1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::async_payments::{AsyncPaymentsMessage, HeldHtlcAvailable, ReleaseHeldHtlc, AsyncPaymentsMessageHandler};
70 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
71 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
72 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
73 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
74 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
75 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
76 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
77 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
78 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
79 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
80 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
82 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
84 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
85 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
86 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
87 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
88 crate::sign::KeysManager,
92 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
96 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
99 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::{cmp, mem};
101 use core::cell::RefCell;
103 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
104 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
105 use core::time::Duration;
106 use core::ops::Deref;
108 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
109 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
110 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
112 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
114 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
115 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
116 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
118 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
119 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
120 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
121 // before we forward it.
123 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
124 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
125 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
126 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
127 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
129 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
130 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
131 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
132 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
133 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
135 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
136 /// do with the HTLC.
137 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
138 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
140 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
141 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
142 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
143 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
144 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
145 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
147 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
149 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
150 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
152 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
153 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
154 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
155 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
156 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
158 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
159 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
160 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
161 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
162 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
163 /// blinded path was not used.
165 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
166 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
167 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
169 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
170 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
171 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
172 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
175 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
177 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
178 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
179 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
180 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
181 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
182 requires_blinded_error: bool,
184 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
185 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
186 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
188 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
189 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
191 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
192 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
193 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
194 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
195 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
196 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
197 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
199 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
200 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
201 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
202 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
204 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
205 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
206 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
208 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
209 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
210 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
211 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
212 requires_blinded_error: bool,
216 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
217 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
218 pub struct BlindedForward {
219 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
220 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
221 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
222 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
223 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
224 /// the introduction node.
225 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
228 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
229 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
230 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
232 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
233 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
234 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
240 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
244 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
245 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
246 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
247 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
249 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
250 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
251 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
252 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
253 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
255 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
257 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
258 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
259 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
261 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
262 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
263 /// it along another path).
265 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
266 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
267 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
268 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
269 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
270 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
271 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
272 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
273 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
275 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
278 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
280 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
282 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
285 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
286 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
287 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
288 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
291 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
292 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
293 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
294 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
295 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
298 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
299 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
300 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
302 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
303 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
304 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
307 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
308 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
310 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
311 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
312 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
315 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
316 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
317 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
320 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
325 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
329 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
330 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
331 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
332 pub enum BlindedFailure {
333 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
334 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
335 FromIntroductionNode,
336 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
337 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
341 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
342 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
343 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
344 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
345 short_channel_id: u64,
346 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
348 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
349 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
350 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
351 channel_id: ChannelId,
353 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
354 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
359 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
361 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
362 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
363 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
365 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
366 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
369 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
370 struct ClaimableHTLC {
371 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
373 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
375 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
376 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
377 sender_intended_value: u64,
378 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
380 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
381 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
382 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
383 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
385 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
386 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
389 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
390 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
391 events::ClaimedHTLC {
392 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
393 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
394 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
395 value_msat: val.value,
396 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
401 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
402 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
404 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
405 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
406 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
409 /// Number of bytes in the id.
410 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
413 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
414 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
419 impl Readable for PaymentId {
420 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
421 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
426 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
427 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
428 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
432 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
434 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
435 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
436 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
438 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
444 impl Readable for InterceptId {
445 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
446 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
451 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
452 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
453 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
454 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
455 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
458 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
460 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
461 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
462 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
464 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
465 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
470 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
471 (0, short_channel_id, required),
472 (2, htlc_id, required),
474 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
475 (0, session_priv, required),
480 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
481 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
482 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
483 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
484 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
487 session_priv: SecretKey,
488 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
489 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
490 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
491 payment_id: PaymentId,
494 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
495 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
496 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
498 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
500 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
502 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
505 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
506 payment_id.hash(hasher);
507 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
513 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
515 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
516 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
517 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
518 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
519 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
520 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
524 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
525 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
526 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
527 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
528 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
529 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
531 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
537 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
538 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
540 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
541 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
542 pub enum FailureCode {
543 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
544 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
545 TemporaryNodeFailure,
546 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
547 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
548 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
549 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
550 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
551 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
552 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
553 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
554 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
555 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
557 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
558 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
559 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
562 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
563 fn into(self) -> u16 {
565 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
566 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
567 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
568 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
573 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
574 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
575 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
576 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
577 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
579 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
580 err: msgs::LightningError,
581 closes_channel: bool,
582 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
584 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
586 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
588 err: LightningError {
590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
591 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
597 closes_channel: false,
598 shutdown_finish: None,
602 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
603 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
606 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
607 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
608 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
609 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
610 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
611 // commitment upon reconnecting.
612 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
614 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
617 err: LightningError { err, action },
618 closes_channel: true,
619 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
623 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
626 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
628 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
629 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
633 log_level: Level::Warn,
636 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
638 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
640 ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
642 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
643 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
650 closes_channel: false,
651 shutdown_finish: None,
655 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
660 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
661 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
662 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
663 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
664 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
666 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
667 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
668 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
669 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
670 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
671 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
672 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
674 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
678 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
679 struct ClaimingPayment {
681 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
682 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
683 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
684 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
685 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
687 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
688 (0, amount_msat, required),
689 (2, payment_purpose, required),
690 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
691 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
692 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
693 (9, onion_fields, option),
696 struct ClaimablePayment {
697 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
698 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
699 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
702 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
703 struct ClaimablePayments {
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
705 /// failed/claimed by the user.
707 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
708 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
710 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
711 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
712 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
714 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
715 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
716 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
717 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
720 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
721 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
722 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
723 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
725 enum BackgroundEvent {
726 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
727 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
728 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
729 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
731 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
732 /// are regenerated on startup.
733 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
734 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
735 /// channel to continue normal operation.
737 /// In general this should be used rather than
738 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
739 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
740 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
742 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
743 /// are regenerated on startup.
744 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
745 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
746 funding_txo: OutPoint,
747 channel_id: ChannelId,
748 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
750 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
751 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
753 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
754 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
755 channel_id: ChannelId,
760 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
761 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
762 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
763 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
764 /// event can be generated.
765 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
766 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
767 /// operation of another channel.
769 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
770 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
771 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
772 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
774 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
775 event: events::Event,
776 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
778 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
779 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
780 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
782 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
783 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
784 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
785 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
786 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
788 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
789 /// stored for later processing.
790 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
791 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
792 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
793 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
794 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
798 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
799 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
800 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
801 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
802 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
803 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
804 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
805 (4, blocking_action, required),
806 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
807 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
808 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
810 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
811 (0, event, upgradable_required),
812 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
813 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
814 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
815 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
816 // downgrades to prior versions.
817 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
821 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
822 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
823 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
824 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
825 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
826 channel_id: ChannelId,
829 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
830 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
831 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
832 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
833 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
834 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
835 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
839 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
840 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
841 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
842 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
843 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
844 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
846 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
848 channel_id: ChannelId,
849 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
854 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
855 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
856 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
857 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
858 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
863 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
864 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
868 /// State we hold per-peer.
869 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
870 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
872 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
873 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
874 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
876 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
877 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
878 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
879 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
880 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
881 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
882 latest_features: InitFeatures,
883 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
884 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
885 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
886 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
887 /// user but which have not yet completed.
889 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
890 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
891 /// for a missing channel.
892 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
893 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
894 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
896 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
897 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
898 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
899 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
901 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
902 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
903 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
904 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
905 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
906 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
907 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
908 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
909 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
910 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
911 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
912 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
913 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
915 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
916 pub is_connected: bool,
919 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
920 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
921 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
922 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
923 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
924 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
927 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
929 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
930 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
931 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
932 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
933 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
934 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
937 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
938 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
941 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
942 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
943 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
946 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
947 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
948 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
949 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
953 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
954 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
955 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
956 /// The original OpenChannel message.
957 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
958 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
959 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
962 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
963 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
964 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
966 /// The number of blocks of historical feerate estimates we keep around and consider when deciding
967 /// to force-close a channel for having too-low fees. Also the number of blocks we have to see
968 /// after startup before we consider force-closing channels for having too-low fees.
969 pub(super) const FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS: usize = 144;
971 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
972 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
974 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
977 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
978 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
979 struct PendingInboundPayment {
980 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
981 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
982 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
983 /// this payment being removed.
985 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
986 user_payment_id: u64,
987 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
988 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
989 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
992 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
993 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
994 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
995 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
996 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
997 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
998 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
999 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1001 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1002 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1003 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1011 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1014 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1015 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1016 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1021 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1022 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1023 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1024 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1025 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1026 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1027 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1028 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1029 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1031 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1032 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1033 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1042 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1045 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1046 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1047 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1052 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1054 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1056 pub trait AChannelManager {
1057 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1058 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1059 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1060 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1061 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1062 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1063 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1064 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1065 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1066 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1067 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1068 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1069 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1070 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1071 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1072 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1073 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1074 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1075 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1076 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1077 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1078 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1079 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1080 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1081 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1082 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1083 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1084 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1085 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1086 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1087 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1088 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1089 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1090 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1091 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1092 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1095 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1096 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1098 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1099 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1100 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1102 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1103 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1107 type Watch = M::Target;
1109 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1111 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1113 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1115 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1116 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1118 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1120 type Router = R::Target;
1122 type Logger = L::Target;
1124 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1127 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1128 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1130 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1131 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1133 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1134 /// closing channels
1135 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1136 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1137 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1138 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1140 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1141 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1143 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1144 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1145 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1146 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1147 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1148 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1150 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1151 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1153 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1155 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1156 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1157 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1158 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1159 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1161 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1162 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1163 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1165 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1166 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1167 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1169 /// # Initialization
1171 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1172 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1173 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1174 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1175 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1178 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1179 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1180 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1181 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1182 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1183 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1184 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1185 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1187 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1190 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1191 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1192 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1193 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1195 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1197 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1198 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1199 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1200 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1202 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1203 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1204 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1205 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1206 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1207 /// # mut reader: R,
1208 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1209 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1210 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1211 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1214 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1215 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1216 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1217 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1220 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1221 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1222 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1223 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1224 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1226 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1227 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1229 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1232 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1233 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1234 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1242 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1243 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1244 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1245 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1246 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1247 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1248 /// as documented by those traits
1249 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1251 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1252 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1253 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1255 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1256 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1258 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1259 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1260 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1261 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1265 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1266 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1267 /// currently open channels.
1270 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1272 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1273 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1274 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1275 /// for details in channels {
1276 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1281 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1282 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1283 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1284 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1286 /// ## Opening Channels
1288 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1289 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1290 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1293 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1294 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1295 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1296 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1298 /// # trait Wallet {
1299 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1300 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1301 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1304 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1305 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1306 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1307 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1308 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1309 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1310 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1313 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1314 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1315 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1316 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1317 /// user_channel_id, ..
1319 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1320 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1321 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1323 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1324 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1326 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1327 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1330 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1331 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1333 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1334 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1337 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1338 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1339 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1347 /// ## Accepting Channels
1349 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1350 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1351 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1354 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1355 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1356 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1358 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1360 /// # unimplemented!()
1363 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1364 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1365 /// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1366 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1367 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1368 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1369 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1370 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
1372 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1373 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1378 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1379 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1380 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1382 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1383 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1392 /// ## Closing Channels
1394 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1395 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1396 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1397 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1398 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1401 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1402 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1403 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1404 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1406 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1407 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1409 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1410 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1411 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1412 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1415 /// // On the event processing thread
1416 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1417 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1418 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1419 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1429 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1430 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1431 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1432 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1433 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1436 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1437 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1438 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1439 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1441 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1443 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1444 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1445 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1446 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1447 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1448 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1450 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1451 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1452 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1455 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1456 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1458 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1459 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1460 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1461 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1462 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1464 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1465 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1468 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1471 /// // On the event processing thread
1472 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1473 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1474 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1475 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1476 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1477 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1479 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1480 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1482 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1483 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1484 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1485 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1490 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1491 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1492 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1500 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1501 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1504 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1505 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1506 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1507 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1509 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1510 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1511 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1513 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1514 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1515 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1516 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1517 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1518 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1520 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1521 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1524 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1525 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1527 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1529 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1530 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1531 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1537 /// // On the event processing thread
1538 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1539 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1540 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1547 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1549 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1550 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1551 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1552 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1553 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1554 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1557 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1558 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1559 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1561 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1562 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1563 /// # let absolute_expiry = None;
1564 /// let offer = channel_manager
1565 /// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
1567 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1568 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1569 /// # let offer = builder
1570 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1571 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1573 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1575 /// // On the event processing thread
1576 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1577 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1578 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1579 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1580 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1582 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1583 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1588 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1589 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1598 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1599 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1600 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1603 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1604 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1605 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1607 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1608 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1609 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1611 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1612 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1613 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1614 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1616 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1617 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1620 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1621 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1623 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1625 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1629 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1631 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1633 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1637 /// // On the event processing thread
1638 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1639 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1640 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1641 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1648 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1650 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1651 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1652 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1653 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1656 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1657 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1658 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1659 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1661 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1662 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1663 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1664 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1665 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1666 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1667 /// let refund = channel_manager
1668 /// .create_refund_builder(
1669 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1672 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1673 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1674 /// # let refund = builder
1675 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1676 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1678 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1680 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1681 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1683 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1685 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1689 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1691 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1693 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1697 /// // On the event processing thread
1698 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1699 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1700 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1708 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1709 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1712 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1713 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1714 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1716 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1717 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1718 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1719 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1720 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1721 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1724 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1727 /// // On the event processing thread
1728 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1729 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1730 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1731 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1732 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1733 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1735 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1736 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1741 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1742 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1743 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1753 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1754 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1755 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1756 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1758 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1759 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1760 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1761 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1762 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1763 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1764 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1765 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1766 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1768 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1769 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1770 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1772 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1774 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1775 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1776 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1777 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1778 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1780 /// # DoS Mitigation
1782 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1783 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1784 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1785 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1787 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1788 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1789 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1793 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1794 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1795 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1796 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1797 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1799 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1800 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1801 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1802 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1803 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1804 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1805 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1806 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1807 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1808 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1809 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1810 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1811 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1812 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1813 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1814 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1815 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1816 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1817 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1818 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1819 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1820 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1821 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1822 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1823 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1824 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1825 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1826 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1827 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1828 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1829 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1830 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1831 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1832 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1833 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1834 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1835 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1836 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1837 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1838 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1841 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1842 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1843 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1844 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1845 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1849 // `pending_offers_messages`
1851 // `total_consistency_lock`
1853 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1855 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1857 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1859 // |__`per_peer_state`
1861 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1863 // |__`claimable_payments`
1865 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1869 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1871 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1873 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1877 // |__`pending_events`
1879 // |__`pending_background_events`
1881 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1883 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1884 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1885 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1886 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1887 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1888 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1892 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1893 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1894 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1900 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1902 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1904 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1905 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1907 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1908 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1909 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1910 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1912 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1913 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1915 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1916 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1917 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1918 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1919 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1920 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1921 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1922 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1924 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1926 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1927 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1929 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1931 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1932 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1933 /// and via the classic SCID.
1935 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1936 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1938 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1940 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1942 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1943 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1944 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1946 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1947 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1949 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1951 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1952 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1953 /// and via the classic SCID.
1955 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1956 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1958 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1959 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1961 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1962 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1964 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1965 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1967 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1968 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1969 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1970 /// active channel list on load.
1972 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1973 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1975 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1977 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1978 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1979 /// the handling of the events.
1981 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1982 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1985 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1986 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1987 /// would break backwards compatability.
1988 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1989 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1990 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1992 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1994 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1996 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1998 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
2000 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
2001 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
2002 /// confirmation depth.
2004 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
2005 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
2006 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2008 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2010 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2012 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2014 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2016 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2018 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2019 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2020 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2022 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2023 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2025 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2026 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2027 /// keeping additional state.
2028 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2030 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2031 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2032 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2033 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2035 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2036 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2038 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2039 /// are currently open with that peer.
2041 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2042 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2045 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2047 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2048 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2049 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2050 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2051 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2053 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2054 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2055 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2056 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2057 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2059 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2060 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2062 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2063 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2064 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2065 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2066 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2068 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2069 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2071 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2072 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2073 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2074 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2075 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2077 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2081 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2082 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2083 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2084 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2085 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2086 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2087 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2088 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2089 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2090 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2091 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2093 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2094 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2095 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2097 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2099 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2100 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2102 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2104 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2105 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2107 /// We only want to force-close our channels on peers based on stale feerates when we're
2108 /// confident the feerate on the channel is *really* stale, not just became stale recently.
2109 /// Thus, we store the fee estimates we had as of the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks
2110 /// (after startup completed) here, and only force-close when channels have a lower feerate
2111 /// than we predicted any time in the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks.
2113 /// We only keep this in memory as we assume any feerates we receive immediately after startup
2114 /// may be bunk (as they often are if Bitcoin Core crashes) and want to delay taking any
2115 /// actions for a day anyway.
2117 /// The first element in the pair is the
2118 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate, the second the
2119 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate.
2120 last_days_feerates: Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, u32)>>,
2124 signer_provider: SP,
2129 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2131 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2132 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2133 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2134 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2135 pub struct ChainParameters {
2136 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2137 pub network: Network,
2139 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2141 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2142 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2145 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2149 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2150 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2153 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2154 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2155 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2156 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2157 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2158 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2160 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2161 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2162 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2163 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2164 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2165 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2167 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2168 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2171 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2172 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2173 /// events to handle.
2175 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2176 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2178 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2179 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2182 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2183 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2184 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2185 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2187 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2188 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2189 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2190 should_persist: move || {
2191 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2192 // processing and return that.
2193 let notify = persist_check();
2194 match (notify, force_notify) {
2195 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2196 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2197 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2198 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2199 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2202 _read_guard: read_guard,
2206 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2207 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2208 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2209 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2210 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2211 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2213 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2214 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2215 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2216 should_persist: persist_check,
2217 _read_guard: read_guard,
2222 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2223 fn drop(&mut self) {
2224 match (self.should_persist)() {
2225 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2226 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2227 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2229 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2230 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2231 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2236 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2237 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2239 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2241 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2242 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2243 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2244 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2245 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2247 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2248 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2250 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2252 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2253 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2254 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2255 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2256 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2257 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2258 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2259 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2260 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2261 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2262 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2263 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2264 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2266 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2267 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2269 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2270 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2271 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2272 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2274 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2275 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2276 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2277 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2278 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2279 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2281 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2283 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2284 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2286 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2288 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2289 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2291 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2292 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2293 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2295 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2296 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2297 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2299 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2300 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2301 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2302 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2304 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2305 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2306 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2308 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2309 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2310 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2312 /// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
2313 /// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
2315 /// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
2316 /// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
2317 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
2318 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
2320 /// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
2321 /// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
2322 /// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
2323 pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
2325 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2326 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2327 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2328 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2329 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2331 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2332 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2333 payment_id: PaymentId,
2335 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2337 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2338 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2339 payment_id: PaymentId,
2340 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2342 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2343 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2344 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2347 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2348 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2349 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2351 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2352 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2353 payment_id: PaymentId,
2354 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2355 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2356 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2358 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2359 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2360 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2362 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2363 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2364 payment_id: PaymentId,
2365 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2366 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2370 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2372 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2374 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2375 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2376 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2377 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2379 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2380 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2381 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2384 macro_rules! handle_error {
2385 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2386 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2387 // entering the macro.
2388 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2389 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2393 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2394 let mut msg_event = None;
2396 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2397 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2398 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2399 let logger = WithContext::from(
2400 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2402 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2404 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2405 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2406 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2407 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2412 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2415 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2417 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2418 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2419 action: err.action.clone()
2423 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2424 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2425 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2426 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2427 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2431 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2438 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2439 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2440 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2441 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2443 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2444 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2445 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2447 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2448 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2449 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2450 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2451 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2453 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2454 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2456 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2460 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2461 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2462 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2464 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2465 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2467 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2468 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2470 ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
2471 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2472 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2474 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2476 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2481 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2482 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2484 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2485 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2487 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2488 match $channel_phase {
2489 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2490 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2492 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2493 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2495 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2496 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2498 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2499 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2500 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2502 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2503 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2504 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2510 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2511 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2515 let key = *$entry.key();
2516 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2518 $entry.remove_entry();
2526 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2527 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2531 let key = *$entry.key();
2532 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2534 $entry.remove_entry();
2542 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2543 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2545 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2546 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2552 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2553 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2554 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2555 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2556 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2558 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2559 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2560 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2561 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2562 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2563 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2564 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2565 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2566 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2567 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2572 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2573 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2574 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2575 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2576 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2577 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2578 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2579 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2580 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2581 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2583 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2588 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2589 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2590 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2591 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2592 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2593 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2594 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2595 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2596 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2598 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2603 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2604 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2605 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2606 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2607 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2608 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2609 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2610 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2611 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2612 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2613 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2614 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2616 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2617 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2618 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2624 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2625 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2627 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2628 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2629 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2630 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2631 updates.announcement_sigs);
2632 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2633 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2636 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2637 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2638 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2639 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2641 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2642 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2643 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2644 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2645 let mut batch_completed = false;
2646 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2647 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2648 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2649 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2651 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2652 channel_state.2 = true;
2654 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2656 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2658 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2661 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2662 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2663 if batch_completed {
2664 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2665 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2666 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2667 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2668 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2669 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2670 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2671 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2672 chan.set_batch_ready();
2673 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2674 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2678 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2679 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2680 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2685 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2687 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2688 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2690 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2691 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2693 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2694 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2695 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2696 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2701 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2702 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2703 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2704 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2706 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2707 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2708 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2709 panic!("{}", err_str);
2711 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2712 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2713 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2716 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2722 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2723 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2724 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2726 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2727 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2728 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2729 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2730 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2731 // filter for uniqueness here.
2732 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2733 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2734 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2735 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2737 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2738 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2740 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2741 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2742 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2748 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2749 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2750 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2751 while !processed_all_events {
2752 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2759 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2760 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2761 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2763 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2764 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2765 result = $self.process_background_events();
2767 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2768 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2769 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2770 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2774 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2775 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2776 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2780 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2782 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2783 $event_to_handle = event;
2785 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2786 post_event_actions.push(action);
2791 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2792 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2793 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2794 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2795 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2796 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2799 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2800 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2801 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2802 processed_all_events = false;
2806 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2807 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2808 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2810 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2811 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2812 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2818 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2820 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2821 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2822 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2823 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2824 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2825 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2829 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2831 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2833 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2834 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2836 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2838 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2839 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2840 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2843 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2844 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2845 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2847 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2848 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2849 current_timestamp: u32,
2851 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2852 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2853 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2854 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2856 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2857 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2858 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2863 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2865 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2866 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2867 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2868 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2869 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2870 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2871 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2872 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2873 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2875 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2878 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2879 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2881 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2883 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2885 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2887 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2888 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2889 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2890 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2891 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2892 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2893 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2894 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2896 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2897 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2899 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2909 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2910 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2911 &self.default_configuration
2914 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2915 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2916 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2919 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2920 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2922 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2924 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2928 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2933 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2935 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2936 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2937 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2938 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2939 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2941 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2942 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2944 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2945 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2946 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2948 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2949 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2950 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2952 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2953 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2955 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2956 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2957 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2958 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2959 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2960 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2962 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2963 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2964 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2965 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2966 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2970 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2971 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2972 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2976 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2977 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2979 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2981 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2982 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2983 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2988 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2989 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2990 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2991 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2992 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2993 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2997 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3002 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3004 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3005 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3006 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3010 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3017 node_id: their_network_key,
3020 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3023 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3024 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3025 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3026 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3027 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3028 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3029 // the same channel.
3030 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3032 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3033 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3034 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3035 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3036 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3037 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3038 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3039 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3040 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3044 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3045 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3046 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3054 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3055 /// more information.
3056 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3057 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3058 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3059 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3060 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3061 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3062 // the same channel.
3063 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3065 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3066 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3067 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3068 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3069 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3070 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3071 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3072 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3080 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3081 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3083 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3084 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3086 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3087 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3088 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3089 // really wanted anyway.
3090 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3093 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3094 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3095 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3098 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3099 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3100 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3101 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3102 let context_to_details = |context| {
3103 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3105 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3107 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3108 .map(context_to_details)
3114 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3115 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3117 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3118 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3119 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3121 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3122 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3123 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3124 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3125 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3126 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3128 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3129 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3130 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3132 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3133 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3134 payment_id: *payment_id,
3135 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3136 total_msat: *total_msat,
3139 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3140 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3142 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3143 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3145 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3150 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3151 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3153 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3154 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3160 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3162 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3163 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3167 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3168 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3169 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3170 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3171 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3172 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3174 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3175 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3176 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3177 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3178 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3182 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3183 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3185 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3186 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3187 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3188 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3191 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3192 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
3195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3196 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3198 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3199 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3206 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3207 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3208 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3209 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3212 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3213 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3219 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3220 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3221 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3223 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3224 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3226 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3227 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3228 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3229 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3231 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3233 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3234 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3235 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3238 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3239 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3240 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3241 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3242 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3243 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3246 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3247 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3248 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3250 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3251 /// the channel being closed or not:
3252 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3253 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3254 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3255 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3256 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3257 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3258 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3260 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3261 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3262 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3263 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3265 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3267 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3268 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3269 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3272 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3273 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3274 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3275 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3276 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3279 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3280 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3281 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3282 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3283 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3286 let logger = WithContext::from(
3287 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3290 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3291 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3292 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3293 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3294 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3295 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3296 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3298 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3299 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3300 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3301 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3302 // ignore the result here.
3303 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3305 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3306 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3307 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3308 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3310 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3311 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3312 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3313 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3314 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3315 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3316 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3319 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3322 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3323 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3328 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3329 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3330 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3331 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3332 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3333 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3334 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3335 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3338 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3339 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3340 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3344 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3345 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3349 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3350 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3351 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3352 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3353 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3354 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3355 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3356 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3357 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3358 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3359 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3361 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(broadcast) }
3363 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3364 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3365 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3366 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3367 mem::drop(peer_state);
3368 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3370 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3371 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3372 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3374 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3375 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3376 // Unfunded channel has no update
3377 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3379 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3380 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3381 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3382 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3383 // Unfunded channel has no update
3384 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3387 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3388 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3389 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3390 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3392 (None, *peer_node_id)
3394 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3397 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3398 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3399 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3400 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3405 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3408 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool, error_message: String)
3409 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3410 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3411 log_debug!(self.logger,
3412 "Force-closing channel, The error message sent to the peer : {}", error_message);
3413 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3414 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3416 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3417 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3418 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3419 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3420 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3421 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3422 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: error_message }
3433 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s),
3434 /// rejecting new HTLCs.
3436 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing
3437 /// channels and should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3439 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id`
3440 /// isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3441 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3442 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3443 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, error_message)
3446 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3447 /// the latest local transaction(s).
3449 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3450 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3452 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3453 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3454 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3455 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3456 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3457 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3458 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, error_message)
3461 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3462 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3464 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3465 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3466 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3467 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3468 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3472 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3473 /// local transaction(s).
3475 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and
3476 /// should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3477 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3478 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3479 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3483 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3484 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3485 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3486 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3487 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3488 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3489 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3490 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3492 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3493 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3494 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3495 // we don't have the channel here.
3496 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3499 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3500 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3501 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3502 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3503 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3504 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3505 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3506 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3507 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3508 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3509 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.channel_flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3510 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3512 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3515 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3516 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3517 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3519 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3520 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3521 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3527 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3528 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3529 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3530 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3532 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3533 None => return None,
3534 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3536 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3537 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3538 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3543 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3544 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3547 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3551 fn can_forward_htlc(
3552 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3553 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3554 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3555 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3558 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3560 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3561 // intercept forward.
3562 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3563 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3564 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3566 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3571 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3572 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3573 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3575 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3576 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3578 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3584 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3585 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3586 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3587 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3588 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3589 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3590 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3591 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3592 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3593 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3595 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3596 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3598 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3599 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3600 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3602 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3603 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3604 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3605 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3606 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3607 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3608 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3610 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3614 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3615 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3617 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3618 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3619 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3620 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3621 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3622 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3623 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3627 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3628 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3630 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3632 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3633 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3634 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3635 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3636 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3640 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3641 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3643 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3645 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3646 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3649 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3650 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3651 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3652 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3655 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3656 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3657 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3658 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3659 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3660 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3661 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3665 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3668 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3669 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3670 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3671 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3672 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3673 macro_rules! return_err {
3674 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3676 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3677 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3678 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3679 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3680 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3681 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3682 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3683 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3684 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3688 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3689 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3690 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3691 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3692 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3698 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3700 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3701 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3702 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3703 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3706 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3707 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3708 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3709 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3710 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3712 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3715 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3716 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3717 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3718 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3719 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3725 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3726 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3727 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3729 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3730 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3731 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3733 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3734 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3735 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3736 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3737 return Err(LightningError {
3738 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3739 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3742 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3743 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3745 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3746 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3747 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3750 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3751 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3752 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3753 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3755 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3756 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3757 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3759 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3760 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3761 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3762 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3763 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3764 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3765 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3769 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3772 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3773 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3774 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3775 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3777 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3778 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3779 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3780 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3781 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3784 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3785 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3787 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3788 message_flags: 1, // Only must_be_one
3789 channel_flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3790 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3791 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3792 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3793 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3794 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3795 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3797 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3798 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3799 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3801 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3803 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3810 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3811 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3812 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3813 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3814 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3818 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3819 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3820 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3823 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3824 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3825 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3826 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3828 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3829 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3830 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3832 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3833 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3837 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3838 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3840 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3841 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3842 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3844 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3847 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3849 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3850 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3854 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3857 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3858 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3859 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3860 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3861 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3863 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3864 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3865 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3866 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3868 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3869 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3871 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3872 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3873 Some(monitor_update) => {
3874 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3876 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3877 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3878 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3879 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3880 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3881 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3882 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3890 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3893 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3894 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3895 // `channel_by_id` map.
3896 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3897 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3901 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3902 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3904 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3909 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3911 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3912 /// fields for more info.
3914 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3915 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3917 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3919 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3920 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3921 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3922 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3923 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3925 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3926 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3927 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3928 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3929 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3931 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3932 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3933 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3934 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3936 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3938 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3939 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3940 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3942 /// In general, a path may raise:
3943 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3944 /// node public key) is specified.
3945 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3946 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3947 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3948 /// relevant updates.
3950 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3951 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3952 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3954 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3955 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3956 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3957 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3958 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3959 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3960 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3961 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3963 self.pending_outbound_payments
3964 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3965 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3966 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3969 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3970 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3971 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3972 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3974 self.pending_outbound_payments
3975 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3976 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3977 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3978 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3982 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3983 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3985 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3986 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3987 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3991 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3992 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3993 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3997 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3998 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4001 /// Pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] associated with the `payment_id` encoded in its `payer_metadata`.
4003 /// The invoice's `payer_metadata` is used to authenticate that the invoice was indeed requested
4004 /// before attempting a payment. [`Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice`] is returned if this
4005 /// fails or if the encoded `payment_id` is not recognized. The latter may happen once the
4006 /// payment is no longer tracked because the payment was attempted after:
4007 /// - an invoice for the `payment_id` was already paid,
4008 /// - one full [timer tick] has elapsed since initially requesting the invoice when paying an
4010 /// - the refund corresponding to the invoice has already expired.
4012 /// To retry the payment, request another invoice using a new `payment_id`.
4014 /// Attempting to pay the same invoice twice while the first payment is still pending will
4015 /// result in a [`Bolt12PaymentError::DuplicateInvoice`].
4017 /// Otherwise, either [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] are used to indicate
4018 /// whether or not the payment was successful.
4020 /// [timer tick]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
4021 pub fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4022 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
4023 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
4024 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
4025 Ok(payment_id) => self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(invoice, payment_id),
4026 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12PaymentError::UnexpectedInvoice),
4030 fn send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4032 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4033 self.pending_outbound_payments
4034 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4035 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4036 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, &self,
4037 &self.secp_ctx, best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4038 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4042 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4043 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4044 /// retries are exhausted.
4046 /// # Event Generation
4048 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4049 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4051 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4052 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4053 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4055 /// # Requested Invoices
4057 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4058 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4059 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4060 /// once the invoice has been received.
4062 /// # Restart Behavior
4064 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4065 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4066 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4068 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4069 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4071 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4074 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4075 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4076 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4077 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4078 /// never reach the recipient.
4080 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4081 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4083 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4084 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4086 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4087 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4088 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4090 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4091 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4092 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4095 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4096 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4098 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4101 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4102 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4103 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4105 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4106 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4107 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4108 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4111 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4112 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4113 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4114 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4115 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4117 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4118 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4119 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4122 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4125 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4126 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4129 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4130 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4132 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4133 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4134 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4135 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4136 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4137 let payment_params =
4138 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4140 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4142 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4145 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4146 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4148 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4149 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4150 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4151 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4153 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4154 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4155 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4156 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4157 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4158 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4159 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4160 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4161 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4162 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4164 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4165 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4166 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4167 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4171 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4173 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4174 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4177 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4179 let mut res = Vec::new();
4181 for mut path in route.paths {
4182 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4183 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4184 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4185 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4186 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4189 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4192 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4193 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4195 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4197 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4198 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4203 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4206 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4211 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4212 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4213 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4215 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4216 let used_liquidity =
4217 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4219 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4220 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4222 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4225 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4230 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4231 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4232 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4239 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4240 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4241 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4242 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4243 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4244 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4245 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4246 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4247 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4249 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4250 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4252 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4253 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4254 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4256 let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
4257 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4258 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4259 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4260 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4261 } else { unreachable!(); };
4263 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4264 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4265 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4268 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4269 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4271 let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
4272 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4273 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4277 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4278 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4280 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4281 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4282 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4283 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4288 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4289 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4291 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4292 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4295 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4296 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4297 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4301 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4302 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4303 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4307 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4309 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4312 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4313 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4317 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4318 funding_txo, o.get()
4320 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4321 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4322 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4323 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4324 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4325 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4328 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4335 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4336 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4337 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4341 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4343 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4344 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4346 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4347 /// across the p2p network.
4349 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4350 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4352 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4353 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4354 /// keys per-channel).
4356 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4357 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4358 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4360 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4361 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4362 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4364 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4365 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4366 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4367 /// for more details.
4369 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4370 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4371 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4372 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4375 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4377 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4378 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4380 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4381 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4382 /// signature for each channel.
4384 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4385 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4386 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4387 let mut result = Ok(());
4389 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4390 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4391 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4392 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4393 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4398 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4399 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4400 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4404 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4405 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4406 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4407 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4408 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4409 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4410 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4411 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4413 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4414 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4419 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4420 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4421 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4422 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4426 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4427 match states.entry(txid) {
4428 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4429 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4430 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4434 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4437 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4438 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4439 temporary_channel_id,
4440 counterparty_node_id,
4441 funding_transaction.clone(),
4444 let mut output_index = None;
4445 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4446 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4447 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4448 if output_index.is_some() {
4449 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4451 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4454 if output_index.is_none() {
4455 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4457 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4458 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4459 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4460 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4461 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4462 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4468 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4469 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4470 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4471 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4472 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4473 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4474 .into_iter().flatten()
4475 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4477 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4478 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4480 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4483 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4484 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4485 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4486 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4487 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4488 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4489 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4490 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4491 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4492 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4493 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4494 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4496 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4503 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4504 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4505 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4511 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4513 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4514 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4515 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4516 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4518 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4519 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4521 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4522 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4524 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4526 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4527 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4528 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4529 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4530 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4531 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4532 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4533 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4534 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4535 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4536 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4538 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4545 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4549 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4550 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4551 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4552 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4556 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4557 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4558 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4559 config.apply(config_update);
4560 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4563 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4564 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4565 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4566 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4567 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4569 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4576 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4577 debug_assert!(false);
4578 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4580 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4581 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4588 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4590 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4591 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4592 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4593 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4595 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4596 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4598 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4599 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4601 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4603 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4604 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4605 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4606 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4607 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4608 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4609 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4610 pub fn update_channel_config(
4611 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4612 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4613 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4616 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4617 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4619 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4620 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4622 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4623 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4624 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4625 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4626 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4628 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4629 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4630 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4633 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4636 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4637 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4638 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4639 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4640 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4641 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4642 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4644 let next_hop_scid = {
4645 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4646 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4647 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4650 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4651 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4652 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4653 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4654 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4657 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4659 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4660 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4661 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4664 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4665 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4666 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4667 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4668 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4675 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4676 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4677 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4680 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4681 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4682 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4683 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4686 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4688 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4689 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4690 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4691 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4692 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4695 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4696 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4697 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4698 payment.prev_channel_id,
4699 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4700 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4702 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4706 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4707 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4709 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4712 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4713 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4714 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4716 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4717 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4718 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4721 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4722 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4723 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4724 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4725 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4726 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4727 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4728 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4729 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4730 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4733 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4734 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4736 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4741 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4742 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4743 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4745 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4746 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4747 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4748 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4749 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4750 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4751 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4753 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4754 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4758 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4762 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4763 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4764 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4765 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4766 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4767 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4768 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4769 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4772 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4773 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4774 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4775 incoming_channel_details
4777 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4781 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4782 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4783 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4784 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4785 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4787 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4789 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4794 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4795 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4797 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4798 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4799 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4800 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4801 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4805 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4806 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4807 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4808 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4813 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4814 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4815 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4817 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4818 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4821 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4822 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4825 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4826 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4827 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4828 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4830 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4831 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4832 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4834 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4835 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4840 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4841 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4842 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4844 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4845 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4847 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4848 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4849 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4854 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4855 // proposed to as a batch.
4856 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4857 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4858 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4859 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4860 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4861 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4862 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4863 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4865 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4866 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4867 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4868 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4871 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4872 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4873 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4874 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4880 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4882 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4883 /// Will likely generate further events.
4884 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4887 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4889 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4890 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4891 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4893 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4894 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4896 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4897 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4898 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4899 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4900 ($forward_infos: expr) => {
4901 for forward_info in $forward_infos {
4902 match forward_info {
4903 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4904 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4905 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4906 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4907 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4910 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4911 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4912 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4913 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4915 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4916 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4917 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4918 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4919 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4920 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4921 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4922 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4923 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4926 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4927 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4929 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4932 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4933 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4939 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4940 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4942 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4946 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4947 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4949 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4953 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4954 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4955 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4956 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4957 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4958 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4959 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4962 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4963 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4964 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4965 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4966 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4968 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4970 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4971 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4975 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4976 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4977 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4978 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4979 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4980 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4982 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4983 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4989 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4992 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4995 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4996 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4997 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4998 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4999 // problem, not ours.
5005 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5006 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5007 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5009 forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
5013 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5015 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5016 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5017 forwarding_channel_not_found!(pending_forwards.drain(..));
5020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 let mut draining_pending_forwards = pending_forwards.drain(..);
5023 while let Some(forward_info) = draining_pending_forwards.next() {
5024 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5025 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5026 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5027 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5028 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5029 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5030 ref onion_packet, blinded, ..
5031 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5034 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5035 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5036 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5037 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5038 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5039 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5040 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5041 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5042 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5043 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5045 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5046 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5047 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5048 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5049 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5050 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5054 // Forward the HTLC over the most appropriate channel with the corresponding peer,
5055 // applying non-strict forwarding.
5056 // The channel with the least amount of outbound liquidity will be used to maximize the
5057 // probability of being able to successfully forward a subsequent HTLC.
5058 let maybe_optimal_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.values_mut().filter_map(|phase| match phase {
5059 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5060 let balances = chan.context.get_available_balances(&self.fee_estimator);
5061 if outgoing_amt_msat <= balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat &&
5062 outgoing_amt_msat >= balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat &&
5063 chan.context.is_usable() {
5064 Some((chan, balances))
5070 }).min_by_key(|(_, balances)| balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat).map(|(c, _)| c);
5071 let optimal_channel = match maybe_optimal_channel {
5074 // Fall back to the specified channel to return an appropriate error.
5075 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5078 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5084 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &optimal_channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
5085 let channel_description = if optimal_channel.context.get_short_channel_id() == Some(short_chan_id) {
5090 log_trace!(logger, "Forwarding HTLC from SCID {} with payment_hash {} and next hop SCID {} over {} channel {} with corresponding peer {}",
5091 prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id, channel_description, optimal_channel.context.channel_id(), &counterparty_node_id);
5092 if let Err(e) = optimal_channel.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5093 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5094 onion_packet.clone(), skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5097 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5098 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {} to peer {}: {}", &payment_hash, &counterparty_node_id, msg);
5100 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5103 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5104 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5105 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5106 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5107 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5110 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5116 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5117 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5119 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5120 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5121 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5122 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5123 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), &&logger), htlc_id))
5125 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5129 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5130 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5131 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5132 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5133 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5134 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5136 Some((res, htlc_id))
5138 forwarding_channel_not_found!(core::iter::once(forward_info).chain(draining_pending_forwards));
5143 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5144 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5145 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5146 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5147 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5148 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5151 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5153 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5154 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5155 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5161 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5162 match forward_info {
5163 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5164 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5165 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5166 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5167 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5170 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5171 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5172 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5173 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5174 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5175 requires_blinded_error: _
5177 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5178 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5179 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5180 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5181 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5183 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5184 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5185 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5187 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5188 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5192 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5193 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5196 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5199 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5200 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5201 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5202 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5203 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5204 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5205 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5206 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5207 phantom_shared_secret,
5210 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5211 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5212 // if routing nodes overpay
5213 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5214 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5216 total_value_received: None,
5217 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5220 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5223 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5225 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5226 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5227 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5228 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5229 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5230 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5232 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5233 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5234 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5235 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5236 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5237 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5238 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5239 phantom_shared_secret,
5242 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5243 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5245 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5248 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5249 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5250 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5251 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5252 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5255 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5256 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5257 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5258 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5259 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5260 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5261 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5263 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5264 .entry(payment_hash)
5265 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5266 .or_insert_with(|| {
5267 committed_to_claimable = true;
5269 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5272 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5273 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5274 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5275 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5277 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5278 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5279 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5281 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5282 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5283 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5286 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5288 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5289 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5290 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5291 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5292 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5293 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5294 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5295 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5296 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5297 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5299 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5301 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5302 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5303 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5304 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5305 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5306 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5308 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5309 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5310 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5311 committed_to_claimable = true;
5313 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5314 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5315 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5316 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5317 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5318 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5319 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5320 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5321 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5325 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5326 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5327 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5328 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5329 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5331 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5333 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5334 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5336 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5337 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5338 committed_to_claimable = true;
5341 payment_claimable_generated
5345 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5346 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5347 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5348 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5349 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5350 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5351 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5352 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5353 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5354 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5355 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5356 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5357 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5358 Ok(result) => result,
5360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5361 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5364 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5365 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5366 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5368 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5369 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5372 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5374 payment_data.payment_secret,
5377 check_total_value!(purpose);
5379 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5380 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5381 check_total_value!(purpose);
5385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5386 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5388 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5390 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5391 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5394 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5396 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5397 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5399 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5400 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5401 payment_data.payment_secret,
5404 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5405 if payment_claimable_generated {
5406 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5412 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5413 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5422 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5423 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5424 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5426 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5427 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5429 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5431 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5432 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5433 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5435 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5437 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5438 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5439 events.append(&mut new_events);
5442 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5444 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5445 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5446 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5448 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5450 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5451 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5452 if background_events.is_empty() {
5453 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5456 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5458 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5459 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5460 // monitor updating completing.
5461 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5463 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5464 let mut updated_chan = false;
5466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5467 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5468 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5469 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5470 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5471 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5472 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5473 updated_chan = true;
5474 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5475 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5477 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5480 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5485 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5486 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5489 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5490 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5491 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5494 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5495 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5497 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5498 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5499 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5500 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5501 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5507 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5510 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5511 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5512 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5513 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5514 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5517 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5518 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5520 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5522 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5523 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5524 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5526 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5527 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5528 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5529 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5531 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5532 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5534 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5535 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5539 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5540 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5541 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5542 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5543 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5544 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5545 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5547 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5548 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5550 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5551 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5552 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5553 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5554 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5555 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5557 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5562 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5563 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5571 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5573 /// This currently includes:
5574 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5575 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5576 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5578 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5579 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5580 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5581 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5582 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5583 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5584 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5585 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5587 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5588 /// estimate fetches.
5590 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5591 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5592 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5593 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5594 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5596 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5597 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5599 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5600 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5601 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5602 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5604 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5605 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5606 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5607 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5608 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5609 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5611 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5612 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5613 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5615 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5616 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5617 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(false) }));
5618 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5619 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5621 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5622 channel_id: *chan_id,
5623 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5635 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5638 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5639 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5640 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5642 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5643 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5648 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5649 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5651 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5652 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5653 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5654 if needs_close { return false; }
5657 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5658 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5659 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5660 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5661 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5662 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5663 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5664 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5666 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5667 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5669 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5670 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5674 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5676 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5679 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5681 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5682 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5683 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5684 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5685 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5689 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5691 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5697 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5699 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5700 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5701 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5702 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5703 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5704 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5705 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5706 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5707 channel_id: *chan_id,
5708 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5716 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5717 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5718 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5720 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5721 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5722 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5724 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5725 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5726 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5727 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5729 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5730 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5731 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5732 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5737 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5738 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5739 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5740 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5741 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5742 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5743 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5744 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5745 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5751 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5753 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5754 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5759 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5760 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5761 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5762 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5763 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5764 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5765 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5766 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5767 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5768 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5769 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5771 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5772 // have no channels to the peer.
5773 let remove_entry = {
5774 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5775 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5778 entry.remove_entry();
5781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5786 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5787 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5788 // This should be unreachable
5789 debug_assert!(false);
5792 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5793 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5794 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5795 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5796 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5797 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5798 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5801 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5802 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5803 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5805 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5806 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5813 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5814 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5815 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5816 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5820 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5821 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5824 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5825 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5828 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5829 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5830 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5831 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5832 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5833 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5834 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5837 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5838 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5841 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5842 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5843 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5844 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5845 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5852 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5853 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5854 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5856 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5857 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5858 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5859 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5861 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5862 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5863 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5864 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5865 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5869 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5870 /// reason for the failure.
5872 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5873 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5876 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5877 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5878 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5879 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5880 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5881 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5887 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5888 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5889 match failure_code {
5890 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5891 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5892 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5893 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5894 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5895 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5897 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5898 let fail_data = match data {
5899 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5902 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5907 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5908 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5910 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5912 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5913 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5914 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5915 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5916 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5917 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5918 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5920 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5922 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5923 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5925 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5930 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5931 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5932 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5933 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5934 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5935 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5936 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5937 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5938 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5939 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5941 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5942 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5943 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5944 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5946 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5947 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5948 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5949 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5950 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5954 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5955 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5956 // be surfaced to the user.
5957 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5958 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5959 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5961 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5963 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5966 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5968 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5969 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5971 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5972 debug_assert!(false);
5973 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5978 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5981 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5982 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5983 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5984 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5988 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5989 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5990 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5993 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5994 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5995 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5996 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5997 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5998 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5999 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6000 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6001 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6002 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6005 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6006 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6007 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6010 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6011 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6012 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6013 let mut push_forward_event;
6015 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6016 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6017 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6018 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6020 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6021 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6022 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6025 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
6026 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6027 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6029 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6030 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6031 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6032 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6033 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6035 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6037 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6038 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6040 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6041 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6045 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6046 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6048 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6052 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6053 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6054 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6055 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6056 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6057 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6060 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6063 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6064 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6065 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6066 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6067 failed_next_destination: destination,
6074 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6075 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6077 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6078 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6079 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6080 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6082 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6083 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6084 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6085 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6087 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6088 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6089 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6091 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6092 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6093 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6094 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6095 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6096 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6097 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6098 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6099 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6102 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6103 /// even type numbers.
6107 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6108 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6110 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6111 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6112 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6115 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6116 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6121 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6122 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6123 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6124 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6125 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6126 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6127 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6128 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6133 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6134 .entry(payment_hash)
6136 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6137 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6140 .or_insert_with(|| {
6141 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6142 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6144 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6145 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6148 sender_intended_value,
6149 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6153 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6154 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6155 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6156 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6157 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6158 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6159 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6160 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6161 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6162 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6172 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6174 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6175 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6176 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6177 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6178 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6179 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6180 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6181 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6182 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6184 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6185 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6186 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6187 debug_assert!(false);
6191 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6193 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6194 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6195 debug_assert!(false);
6199 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6200 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6202 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6203 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6204 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6205 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6208 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6209 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6210 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6211 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6215 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6216 self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6217 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6218 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6219 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6220 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6226 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6227 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6228 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6229 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6230 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6231 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6232 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6234 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6237 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6238 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6239 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6240 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(
6245 &self, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6246 completion_action: ComplFunc,
6248 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6250 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6251 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6252 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6253 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6255 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6256 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6257 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6258 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6261 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6262 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6263 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6264 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6268 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6269 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6270 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6273 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6276 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6277 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6278 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6279 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6280 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6283 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6284 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6285 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6287 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6290 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6291 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6293 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6294 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6295 // monitor update as a background event.
6296 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6297 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6298 counterparty_node_id,
6299 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6300 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6301 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6305 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6306 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6311 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6313 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6315 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6316 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6317 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6318 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6319 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6321 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6323 debug_assert!(false,
6324 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6327 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6328 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6329 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6330 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6331 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6333 let mut found_blocker = false;
6334 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6335 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6336 // which case we need to only remove the one
6337 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6338 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6339 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6340 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6342 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6345 debug_assert!(false);
6354 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6355 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6356 counterparty_node_id: None,
6357 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6360 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6364 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6365 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6366 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6367 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6368 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6369 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6370 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6371 // again on restart.
6372 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6373 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6374 payment_preimage, update_res);
6377 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6378 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6380 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6381 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6382 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6383 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6384 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6385 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6386 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6387 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6388 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6389 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6392 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6393 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6394 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6395 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6396 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6397 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6400 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6401 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6404 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6405 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6406 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6407 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6410 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6411 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6412 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6413 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6414 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6416 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6417 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6418 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6420 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6421 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6424 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6425 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6426 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6427 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6429 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6430 self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6431 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6432 let chan_to_release =
6433 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6434 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6436 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6437 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6438 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6439 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6444 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6445 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6446 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6447 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6448 // in the background.
6449 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6450 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6451 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6452 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6454 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6455 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6456 funding_txo, update, ..
6458 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6459 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6460 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6461 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6463 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6469 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6470 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6471 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6473 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6474 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6476 monitor_update.updates[0],
6477 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6482 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6483 // immediately once we get going.
6484 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6487 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6489 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6492 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6493 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6494 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6495 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6496 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6497 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6498 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6502 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6503 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6504 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6507 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6508 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6509 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6510 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6511 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6512 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6513 prev_user_channel_id,
6514 next_user_channel_id,
6515 total_fee_earned_msat,
6517 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6518 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6520 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6528 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6529 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6530 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6533 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6534 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6535 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6536 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6538 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6540 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6541 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6542 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6544 payment_purpose: purpose,
6547 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6550 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6554 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6556 sender_intended_total_msat,
6561 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6562 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6564 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6565 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6566 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6569 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6570 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6572 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6573 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6574 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6575 downstream_channel_id,
6576 Some(blocking_action),
6583 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6584 /// update completion.
6585 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6586 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6587 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6588 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6589 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6590 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6591 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6592 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6593 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6594 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6595 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6596 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6597 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6598 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6599 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6600 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6602 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6603 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6605 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6606 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6607 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6608 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6610 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6611 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6612 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6615 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6616 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6618 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6620 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6625 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6626 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6627 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6628 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6633 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6634 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6635 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6636 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6637 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6642 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6646 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6652 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6653 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6654 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6659 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6660 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6663 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6666 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6667 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6669 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6670 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6672 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6673 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6674 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6675 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6676 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6681 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6682 let mut peer_state_lock;
6683 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6684 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6685 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6686 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6688 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6691 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6692 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6693 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6694 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6695 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6698 let remaining_in_flight =
6699 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6700 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6703 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6704 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6705 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6706 remaining_in_flight);
6707 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || remaining_in_flight != 0 {
6710 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6713 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6715 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6716 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6719 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6720 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6721 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6723 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6724 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6725 /// used to accept such channels.
6727 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6728 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6729 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6730 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6733 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6734 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6736 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6737 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6738 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6740 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6741 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6743 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6744 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6746 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6747 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6749 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6750 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6751 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6752 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6755 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6757 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6758 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6760 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6761 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6763 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6765 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6766 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6768 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6772 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6774 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6775 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6776 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6778 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6779 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6780 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6781 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6782 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6783 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6784 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6787 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6788 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6790 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6796 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6797 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6798 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6799 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6801 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6805 Ok(mut channel) => {
6807 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6808 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6809 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6810 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6811 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6812 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6813 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6816 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6817 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6818 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6820 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6822 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6823 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6824 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6825 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6826 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6827 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6828 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6829 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6832 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6833 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6834 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6836 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6840 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6841 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6842 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6844 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6845 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6846 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6849 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6856 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6857 /// or 0-conf channels.
6859 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6860 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6861 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6862 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6863 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6864 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6866 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6867 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6868 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6869 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6870 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6871 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6872 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6876 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6879 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6880 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6882 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6883 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6885 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6886 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6887 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6888 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6889 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6891 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6894 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6895 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6896 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6899 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6900 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6901 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6902 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6903 // included in the unfunded count.
6904 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6905 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6906 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6910 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6913 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6914 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6915 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6916 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6921 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6924 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6925 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6926 // likely to be lost on restart!
6927 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6928 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6929 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6932 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6934 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6937 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6938 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6939 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6940 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6941 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6943 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6944 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6946 debug_assert!(false);
6947 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6948 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6949 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6952 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6954 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6955 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6956 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6957 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6958 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6959 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6961 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6962 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6963 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6966 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6967 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6969 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6970 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6973 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6974 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6977 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6978 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6981 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6982 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6983 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6984 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6986 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6988 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6989 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6990 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6991 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6992 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6993 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6996 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6997 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6998 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7003 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7004 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7005 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7006 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7007 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7008 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7009 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7017 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7018 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7019 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7020 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7021 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7023 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7024 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7025 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7026 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7029 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7030 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7033 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7034 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7036 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7040 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7041 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7042 // likely to be lost on restart!
7043 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7044 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7045 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7047 debug_assert!(false);
7048 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7050 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7054 match phase.get_mut() {
7055 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7056 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7057 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7067 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7068 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7069 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7070 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7071 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7073 user_channel_id: user_id,
7078 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7079 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7081 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7082 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7084 debug_assert!(false);
7085 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7090 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7091 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7092 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7093 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7094 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7096 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7097 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7098 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7099 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7100 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7101 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7102 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7103 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7104 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7108 Some(mut phase) => {
7109 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7110 let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
7111 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7113 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7116 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7118 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7119 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7120 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7121 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7122 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7123 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7125 let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
7126 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7127 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7130 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7132 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7135 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7136 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7137 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7138 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7141 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7142 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7143 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7144 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7146 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7147 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7148 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7149 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7150 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7157 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7158 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7159 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7161 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7165 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7166 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7167 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7175 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7176 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7177 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7178 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7180 debug_assert!(false);
7181 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7186 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7188 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7189 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7190 let logger = WithContext::from(
7192 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7193 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7197 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7199 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7200 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7201 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7202 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7203 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7204 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7205 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7206 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7207 } else { unreachable!(); }
7210 let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7211 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7212 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7213 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7214 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7215 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7216 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7220 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7221 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7222 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7223 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7224 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7225 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7236 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7237 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7238 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7240 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7242 debug_assert!(false);
7243 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7245 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7246 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7247 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7248 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7249 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7250 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7251 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7252 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7253 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7254 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7255 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7256 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7257 msg: announcement_sigs,
7259 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7260 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7261 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7262 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7263 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7264 // announcement_signatures.
7265 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7266 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7267 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7268 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7275 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7276 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7281 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7282 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7286 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7291 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7292 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7293 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7296 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7298 debug_assert!(false);
7299 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7303 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7304 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7306 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7307 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7308 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7309 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7311 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7314 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7315 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7316 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7317 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7319 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7320 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7321 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7322 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7323 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7324 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7328 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7329 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7330 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7331 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7334 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7335 let context = phase.context_mut();
7336 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7337 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7338 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7339 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7341 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7342 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7343 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7344 let context = phase.context_mut();
7345 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7346 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7347 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7354 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7355 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7356 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7357 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7359 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7360 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7366 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7370 debug_assert!(false);
7371 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7373 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7374 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7375 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7376 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7378 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7379 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7380 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7381 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7382 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7383 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7388 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7389 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7390 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7391 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7392 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7393 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7394 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7396 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7397 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7403 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7404 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7405 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7406 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7408 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7409 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7410 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7411 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7416 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7417 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7418 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7423 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7424 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7425 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7426 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7428 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7429 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7430 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7431 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7433 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7434 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7436 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7438 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7440 debug_assert!(false);
7441 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7445 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7447 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7448 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7449 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7450 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7451 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7452 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7454 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7456 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7457 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7458 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7459 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7460 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7461 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7462 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7463 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7464 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7465 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7466 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7467 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7471 match pending_forward_info {
7472 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7473 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7475 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7476 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7477 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7478 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7479 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7481 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7482 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7483 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7484 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7485 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7488 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7494 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7496 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7497 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7505 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7507 let next_user_channel_id;
7508 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7510 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7512 debug_assert!(false);
7513 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7517 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7519 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7520 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7521 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7522 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7524 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7526 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7527 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7528 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7530 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7531 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7532 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7533 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7534 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7535 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7536 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7537 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7540 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7541 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7547 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7548 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7549 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7555 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7556 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7557 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7559 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7561 debug_assert!(false);
7562 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7564 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7565 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7566 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7568 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7569 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7571 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7572 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7580 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7581 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7582 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7583 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7584 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7586 debug_assert!(false);
7587 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7593 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7594 let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7595 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7597 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7598 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7600 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7601 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7609 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7611 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7613 debug_assert!(false);
7614 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7616 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7617 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7620 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7621 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7622 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7623 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7624 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7625 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7626 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7630 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7631 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7634 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7638 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7639 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7640 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7641 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7642 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7643 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7644 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7647 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7651 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7652 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7653 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7657 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7658 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7659 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7660 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7661 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7662 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7663 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7664 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7665 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7666 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7667 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7669 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7670 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7672 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7673 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7674 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7675 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7677 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7678 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7681 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7682 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7684 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7685 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7686 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7688 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7689 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7690 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7691 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7692 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7695 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7696 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7699 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7700 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7701 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7702 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7703 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7704 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7705 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7706 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7707 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7708 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7709 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7712 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7713 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7714 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7719 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7720 // payments are being processed.
7721 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7722 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7723 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7730 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7731 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7734 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7735 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7736 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7742 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7743 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7744 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7745 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7746 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7748 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7749 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7750 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7751 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7752 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7753 // real by taking more time.
7754 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7755 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7756 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7761 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7762 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7763 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7764 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7765 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7766 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7767 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7769 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7770 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7771 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7772 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7773 channel_funding_outpoint,
7775 counterparty_node_id,
7780 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7781 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7782 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7785 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7786 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7789 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7790 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7791 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7797 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7798 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7800 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7802 debug_assert!(false);
7803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7804 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7808 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7809 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7810 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7811 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7812 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7813 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7814 *counterparty_node_id)
7816 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7817 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7818 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7819 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7820 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7821 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7822 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7826 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7827 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7833 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7837 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7839 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7841 debug_assert!(false);
7842 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7844 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7845 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7846 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7847 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7848 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7849 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7850 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7852 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7853 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7861 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7863 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7865 debug_assert!(false);
7866 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7872 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7873 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7874 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7877 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7878 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7879 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7880 msg, &self.default_configuration
7881 ), chan_phase_entry),
7882 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7883 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7884 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7887 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7888 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7891 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7896 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7897 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7898 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7899 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7901 // It's not a local channel
7902 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7906 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7907 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7908 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7912 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7914 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7915 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7916 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7917 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7918 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7919 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7920 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7922 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7924 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7925 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0;
7926 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7927 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7929 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7930 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7931 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7932 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7935 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7939 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7940 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7945 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7948 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7949 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7950 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7952 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7954 debug_assert!(false);
7955 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7956 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7960 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7963 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7965 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7966 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7967 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7968 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7969 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7970 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7971 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7972 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7973 let mut channel_update = None;
7974 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7976 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7979 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7980 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7981 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7982 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7983 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7984 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7985 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7990 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7991 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7992 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7993 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7994 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7995 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7996 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7997 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8001 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
8002 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8006 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8008 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8009 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8010 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8011 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8012 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8013 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8015 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8016 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8017 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8018 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8019 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8020 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8021 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8022 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8023 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8024 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8025 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8026 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8027 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8028 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8029 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8030 next_funding_txid: None,
8033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8034 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8035 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8041 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8042 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8044 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8047 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8048 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8049 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8051 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8052 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8053 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8054 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8055 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8056 match monitor_event {
8057 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8058 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
8059 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8060 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8061 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8062 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8063 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8065 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8066 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8067 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8071 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8072 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8073 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8075 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8076 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8077 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8078 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8081 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8082 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8083 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8086 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8087 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8088 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8089 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8092 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }
8094 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8095 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8096 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8097 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8102 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8104 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8112 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8113 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8119 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8120 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8123 has_pending_monitor_events
8126 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8127 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8128 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8130 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8131 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8132 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8135 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8136 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8137 /// update was applied.
8138 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8139 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8140 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8142 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8143 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8144 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8145 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8147 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8148 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8150 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8151 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8152 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8153 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8155 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8156 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8157 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8158 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8159 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8160 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8162 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8163 has_monitor_update = true;
8165 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8166 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8167 continue 'peer_loop;
8176 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8177 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8178 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8184 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8185 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8187 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8188 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8190 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8191 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8192 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8195 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8196 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8198 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8199 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8200 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8206 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8212 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8213 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8216 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8217 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8218 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8228 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8229 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8230 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8233 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8234 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8238 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8241 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8242 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8248 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8249 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8250 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8251 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8252 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8253 let mut has_update = false;
8254 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8256 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8258 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8261 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8262 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8264 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8265 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8266 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8267 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8268 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8271 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8274 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8275 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8276 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8278 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8279 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8280 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8281 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8282 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8283 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8288 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8289 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8290 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8296 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8297 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8302 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8308 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8309 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8312 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8313 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8319 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8320 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8322 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8323 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8324 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8325 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8326 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8327 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8328 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8329 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8330 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8331 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8332 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8333 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8334 assert!(should_broadcast);
8335 } else { unreachable!(); }
8336 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8337 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8338 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8341 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8346 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8347 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8348 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
8349 /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
8353 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
8354 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8355 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8356 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8358 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8362 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8367 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8369 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8370 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8371 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8372 &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8373 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8374 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8375 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8376 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8377 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8379 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8380 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8381 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8382 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8384 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8387 let builder = match absolute_expiry {
8389 Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
8396 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8397 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8398 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8402 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8403 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8405 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8406 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8407 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8410 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8411 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8412 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8414 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8415 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8419 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
8420 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8421 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8422 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8424 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8428 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8429 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8434 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8435 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8436 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8438 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8439 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8440 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8441 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8442 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8443 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8444 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8445 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8446 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8447 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8448 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8449 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8451 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(Some(absolute_expiry))
8452 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8453 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8454 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8456 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8457 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8462 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8463 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8464 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8465 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8467 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8473 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8475 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8477 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8478 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8479 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8480 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8484 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8485 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8486 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8487 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8490 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8492 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8494 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8495 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8496 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8498 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8499 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8500 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8501 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8502 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8503 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8504 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8506 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8507 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8511 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8512 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8515 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8516 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8517 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8521 /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
8522 /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
8523 /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
8527 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8528 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8529 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8534 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8535 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8536 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8537 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8540 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8541 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8542 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8543 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8544 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8545 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8546 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8547 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8548 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8549 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8550 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8551 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8552 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8553 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8554 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8556 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8557 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8559 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8561 let builder = match quantity {
8563 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8565 let builder = match amount_msats {
8567 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8569 let builder = match payer_note {
8571 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8573 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8574 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8576 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8578 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8579 self.pending_outbound_payments
8580 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8581 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8583 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8585 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8586 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8587 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8588 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8589 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8590 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8591 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8592 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8593 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8594 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8595 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8597 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8599 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8600 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8601 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8602 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8605 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8607 debug_assert!(false);
8608 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8614 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8617 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8618 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8619 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8623 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8624 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8625 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8626 /// received and no retries will be made.
8631 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8632 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8635 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8636 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8637 &self, refund: &Refund
8638 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8639 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8640 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8641 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8643 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8644 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8646 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8647 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8652 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8653 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8654 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8655 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8656 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8658 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8660 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8661 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8662 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8664 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8665 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8666 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8668 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8669 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8670 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8672 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8673 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8674 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8675 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8677 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8678 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8679 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8680 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8681 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8684 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8686 for path in refund.paths() {
8687 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8688 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8689 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8690 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8692 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8698 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8702 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8705 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8706 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8708 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8709 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8710 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8712 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8714 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8715 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8719 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8720 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8722 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8724 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8725 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8727 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8728 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8729 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8730 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8731 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8732 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8733 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8734 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8735 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8736 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8739 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8740 /// stored external to LDK.
8742 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8743 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8744 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8746 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8747 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8750 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8751 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8752 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8753 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8755 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8756 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8757 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8758 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8759 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8761 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8762 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8763 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8764 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8765 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8767 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8768 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8770 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8771 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8775 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8776 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8778 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8780 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8781 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8783 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8784 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8785 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8786 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8787 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8788 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8789 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8792 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8793 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8795 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8796 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8797 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8800 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on the path's intended
8803 /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
8804 /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
8805 /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
8806 fn create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(
8807 &self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8808 ) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8809 let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
8810 let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
8812 if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
8813 self.create_compact_blinded_path()
8815 self.create_blinded_path()
8819 pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
8820 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8821 let now = Duration::from_secs(
8822 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8824 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8825 let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
8826 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
8827 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
8832 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8834 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8835 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8836 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8837 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8839 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8841 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8842 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8843 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8844 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8845 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8848 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8849 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8852 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
8854 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8855 fn create_compact_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8856 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8857 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8859 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8861 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8862 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8863 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8864 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8866 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8868 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8869 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8870 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8872 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8875 .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8876 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8879 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8880 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8881 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8882 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8883 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8884 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8886 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8887 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8888 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8889 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8890 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8892 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8894 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8898 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8899 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8903 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8904 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8906 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8907 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8908 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8909 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8911 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8912 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8913 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8914 Some(_) => continue,
8915 None => return scid_candidate
8920 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8922 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8923 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8925 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8926 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8927 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8931 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8932 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8933 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8935 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8936 /// times to get a unique scid.
8937 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8938 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8939 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8941 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8942 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8943 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8944 return scid_candidate
8948 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8949 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8950 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8951 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8953 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8954 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8957 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8958 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8960 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8961 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8962 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8971 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8972 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8973 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8974 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8975 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8979 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8980 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8981 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8982 events.push_back((event, None));
8986 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8987 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8988 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8992 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8993 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8997 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8998 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9001 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9002 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9003 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9004 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9005 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9006 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9007 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9009 let logger = WithContext::from(
9010 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
9013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9014 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9015 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9017 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9018 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9019 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9020 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9022 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9026 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9027 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9028 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9029 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9030 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9031 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9036 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9038 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9039 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9040 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9041 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9043 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9044 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9045 if further_update_exists {
9046 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9051 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9058 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9059 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9065 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9066 for action in actions {
9068 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9069 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9071 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9077 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9078 /// using the given event handler.
9080 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9081 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9085 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9089 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9091 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9092 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9093 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9094 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9095 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9096 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9100 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9101 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9102 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9103 /// is always placed next to each other.
9105 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9106 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9107 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9108 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9110 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9111 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9112 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9113 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9114 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9115 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9116 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9118 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9119 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9120 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9121 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9124 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9125 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9127 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9128 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9131 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9132 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9134 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9137 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9138 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9140 if peer_state.is_connected {
9141 is_any_peer_connected = true
9145 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9146 if is_any_peer_connected {
9147 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9148 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9151 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9152 events.replace(pending_events);
9161 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9163 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9164 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9165 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9166 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9167 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9168 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9172 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9174 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9175 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9176 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9178 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9184 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9185 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9186 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9187 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9188 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9189 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9193 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9195 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9196 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9197 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9198 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9199 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9202 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9203 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9206 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9207 let _persistence_guard =
9208 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9209 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9210 let new_height = height - 1;
9212 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9213 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9214 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9215 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9216 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9217 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9220 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9224 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9226 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9227 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9228 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9229 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9230 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9231 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9235 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9236 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9237 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9238 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9240 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9241 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9243 let _persistence_guard =
9244 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9245 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9246 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9247 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9249 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9250 if height < last_best_block_height {
9251 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9252 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9256 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9257 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9258 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9259 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9261 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9262 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9264 let _persistence_guard =
9265 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9266 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9267 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9269 let mut min_anchor_feerate = None;
9270 let mut min_non_anchor_feerate = None;
9271 if self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
9272 // If we're past the startup phase, update our feerate cache
9273 let mut last_days_feerates = self.last_days_feerates.lock().unwrap();
9274 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9275 last_days_feerates.pop_front();
9277 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9278 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9279 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9280 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9281 last_days_feerates.push_back((anchor_feerate, non_anchor_feerate));
9282 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9283 min_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(f, _)| f).min().copied();
9284 min_non_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(_, f)| f).min().copied();
9288 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| {
9289 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9290 if channel.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
9291 if let Some(feerate) = min_anchor_feerate {
9292 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9295 if let Some(feerate) = min_non_anchor_feerate {
9296 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9299 channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9302 macro_rules! max_time {
9303 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9305 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9306 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9307 // having an explicit local time source.
9308 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9309 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9310 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9311 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9312 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9318 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9319 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9320 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9321 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9325 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9326 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9327 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9330 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9331 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9332 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9333 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9334 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9335 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9342 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9343 let _persistence_guard =
9344 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9345 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9346 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9347 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9348 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9349 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9350 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9351 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9356 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9358 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9359 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9360 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9361 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9362 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9363 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9367 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9368 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9370 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9371 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9372 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9373 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9374 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9376 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9377 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9379 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9380 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9381 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9382 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9383 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9385 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9387 // Retain unfunded channels.
9388 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9389 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9390 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9391 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9392 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9393 let res = f(channel);
9394 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9395 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9396 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9397 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9398 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9400 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9401 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9402 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9403 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9404 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9405 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9407 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9412 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9417 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9418 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9421 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9422 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9423 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9424 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9425 msg: announcement_sigs,
9427 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9428 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9429 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9431 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9432 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9433 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9438 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9439 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9440 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9441 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9442 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9443 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9444 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9445 // is always consistent.
9446 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9447 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9448 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9449 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9450 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9453 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9454 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9455 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9456 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9457 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9458 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9459 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9460 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9461 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9465 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9466 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9467 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9468 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9469 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9470 data: reason_message,
9483 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9484 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9485 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9486 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9487 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9488 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9489 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9490 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9491 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9492 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9494 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9495 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9496 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9500 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9503 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9504 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9505 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9506 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9507 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9508 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9509 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9510 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9511 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9512 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9513 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9514 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9517 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9518 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9519 _ => unreachable!(),
9521 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9522 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9523 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9524 let logger = WithContext::from(
9525 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9527 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9533 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9535 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9536 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9540 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9541 /// may have events that need processing.
9543 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9544 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9546 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9547 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9548 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9549 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9552 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9554 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9555 /// indicates this should be checked.
9556 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9557 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9560 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9561 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9562 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9565 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9566 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9567 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9568 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9571 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9572 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9573 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9574 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9577 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9578 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9580 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9581 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9582 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9583 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9584 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9587 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9588 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9589 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9590 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9593 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9594 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9595 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9596 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9599 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9600 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9601 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9602 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9605 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9606 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9607 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9608 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9612 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9613 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9615 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9616 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9617 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9618 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9619 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9620 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9624 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9625 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9626 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9627 // change to the contents.
9628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9629 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9630 let persist = match &res {
9631 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9632 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9633 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9635 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9637 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9642 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9643 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9644 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9645 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9648 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9649 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9650 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9651 // change to the contents.
9652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9653 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9654 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9658 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9659 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9660 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9661 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9664 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9666 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9669 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9671 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9674 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9675 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9676 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9677 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9678 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9680 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9681 let persist = match &res {
9682 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9683 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9685 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9690 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9691 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9692 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9693 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9697 fn handle_splice_init(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceInit) {
9698 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9699 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9700 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9704 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9705 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9706 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9707 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9711 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9712 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9713 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9714 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9717 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9719 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9722 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9724 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9727 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9728 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9729 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9730 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9732 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9733 let persist = match &res {
9734 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9735 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9736 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9738 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9743 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9745 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9748 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9749 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9750 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9751 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9752 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9753 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9754 let persist = match &res {
9755 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9756 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9757 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9759 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9764 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9765 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9766 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9767 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9768 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9769 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9770 let persist = match &res {
9771 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9772 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9773 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9775 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9780 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9782 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9785 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9786 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9787 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9790 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9791 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9792 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9793 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9795 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9796 let persist = match &res {
9797 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9798 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9799 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9801 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9806 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9808 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9811 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9812 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9813 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9816 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9821 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9823 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9824 let persist = match &res {
9825 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9826 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9827 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9829 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9834 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9836 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9837 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9838 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9841 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9842 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9843 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9845 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9846 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9848 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9849 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9850 let context = match phase {
9851 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9852 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9853 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9854 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9859 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9860 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9861 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9862 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9863 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9865 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9866 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9867 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9868 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9871 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9872 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9875 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9876 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9880 // Clean up for removal.
9881 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9882 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9885 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9886 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9887 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9888 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9890 // V1 Channel Establishment
9891 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9892 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9893 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9895 // V2 Channel Establishment
9896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9898 // Common Channel Establishment
9899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9900 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceInit { .. } => false,
9905 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9906 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9907 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9908 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9909 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9913 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9914 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9915 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9916 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9917 // Channel Operations
9918 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9919 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9920 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9921 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9922 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9923 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9925 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9926 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9927 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9928 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9929 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9930 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9933 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9941 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9942 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9943 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9944 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9947 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9949 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9951 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9952 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9956 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9957 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9958 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9959 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9963 let mut res = Ok(());
9965 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9966 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9967 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9968 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9969 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9970 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9971 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9974 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9975 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9977 if inbound_peer_limited {
9979 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9981 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9982 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9983 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9984 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9985 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9986 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9987 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9988 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9992 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9993 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9994 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9996 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9997 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9998 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9999 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10002 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10005 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10006 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10011 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10014 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10017 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10019 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10021 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10022 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
10023 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10024 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10025 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10029 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10031 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10032 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10036 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10037 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10038 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10040 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10041 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10045 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10046 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10047 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10048 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10049 debug_assert!(false);
10052 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
10053 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10054 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10055 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10056 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10057 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10058 debug_assert!(false);
10064 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10065 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10070 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10071 match &msg.data as &str {
10072 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10073 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10075 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10076 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10077 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10078 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10079 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10080 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10081 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10082 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10083 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10085 || -> NotifyOption {
10086 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10087 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10088 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10089 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10090 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10091 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10092 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10093 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10097 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10098 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10099 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10100 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10101 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10102 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10104 log_level: Level::Trace,
10107 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10108 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10109 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10111 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10122 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10123 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10125 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10126 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10127 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10128 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10129 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10130 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10131 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10132 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10134 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10135 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10136 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10140 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10142 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10143 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10144 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10145 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10146 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10147 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10148 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10149 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10150 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10156 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10157 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10158 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10159 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10160 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10166 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10167 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10168 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10172 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10173 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10177 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10178 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10181 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10182 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10185 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10186 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10189 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10190 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10191 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10192 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10195 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10196 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10197 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10198 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10201 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10202 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10203 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10204 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10207 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10208 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10209 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10210 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10213 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10214 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10215 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10216 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10219 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10220 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10221 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10222 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10225 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10226 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10227 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10228 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10231 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10232 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10233 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10234 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10237 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10238 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10239 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10240 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10244 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10245 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10247 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10248 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10249 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10250 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10251 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10252 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10256 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10257 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10258 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10261 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10262 let responder = match responder {
10263 Some(responder) => responder,
10264 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10266 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10269 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10270 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10272 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10273 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10275 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10276 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10280 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10281 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10282 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10284 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10286 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10287 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10291 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10292 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10293 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10295 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10296 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10298 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10300 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10301 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10305 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10306 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10307 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10310 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10311 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10312 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10313 payment_paths, payment_hash
10315 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10316 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10317 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10320 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10321 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10322 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10324 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10325 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10326 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10327 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10328 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10331 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10332 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10333 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10334 .and_then(|invoice| {
10336 let mut invoice = invoice;
10338 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10339 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10341 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10346 Ok(invoice) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10347 Err(error) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10350 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10351 let result = match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10352 Ok(payment_id) => {
10353 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10354 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10355 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10356 } else if self.default_configuration.manually_handle_bolt12_invoices {
10357 let event = Event::InvoiceReceived { payment_id, invoice, responder };
10358 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
10359 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10361 self.send_payment_for_verified_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10364 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10368 Err(()) => Err(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())),
10372 Ok(()) => ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10373 Err(e) => match responder {
10374 Some(responder) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10376 log_trace!(self.logger, "No reply path for sending invoice error: {:?}", e);
10377 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10382 #[cfg(async_payments)]
10383 OffersMessage::StaticInvoice(_invoice) => {
10385 Some(responder) => {
10386 responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10387 InvoiceError::from_string("Static invoices not yet supported".to_string())
10390 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10393 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10395 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10400 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10401 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10405 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10406 AsyncPaymentsMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10408 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10409 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10410 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10411 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10412 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10413 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10417 fn held_htlc_available(
10418 &self, _message: HeldHtlcAvailable, _responder: Option<Responder>
10419 ) -> ResponseInstruction<ReleaseHeldHtlc> {
10420 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10423 fn release_held_htlc(&self, _message: ReleaseHeldHtlc) {}
10425 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<AsyncPaymentsMessage>> {
10430 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10431 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10433 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10435 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10436 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10437 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10438 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10442 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10443 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10447 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10448 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10449 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10450 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10451 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10455 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10456 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10458 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10459 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10460 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10461 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10462 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10465 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10466 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10467 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10468 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10471 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10472 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10473 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10474 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10477 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10478 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10479 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10480 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10483 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10484 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10485 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10486 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10487 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10488 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10489 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10490 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10491 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10492 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10493 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10494 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10495 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10496 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10497 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10498 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10499 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10500 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10501 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10502 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10503 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10508 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10509 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10511 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10512 (2, channels, required_vec),
10513 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10514 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10517 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10518 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10519 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10522 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10524 (0, onion_packet, required),
10525 (1, blinded, option),
10526 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10529 (0, payment_data, required),
10530 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10531 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10532 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10533 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10534 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10535 (9, payment_context, option),
10537 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10538 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10539 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10540 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10541 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10542 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10543 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10548 (0, routing, required),
10549 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10550 (4, payment_hash, required),
10551 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10552 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10553 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10554 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10558 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10559 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10561 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10562 0u8.write(writer)?;
10563 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10564 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10565 reason.write(writer)?;
10567 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10568 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10570 1u8.write(writer)?;
10571 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10572 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10573 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10574 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10581 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10582 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10583 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10586 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10587 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10588 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10589 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10593 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10594 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10595 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10596 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10597 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10600 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10601 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10602 // messages contained in the variants.
10603 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10604 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10605 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10607 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10608 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10609 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10610 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10611 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10614 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10615 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10616 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10617 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10618 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10620 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10625 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10630 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10631 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10632 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10635 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10636 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10637 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10638 (2, outpoint, required),
10639 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10640 (4, htlc_id, required),
10641 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10642 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10643 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10644 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10645 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10648 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10649 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10650 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10651 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10652 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10654 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10656 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10657 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10658 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10659 (2, self.value, required),
10660 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10661 (4, payment_data, option),
10662 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10663 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10664 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10665 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10671 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10672 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10673 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10674 (0, prev_hop, required),
10675 (1, total_msat, option),
10676 (2, value_ser, required),
10677 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10678 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10679 (5, total_value_received, option),
10680 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10681 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10682 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10684 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10685 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10686 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10688 if payment_data.is_some() {
10689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10691 if total_msat.is_none() {
10692 total_msat = Some(value);
10694 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10697 if total_msat.is_none() {
10698 if payment_data.is_none() {
10699 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10701 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10703 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10707 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10710 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10711 total_value_received,
10712 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10714 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10715 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10720 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10721 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10722 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10725 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10726 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10727 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10728 let mut payment_id = None;
10729 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10730 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10731 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10732 (0, session_priv, required),
10733 (1, payment_id, option),
10734 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10735 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10736 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10737 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10739 if payment_id.is_none() {
10740 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10742 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10744 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10745 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10746 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10748 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10749 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10750 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10751 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10755 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10756 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10757 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10759 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10762 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10763 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10768 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10769 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10771 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10772 0u8.write(writer)?;
10773 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10774 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10775 (0, session_priv, required),
10776 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10777 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10778 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10779 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10780 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10781 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10784 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10785 1u8.write(writer)?;
10786 field.write(writer)?;
10793 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10794 (0, forward_info, required),
10795 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10796 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10797 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10798 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10799 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10800 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10801 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10804 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10805 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10806 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10808 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10812 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10813 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10814 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10815 (0, htlc_id, required),
10816 (2, err_packet, required),
10819 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10820 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10821 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10822 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10823 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10824 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10825 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10826 (0, htlc_id, required),
10827 (1, failure_code, required),
10828 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10829 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10837 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10838 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10839 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10841 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10843 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10844 (0, htlc_id, required),
10845 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10846 (2, err_packet, required),
10847 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10849 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10850 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10851 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10853 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10857 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10858 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10862 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10867 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10868 (0, payment_secret, required),
10869 (2, expiry_time, required),
10870 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10871 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10872 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10875 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10877 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10879 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10880 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10881 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10882 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10886 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10887 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10889 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10891 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10893 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10894 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10895 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10898 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10900 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10902 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10903 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10904 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10905 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10906 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10907 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10910 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10911 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10915 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10917 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10918 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10919 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10920 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10921 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10922 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10925 channel.write(writer)?;
10931 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10932 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10933 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10934 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10935 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10936 for forward in pending_forwards {
10937 forward.write(writer)?;
10942 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10943 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10944 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10945 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10948 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10949 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10950 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10952 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10953 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10954 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10955 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10956 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10957 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10958 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10959 htlc.write(writer)?;
10961 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10962 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10965 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10966 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10967 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10968 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10969 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10970 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10971 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10974 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10975 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10976 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10977 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10978 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10980 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10981 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10982 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10983 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10984 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10985 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10986 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10991 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10992 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10993 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10994 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10995 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10996 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10997 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10998 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10999 0u64.write(writer)?;
11001 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11002 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11003 event.write(writer)?;
11007 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11008 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11009 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11010 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11011 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11012 0u64.write(writer)?;
11014 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11015 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11016 // likely to be identical.
11017 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11018 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11020 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11021 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11022 hash.write(writer)?;
11023 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11026 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11027 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11028 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11029 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11030 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11033 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11034 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11036 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11037 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11038 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11039 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11042 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11043 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11044 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11045 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11049 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11050 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11051 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11053 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11054 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11055 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11061 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11062 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11063 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11064 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11067 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11068 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11069 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11070 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11071 pending_claiming_payments = None;
11074 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11075 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11076 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11077 if !updates.is_empty() {
11078 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11079 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11084 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11085 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11086 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11087 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11088 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11089 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11090 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11091 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11092 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11093 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11094 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11095 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11096 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11097 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11104 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11105 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11106 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11107 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11110 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11111 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11112 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11113 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11114 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11115 // check that the event is sane here.
11116 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11117 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11118 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11119 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11125 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11126 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11127 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11128 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11129 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11130 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11133 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11134 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11135 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11136 events.push_back((ev, action));
11137 } else if action.is_some() {
11138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11145 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11147 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11149 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11150 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11151 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11152 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11153 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11154 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11155 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11156 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11157 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11158 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11159 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11160 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11161 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11163 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11164 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11166 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11167 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11169 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11170 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11171 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11172 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11173 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11174 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11176 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11177 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11179 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11180 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11181 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11182 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11183 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11188 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11189 pub entropy_source: ES,
11191 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11192 pub node_signer: NS,
11194 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11195 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11197 pub signer_provider: SP,
11199 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11201 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11202 pub fee_estimator: F,
11203 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11205 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11206 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11207 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11208 pub chain_monitor: M,
11210 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11211 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11212 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11213 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11214 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11215 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11217 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11219 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11220 /// deserialization.
11222 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11223 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11224 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11226 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11227 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11229 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11230 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11231 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11232 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11234 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11237 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11238 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11241 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11242 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11244 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11245 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11246 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11247 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11248 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11249 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11253 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11254 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11255 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11256 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11257 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11259 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11260 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11261 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11267 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11268 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11269 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11270 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11272 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11273 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11275 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11276 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11277 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11281 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11282 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11283 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11287 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11288 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11290 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11292 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11293 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11294 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11295 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11299 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11300 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11302 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11303 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11304 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11306 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11308 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11309 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11310 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11311 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11312 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11313 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11314 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11315 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11316 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11317 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11318 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11320 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11321 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11322 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11323 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11324 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11325 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11326 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11327 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11328 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11329 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11330 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11331 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11332 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11333 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11334 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11336 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11337 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11338 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11340 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11341 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11342 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11344 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11345 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11346 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11348 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11349 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11350 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11352 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11353 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11354 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11357 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11358 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11359 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11360 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11361 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11362 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11363 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11364 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11366 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11367 let mut found_htlc = false;
11368 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11369 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11372 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11373 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11374 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11375 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11376 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11377 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11378 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11379 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11381 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11382 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11383 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11387 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11388 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11389 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11390 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11391 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11392 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11394 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11395 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11397 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11398 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11399 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11400 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11403 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11404 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11405 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11409 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11410 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11411 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11412 // safely discard the channel.
11413 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11414 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11415 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11416 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11417 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11418 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11419 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11420 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11423 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11424 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11425 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11426 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11427 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11428 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11432 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11433 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11434 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11435 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11436 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11438 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11439 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11440 counterparty_node_id: None,
11441 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11442 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11444 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11448 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11449 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11450 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11451 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11452 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11453 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11454 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11455 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11456 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11458 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11461 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11462 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11463 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11464 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11465 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11466 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11467 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11468 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11470 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11473 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11476 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11477 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11478 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11479 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11480 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11481 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11482 is_connected: false,
11486 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11487 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11488 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11489 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11490 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11491 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11492 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11493 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11496 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11497 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11498 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11499 for _ in 0..event_count {
11500 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11501 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11506 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11507 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11508 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11510 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11511 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11512 // on-startup monitor updates.
11513 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11514 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11516 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11520 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11521 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11523 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11524 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11525 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11526 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11527 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11531 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11532 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11533 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11534 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11535 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11536 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11537 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11539 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11540 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11544 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11545 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11546 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11547 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11548 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11549 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11550 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11551 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11552 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11553 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11554 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11555 let mut events_override = None;
11556 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11557 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11558 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11559 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11560 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11561 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11562 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11563 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11564 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11565 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11566 (8, events_override, option),
11567 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11568 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11569 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11570 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11571 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11573 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11574 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11575 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11578 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11579 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11582 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11583 pending_events_read = events;
11586 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11587 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11590 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11591 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11592 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11593 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11594 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11595 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11597 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11599 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11600 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11601 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11604 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11605 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11606 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11607 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11608 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11610 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11611 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11612 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11614 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11615 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11616 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11617 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11618 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11620 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11621 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11622 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11623 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11624 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11625 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11626 pending_background_events.push(
11627 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11628 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11629 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11630 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11631 update: update.clone(),
11634 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11635 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11636 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11637 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11638 pending_background_events.push(
11639 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11640 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11641 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11644 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11645 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11646 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11648 max_in_flight_update_id
11652 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11655 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11656 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11657 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11659 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11661 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11662 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11663 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11664 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11665 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11666 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11667 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11668 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11669 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11672 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11673 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11674 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11675 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11676 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11677 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11678 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11679 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11680 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11681 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11682 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11685 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11686 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11687 debug_assert!(false);
11688 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11693 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11694 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11695 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11696 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11697 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11698 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11699 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11700 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11701 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11702 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11704 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11705 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11706 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11708 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11709 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11710 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11711 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11712 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11713 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11714 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11715 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11716 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11721 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11722 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11724 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11725 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11726 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11727 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11730 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11731 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11732 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11733 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11734 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11735 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11736 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11738 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11739 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11740 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11741 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11742 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11743 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11744 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11745 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11746 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11749 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11750 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11751 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11752 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11754 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11755 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11756 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11759 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11760 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11761 retry_strategy: None,
11762 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11763 payment_params: None,
11764 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11765 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11766 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11767 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11768 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11769 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11770 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11771 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11772 total_msat: path_amt,
11773 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11774 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11776 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11777 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11782 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11783 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11784 match htlc_source {
11785 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11786 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11787 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11788 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11790 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11791 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11792 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11793 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11794 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11795 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11796 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11797 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11798 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11800 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11801 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11805 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11807 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11808 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11809 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11810 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11811 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11812 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11817 !forwards.is_empty()
11819 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11820 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11821 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11822 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11823 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11824 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11825 intercepted_id != ev_id
11832 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11833 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11834 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11835 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11836 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11837 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11838 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11839 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11840 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11841 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11842 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11844 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11845 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11846 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11847 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11849 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11850 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11851 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11858 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11859 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11861 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11863 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11864 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11865 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11866 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11867 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11868 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11869 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11870 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11871 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11872 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11875 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11876 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11877 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11878 // channel still live case here.
11882 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11883 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11888 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11889 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11890 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11891 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11892 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11893 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11894 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11895 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11899 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11900 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11902 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11903 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11904 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11905 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11907 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11908 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11909 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11911 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11912 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11914 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11915 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11917 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11920 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11921 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11922 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11924 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11928 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11929 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11930 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11931 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11932 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11934 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11935 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11936 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11937 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11938 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11939 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11940 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11941 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11943 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11944 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11948 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11950 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11952 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11953 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11955 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11956 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11961 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11962 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11964 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11966 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11968 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11969 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11970 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11971 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11975 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11976 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11979 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11980 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11981 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11982 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11983 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11985 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11986 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11987 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11989 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11990 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11991 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11992 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11993 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11994 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11996 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11997 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11998 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11999 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12000 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12001 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12005 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12006 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12007 debug_assert!(false);
12008 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12013 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12015 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12016 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12017 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12018 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12019 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12020 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12021 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12022 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12023 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12024 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12025 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12027 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12028 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12030 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12031 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12032 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12033 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12035 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12036 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12037 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12038 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12040 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12041 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12042 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12043 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12045 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12046 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12047 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12050 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12051 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
12052 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12055 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12056 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12059 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12062 purpose: payment.purpose,
12063 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12064 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12065 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12066 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
12072 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12073 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12074 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12075 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
12076 for action in actions.iter() {
12077 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12078 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12079 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12081 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12083 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12084 blocked_channel_id);
12085 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12086 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12087 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12089 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12090 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12091 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12092 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12096 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12097 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12101 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12103 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12104 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12108 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12110 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12111 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12112 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12113 router: args.router,
12115 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12117 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12118 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12119 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12120 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12122 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12123 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12124 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12125 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12126 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12127 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12128 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12130 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12132 our_network_pubkey,
12135 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12137 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12139 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12140 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12141 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12142 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12143 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12145 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12146 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12148 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12150 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12152 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12154 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12155 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12156 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12158 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
12160 logger: args.logger,
12161 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12164 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12165 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12166 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12167 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12168 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12171 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12172 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12173 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12174 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12175 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12176 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12177 downstream_channel_id, None
12181 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12182 //connection or two.
12184 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12190 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12191 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12192 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12193 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12194 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12195 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12196 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12197 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12198 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12199 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12200 use crate::prelude::*;
12201 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12202 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12203 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12204 use crate::util::test_utils;
12205 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12206 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12209 fn test_notify_limits() {
12210 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12211 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12215 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12217 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12218 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12219 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12220 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12221 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12223 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12225 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12226 // to connect messages with new values
12227 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12228 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12229 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12230 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12231 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12232 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12234 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12235 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12236 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12237 // ... but the last node should not.
12238 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12239 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12240 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12241 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12243 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12244 // about the channel.
12245 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12246 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12247 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12249 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12251 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12252 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12253 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12254 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12255 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12256 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12258 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12259 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12260 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12262 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12263 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12264 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12265 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12266 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12267 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.channel_flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12269 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12270 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12271 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12272 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12273 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12274 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12275 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12276 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12278 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12279 // the channel info has updated.
12280 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12281 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12282 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12283 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12284 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12285 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12289 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12290 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12296 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12298 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12299 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12300 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12301 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12303 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12304 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12305 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12306 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12307 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12308 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12309 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12310 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12312 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12314 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12316 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12317 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12318 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12320 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12321 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12322 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12323 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12324 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12328 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12330 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12331 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12332 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12333 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12334 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12335 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12336 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12338 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12340 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12341 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12342 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12346 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12348 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12349 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12350 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12351 // lightning messages manually.
12352 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12353 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12356 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12358 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12359 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12361 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12362 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12364 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12365 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12367 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12368 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12369 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12371 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12372 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12373 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12375 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12377 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12379 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12380 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12383 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12384 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12385 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12388 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12389 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12390 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12391 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12396 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12397 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12398 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12399 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12401 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12406 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12407 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12408 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12411 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12412 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12413 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12414 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12415 // fails as expected.
12416 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12417 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12418 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12419 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12420 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12421 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12424 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12425 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12427 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12428 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12429 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12430 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12432 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12433 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12434 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12436 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12437 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12438 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12439 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12440 let route = find_route(
12441 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12442 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12444 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12445 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12447 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12448 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12449 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12450 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12454 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12455 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12457 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12459 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12460 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12461 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12462 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12463 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12464 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12465 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12466 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12467 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12469 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12470 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12472 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12473 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12474 let route = find_route(
12475 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12476 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12478 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12479 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12481 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12482 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12483 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12484 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12485 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12487 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12488 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12489 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12490 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12492 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12493 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12494 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12495 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12498 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12500 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12502 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12503 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12504 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12505 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12506 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12507 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12508 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12509 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12510 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12512 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12515 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12516 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12517 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12518 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12522 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12523 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12524 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12526 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12527 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12528 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12531 let route = find_route(
12532 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12533 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12535 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12536 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12537 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12539 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12540 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12541 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12542 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12543 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12545 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12546 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12547 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12549 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12551 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12552 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12553 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12554 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12556 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12559 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12560 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12564 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12565 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12566 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12567 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12570 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12572 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12573 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12575 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12576 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12577 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12578 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12579 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12580 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12581 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12582 let route = find_route(
12583 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12584 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12587 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12588 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12589 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12590 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12591 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12592 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12595 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12596 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12597 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12598 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12599 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12600 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12603 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12607 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12608 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12609 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12610 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12611 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12612 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12613 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12614 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12615 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12617 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12618 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12620 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12621 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12622 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12623 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12624 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12625 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12626 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12627 let route = find_route(
12628 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12629 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12632 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12633 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12634 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12635 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12636 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12637 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12638 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12639 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12642 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12643 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12644 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12645 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12646 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12647 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12648 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12650 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12654 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12658 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12660 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12661 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12662 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12663 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12665 // Marshall an MPP route.
12666 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12667 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12668 route.paths.push(path);
12669 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12670 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12671 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12672 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12673 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12674 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12676 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12677 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12679 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12680 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12682 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12687 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12690 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12691 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12693 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12695 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12697 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12699 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12700 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12701 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12704 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12705 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12706 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12709 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12710 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12711 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12713 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12714 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12716 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12717 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12719 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12720 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12721 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12723 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12724 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12725 }, false).unwrap();
12727 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12728 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12729 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12730 match &node_0_events[0] {
12731 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12735 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12736 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12737 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12742 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12750 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12751 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12752 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12753 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
12754 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12756 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12759 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12760 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12761 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12762 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12763 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12764 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12767 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12770 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12771 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12776 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12777 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12781 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12783 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12784 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12786 total_msat: 100_000,
12789 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12790 // payment verification fails as expected.
12791 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12792 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12793 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12794 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12796 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12800 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12801 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12805 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12806 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12807 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12808 // the channel is successfully closed.
12809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12812 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12814 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12815 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12816 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12817 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12818 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12820 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12821 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12823 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12824 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12825 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12826 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12829 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12831 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12832 // as it has the funding transaction.
12833 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12834 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12835 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12838 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12840 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12842 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12844 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12845 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12846 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12848 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12851 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12852 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12853 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12854 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12855 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12858 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12859 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12861 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12862 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12863 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12864 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12866 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12867 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12868 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12869 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12871 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12872 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12874 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12875 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12876 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12877 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12878 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12879 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12880 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12884 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12885 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12886 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12887 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12888 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12889 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12890 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12893 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12895 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12896 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12897 // closing transaction).
12898 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12899 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12900 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12902 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12903 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12904 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12905 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12906 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12909 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12911 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12913 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12914 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12915 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12917 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12919 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12920 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12923 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12924 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12925 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12928 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12929 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12930 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12933 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12934 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12935 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12938 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12939 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12940 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12943 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12945 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12946 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12948 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12949 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12951 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12952 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12957 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12958 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12959 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12960 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12961 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12962 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12963 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12964 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12967 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12968 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12969 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12970 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12972 // Test the API functions.
12973 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12975 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12977 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12979 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12981 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12983 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12985 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12989 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12990 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12991 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12992 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12993 // the given `channel_id`.
12994 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12995 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12996 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12999 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13002 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13003 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13005 // Test the API functions.
13006 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13008 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13010 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13012 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13014 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13016 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13020 fn test_connection_limiting() {
13021 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13027 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13029 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13030 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13032 let mut funding_tx = None;
13033 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13035 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13038 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13039 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13040 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13041 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13042 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13044 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13046 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13048 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13050 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13052 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13054 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13057 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13058 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13059 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13060 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13061 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13062 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13064 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13065 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13067 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13068 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13069 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13070 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13071 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13072 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13073 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13076 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13077 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13078 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13079 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13080 }, true).unwrap_err();
13082 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13083 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13084 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13085 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13086 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13087 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13088 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13090 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13091 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13093 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13094 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13095 }, true).unwrap_err();
13097 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13098 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13099 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13100 }, false).unwrap();
13101 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13103 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13104 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13106 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13107 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13108 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13109 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13110 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13112 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13113 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13114 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13116 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13117 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13118 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13120 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13121 // "protected" and can connect again.
13122 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13124 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13126 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13128 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13130 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13131 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13135 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13136 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13140 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13142 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13144 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13145 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13147 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13148 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13149 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13150 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13153 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13155 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13156 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13157 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13159 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13160 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13161 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13163 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13164 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13165 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13166 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13170 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13171 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13172 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13175 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13176 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13177 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13178 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13180 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13182 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13183 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13185 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13186 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13187 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13188 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13189 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13190 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13193 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13196 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13197 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13201 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13202 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13205 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13206 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13207 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13208 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13209 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13211 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13212 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13214 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13215 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13216 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13217 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13223 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13224 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13226 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13227 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13228 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13230 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13231 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13235 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13239 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13240 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13241 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13242 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13243 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13244 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13245 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13246 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13247 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13248 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13249 payment_metadata: None,
13250 keysend_preimage: None,
13251 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13252 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13254 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13256 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13257 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13258 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13259 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13260 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13261 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13262 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13264 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13265 } else { panic!(); }
13267 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13268 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13269 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13270 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13271 payment_metadata: None,
13272 keysend_preimage: None,
13273 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13274 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13276 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13278 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13279 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13280 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13281 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13285 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13286 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13287 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13288 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13289 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13291 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13292 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13293 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13294 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13295 payment_metadata: None,
13296 keysend_preimage: None,
13297 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13298 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13300 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13301 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13302 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13304 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13305 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13306 // is not satisfied.
13307 assert!(result.is_ok());
13311 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13312 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13313 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13314 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13315 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13317 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13318 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13323 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13324 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13326 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13327 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13329 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13330 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13331 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13332 match &msg_events[0] {
13333 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13334 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13336 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13337 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13338 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13344 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13345 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13347 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13348 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13351 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13355 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13356 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13357 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13358 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13361 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13362 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13363 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13366 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13368 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13369 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13370 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13372 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13373 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13375 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13376 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13381 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13382 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13384 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13385 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13387 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13388 // not have generated any events.
13389 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13393 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13394 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13395 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13396 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13397 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13399 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13400 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13402 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13403 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13406 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13407 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13408 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13409 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13410 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13412 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13413 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13416 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13417 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13418 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13420 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13421 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13422 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13423 ..Default::default()
13425 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13426 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13427 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13429 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13430 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13433 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13434 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13435 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13436 ..Default::default()
13438 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13440 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13441 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13443 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13444 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13447 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13448 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13449 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13450 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13451 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13454 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13455 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13456 ..Default::default()
13458 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13461 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13462 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13463 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13464 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13468 fn test_payment_display() {
13469 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13470 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13471 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13472 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13473 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13474 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13478 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13479 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13480 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13481 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13482 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13484 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13486 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13487 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13488 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13489 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13490 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13491 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13492 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13493 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed { broadcasted_latest_txn: Some(true) }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13495 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13496 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13497 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13500 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13501 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13503 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13504 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13506 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13507 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13508 }, false).unwrap();
13509 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13510 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13511 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13513 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13515 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13516 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13517 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13518 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13519 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13520 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13521 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13522 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13523 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13524 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13525 } else { panic!() };
13526 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13527 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13528 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13529 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13531 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13533 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13534 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13535 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13540 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13541 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13542 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13543 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13546 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13547 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13548 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13550 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13551 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13553 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13554 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13557 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13558 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13559 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13561 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13565 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13566 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13567 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13569 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13574 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13575 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13576 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13577 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13579 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13580 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13581 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13583 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13585 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13586 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13587 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13588 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13590 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13591 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13599 use crate::chain::Listen;
13600 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13601 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13602 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13603 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13604 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13605 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13606 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13607 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13608 use crate::util::test_utils;
13609 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13611 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13612 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13613 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13614 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13615 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13616 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13618 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13620 use criterion::Criterion;
13622 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13623 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13624 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13625 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13626 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13627 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13628 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13630 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13631 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13633 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13634 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13636 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13638 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13641 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13642 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13645 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13646 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13647 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13649 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13650 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13652 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13653 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13654 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13655 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13656 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13658 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13659 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13660 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13662 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13663 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13664 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13665 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13667 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13668 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13669 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13671 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13672 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13673 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13674 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13675 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13677 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13678 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13679 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13681 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13682 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13684 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13685 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13686 }, false).unwrap();
13687 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13688 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13689 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13692 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13693 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13694 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13696 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13697 } else { panic!(); }
13699 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13700 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13701 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13702 match events_b[0] {
13703 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13704 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13706 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13709 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13710 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13711 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13712 match events_a[0] {
13713 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13714 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13719 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13721 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13722 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13723 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13725 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13726 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13727 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13728 match msg_events[0] {
13729 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13730 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13731 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13735 match msg_events[1] {
13736 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13740 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13741 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13742 match events_a[0] {
13743 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13744 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13749 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13750 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13751 match events_b[0] {
13752 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13753 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13755 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13758 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13759 macro_rules! send_payment {
13760 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13761 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13762 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13763 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13764 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13765 payment_count += 1;
13766 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13767 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13769 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13770 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13771 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13772 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13773 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13774 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13775 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13776 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13777 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13778 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13779 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13781 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13782 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13783 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13784 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13786 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13787 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13788 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13789 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13790 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13792 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13795 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13796 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13797 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13798 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13800 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13804 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13805 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13806 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);