1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
39 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
45 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
48 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
50 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
52 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
53 use util::config::UserConfig;
54 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
55 use util::{byte_utils, events};
56 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
58 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
59 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
73 use util::crypto::sign;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
97 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
98 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
101 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
102 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
106 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
107 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
112 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
113 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
114 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
115 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
116 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
135 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
137 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
138 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
139 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
142 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
143 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
145 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
149 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
153 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
154 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
155 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
156 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
157 short_channel_id: u64,
159 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
160 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
162 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
163 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
168 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
170 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
171 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
172 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
174 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
175 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
178 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
179 struct ClaimableHTLC {
180 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
182 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
184 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
186 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
190 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
191 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
192 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
193 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
195 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
196 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
201 impl Readable for PaymentId {
202 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
203 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
207 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
211 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
214 session_priv: SecretKey,
215 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
216 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
217 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
218 payment_id: PaymentId,
219 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
220 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
223 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
224 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
225 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
227 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
229 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
234 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
235 payment_id.hash(hasher);
236 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
237 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
238 payment_params.hash(hasher);
243 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
246 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
247 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
249 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
250 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
251 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
252 payment_secret: None,
253 payment_params: None,
258 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
259 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
261 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
269 struct ReceiveError {
275 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
276 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
278 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
283 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
285 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
286 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
287 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
288 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
289 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
291 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
292 err: msgs::LightningError,
293 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
294 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
296 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
298 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 err: LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
303 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
310 shutdown_finish: None,
314 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
316 err: LightningError {
318 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
321 shutdown_finish: None,
325 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
326 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
329 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
331 err: LightningError {
333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
334 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
340 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
341 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
345 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
348 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
350 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
351 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
355 log_level: Level::Warn,
358 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
360 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
362 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
371 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
374 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
382 shutdown_finish: None,
387 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
388 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
389 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
390 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
391 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
393 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
394 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
395 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
396 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
397 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
398 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
399 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
401 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
405 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
406 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
407 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
408 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
409 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
410 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
411 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
412 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
414 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
415 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
416 /// and via the classic SCID.
418 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
419 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
420 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
421 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
422 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
423 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
424 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
426 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
427 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
428 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
429 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
432 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
433 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
434 /// quite some time lag.
435 enum BackgroundEvent {
436 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
437 /// commitment transaction.
438 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
441 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
442 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
444 latest_features: InitFeatures,
447 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
448 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
450 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
453 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
454 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
455 struct PendingInboundPayment {
456 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
457 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
458 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
459 /// this payment being removed.
461 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
462 user_payment_id: u64,
463 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
464 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
465 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
468 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
469 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
470 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
472 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
475 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
476 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
477 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
478 pending_amt_msat: u64,
479 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
480 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
481 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
483 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
484 starting_block_height: u32,
486 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
487 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
488 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
490 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
491 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
493 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
494 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
495 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
496 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
497 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
499 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
501 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
502 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
506 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
507 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
513 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
519 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
525 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
527 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
532 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
536 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
537 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
541 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
542 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
543 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
546 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
550 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
551 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
554 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
555 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
556 let our_payment_hash;
557 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
558 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
559 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
561 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
562 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
563 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
567 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
571 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
572 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
573 let remove_res = match self {
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
578 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
582 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
583 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
584 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
585 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
586 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
587 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
594 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
595 let insert_res = match self {
596 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
597 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
598 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
600 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
601 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
604 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
605 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
606 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
607 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
608 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
615 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
617 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
618 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
619 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
620 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
627 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
628 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
629 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
630 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
631 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
632 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
633 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
635 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
636 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
638 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
639 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
640 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
641 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
642 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
643 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
644 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
645 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
647 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
648 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
650 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
651 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
653 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
654 /// to individual Channels.
656 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
657 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
658 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
659 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
661 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
662 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
663 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
664 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
665 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
666 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
667 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
669 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
670 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
671 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
672 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
675 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
676 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
677 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
678 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
679 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
681 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
682 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
683 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
684 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
685 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
686 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
687 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
688 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
689 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
690 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
693 default_configuration: UserConfig,
694 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
700 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
702 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
703 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
705 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
706 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
707 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
708 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
710 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
711 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
712 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
713 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
714 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
715 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
717 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
718 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
719 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
720 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
721 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
722 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
723 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
724 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
726 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
728 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
729 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
731 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
732 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
733 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
734 /// active channel list on load.
735 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
737 our_network_key: SecretKey,
738 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
740 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
742 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
743 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
744 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
746 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
747 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
749 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
750 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
751 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
753 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
754 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
755 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
756 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
758 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
759 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
760 /// are currently open with that peer.
761 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
762 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
765 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
766 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
768 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
769 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
770 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
771 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
772 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
773 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
774 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
775 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
776 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
778 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
785 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
787 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
788 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
789 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
790 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
791 pub struct ChainParameters {
792 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
793 pub network: Network,
795 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
797 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
798 pub best_block: BestBlock,
801 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
807 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
808 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
809 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
810 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
811 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
812 /// updates are ready for persistence).
814 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
815 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
816 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
817 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
818 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
820 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
821 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
824 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
825 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
829 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
830 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
832 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
833 persistence_notifier: notifier,
834 should_persist: persist_check,
835 _read_guard: read_guard,
840 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
842 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
843 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
848 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
849 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
851 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
853 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
854 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
855 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
856 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
857 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
859 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
860 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
862 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
864 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
865 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
866 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
867 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
868 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
869 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
870 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
872 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
873 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
875 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
876 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
877 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
878 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
880 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
881 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
882 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
883 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
884 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
888 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
890 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
891 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
894 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
896 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
897 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
898 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
900 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
901 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
903 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
904 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
905 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
906 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
907 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
908 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
909 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
910 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
911 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
912 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
913 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
916 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
917 /// to better separate parameters.
918 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
919 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
920 /// The node_id of our counterparty
921 pub node_id: PublicKey,
922 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
923 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
924 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
925 pub features: InitFeatures,
926 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
927 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
928 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
930 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
932 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
933 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
934 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
935 /// payments to us through this channel.
936 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
937 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
938 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
939 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
940 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
941 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
942 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
945 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
946 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
947 pub struct ChannelDetails {
948 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
949 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
950 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
951 /// lifetime of the channel.
952 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
953 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
954 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
955 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
956 /// our counterparty already.
958 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
959 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
960 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
961 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
963 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
964 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
965 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
966 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
968 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
969 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
971 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
972 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
974 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
975 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
976 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
977 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
978 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
979 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
980 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
981 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
982 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
985 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
987 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
988 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
989 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
990 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
991 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
992 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
993 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
995 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
996 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
998 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
999 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1000 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1001 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1002 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1003 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1004 /// this value on chain.
1006 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1008 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1010 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1011 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1012 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1013 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1014 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1015 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1016 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1018 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1019 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1020 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1021 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1023 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1024 pub balance_msat: u64,
1025 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1026 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1027 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1028 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1030 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1032 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1033 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1034 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1035 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1036 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1037 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1038 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1039 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1041 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1042 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1043 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1044 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1045 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1046 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1047 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1049 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1050 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1051 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1052 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1053 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1054 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1055 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1056 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1057 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1059 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1061 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1062 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1063 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1064 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1065 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1066 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1067 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1068 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1069 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1071 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1072 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1073 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1074 pub is_outbound: bool,
1075 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1076 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1077 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1078 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1079 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1081 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1082 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1083 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1084 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1086 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1087 pub is_usable: bool,
1088 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1089 pub is_public: bool,
1090 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1091 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1092 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1093 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1094 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1097 impl ChannelDetails {
1098 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1099 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1100 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1102 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1103 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1104 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1105 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1108 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1109 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1110 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1112 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1113 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1114 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1115 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1119 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1120 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1121 /// states for more.
1122 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1123 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1124 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1125 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1126 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1127 ParameterError(APIError),
1128 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1129 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1130 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1131 /// payment in full.
1133 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1135 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1136 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1137 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1138 /// paths than the ones selected).
1139 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1140 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1141 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1142 /// in over-/re-payment.
1144 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1145 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1146 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1148 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1149 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1150 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1151 /// with the latest update_id.
1153 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1154 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1155 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1156 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1157 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1158 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1159 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1160 payment_id: PaymentId,
1164 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1166 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1168 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1169 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1170 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1171 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1173 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1174 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1175 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1178 macro_rules! handle_error {
1179 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1182 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1183 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1185 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1186 // entering the macro.
1187 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1188 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1191 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1193 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1194 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1195 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1196 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1200 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1201 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1202 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1203 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1208 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1209 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1211 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1212 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1213 action: err.action.clone()
1217 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1218 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1221 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1228 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1229 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1230 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1231 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1233 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1234 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1235 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1236 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1237 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1239 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1240 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1242 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1246 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1247 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1248 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1250 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1251 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1253 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1254 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1256 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1257 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1258 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1259 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1260 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1261 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1263 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1264 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1265 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1266 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1267 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1268 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1274 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1275 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1279 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1281 $entry.remove_entry();
1289 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1290 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1294 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1296 $entry.remove_entry();
1304 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1305 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1307 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1308 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1314 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1315 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1317 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1318 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1319 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1320 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1321 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1322 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1323 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1324 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1325 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1326 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1327 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1328 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1329 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1330 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1333 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1334 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1335 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1336 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1337 match $action_type {
1338 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1339 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1341 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1342 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1344 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1345 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1346 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1347 if !$resend_commitment {
1348 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1351 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1353 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1354 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1358 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_funding_locked: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1359 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_funding_locked, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1361 $entry.remove_entry();
1365 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1366 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1367 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1369 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1370 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_funding_locked: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1373 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_funding_locked, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1375 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1376 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1378 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1379 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1383 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1385 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1388 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1392 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1393 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1395 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1396 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1399 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1404 macro_rules! send_funding_locked {
1405 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $funding_locked_msg: expr) => {
1406 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1407 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1408 msg: $funding_locked_msg,
1410 // Note that we may send a funding locked multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1411 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1412 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1413 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1414 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1415 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1416 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1417 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1418 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1423 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1424 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1425 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1426 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1427 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1429 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1430 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1431 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1433 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1434 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1435 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1436 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1439 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1440 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1441 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1442 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1443 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1444 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1445 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1446 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1447 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1448 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1449 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1450 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1453 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1454 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1455 // before it should be allowed to.
1456 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1457 send_funding_locked!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1459 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1460 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1461 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1466 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1467 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1468 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1469 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1470 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1471 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1472 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1473 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1474 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1475 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1476 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1477 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1478 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1479 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1480 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1481 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1482 let mut order = $order;
1484 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1486 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1490 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1491 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1492 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1493 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1498 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1499 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1500 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1501 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1502 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1507 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1511 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1516 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1517 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1518 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1523 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1524 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1525 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1526 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1527 assert!(res.is_ok());
1530 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1534 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1535 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1536 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1538 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1540 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1541 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1546 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1547 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1548 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1549 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1550 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1553 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1555 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1556 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1558 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1560 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1561 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1562 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1563 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1564 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1565 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1566 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1567 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1569 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1570 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1571 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1575 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1577 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1578 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1579 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1580 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1581 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1582 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1584 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1585 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1586 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1588 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1589 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1592 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1593 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1595 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1596 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1598 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1600 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1601 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1602 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1603 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1611 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1612 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1613 &self.default_configuration
1616 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1617 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1618 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1621 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1622 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1624 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1626 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1630 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1635 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1637 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1638 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1639 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1640 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1641 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1644 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1645 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1647 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1648 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1649 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1651 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1652 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1653 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1654 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1655 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1656 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1658 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1659 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1660 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1661 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1662 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1663 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1668 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1669 Some(peer_state) => {
1670 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1671 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1672 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1673 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1674 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1675 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1676 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1680 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1685 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1688 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1691 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1692 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1694 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1695 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1699 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1701 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1704 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1706 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1707 node_id: their_network_key,
1710 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1713 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1714 let mut res = Vec::new();
1716 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1717 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1718 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1719 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1720 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1721 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1722 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1723 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1724 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1725 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1726 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1727 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1728 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1729 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1730 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1731 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1732 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1733 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1734 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1735 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1736 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1738 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1739 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1740 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1741 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1742 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1743 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1744 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1745 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1746 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1747 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1748 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1749 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1750 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1751 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1752 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1753 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1754 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1755 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1756 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1757 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1758 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1759 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat()
1763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1764 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1765 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1766 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1772 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1773 /// more information.
1774 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1775 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1778 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1779 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1781 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1782 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1784 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1785 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1786 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1787 // really wanted anyway.
1788 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1791 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1792 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1793 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1794 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1795 Some(transaction) => {
1796 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1800 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1801 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1802 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1803 reason: closure_reason
1807 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1810 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1811 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1816 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1817 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1820 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1821 Some(peer_state) => {
1822 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1824 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1826 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1828 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1830 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1831 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1832 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1833 let (result, is_permanent) =
1834 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1836 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1843 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1847 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1848 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1849 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1850 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1854 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1862 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1866 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1870 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1871 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1872 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1874 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1875 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1877 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1878 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1879 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1880 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1882 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1884 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1885 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1886 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1887 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1891 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1892 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1893 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1895 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1896 /// the channel being closed or not:
1897 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1898 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1899 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1900 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1901 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1902 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1903 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1905 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1908 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1909 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1910 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1911 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1915 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1916 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1917 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1918 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1921 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1922 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1923 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1924 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1925 // ignore the result here.
1926 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1930 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1931 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1932 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1934 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1935 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1936 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1937 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1938 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1940 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1941 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1943 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1945 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1947 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1950 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1951 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1952 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1953 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1954 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1959 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1962 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1963 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1964 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1966 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1967 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1968 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None) {
1969 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1970 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1971 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1972 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1974 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1984 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1985 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1986 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1987 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1988 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
1992 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
1993 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
1995 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1996 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
1997 return Err(ReceiveError {
1998 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2000 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2003 // final_expiry_too_soon
2004 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2005 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2006 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2007 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2008 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2009 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2010 return Err(ReceiveError {
2012 err_data: Vec::new(),
2013 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2016 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2017 return Err(ReceiveError {
2019 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2020 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2024 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2025 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2026 return Err(ReceiveError {
2027 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2028 err_data: Vec::new(),
2029 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2032 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2033 return Err(ReceiveError {
2034 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2035 err_data: Vec::new(),
2036 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2039 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2040 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2041 return Err(ReceiveError {
2042 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2043 err_data: Vec::new(),
2044 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2046 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2047 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2049 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2050 phantom_shared_secret,
2052 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2053 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2054 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2055 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2056 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2057 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2058 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2059 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2060 return Err(ReceiveError {
2061 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2062 err_data: Vec::new(),
2063 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2067 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2069 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2072 return Err(ReceiveError {
2073 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2074 err_data: Vec::new(),
2075 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2080 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2083 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2084 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2085 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2089 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2090 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2091 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2093 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2094 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2096 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2097 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2098 failure_code: $err_code,
2099 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2104 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2105 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2108 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2110 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2111 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2112 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2113 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2114 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2115 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2116 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2117 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2120 let mut channel_state = None;
2121 macro_rules! return_err {
2122 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2124 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2125 if channel_state.is_none() {
2126 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2128 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2129 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2130 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2131 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2132 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2137 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2139 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2140 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2142 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2143 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2147 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2148 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2150 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2152 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2153 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2154 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2155 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2156 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2158 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2161 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2162 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2164 let blinding_factor = {
2165 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2166 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2167 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2168 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2171 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2173 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2175 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2178 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2179 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2182 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2183 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2184 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2185 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2186 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2190 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2191 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2192 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2195 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2196 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2197 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2198 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2203 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2204 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2205 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2206 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2207 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2208 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2209 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2210 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2211 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2212 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2213 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2215 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2218 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2221 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2223 let (chan_update_opt, forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta) = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2224 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2225 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2226 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2227 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2228 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2229 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2231 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2232 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2233 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2234 // we don't have the channel here.
2235 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2237 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2239 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2240 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2241 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2242 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2243 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2244 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2245 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2247 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2248 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2250 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2251 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2252 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2253 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2254 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, chan_update_opt));
2256 (chan_update_opt, chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta())
2257 } else { (None, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA) };
2259 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + forwardee_cltv_expiry_delta as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2260 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, chan_update_opt));
2262 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2263 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2264 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2265 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2266 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2267 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2269 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2270 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2272 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2273 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2274 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2275 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2276 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2277 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2278 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2279 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2280 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2281 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2287 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2288 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2289 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2290 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2292 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2293 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2295 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2296 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2297 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2299 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2300 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2301 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2303 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2308 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2311 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2312 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2313 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2315 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2316 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2317 if !chan.should_announce() {
2318 return Err(LightningError {
2319 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2320 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2323 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2324 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2327 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2330 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2331 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2332 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2333 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2334 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2335 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2336 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2337 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2338 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2342 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2344 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2346 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2348 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2349 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2351 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2352 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2353 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2354 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2355 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2356 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2357 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2358 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2361 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2362 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2364 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2370 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2371 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2373 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2374 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2375 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2377 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2378 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2379 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2380 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2381 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2383 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2387 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2388 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2390 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2391 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2392 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2393 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2394 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2395 err: "Payment already completed"
2400 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2401 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2402 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2405 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2407 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2408 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2409 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2410 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2411 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2412 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2413 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2414 total_msat: total_value,
2416 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2420 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2421 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2423 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2424 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2426 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2427 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2429 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2430 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2432 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2433 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2435 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2436 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2437 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2438 channel_state, chan)
2440 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2441 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2442 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2443 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2444 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2445 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2446 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2447 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2448 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2449 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2451 insert_outbound_payment!();
2453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2455 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2456 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2457 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2458 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2459 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2460 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2468 } else { unreachable!(); }
2472 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2473 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2475 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2480 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2482 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2483 /// fields for more info.
2485 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2486 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2487 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2488 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2489 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2490 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2492 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2494 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2495 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2496 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2498 /// In general, a path may raise:
2499 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2500 /// node public key) is specified.
2501 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2502 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2504 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2505 /// relevant updates.
2507 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2508 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2509 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2511 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2512 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2513 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2514 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2516 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2517 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2518 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2519 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2520 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2523 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2524 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2525 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2527 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2528 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2529 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2530 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2531 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2533 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2534 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2536 let mut total_value = 0;
2537 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2538 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2539 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2540 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2541 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2542 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2543 continue 'path_check;
2545 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2546 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2547 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2548 continue 'path_check;
2551 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2552 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2554 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2555 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2557 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2558 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2559 total_value = amt_msat;
2562 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2563 let mut results = Vec::new();
2564 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2565 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2567 let mut has_ok = false;
2568 let mut has_err = false;
2569 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2570 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2571 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2572 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2573 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2574 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2575 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2579 } else if res.is_err() {
2580 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2581 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2584 if has_err && has_ok {
2585 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2588 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2589 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2590 Some(RouteParameters {
2591 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2592 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2593 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2599 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2600 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2601 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2602 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2608 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2610 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2611 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2612 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2613 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2614 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2616 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2617 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2618 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2619 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2620 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2621 if path.len() == 0 {
2622 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2623 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2628 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2629 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2630 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2632 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2633 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2635 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2636 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2637 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2638 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2641 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2643 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2644 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2645 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2648 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2649 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2650 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2653 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2654 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2655 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2660 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2661 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2665 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2668 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2670 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2671 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2672 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2673 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2675 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2676 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2677 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2679 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2680 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2681 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2682 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2685 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2686 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2687 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2688 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2689 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2691 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2699 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2700 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2701 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2702 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2703 /// never reach the recipient.
2705 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2707 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2708 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2710 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2712 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2713 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2714 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2716 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2718 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2719 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2720 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2725 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2726 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2727 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2728 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2729 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2731 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2733 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2735 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2736 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2737 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2738 } else { unreachable!(); })
2741 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2743 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2744 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2747 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2748 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2753 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2754 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2755 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2758 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2759 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2760 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2770 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2772 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2776 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2778 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2779 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2781 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2782 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2784 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2785 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2786 /// keys per-channel).
2788 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2789 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2790 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2792 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2793 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2794 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2796 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2797 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2798 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2801 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2802 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2803 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2804 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2808 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2809 let mut output_index = None;
2810 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2811 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2812 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2813 if output_index.is_some() {
2814 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2815 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2818 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2819 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2820 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2823 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2826 if output_index.is_none() {
2827 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2828 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2831 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2836 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2837 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2838 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2840 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2843 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2844 // smaller than 500:
2845 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2847 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2848 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2849 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2850 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2851 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2852 /// our network addresses.
2854 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2855 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2857 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2858 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2859 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2860 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2862 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2864 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2865 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2868 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2869 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2872 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2873 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2874 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2876 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2877 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2878 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2879 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2880 rgb, alias, addresses,
2881 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2882 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2884 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2885 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2887 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2890 let mut announced_chans = false;
2891 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2892 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2893 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2895 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2900 announced_chans = true;
2902 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2903 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2904 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2908 if announced_chans {
2909 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2910 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2911 signature: node_announce_sig,
2912 contents: announcement
2918 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2920 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2921 /// Will likely generate further events.
2922 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2925 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2926 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2927 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
2928 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2930 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2931 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2933 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2934 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2935 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2936 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2938 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2939 match forward_info {
2940 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2941 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2942 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2943 macro_rules! fail_forward {
2944 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
2946 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2947 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2948 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2949 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2950 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2951 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2952 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
2954 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2955 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
2961 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
2962 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
2963 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
2964 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
2965 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
2967 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2968 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
2969 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
2970 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
2971 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
2973 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
2975 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2976 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
2980 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
2981 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
2982 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
2983 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
2989 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2992 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
2995 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2996 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2997 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2998 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2999 // problem, not ours.
3006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3007 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3008 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3009 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3010 match forward_info {
3011 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3012 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3014 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3015 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3016 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3017 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3018 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3019 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3020 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3022 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3023 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3025 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3027 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3030 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3032 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3033 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3034 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3040 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3042 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3043 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3044 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3045 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3046 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3047 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3048 // this channel currently :/.
3054 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3055 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3057 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3059 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3061 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3064 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3066 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3067 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3068 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3071 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3073 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3074 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3075 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3076 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3077 // messages when we can.
3078 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3079 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3080 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3087 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3088 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3091 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3092 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3093 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3094 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3095 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3096 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3098 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3099 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3100 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3101 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3102 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3104 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3106 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3110 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3111 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3114 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3115 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3117 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3118 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3119 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3120 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3121 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3122 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3124 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3132 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3133 match forward_info {
3134 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3135 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3136 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3137 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3138 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3139 let _legacy_hop_data = payment_data.clone();
3140 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3142 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3143 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3145 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3148 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3149 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3150 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3151 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3152 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3154 phantom_shared_secret,
3156 value: amt_to_forward,
3158 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3163 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3165 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3166 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3167 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3169 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3170 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3171 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3172 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3174 phantom_shared_secret,
3176 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3181 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3182 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3183 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3184 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3185 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3186 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3187 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3188 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3189 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3193 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3194 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3195 total_value += htlc.value;
3196 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3197 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3198 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3200 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3201 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3203 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3205 _ => unreachable!(),
3208 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3209 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3210 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3211 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3212 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3213 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3214 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3216 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3217 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3218 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3222 payment_received_generated = true;
3224 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3225 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3227 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3229 payment_received_generated
3233 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3234 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3235 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3236 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3237 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3238 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3239 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3240 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3242 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3243 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3244 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3245 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3246 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3248 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3252 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3254 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3255 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3257 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3258 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3260 amt: amt_to_forward,
3261 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3265 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3266 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3273 if payment_data.is_none() {
3274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3275 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3278 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3279 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3281 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3282 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3284 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3285 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3287 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3288 if payment_received_generated {
3289 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3296 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3304 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3305 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3307 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3309 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3310 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3313 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3314 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3315 events.append(&mut new_events);
3318 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3320 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3321 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3323 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3324 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3325 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3326 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3327 if background_events.is_empty() {
3331 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3333 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3334 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3335 // monitor updating completing.
3336 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3343 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3344 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3345 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3346 self.process_background_events();
3349 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3350 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3351 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3352 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3353 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3354 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3355 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3357 if !chan.is_live() {
3358 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3359 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3360 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3363 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3365 let mut retain_channel = true;
3366 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3369 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3370 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3374 let ret_err = match res {
3375 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3376 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3377 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3378 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3381 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3382 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3383 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3384 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3385 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3386 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3387 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3388 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3398 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3402 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3403 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3404 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3405 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3406 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3407 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3408 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3410 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3412 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3414 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3415 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3416 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3417 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3418 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3419 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3420 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3422 handle_errors.push(err);
3432 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3434 /// This currently includes:
3435 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3436 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3437 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3440 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3441 /// estimate fetches.
3442 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3443 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3444 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3445 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3447 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3449 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3450 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3452 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3453 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3454 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3455 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3456 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3457 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3458 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3459 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3461 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3463 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3465 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3466 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3467 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3468 if needs_close { return false; }
3471 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3472 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3473 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3474 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3475 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3476 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3477 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3478 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3482 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3483 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3485 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3486 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3487 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3491 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3492 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3500 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3501 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3502 // This should be unreachable
3503 debug_assert!(false);
3506 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3507 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3508 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3509 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3511 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3512 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3513 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3515 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3523 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3524 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3527 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3528 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3534 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3535 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3536 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3537 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3538 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3539 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3540 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3542 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3543 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3544 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3545 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3546 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3547 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3548 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3549 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3550 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3551 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3552 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3558 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3559 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3561 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3563 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3564 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3565 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3566 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3567 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3568 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3569 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3571 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3573 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3574 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3576 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3581 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3582 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3583 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3584 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3585 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3586 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3587 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3588 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3589 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3591 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3592 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3593 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3594 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3596 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3597 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3598 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3599 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3600 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3604 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3605 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3606 // be surfaced to the user.
3607 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3608 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3610 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3611 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3612 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3614 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3618 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3619 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3620 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3622 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3623 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3624 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3625 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3626 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3627 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3628 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3629 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3630 Some(RouteParameters {
3631 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3632 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3633 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3636 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3637 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3638 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3640 rejected_by_dest: false,
3641 network_update: None,
3642 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3644 short_channel_id: None,
3651 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3652 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3654 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3667 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3668 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3669 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3670 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3671 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3672 /// still-available channels.
3673 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3674 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3675 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3676 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3679 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3680 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3681 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3683 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3684 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3685 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3686 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3687 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3688 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3689 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3690 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3691 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3694 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3698 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3699 all_paths_failed = true;
3700 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3701 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3703 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3712 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3713 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3714 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3715 Some(RouteParameters {
3716 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3717 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3718 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3723 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3724 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3726 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3728 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3729 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3730 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3731 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3732 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3733 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3734 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3735 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3742 error_code: onion_error_code,
3744 error_data: onion_error_data
3747 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3753 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3754 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3755 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3756 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3758 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3759 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3760 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3761 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3762 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3763 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3764 network_update: None,
3767 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3770 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3772 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3776 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3777 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3778 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3780 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3781 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3782 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3783 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3784 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3785 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3786 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3787 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3789 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3790 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3793 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3795 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3799 let mut forward_event = None;
3800 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3801 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3803 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3805 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3808 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3811 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3812 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3813 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3814 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3815 time_forwardable: time
3822 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3823 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3825 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3826 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3827 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3828 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3830 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3831 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3833 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3834 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3835 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3836 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3837 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3838 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3842 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3843 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3844 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3845 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3847 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3848 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3849 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3850 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3852 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3853 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3854 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3855 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3856 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3858 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3859 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3860 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3866 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3867 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3868 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3870 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3871 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3872 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3873 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3875 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3876 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3878 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3879 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3880 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3881 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3882 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3883 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3884 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3885 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3887 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3888 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3889 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3890 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3891 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3892 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3894 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3899 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3900 // which were generated.
3901 channel_state.take();
3903 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3904 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3905 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3912 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3913 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3914 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3915 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3916 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3918 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3922 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3923 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3924 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3925 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3926 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3927 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3928 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3929 payment_preimage, e);
3930 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3931 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3932 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3933 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3936 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3937 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3938 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3939 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3940 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3941 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3942 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3943 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3944 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3945 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3951 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3953 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3956 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3957 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3958 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3959 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3960 payment_preimage, e);
3962 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3963 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3965 chan.remove_entry();
3967 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3970 } else { unreachable!(); }
3973 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3974 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3975 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3976 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3977 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3978 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3979 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3980 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3981 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3982 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3983 pending_events.push(
3984 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3986 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3991 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3999 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4001 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4002 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4003 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4004 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4005 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4006 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4007 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4008 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4009 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4010 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4011 pending_events.push(
4012 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4013 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4019 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4023 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4024 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4025 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4027 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4028 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4029 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4030 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4031 pending_events.push(
4032 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4040 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4045 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4048 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4049 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4050 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4051 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4052 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4053 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4054 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4057 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4058 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4059 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4060 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4061 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4064 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4065 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4066 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4067 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4068 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4069 payment_preimage, e);
4071 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4072 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4073 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4074 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4077 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4078 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4079 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4080 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4084 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4085 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4086 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4089 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4090 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4091 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4093 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4095 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4105 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4106 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4107 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4110 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4111 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4113 let chan_restoration_res;
4114 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4115 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4116 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4117 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4118 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4121 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4125 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4126 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4127 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4128 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4129 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4130 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4132 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4133 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4134 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4139 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked, updates.announcement_sigs);
4140 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4141 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4143 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4145 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4146 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4147 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4148 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4152 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4154 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4155 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4158 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4159 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4160 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4162 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4163 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4164 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4165 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4168 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4169 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4171 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4172 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4173 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4175 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4176 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4178 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4179 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4181 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4182 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4184 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4185 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4186 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4187 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4190 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4193 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4195 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4197 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4198 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4200 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4201 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4203 if accept_0conf { channel.get_mut().set_0conf(); }
4204 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4205 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4206 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4210 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4216 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4217 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4221 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4222 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4225 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4226 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4227 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4228 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4231 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4238 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4239 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4240 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4241 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4244 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4245 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4246 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4247 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4251 pending_events.push(
4252 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4253 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4254 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4255 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4256 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4257 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4262 entry.insert(channel);
4268 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4269 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4272 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4274 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4277 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.peer_channel_config_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4278 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4283 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4284 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4285 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4286 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4287 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4289 user_channel_id: user_id,
4294 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4295 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut funding_locked), mut chan) = {
4296 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4297 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4301 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4304 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4306 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4309 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4310 // lock before watch_channel
4311 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4313 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4314 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4315 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4316 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4317 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4318 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4319 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4320 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4321 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4322 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4325 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4326 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4327 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4328 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4329 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4330 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, funding_locked.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4331 funding_locked = None; // Don't send the funding_locked now
4335 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4336 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4343 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4346 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
4347 send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4355 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4357 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4358 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4359 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4360 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4361 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4362 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4363 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4365 let (monitor, funding_tx, funding_locked) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4366 Ok(update) => update,
4367 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4369 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4370 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, funding_locked.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4371 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4372 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4373 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4374 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4375 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4376 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4381 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
4382 send_funding_locked!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4386 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4389 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4390 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4394 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4395 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4396 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4397 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4399 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4402 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4403 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4404 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4406 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4407 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4408 msg: announcement_sigs,
4410 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4411 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4412 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4413 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4414 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4415 // announcement_signatures.
4416 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4417 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4430 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4431 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4432 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4433 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4434 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4436 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4438 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4439 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4442 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4443 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4444 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4445 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4448 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4449 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4451 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4452 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4453 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4454 let (result, is_permanent) =
4455 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4457 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4463 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4464 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4465 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4472 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4475 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4476 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4479 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4483 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4484 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4485 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4487 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4488 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4489 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4492 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4493 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4494 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4495 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4500 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4501 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4502 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4503 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4504 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4505 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4506 } else { (tx, None) }
4508 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4511 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4512 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4513 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4515 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4516 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4517 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4522 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4527 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4528 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4529 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4530 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4532 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4533 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4534 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4535 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4537 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4538 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4540 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4542 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4543 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4546 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4547 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4548 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4549 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4550 match pending_forward_info {
4551 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4552 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4553 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4554 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4556 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4558 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4559 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4560 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4563 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4565 _ => pending_forward_info
4568 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4575 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4576 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4577 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4578 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4579 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4581 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4582 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4584 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4586 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4589 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4593 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4594 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4601 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4608 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4609 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4610 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4611 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4616 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4617 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4618 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4620 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4627 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4628 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4629 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4630 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4632 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4635 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4636 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4637 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4638 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4639 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4640 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4641 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4646 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4647 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4650 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4651 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4653 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4654 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4655 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4656 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4657 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4658 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4659 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4660 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4662 commitment_signed: msg,
4668 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4673 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4674 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4675 let mut forward_event = None;
4676 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4677 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4678 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4679 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4681 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4682 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4683 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4684 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4685 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4688 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4689 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4692 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4693 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4698 match forward_event {
4700 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4701 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4702 time_forwardable: time
4710 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4711 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4713 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4714 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4715 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4717 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4718 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4720 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4721 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4722 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4723 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4724 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4725 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4726 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4727 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4728 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4729 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4730 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4732 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4733 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4734 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4735 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4736 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4738 } else { unreachable!(); }
4741 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4742 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4743 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4747 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4748 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4749 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4750 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4751 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4756 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4758 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4759 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4761 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4762 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4764 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4765 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4772 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4773 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4774 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4775 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4777 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4780 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4787 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4788 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4789 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4791 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4793 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4796 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4797 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4800 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4801 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4802 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4803 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4804 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4805 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4813 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4814 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4817 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4818 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4820 // It's not a local channel
4821 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4824 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4826 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4827 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4828 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4829 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4830 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4831 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4835 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4836 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4837 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4838 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4840 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4845 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4848 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4849 let chan_restoration_res;
4850 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4851 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4852 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4854 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4856 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4859 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4860 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4861 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4862 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4863 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
4864 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
4865 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
4866 let mut channel_update = None;
4867 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
4868 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4869 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4872 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4873 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4874 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4875 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4876 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4877 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4878 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4883 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4884 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
4885 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
4886 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.funding_locked, responses.announcement_sigs);
4887 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4890 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
4892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4895 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4896 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4898 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4899 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4904 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4905 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4906 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4907 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4908 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4909 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4910 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
4911 match monitor_event {
4912 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4913 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4915 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4917 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4921 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4922 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4923 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4924 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4925 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4926 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4927 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4928 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4929 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4930 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4935 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4936 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4938 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4940 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4941 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4942 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4943 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4944 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4949 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4950 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4956 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4957 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4960 has_pending_monitor_events
4963 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4964 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4965 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4967 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4968 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4971 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4972 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4973 /// update was applied.
4975 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4976 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4977 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4978 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4979 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4980 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4981 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4982 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4984 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4985 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4986 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4987 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4988 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4990 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4991 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4992 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4993 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4994 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4996 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4997 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4998 has_monitor_update = true;
4999 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5000 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5001 if close_channel { return false; }
5003 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5004 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5005 updates: commitment_update,
5012 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5013 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5014 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5021 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5022 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5023 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
5026 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5027 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5033 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5034 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5035 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5036 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5037 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5038 let mut has_update = false;
5040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5042 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5043 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5044 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5046 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5047 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5048 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5049 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5052 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5055 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5056 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5057 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5058 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5064 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5066 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5067 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5068 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5074 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5075 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5082 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5083 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5089 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5090 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5092 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5093 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5094 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5095 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5096 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5097 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5098 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5099 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5100 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5101 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5102 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5103 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5104 assert!(should_broadcast);
5105 } else { unreachable!(); }
5106 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5108 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5112 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5113 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5115 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5116 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5119 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5122 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5123 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5124 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5125 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5126 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5127 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5128 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5129 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5130 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5131 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5132 // never fail a payment too early.
5133 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5135 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5143 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5146 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5147 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5149 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5150 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5151 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5153 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5155 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5156 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5160 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5161 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5163 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5165 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5166 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5167 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5168 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5169 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5170 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5173 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5174 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5176 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5179 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5181 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5183 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5184 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5185 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5186 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5187 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5190 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5191 /// stored external to LDK.
5193 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5194 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5195 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5197 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5198 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5201 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5202 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5203 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5204 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5206 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5207 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5208 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5209 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5210 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5212 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5213 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5214 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5215 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5216 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5218 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5219 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5221 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5222 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5226 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5227 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5229 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5231 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5232 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5233 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5234 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5237 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5238 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5240 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5243 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5245 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5247 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5248 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5251 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5252 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5254 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5255 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5256 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5259 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5260 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5262 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5263 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5264 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5265 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5267 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5268 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5269 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5276 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5278 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5279 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5281 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5282 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5283 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5288 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5289 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5290 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5291 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5296 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5297 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5301 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5302 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5306 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5307 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5308 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5309 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5310 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5313 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5314 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5315 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5316 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5318 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5319 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5320 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5321 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5324 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5325 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5327 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5328 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5331 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5332 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5333 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5335 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5336 events.replace(pending_events);
5345 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5347 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5349 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5353 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5355 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5356 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5358 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5359 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5360 /// restarting from an old state.
5361 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5362 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5363 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5365 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5366 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5367 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5368 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5371 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5372 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5373 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5376 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5377 handler.handle_event(&event);
5385 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5387 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5388 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5389 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5390 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5393 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5395 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5396 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5397 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5398 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5399 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5402 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5403 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5406 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5407 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5408 let new_height = height - 1;
5410 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5411 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5412 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5413 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5414 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5415 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5418 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5422 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5424 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5425 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5426 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5427 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5430 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5431 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5432 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5433 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5435 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5436 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5439 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5440 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5442 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5443 if height < last_best_block_height {
5444 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5445 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5449 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5450 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5451 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5452 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5454 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5455 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5457 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5459 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5461 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5463 macro_rules! max_time {
5464 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5466 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5467 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5468 // having an explicit local time source.
5469 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5470 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5471 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5472 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5473 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5479 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5480 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5481 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5482 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5483 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5486 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5487 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5488 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5489 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5490 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5491 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5492 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5493 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5494 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5502 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5503 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5504 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5505 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5506 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5507 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5513 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5514 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5515 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5516 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5517 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5518 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5519 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5520 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5525 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5527 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5528 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5529 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5530 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5533 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5534 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5536 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5537 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5538 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5539 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5540 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5542 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5543 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5545 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5546 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5547 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5548 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5549 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5550 let res = f(channel);
5551 if let Ok((funding_locked_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5552 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5553 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5554 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5558 if let Some(funding_locked) = funding_locked_opt {
5559 send_funding_locked!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, funding_locked);
5560 if channel.is_usable() {
5561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5562 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5563 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5564 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5572 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5573 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5574 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5575 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5576 msg: announcement_sigs,
5578 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5579 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5582 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5583 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5584 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5589 if channel.is_our_funding_locked() {
5590 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5591 // If we sent a 0conf funding_locked, and now have an SCID, we add it
5592 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5593 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5594 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5595 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5596 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5597 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5598 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5599 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5602 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5603 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5604 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5605 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5606 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5607 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5608 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5612 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5613 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5614 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5615 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5616 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5617 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5618 data: reason_message,
5626 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5627 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5628 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5629 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5630 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5631 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5632 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5633 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5634 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5635 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5636 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5637 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5638 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5643 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5648 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5650 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5651 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5655 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5656 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5657 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5660 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5661 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5662 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5663 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5666 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5667 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5669 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5670 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5673 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5674 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5675 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5676 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5677 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5681 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5682 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5683 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5684 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5688 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5689 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5690 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5691 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5692 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5696 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5698 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5701 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5703 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5706 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5708 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5711 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5712 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5713 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5716 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5718 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5721 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5723 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5726 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5728 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5731 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5732 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5733 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5736 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5737 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5738 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5741 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5743 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5746 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5748 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5751 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5753 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5756 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5758 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5761 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5762 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5763 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5766 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5768 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5771 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5772 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5773 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5776 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5781 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5782 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5783 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5786 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5787 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5788 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5789 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5793 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5794 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5795 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5796 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5797 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5798 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5799 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5800 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5801 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5802 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5805 no_channels_remain = false;
5810 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5815 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5816 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5818 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5819 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5823 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5824 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5825 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5827 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5829 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5830 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
5835 if no_channels_remain {
5836 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5839 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5840 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5844 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5845 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5850 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5851 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5853 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5854 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5857 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5858 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5865 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5866 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5867 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5868 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5869 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5870 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5871 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5875 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5876 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5877 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5883 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5886 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5887 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5889 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5890 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5891 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5892 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5893 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5898 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
5899 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5900 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
5901 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5904 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
5905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
5906 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5914 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5915 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data));
5920 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5921 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5922 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5923 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5924 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5925 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5928 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5931 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5937 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5938 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5943 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5944 let result = *guard;
5952 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5953 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5954 let current_time = Instant::now();
5956 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5957 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5962 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5963 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5964 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5965 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5966 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5968 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5969 let result = *guard;
5970 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5974 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5975 None => return result,
5981 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5983 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5984 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5985 *persistence_lock = true;
5986 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5991 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5992 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5994 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
5995 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
5996 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
5997 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6000 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6001 (2, node_id, required),
6002 (4, features, required),
6003 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6004 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6005 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6006 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6009 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6010 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6011 (2, channel_id, required),
6012 (3, channel_type, option),
6013 (4, counterparty, required),
6014 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6015 (6, funding_txo, option),
6016 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6017 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6018 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6019 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6020 (16, balance_msat, required),
6021 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6022 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6023 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6024 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6025 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6026 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6027 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6028 (26, is_outbound, required),
6029 (28, is_funding_locked, required),
6030 (30, is_usable, required),
6031 (32, is_public, required),
6032 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6033 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6036 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6037 (2, channels, vec_type),
6038 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6039 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6042 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6044 (0, onion_packet, required),
6045 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6048 (0, payment_data, required),
6049 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6050 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6052 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6053 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6054 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6058 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6059 (0, routing, required),
6060 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6061 (4, payment_hash, required),
6062 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6063 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6067 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6068 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6070 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6072 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6073 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6074 reason.write(writer)?;
6076 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6077 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6080 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6081 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6082 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6083 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6090 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6091 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6092 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6095 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6096 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6097 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6098 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6102 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6103 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6104 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6105 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6106 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6109 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6110 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6111 // messages contained in the variants.
6112 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6113 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6114 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6116 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6117 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6118 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6119 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6120 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6123 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6124 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6125 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6126 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6127 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6129 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6134 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6139 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6140 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6141 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6142 (2, outpoint, required),
6143 (4, htlc_id, required),
6144 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6147 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6148 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6149 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
6150 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
6153 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
6154 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
6155 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
6157 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6158 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6159 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6160 (2, self.value, required),
6161 (4, payment_data, option),
6162 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6163 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6169 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6170 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6171 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6173 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6174 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6175 let mut total_msat = None;
6176 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6177 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6178 (0, prev_hop, required),
6179 (1, total_msat, option),
6180 (2, value, required),
6181 (4, payment_data, option),
6182 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6183 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6185 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6187 if payment_data.is_some() {
6188 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6190 if total_msat.is_none() {
6191 total_msat = Some(value);
6193 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6196 if payment_data.is_none() {
6197 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6199 if total_msat.is_none() {
6200 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6202 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
6206 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6209 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6216 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6217 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6218 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6221 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6222 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6223 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6224 let mut payment_id = None;
6225 let mut payment_secret = None;
6226 let mut payment_params = None;
6227 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6228 (0, session_priv, required),
6229 (1, payment_id, option),
6230 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6231 (3, payment_secret, option),
6232 (4, path, vec_type),
6233 (5, payment_params, option),
6235 if payment_id.is_none() {
6236 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6238 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6240 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6241 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6242 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6243 path: path.unwrap(),
6244 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6249 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6250 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6255 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6256 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6258 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6260 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6261 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6262 (0, session_priv, required),
6263 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6264 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6265 (3, payment_secret, option),
6266 (4, path, vec_type),
6267 (5, payment_params, option),
6270 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6272 field.write(writer)?;
6279 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6280 (0, LightningError) => {
6284 (0, failure_code, required),
6285 (2, data, vec_type),
6289 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6291 (0, forward_info, required),
6292 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6293 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6294 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6297 (0, htlc_id, required),
6298 (2, err_packet, required),
6302 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6303 (0, payment_secret, required),
6304 (2, expiry_time, required),
6305 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6306 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6307 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6310 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6312 (0, session_privs, required),
6315 (0, session_privs, required),
6316 (1, payment_hash, option),
6319 (0, session_privs, required),
6320 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6321 (2, payment_hash, required),
6322 (4, payment_secret, option),
6323 (6, total_msat, required),
6324 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6325 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6328 (0, session_privs, required),
6329 (2, payment_hash, required),
6333 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6334 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6335 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6336 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6337 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6341 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6343 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6345 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6347 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6348 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6349 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6352 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6353 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6354 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6355 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6356 unfunded_channels += 1;
6359 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6360 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6361 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6362 channel.write(writer)?;
6366 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6367 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6368 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6369 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6370 for forward in pending_forwards {
6371 forward.write(writer)?;
6375 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6376 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6377 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6378 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6379 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6380 htlc.write(writer)?;
6384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6385 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6386 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6387 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6388 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6389 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6392 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6393 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6394 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6395 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6396 for event in events.iter() {
6397 event.write(writer)?;
6400 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6401 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6402 for event in background_events.iter() {
6404 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6406 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6407 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6412 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6413 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6415 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6416 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6417 hash.write(writer)?;
6418 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6421 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6422 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6423 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6424 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6425 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6428 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6429 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6431 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6432 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6433 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6434 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6437 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6438 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6442 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6443 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6444 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6446 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6447 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6448 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6453 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6454 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6455 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6456 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6457 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6464 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6466 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6468 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6469 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6470 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6471 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6472 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6473 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6474 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6475 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6476 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6477 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6478 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6479 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6480 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6482 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6483 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6485 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6486 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6488 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6489 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6490 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6491 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6492 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6493 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6495 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6496 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6497 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6499 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6503 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6504 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6506 pub keys_manager: K,
6508 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6510 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6511 pub fee_estimator: F,
6512 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6514 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6515 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6516 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6517 pub chain_monitor: M,
6519 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6520 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6521 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6522 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6523 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6524 /// deserialization.
6526 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6527 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6528 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6530 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6531 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6533 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6534 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6535 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6536 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6538 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6541 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6542 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6545 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6546 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6547 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6548 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6549 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6550 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6553 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6554 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6555 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6556 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6557 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6559 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6560 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6565 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6566 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6567 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6568 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6569 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6571 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6572 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6575 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6576 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6577 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6581 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6582 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6583 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6584 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6585 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6586 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6589 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6590 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6592 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6594 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6598 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6600 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6601 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6602 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6603 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6604 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6605 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6606 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6607 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6608 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6609 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6610 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6611 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6612 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6613 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6614 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6615 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6616 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6617 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6618 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6619 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6621 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6622 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6623 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6624 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6625 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6626 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6627 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6628 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6629 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6630 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6631 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6632 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6633 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6634 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6635 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6636 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6639 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6640 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6641 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6643 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6646 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6647 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6648 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6649 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6650 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6655 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6656 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6657 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6658 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6662 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6663 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6665 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6666 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6669 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6670 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6672 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6675 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6677 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6678 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6680 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6681 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6682 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6684 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6687 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6688 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6689 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6690 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let peer_state = PeerState {
6692 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6694 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6697 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6699 for _ in 0..event_count {
6700 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6701 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6705 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6706 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6707 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6708 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6709 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6710 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6711 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6712 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6716 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6718 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6719 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6720 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6721 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6725 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6729 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6730 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6731 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6732 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6736 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6737 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6738 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6739 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6740 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6742 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6744 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6749 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6750 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6751 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6752 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6753 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6754 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6755 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6756 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6757 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6758 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6760 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6761 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6764 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6765 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6766 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6767 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6768 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6769 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6771 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6773 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6774 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6775 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6776 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6777 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6778 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6779 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6781 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6782 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6783 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6784 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6785 if path.is_empty() {
6786 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6789 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6790 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6791 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6792 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6794 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6795 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6796 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6799 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6800 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6801 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6802 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6804 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6805 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6806 total_msat: path_amt,
6807 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6809 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6810 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6819 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6820 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6822 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6823 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6826 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
6828 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6830 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
6831 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6832 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6833 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6838 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
6839 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
6840 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
6841 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
6843 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
6844 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
6845 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
6847 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6848 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
6849 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6850 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6851 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6852 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6854 if chan.is_usable() {
6855 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
6856 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
6857 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
6858 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
6859 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6864 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6865 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6866 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6868 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6869 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6870 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6872 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6874 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6879 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6881 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6882 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6883 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6885 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
6886 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
6892 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6893 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6895 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6897 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6898 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6899 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6900 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6902 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6903 logger: args.logger,
6904 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6907 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6908 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6911 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6912 //connection or two.
6914 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6920 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6921 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6922 use core::time::Duration;
6923 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6924 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6925 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6926 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6927 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6928 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6930 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6931 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6932 use util::errors::APIError;
6933 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6934 use util::test_utils;
6935 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
6937 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6939 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6940 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6942 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6945 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6946 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6948 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6949 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6950 thread::spawn(move || {
6952 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6953 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6954 *persistence_lock = true;
6957 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6963 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6964 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6966 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6969 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6974 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6976 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6979 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6986 fn test_notify_limits() {
6987 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6988 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6992 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6994 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6995 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6996 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6997 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6998 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7000 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7002 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7003 // to connect messages with new values
7004 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7005 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7006 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7007 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7009 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7010 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7011 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7012 // ... but the last node should not.
7013 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7014 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7015 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7016 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7018 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7019 // about the channel.
7020 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7021 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7022 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7024 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7026 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7027 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7028 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7029 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7030 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7031 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7033 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7037 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7038 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7039 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7040 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7041 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7042 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7044 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7045 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7046 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7047 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7048 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7049 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7050 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7051 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7053 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7054 // the channel info has updated.
7055 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7057 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7058 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7059 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7060 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7064 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7065 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7070 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7073 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7074 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7075 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7076 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7077 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7078 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7079 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7081 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7082 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7083 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7085 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7086 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7088 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7090 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7091 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7092 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7094 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7095 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7096 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7098 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7099 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7100 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7101 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7103 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7105 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7106 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7108 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7109 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7111 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7112 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7113 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7115 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7116 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7117 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7118 // lightning messages manually.
7119 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7121 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7122 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7123 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7125 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7126 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7128 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7129 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7131 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7132 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7133 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7135 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7137 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7139 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7141 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7143 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7144 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7147 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7148 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7149 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7152 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7153 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7154 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7155 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7160 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7161 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7162 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7163 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7168 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7169 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7170 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7171 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7178 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7179 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7180 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7181 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7182 // fails as expected.
7183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7187 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7188 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7189 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7191 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7192 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7193 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7195 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7196 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7197 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7198 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7199 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7201 let route = find_route(
7202 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7203 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7205 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7207 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7208 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7209 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7210 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7211 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7213 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7214 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7215 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7217 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7218 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7219 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7220 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7221 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7222 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7223 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7225 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7227 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7228 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7230 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7231 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7232 let route = find_route(
7233 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7234 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7236 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7238 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7240 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7241 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7242 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7244 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7245 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7246 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7250 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7251 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7254 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7256 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7258 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7259 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7260 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7261 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7262 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7263 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7264 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7265 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7266 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7268 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7269 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7273 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7274 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7275 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7279 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7281 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7282 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7283 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7284 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7286 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7287 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7288 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7289 final_value_msat: 10000,
7290 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7292 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7293 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7294 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7295 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7296 let route = find_route(
7297 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7298 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7301 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7302 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7303 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7306 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7307 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7308 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7309 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7310 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7311 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7314 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7318 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7319 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7325 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7326 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7327 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7328 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7330 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7331 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7332 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7333 final_value_msat: 10000,
7334 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7336 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7337 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7338 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7339 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7340 let route = find_route(
7341 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7342 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7345 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7346 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7347 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7348 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7351 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7352 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7353 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7354 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7355 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7356 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7357 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7359 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7363 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7367 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7369 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7370 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7371 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7372 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7374 // Marshall an MPP route.
7375 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7376 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7377 route.paths.push(path);
7378 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7379 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7380 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7381 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7382 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7383 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7385 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7386 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7387 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7388 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7393 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7394 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7400 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7401 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7403 total_msat: 100_000,
7406 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7407 // payment verification fails as expected.
7408 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7409 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7410 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7411 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7413 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7417 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7418 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7422 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7425 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7426 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7427 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7428 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7429 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7430 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7431 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7432 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7433 use util::test_utils;
7434 use util::config::UserConfig;
7435 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7437 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7438 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7439 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7441 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7445 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7446 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7447 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7448 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7449 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7450 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7451 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7456 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7457 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7460 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7461 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7462 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7464 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7465 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7467 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7468 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7470 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7471 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7473 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7474 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7475 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7476 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7477 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7479 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7481 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7483 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7484 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7485 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7486 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7487 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7489 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7491 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7493 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7494 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7495 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7496 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7497 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7500 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7501 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7502 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7504 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7505 } else { panic!(); }
7507 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7508 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7510 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7513 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7516 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7517 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7519 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7520 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7521 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7522 match msg_events[0] {
7523 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7524 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7525 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7529 match msg_events[1] {
7530 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7534 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7536 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7537 macro_rules! send_payment {
7538 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7539 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7540 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7541 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7542 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7543 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7544 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7545 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7546 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7547 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7549 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7550 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7552 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7553 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7555 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7556 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7557 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7558 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7559 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7560 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7561 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7562 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7564 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7565 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7566 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7568 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7569 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7570 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7571 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7572 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7574 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7577 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7578 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7579 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7580 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7582 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7587 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7588 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);