6354 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6359 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6364 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6366 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6369 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6371 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6374 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6379 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6380 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6381 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6384 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6389 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6394 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6396 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6397 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6399 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6401 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6402 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6403 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6404 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6405 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6406 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6407 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6408 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6409 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6412 no_channels_remain = false;
6417 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6419 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6420 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6421 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6422 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6424 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6425 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6426 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6430 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6431 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6432 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6434 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6436 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6442 if no_channels_remain {
6443 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6446 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6447 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6451 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6452 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6457 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6462 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6463 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6464 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6465 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6466 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6469 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6470 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6475 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6476 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6477 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6478 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6479 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6480 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6481 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6482 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6483 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6488 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6489 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6494 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6495 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6496 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6498 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6506 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6510 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6513 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6514 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6515 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6516 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6517 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6522 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6523 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6524 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6525 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6528 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6529 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6530 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6538 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6539 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6543 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6544 provided_node_features()
6547 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6548 provided_init_features()
6552 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6553 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6554 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6555 provided_init_features().to_context()
6558 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6559 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6561 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6562 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6563 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6564 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6565 provided_init_features().to_context()
6568 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6569 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6570 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6571 provided_init_features().to_context()
6574 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6575 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6576 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6577 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6578 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6579 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6580 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6581 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6582 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6583 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6584 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6585 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6586 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6587 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6588 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6589 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6590 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6591 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6595 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6596 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6598 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6599 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6600 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6601 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6605 (2, node_id, required),
6606 (4, features, required),
6607 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6608 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6609 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6610 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6613 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6614 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6615 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6616 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6617 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6618 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6619 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6620 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6621 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6622 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6623 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6624 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6625 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6626 (7, self.config, option),
6627 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6628 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6629 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6630 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6631 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6632 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6633 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6634 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6635 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6636 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6637 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6638 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6639 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6640 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6641 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6642 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6643 (32, self.is_public, required),
6644 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6645 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6646 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6652 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6653 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6654 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6655 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6656 (2, channel_id, required),
6657 (3, channel_type, option),
6658 (4, counterparty, required),
6659 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6660 (6, funding_txo, option),
6661 (7, config, option),
6662 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6663 (9, confirmations, option),
6664 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6665 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6666 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6667 (16, balance_msat, required),
6668 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6669 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6670 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6671 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6672 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6673 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6674 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6675 (26, is_outbound, required),
6676 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6677 (30, is_usable, required),
6678 (32, is_public, required),
6679 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6680 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6681 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6684 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6685 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6686 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6687 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6688 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6692 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6694 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6695 outbound_scid_alias,
6699 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6700 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6702 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6703 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6704 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6705 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6706 confirmations_required,
6708 force_close_spend_delay,
6709 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6710 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6711 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6712 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6713 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6714 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6719 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6720 (2, channels, vec_type),
6721 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6722 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6725 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6727 (0, onion_packet, required),
6728 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6731 (0, payment_data, required),
6732 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6733 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6735 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6736 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6737 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6741 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6742 (0, routing, required),
6743 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6744 (4, payment_hash, required),
6745 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6746 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6747 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6751 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6752 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6754 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6756 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6757 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6758 reason.write(writer)?;
6760 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6761 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6764 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6765 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6766 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6767 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6774 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6775 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6776 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6780 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6787 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6789 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6790 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6793 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6794 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6795 // messages contained in the variants.
6796 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6797 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6798 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6800 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6801 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6802 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6803 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6804 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6807 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6809 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6810 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6811 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6813 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6818 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6823 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6824 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6825 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6826 (2, outpoint, required),
6827 (4, htlc_id, required),
6828 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6831 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6832 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6833 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6834 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6835 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6837 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6838 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6839 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6840 (2, self.value, required),
6841 (4, payment_data, option),
6842 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6843 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6849 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6850 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6851 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6853 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6854 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6855 let mut total_msat = None;
6856 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6857 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6858 (0, prev_hop, required),
6859 (1, total_msat, option),
6860 (2, value, required),
6861 (4, payment_data, option),
6862 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6863 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6865 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6867 if payment_data.is_some() {
6868 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6870 if total_msat.is_none() {
6871 total_msat = Some(value);
6873 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6876 if total_msat.is_none() {
6877 if payment_data.is_none() {
6878 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6880 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6882 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6886 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6889 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6896 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6897 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6898 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6902 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6903 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6904 let mut payment_id = None;
6905 let mut payment_secret = None;
6906 let mut payment_params = None;
6907 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6908 (0, session_priv, required),
6909 (1, payment_id, option),
6910 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6911 (3, payment_secret, option),
6912 (4, path, vec_type),
6913 (5, payment_params, option),
6915 if payment_id.is_none() {
6916 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6918 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6920 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6921 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6922 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6923 path: path.unwrap(),
6924 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6929 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6930 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6935 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6936 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6938 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6940 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6941 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6942 (0, session_priv, required),
6943 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6944 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6945 (3, payment_secret, option),
6946 (4, *path, vec_type),
6947 (5, payment_params, option),
6950 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6952 field.write(writer)?;
6959 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6960 (0, forward_info, required),
6961 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6962 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6963 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6964 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6967 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6969 (0, htlc_id, required),
6970 (2, err_packet, required),
6975 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6976 (0, payment_secret, required),
6977 (2, expiry_time, required),
6978 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6979 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6980 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6983 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6985 (0, session_privs, required),
6988 (0, session_privs, required),
6989 (1, payment_hash, option),
6990 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6993 (0, session_privs, required),
6994 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6995 (2, payment_hash, required),
6996 (4, payment_secret, option),
6997 (6, total_msat, required),
6998 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6999 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7002 (0, session_privs, required),
7003 (2, payment_hash, required),
7007 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7008 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7009 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7010 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7011 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7014 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7015 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7017 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7019 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7021 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7022 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7023 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7027 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7028 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7029 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7030 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7031 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7032 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7033 unfunded_channels += 1;
7036 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7037 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7038 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7039 channel.write(writer)?;
7045 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7046 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7047 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7048 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7049 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7050 for forward in pending_forwards {
7051 forward.write(writer)?;
7056 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7057 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7058 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7060 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7061 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7062 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7063 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7064 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7065 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7066 htlc.write(writer)?;
7068 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7072 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7073 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7074 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7075 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7076 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7079 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7080 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7081 for event in events.iter() {
7082 event.write(writer)?;
7085 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7086 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7087 for event in background_events.iter() {
7089 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7091 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7092 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7097 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7098 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7099 // likely to be identical.
7100 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7101 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7103 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7104 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7105 hash.write(writer)?;
7106 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7109 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7110 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7111 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7112 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7113 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7116 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7117 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7119 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7120 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7121 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7122 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7125 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7126 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7130 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7131 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7132 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7134 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7135 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7136 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7142 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7143 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7144 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7145 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7147 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7148 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7149 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7150 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7151 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7152 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7153 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7154 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7161 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7163 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7165 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7166 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7167 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7168 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7169 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7170 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7171 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7172 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7173 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7174 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7175 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7176 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7177 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7179 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7180 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7182 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7183 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7185 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7186 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7187 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7188 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7189 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7190 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7192 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7193 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7194 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7195 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7196 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7200 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7201 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7203 pub keys_manager: K,
7205 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7207 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7208 pub fee_estimator: F,
7209 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7211 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7212 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7213 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7214 pub chain_monitor: M,
7216 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7217 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7218 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7219 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7220 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7221 /// deserialization.
7223 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7224 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7225 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7227 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7228 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7230 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7231 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7232 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7233 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7235 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7238 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7239 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7242 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7243 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7244 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7245 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7246 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7247 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7250 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7251 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7252 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7253 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7254 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7256 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7257 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7262 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7263 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7264 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7265 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7266 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7267 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7268 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7269 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7272 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7273 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7274 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7278 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7279 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7280 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7282 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7283 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7286 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7287 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7289 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7295 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7297 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7298 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7299 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7300 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7301 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7302 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7303 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7304 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7305 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7306 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7307 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7308 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7309 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7310 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7311 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7312 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7313 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7314 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7315 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7316 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7317 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7318 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7319 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7320 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7321 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7322 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7323 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7324 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7325 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7326 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7327 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7328 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7329 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7330 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7331 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7332 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7333 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7334 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7337 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7338 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7339 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7341 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7342 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7344 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7346 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7347 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7348 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7349 // safely discard the channel.
7350 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7351 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7352 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7353 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7354 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7357 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7358 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7359 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7360 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7361 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7362 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7366 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7367 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7368 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7369 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7373 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7374 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7376 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7377 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7380 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7381 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7383 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7386 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7387 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7388 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7389 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7392 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7393 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7395 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7398 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7400 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7401 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let peer_state = PeerState {
7403 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7405 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7408 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7409 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7410 for _ in 0..event_count {
7411 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7412 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7416 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7417 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7418 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7419 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7420 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7421 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7422 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7423 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7427 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7429 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7430 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7431 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7432 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7436 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7437 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7441 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7442 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7443 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7447 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7449 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7450 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7451 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7453 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7455 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7456 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7460 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7461 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7462 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7463 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7464 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7465 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7466 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7467 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7468 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7469 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7470 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7471 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7472 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7473 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7474 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7475 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7477 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7478 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7481 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7482 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7485 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7486 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7487 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7488 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7489 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7490 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7492 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7494 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7495 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7496 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7497 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7498 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7499 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7500 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7502 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7503 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7504 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7505 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7506 if path.is_empty() {
7507 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7508 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7510 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7511 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7512 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7513 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7514 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7515 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7516 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7517 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7520 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7521 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7522 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7523 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7525 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7526 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7527 total_msat: path_amt,
7528 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7530 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7531 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7540 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7541 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7543 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7544 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7545 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7548 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7549 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7552 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7553 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7554 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7555 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7556 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7558 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7559 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7560 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7561 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7562 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7563 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7564 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7565 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7567 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7568 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7572 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7574 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7576 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7577 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7579 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7583 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7584 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7586 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7587 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7590 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7592 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7594 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7595 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7596 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7597 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7602 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7603 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7604 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7605 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7607 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7608 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7609 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7611 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7612 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7613 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7614 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7615 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7618 if chan.is_usable() {
7619 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7620 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7621 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7622 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7623 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7628 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7630 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7631 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7632 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7633 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7634 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7635 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7636 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7637 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7638 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7639 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7640 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7642 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7643 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7645 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7646 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7647 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7648 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7650 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7651 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7652 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7653 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7655 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7656 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7657 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7658 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7660 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7661 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7662 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7664 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7665 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7668 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7671 purpose: payment_purpose,
7672 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7678 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7680 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7681 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7682 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7684 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7686 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7688 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7690 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7691 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7692 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7693 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7695 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7696 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7697 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7698 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7699 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7700 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7702 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7708 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7710 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7712 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7713 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7714 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7715 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7717 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7718 logger: args.logger,
7719 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7722 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7723 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7724 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7725 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7726 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7729 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7730 //connection or two.
7732 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7738 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7739 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7740 use core::time::Duration;
7741 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7742 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7743 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7744 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7745 use crate::ln::msgs;
7746 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7747 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7748 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7749 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7750 use crate::util::test_utils;
7751 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7754 fn test_notify_limits() {
7755 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7756 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7757 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7760 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7762 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7763 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7764 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7765 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7766 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7768 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7770 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7771 // to connect messages with new values
7772 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7773 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7774 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7775 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7777 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7778 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7779 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7780 // ... but the last node should not.
7781 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7782 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7783 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7784 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7786 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7787 // about the channel.
7788 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7789 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7790 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7792 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7794 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7795 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7796 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7797 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7798 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7799 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7801 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7805 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7806 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7807 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7808 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7809 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7810 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7812 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7813 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7814 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7815 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7816 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7817 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7819 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7821 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7822 // the channel info has updated.
7823 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7824 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7825 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7826 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7827 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7828 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7832 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7833 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7835 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7836 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7837 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7838 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7839 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7841 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7842 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7843 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7844 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7846 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7847 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7848 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7849 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7850 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7851 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7853 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7855 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7857 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7858 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7860 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7862 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7863 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7864 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7866 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7867 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7868 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7870 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7871 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7872 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7873 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7874 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7875 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7877 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7878 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7880 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7881 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7883 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7884 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7885 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7887 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7888 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7889 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7890 // lightning messages manually.
7891 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7892 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7895 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7896 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7897 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7899 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7900 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7902 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7903 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7905 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7906 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7907 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7909 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7910 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7911 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7913 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7915 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7917 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7921 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7922 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7923 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7924 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7926 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7927 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7928 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7929 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7934 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7935 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7936 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7937 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7942 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7943 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7944 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7945 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7952 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7953 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7954 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7955 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7956 // fails as expected.
7957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7960 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7961 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7962 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7963 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7965 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7966 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7967 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7969 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7970 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7971 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7972 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7973 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7975 let route = find_route(
7976 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7977 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7979 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7983 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7984 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7985 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7987 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7988 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7989 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7991 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7993 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7994 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7995 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7996 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7997 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7998 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8000 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8001 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8003 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8006 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8007 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8008 let route = find_route(
8009 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8010 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8012 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8014 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8016 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8017 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8018 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8020 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8021 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8022 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8024 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8026 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8027 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8028 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8032 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8034 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8035 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8036 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8037 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8038 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8039 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8040 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8041 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8042 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8044 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8045 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8049 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8050 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8051 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8055 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8057 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8058 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8059 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8060 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8062 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8063 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8064 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8065 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8066 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8068 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8069 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8070 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8071 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8072 let route = find_route(
8073 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8074 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8077 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8078 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8079 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8080 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8083 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8084 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8085 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8086 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8087 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8088 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8089 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8091 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8095 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8096 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8102 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8103 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8104 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8105 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8107 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8108 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8109 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8110 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8111 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8113 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8114 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8115 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8116 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8117 let route = find_route(
8118 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8119 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8122 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8123 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8124 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8125 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8126 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8129 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8130 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8131 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8132 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8133 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8134 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8135 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8137 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8141 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8145 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8147 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8148 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8149 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8152 // Marshall an MPP route.
8153 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8154 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8155 route.paths.push(path);
8156 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8157 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8158 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8159 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8160 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8161 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8163 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8164 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8165 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8166 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8171 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8172 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8178 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8179 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8181 total_msat: 100_000,
8184 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8185 // payment verification fails as expected.
8186 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8187 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8188 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8189 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8191 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8195 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8196 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8200 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8201 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8202 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8203 // the channel is successfully closed.
8204 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8205 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8207 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8209 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8210 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8212 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8213 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8215 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8216 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8218 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8219 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8220 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8221 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8224 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8226 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8227 // as it has the funding transaction.
8228 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8229 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8230 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8232 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8235 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8237 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8239 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8240 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8241 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8243 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8244 // as it has the funding transaction.
8245 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8246 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8247 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8250 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8251 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8253 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8254 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8255 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8257 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8258 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8259 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8260 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8262 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8263 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8265 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8266 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8267 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8268 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8269 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8270 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8271 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8273 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8274 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8275 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8276 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8277 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8278 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8279 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8282 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8284 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8285 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8286 // closing transaction).
8287 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8288 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8289 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8291 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8292 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8293 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8294 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8295 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8298 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8302 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8303 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8304 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8306 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8308 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8309 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8313 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8315 use crate::chain::Listen;
8316 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8317 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8318 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8319 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8320 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8321 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8322 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8323 use crate::util::test_utils;
8324 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8325 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8327 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8328 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8329 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8331 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8335 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8336 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8337 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8338 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8339 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8340 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8341 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8346 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8347 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8350 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8351 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8352 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8354 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8355 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8357 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8358 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8360 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8361 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8363 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8364 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8365 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8366 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8367 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8369 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8371 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8373 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8374 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8375 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8376 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8377 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8379 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8381 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8383 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8384 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8385 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8386 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8387 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8390 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8391 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8392 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8394 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8395 } else { panic!(); }
8397 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8398 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8400 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8403 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8406 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8407 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8409 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8410 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8411 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8412 match msg_events[0] {
8413 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8414 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8415 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8419 match msg_events[1] {
8420 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8424 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8425 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8427 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8428 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8433 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8434 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8436 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8437 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8442 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8444 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8445 macro_rules! send_payment {
8446 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8447 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8448 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8449 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8450 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8451 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8452 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8453 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8454 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8455 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8457 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8458 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8460 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8461 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8463 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8464 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8465 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8466 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8467 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8468 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8469 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8470 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8473 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8474 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8475 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8477 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8478 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8479 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8480 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8481 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8483 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8486 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8487 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8488 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8489 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8491 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8496 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8497 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);