1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::crypto::sign;
58 use util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use util::errors::APIError;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
400 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
401 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
402 /// confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
689 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
733 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
734 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
735 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
737 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
738 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
739 /// the handling of the events.
742 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
743 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
744 /// would break backwards compatability.
745 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
746 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
747 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
748 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
750 our_network_key: SecretKey,
751 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
753 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
755 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
756 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
757 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
759 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
760 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
762 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
763 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
764 /// keeping additional state.
765 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
767 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
768 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
769 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
771 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
772 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
773 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
774 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
776 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
777 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
778 /// are currently open with that peer.
779 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
780 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
783 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
784 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
786 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
787 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
788 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
789 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
790 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
791 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
792 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
793 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
794 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
796 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
803 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
805 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
806 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
807 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
808 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
809 pub struct ChainParameters {
810 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
811 pub network: Network,
813 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
815 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
816 pub best_block: BestBlock,
819 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
825 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
826 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
827 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
828 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
829 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
830 /// updates are ready for persistence).
832 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
833 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
834 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
835 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
836 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
838 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
839 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
842 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
843 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
844 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
847 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
848 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
850 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
851 persistence_notifier: notifier,
852 should_persist: persist_check,
853 _read_guard: read_guard,
858 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
860 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
861 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
866 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
867 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
869 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
871 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
872 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
873 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
874 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
875 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
877 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
878 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
880 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
882 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
883 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
884 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
885 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
886 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
887 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
888 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
889 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
890 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
891 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
892 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
893 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
894 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
896 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
897 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
899 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
900 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
901 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
902 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
904 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
905 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
906 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
907 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
908 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
909 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
912 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
914 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
915 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
918 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
920 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
921 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
922 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
924 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
925 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
927 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
928 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
929 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
930 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
931 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
932 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
933 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
934 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
935 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
936 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
937 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
940 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
941 /// to better separate parameters.
942 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
943 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
944 /// The node_id of our counterparty
945 pub node_id: PublicKey,
946 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
947 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
948 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
949 pub features: InitFeatures,
950 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
951 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
952 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
954 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
956 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
957 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
958 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
959 /// payments to us through this channel.
960 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
961 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
962 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
963 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
964 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
965 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
966 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
969 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
970 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
971 pub struct ChannelDetails {
972 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
973 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
974 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
975 /// lifetime of the channel.
976 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
977 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
978 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
979 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
980 /// our counterparty already.
982 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
983 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
984 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
985 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
987 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
988 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
989 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
990 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
992 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
993 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
995 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
996 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
998 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
999 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1000 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1001 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1002 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1003 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1004 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1005 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1006 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1009 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1011 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1012 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1013 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1014 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1015 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1016 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1017 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1019 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1020 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1022 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1023 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1024 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1025 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1026 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1027 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1028 /// this value on chain.
1030 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1032 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1034 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1035 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1036 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1037 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1038 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1039 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1040 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1042 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1043 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1044 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1045 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1047 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1048 pub balance_msat: u64,
1049 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1050 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1051 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1052 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1054 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1056 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1057 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1058 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1059 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1060 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1061 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1062 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1063 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1065 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1066 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1067 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1068 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1069 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1070 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1071 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1073 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1074 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1075 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1076 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1077 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1078 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1079 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1080 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1081 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1083 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1085 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1086 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1087 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1088 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1089 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1090 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1091 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1092 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1093 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1095 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1096 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1097 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1098 pub is_outbound: bool,
1099 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1100 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1101 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1102 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1103 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1105 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1106 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1107 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1108 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1110 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1111 pub is_usable: bool,
1112 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1113 pub is_public: bool,
1114 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1115 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1116 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1117 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1118 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1119 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1121 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1122 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1125 impl ChannelDetails {
1126 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1127 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1128 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1130 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1131 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1132 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1133 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1136 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1137 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1138 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1140 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1141 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1142 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1143 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1147 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1148 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1149 /// states for more.
1150 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1151 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1152 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1153 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1154 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1155 ParameterError(APIError),
1156 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1157 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1158 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1159 /// payment in full.
1161 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1163 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1164 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1165 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1166 /// paths than the ones selected).
1167 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1168 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1169 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1170 /// in over-/re-payment.
1172 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1173 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1174 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1176 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1177 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1178 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1179 /// with the latest update_id.
1181 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1182 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1183 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1184 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1185 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1186 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1187 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1188 payment_id: PaymentId,
1192 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1194 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1196 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1197 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1198 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1199 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1201 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1202 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1203 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1206 macro_rules! handle_error {
1207 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1210 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1211 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1213 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1214 // entering the macro.
1215 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1216 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1219 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1221 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1222 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1223 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1224 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1228 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1229 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1230 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1231 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1236 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1237 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1239 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1240 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1241 action: err.action.clone()
1245 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1246 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1249 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1256 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1257 ($self: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1258 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1259 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1261 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1262 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1263 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1264 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1265 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1267 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1268 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1270 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1271 $short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1275 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1276 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1277 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1279 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1280 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1282 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1283 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1285 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1286 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1287 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $channel);
1288 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1289 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1290 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1296 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1297 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1301 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1303 $entry.remove_entry();
1311 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1312 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1316 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1318 $entry.remove_entry();
1326 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1327 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1329 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1330 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel);
1336 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1337 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_chan_info: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1339 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1340 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1341 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_chan_info, $chan);
1342 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1343 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1344 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1345 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1346 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1347 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1348 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1349 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1350 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1351 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1352 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1355 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1356 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1357 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1358 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1359 match $action_type {
1360 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1361 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1363 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1364 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1366 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1367 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1368 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1369 if !$resend_commitment {
1370 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1373 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1375 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1376 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1380 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1381 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1383 $entry.remove_entry();
1387 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1388 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1389 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1392 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1394 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1395 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1397 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1398 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1400 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1401 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1405 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1406 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1407 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1409 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1410 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1414 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1415 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1417 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1418 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1421 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1426 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1427 ($short_to_chan_info: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1428 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1429 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1430 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1432 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1433 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1434 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1435 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1436 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1437 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1438 let scid_insert = $short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1439 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1440 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1445 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1446 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1447 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1448 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1449 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1451 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1452 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1453 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1455 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1456 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1457 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1458 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1461 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1462 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1463 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1464 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1465 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1466 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1467 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1468 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1469 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1470 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1471 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1472 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1475 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1476 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1477 // before it should be allowed to.
1478 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1479 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_chan_info, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1481 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1482 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1483 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1488 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1489 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1490 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1491 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1492 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1493 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1494 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1495 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1496 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1497 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1498 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1499 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1500 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1501 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1502 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1503 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1504 let mut order = $order;
1506 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1508 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1512 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1513 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1514 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1515 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1520 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1521 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1522 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1523 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1524 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1529 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1533 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1538 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1539 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1540 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1545 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1546 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1547 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1548 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1549 assert!(res.is_ok());
1552 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1556 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1557 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1558 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1560 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1562 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1563 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1568 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1569 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1570 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1571 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1572 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1575 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1577 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1578 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1580 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1582 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1583 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1584 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1585 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1586 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1587 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1588 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1589 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1591 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1592 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1593 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1597 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1599 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1600 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1601 short_to_chan_info: HashMap::new(),
1602 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1603 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1604 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1606 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1607 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1608 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1609 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1611 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1612 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1615 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1616 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1618 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1620 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1621 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1623 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1625 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1626 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1627 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1628 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1636 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1637 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1638 &self.default_configuration
1641 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1642 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1643 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1646 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1647 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1649 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1651 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1655 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1660 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1662 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1663 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1664 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1665 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1666 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1669 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1670 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1672 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1673 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1674 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1676 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1677 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1678 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1679 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1680 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1681 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1683 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1684 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1685 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1686 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1687 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1688 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1693 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1694 Some(peer_state) => {
1695 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1696 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1697 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1698 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1699 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1700 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1701 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1705 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1710 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1713 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1716 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1717 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1719 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1720 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1726 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1731 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1732 node_id: their_network_key,
1735 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1738 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1739 let mut res = Vec::new();
1741 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1742 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1743 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1744 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1745 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1746 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1747 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1748 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1749 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1750 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1751 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1752 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1753 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1754 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1755 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1756 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1757 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1758 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1759 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1760 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1761 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1763 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1764 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1765 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1766 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1767 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1768 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1769 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1770 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1771 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1772 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1773 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1774 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1775 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1776 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1777 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1778 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1779 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1780 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1781 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1782 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1783 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1784 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1785 config: Some(channel.config()),
1789 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1790 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1791 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1792 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1798 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1799 /// more information.
1800 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1801 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1804 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1805 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1807 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1808 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1811 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1812 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1813 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1814 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1815 // really wanted anyway.
1816 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1819 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1820 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1821 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1822 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1823 Some(transaction) => {
1824 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1828 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1829 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1830 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1831 reason: closure_reason
1835 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1836 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1838 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1839 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1841 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1842 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1844 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1848 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1849 Some(peer_state) => {
1850 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1851 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1852 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1854 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1856 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1858 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1859 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1860 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1861 let (result, is_permanent) =
1862 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1864 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1871 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1875 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1876 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1877 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1878 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1882 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1890 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1891 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1895 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1899 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1900 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1901 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1903 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1904 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1906 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1907 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1908 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1909 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1911 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1913 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1914 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1915 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1916 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1917 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1920 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1921 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1922 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1924 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1925 /// the channel being closed or not:
1926 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1927 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1928 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1929 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1930 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1931 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1932 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1934 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1936 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1937 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1938 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1939 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1940 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1944 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1945 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1946 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1952 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1953 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1954 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1955 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1956 // ignore the result here.
1957 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1961 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1962 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1963 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1964 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1967 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1968 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1969 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1970 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1972 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1973 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1975 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1977 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1979 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1982 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1983 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1984 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1985 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1986 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1991 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1994 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1995 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1996 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1997 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1998 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1999 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2000 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2001 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2002 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2012 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2013 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2014 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2016 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2017 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2018 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2021 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2022 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2023 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2025 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2026 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2027 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2028 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2029 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2032 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2033 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2034 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2035 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2036 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2040 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2041 /// local transaction(s).
2042 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2043 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2044 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2048 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2049 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2051 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2052 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2053 return Err(ReceiveError {
2054 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2056 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2059 // final_expiry_too_soon
2060 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2061 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2062 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2063 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2064 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2065 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2068 err_data: Vec::new(),
2069 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2072 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2073 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2076 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2080 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2081 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2084 err_data: Vec::new(),
2085 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2091 err_data: Vec::new(),
2092 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2095 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2096 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2102 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2103 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2105 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2106 phantom_shared_secret,
2108 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2109 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2110 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2111 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2112 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2113 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2114 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2115 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2123 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2125 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 return Err(ReceiveError {
2129 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2130 err_data: Vec::new(),
2131 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2136 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2139 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2140 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2141 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2145 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2146 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2147 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2149 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2150 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2151 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2152 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2153 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2154 failure_code: $err_code,
2160 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2161 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2164 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2166 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2167 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2168 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2169 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2170 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2171 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2172 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2173 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2175 macro_rules! return_err {
2176 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2178 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2179 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2180 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2181 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2182 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2188 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2190 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2191 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2193 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2194 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2198 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2199 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2201 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2203 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2204 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2205 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2206 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2207 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2209 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2212 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2213 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2214 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2216 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2217 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2218 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2221 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2222 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2223 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2224 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2225 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2230 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2231 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2234 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2235 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2236 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2237 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2242 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2243 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2244 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2245 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2246 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2247 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2248 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2249 let id_option = channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2250 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2251 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2252 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2254 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2257 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2260 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2262 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2263 let chan = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2264 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2265 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2266 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2267 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2268 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2270 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2271 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2272 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2273 // we don't have the channel here.
2274 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2276 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2278 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2279 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2280 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2281 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2282 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2283 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2284 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2286 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2287 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2289 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2290 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2294 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2296 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2303 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2304 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2305 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2306 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2307 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2308 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2310 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2311 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2313 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2314 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2315 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2316 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2317 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2318 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2319 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2320 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2321 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2322 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2328 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2329 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2330 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2331 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2333 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2334 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2336 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2337 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2338 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2340 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2341 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2342 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2344 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2349 pending_forward_info
2352 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2353 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2354 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2356 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2357 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2358 if !chan.should_announce() {
2359 return Err(LightningError {
2360 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2364 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2365 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2367 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2368 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2371 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2372 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2373 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2374 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2375 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2376 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2378 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2379 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2383 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2385 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2387 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2389 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2390 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2392 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2393 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2394 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2395 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2396 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2397 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2398 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2399 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2402 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2403 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2405 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2411 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2412 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2414 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2415 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2416 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2418 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2419 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2420 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2421 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2422 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2424 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2428 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2429 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2431 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2432 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2433 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2434 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2435 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2436 err: "Payment already completed"
2441 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_chan_info.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2442 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2443 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2446 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2448 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2449 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2450 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2451 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2452 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2453 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2454 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2455 total_msat: total_value,
2457 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2462 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2464 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2465 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2467 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2468 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2470 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2471 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2473 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2474 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2476 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2477 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2478 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2479 channel_state, chan)
2481 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2482 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2483 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2484 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2485 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2486 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2487 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2488 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2489 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2490 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2492 insert_outbound_payment!();
2494 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2495 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2496 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2497 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2498 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2499 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2500 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2501 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2507 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2509 } else { unreachable!(); }
2513 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2514 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2516 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2521 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2523 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2524 /// fields for more info.
2526 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2527 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2528 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2529 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2530 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2531 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2533 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2535 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2536 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2537 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2539 /// In general, a path may raise:
2540 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2541 /// node public key) is specified.
2542 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2543 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2545 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2546 /// relevant updates.
2548 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2549 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2550 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2552 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2553 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2554 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2555 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2557 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2558 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2559 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2560 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2561 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2564 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2565 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2566 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2568 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2569 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2571 let mut total_value = 0;
2572 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2573 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2574 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2575 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2576 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2577 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2578 continue 'path_check;
2580 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2581 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2582 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2583 continue 'path_check;
2586 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2587 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2589 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2590 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2592 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2593 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2594 total_value = amt_msat;
2597 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2598 let mut results = Vec::new();
2599 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2600 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2602 let mut has_ok = false;
2603 let mut has_err = false;
2604 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2605 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2606 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2607 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2608 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2609 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2610 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2614 } else if res.is_err() {
2615 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2616 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2619 if has_err && has_ok {
2620 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2623 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2624 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2625 Some(RouteParameters {
2626 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2627 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2628 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2634 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2635 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2636 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2637 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2643 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2645 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2646 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2647 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2648 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2649 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2651 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2652 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2653 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2654 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2655 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2656 if path.len() == 0 {
2657 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2658 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2663 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2664 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2665 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2667 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2668 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2670 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2671 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2672 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2673 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2676 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2678 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2679 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2680 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2683 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2684 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2685 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2688 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2689 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2690 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2695 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2696 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2700 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2703 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2705 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2706 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2707 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2708 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2710 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2711 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2712 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2714 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2716 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2717 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2720 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2721 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2722 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2723 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2724 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2726 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2734 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2735 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2736 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2737 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2738 /// never reach the recipient.
2740 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2742 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2743 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2745 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2747 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2748 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2749 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2751 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2753 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2754 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2755 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2760 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2761 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2762 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2763 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2764 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2766 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2769 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2770 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2774 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2776 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, Some(payment_id), None) {
2777 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2782 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2784 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2785 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2786 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2789 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2790 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2791 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2792 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2793 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2794 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2797 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2798 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2799 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2800 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2801 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2803 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2805 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2807 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2808 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2809 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2810 } else { unreachable!(); })
2813 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2815 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2816 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2819 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2820 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2827 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2832 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2835 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2836 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2837 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2846 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2848 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2852 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2854 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2855 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2857 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2858 /// across the p2p network.
2860 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2861 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2863 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2864 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2865 /// keys per-channel).
2867 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2868 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2869 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2871 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2872 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2873 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2875 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2876 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2877 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2878 /// for more details.
2880 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2881 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2882 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2885 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2886 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2888 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2893 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2894 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2895 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2896 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2897 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2898 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2899 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2900 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2904 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2905 let mut output_index = None;
2906 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2907 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2908 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2909 if output_index.is_some() {
2910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2911 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2914 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2916 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2919 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2922 if output_index.is_none() {
2923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2924 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2927 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2932 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2933 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 100 (our stated public contract on when
2934 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2936 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2939 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2940 // smaller than 100:
2941 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 100;
2943 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2944 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2945 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2946 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2947 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2948 /// our network addresses.
2950 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2951 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2953 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2954 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2955 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2956 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2958 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 100).
2960 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2961 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2962 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2964 if addresses.len() > 100 {
2965 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2968 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2969 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2970 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2972 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2973 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2974 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2975 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2976 rgb, alias, addresses,
2977 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2978 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2980 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2981 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2983 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2984 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2986 let mut announced_chans = false;
2987 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2988 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2989 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2991 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2996 announced_chans = true;
2998 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2999 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
3000 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
3004 if announced_chans {
3005 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
3006 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
3007 signature: node_announce_sig,
3008 contents: announcement
3014 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3016 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3017 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3018 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3019 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3021 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3022 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3024 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3025 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3027 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3029 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3030 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3031 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3032 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3033 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3034 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3035 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3036 pub fn update_channel_config(
3037 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3038 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3039 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3040 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3041 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3046 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3049 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3050 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3051 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3052 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3053 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3054 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3056 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3057 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3058 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3059 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3063 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3064 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3065 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3068 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3069 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3070 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3072 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3081 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3083 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3084 /// Will likely generate further events.
3085 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3088 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3089 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3090 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3091 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3093 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3094 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3096 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3097 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3098 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&short_chan_id) {
3099 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3101 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3102 match forward_info {
3103 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3104 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3105 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3106 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3107 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3108 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3110 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3111 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3112 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3113 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3114 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3115 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3118 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3119 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3121 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3124 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3125 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3131 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3132 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3134 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3138 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3141 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3145 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3146 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3147 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3148 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3149 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3151 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3152 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3153 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3154 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3155 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3157 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3159 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3160 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3164 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3165 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3166 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3167 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3173 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3176 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3179 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3180 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3181 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3182 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3183 // problem, not ours.
3190 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3191 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3192 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3193 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3194 match forward_info {
3195 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3196 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3198 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3199 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3200 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3201 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3202 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3203 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3204 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3205 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3206 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3207 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3209 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3211 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3214 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3216 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3217 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3218 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3219 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3225 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3227 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3228 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3229 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3230 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3231 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3232 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3233 // this channel currently :/.
3239 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3240 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3242 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3244 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3246 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3247 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3249 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3251 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3252 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3253 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3256 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3258 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3259 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3260 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3261 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3262 // messages when we can.
3263 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3264 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3265 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3272 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3273 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3276 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3277 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3278 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3279 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3280 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3281 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3283 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3285 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3286 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3287 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3290 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3294 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3295 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3298 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3299 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3301 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3302 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3303 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3304 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3305 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3306 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3308 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3316 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3317 match forward_info {
3318 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3319 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3320 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3321 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3322 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3323 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3324 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3326 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3327 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3329 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3332 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3333 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3334 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3335 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3336 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3337 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3338 phantom_shared_secret,
3340 value: amt_to_forward,
3342 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3347 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3348 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3349 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3350 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3351 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3353 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3354 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3355 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3356 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3357 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3358 phantom_shared_secret,
3360 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3361 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3366 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3367 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3368 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3370 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3371 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3372 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3375 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3376 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3377 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3378 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3380 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3384 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3385 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3386 total_value += htlc.value;
3387 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3388 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3389 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3390 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3391 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3392 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3394 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3396 _ => unreachable!(),
3399 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3401 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3402 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3403 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3404 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3405 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3408 amount_msat: total_value,
3410 payment_received_generated = true;
3412 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3413 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3415 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3417 payment_received_generated
3421 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3422 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3423 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3424 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3425 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3426 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3427 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3428 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3430 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3431 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3432 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3433 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3434 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3436 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3440 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3442 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3443 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3445 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3446 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3447 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3449 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3453 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3455 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3461 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3462 if payment_data.is_none() {
3463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3464 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3467 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3468 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3470 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3471 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3472 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3473 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3474 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3476 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3477 if payment_received_generated {
3478 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3484 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3485 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3493 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3494 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3496 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3498 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3499 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3502 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3503 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3504 events.append(&mut new_events);
3507 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3509 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3510 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3512 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3513 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3514 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3515 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3516 if background_events.is_empty() {
3520 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3522 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3523 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3524 // monitor updating completing.
3525 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3532 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3533 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3534 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3535 self.process_background_events();
3538 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_chan_info: &mut HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3539 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3540 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3541 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3542 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3543 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3544 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3546 if !chan.is_live() {
3547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3548 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3549 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3551 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3552 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3554 let mut retain_channel = true;
3555 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3558 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3559 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3563 let ret_err = match res {
3564 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3565 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3566 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3567 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3571 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3572 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3573 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3574 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3575 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3576 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3577 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3587 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3591 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3592 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3593 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3594 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3595 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3596 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3597 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3599 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3601 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3603 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3604 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3605 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3606 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3607 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3608 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3609 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3611 handle_errors.push(err);
3621 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3623 /// This currently includes:
3624 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3625 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3626 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3628 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3629 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3631 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3632 /// estimate fetches.
3633 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3634 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3635 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3636 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3638 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3640 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3641 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3643 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3644 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3645 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3646 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
3647 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3648 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3649 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3650 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3652 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3654 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3656 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3657 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, chan_id);
3658 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3659 if needs_close { return false; }
3662 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3663 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3664 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3665 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3666 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3667 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3668 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3669 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3673 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3674 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3676 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3677 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3678 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3682 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3683 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3688 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3693 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3694 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3695 // This should be unreachable
3696 debug_assert!(false);
3699 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3700 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3701 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3702 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3704 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3705 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3706 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3708 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3716 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3717 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3721 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3722 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3728 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3729 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3730 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3732 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3733 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3734 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3735 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3737 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3738 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3739 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3740 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3741 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3742 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3744 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3745 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3746 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3747 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3748 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3749 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3750 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3751 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3752 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3753 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3754 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3755 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3760 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3761 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3763 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3765 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3766 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3767 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3768 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3769 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3770 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3771 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3773 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3775 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3776 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3778 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3783 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3784 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3785 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3786 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3787 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3788 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3789 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3790 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3791 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3792 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3794 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3795 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3796 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3799 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3800 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3801 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3802 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3803 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3807 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3808 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3809 // be surfaced to the user.
3810 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3811 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3812 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3814 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3816 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3817 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3818 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3819 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3820 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3824 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3826 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state, htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver)
3829 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3830 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3831 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3832 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3833 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3834 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3835 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3836 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3837 Some(RouteParameters {
3838 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3839 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3840 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3843 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3844 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3845 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3847 rejected_by_dest: false,
3848 network_update: None,
3849 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3851 short_channel_id: None,
3858 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3859 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3861 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3867 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3874 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3875 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3876 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3877 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3878 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3879 /// still-available channels.
3880 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3881 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3882 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3883 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3886 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3887 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3888 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3890 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3891 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3892 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3893 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3894 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3895 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3896 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3897 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3898 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3901 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3902 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3905 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3906 all_paths_failed = true;
3907 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3908 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3910 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3916 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3919 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3920 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3921 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3922 Some(RouteParameters {
3923 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3924 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3925 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3928 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3930 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3931 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3933 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3935 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3937 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
3938 if !payment_retryable {
3939 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
3941 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3945 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
3946 payment_id: payment_id,
3947 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3953 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3954 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3955 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3956 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
3957 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3959 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3960 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3961 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3962 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3969 error_code: onion_error_code,
3971 error_data: onion_error_data
3975 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3981 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3982 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3983 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3984 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3986 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3987 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3988 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
3989 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
3990 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3991 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3992 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3993 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3994 network_update: None,
3997 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4000 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4002 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4006 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4007 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4008 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4010 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4011 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4012 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4014 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4015 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4016 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4017 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4019 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4020 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4023 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4024 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4025 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4029 let mut forward_event = None;
4030 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4031 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4033 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4035 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4038 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4041 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4042 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4043 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4044 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4045 time_forwardable: time
4048 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4049 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4050 failed_next_destination: destination
4056 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4057 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4059 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4060 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4061 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4063 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4064 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4065 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4066 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4068 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4069 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4070 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4071 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4072 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4073 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4074 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4075 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4077 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4079 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4080 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4081 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4082 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4084 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4085 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4086 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4087 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4089 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4090 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4091 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4092 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4093 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4095 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4096 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4097 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4098 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4099 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_chan_info.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4103 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4104 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4105 debug_assert!(false);
4109 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4110 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4111 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4112 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4113 if sources.len() != 1 {
4114 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4115 debug_assert!(false);
4121 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4123 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4124 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4127 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4128 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4129 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4133 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4134 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4135 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4137 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4138 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4139 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4140 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4141 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4142 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4143 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4144 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4146 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4147 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4148 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4149 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4150 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4151 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4152 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4153 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4155 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4156 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4157 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4158 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4159 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4160 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4162 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4167 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4168 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4170 purpose: payment_purpose,
4171 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4175 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4176 // which were generated.
4177 channel_state.take();
4179 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4180 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4181 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4186 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4187 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4188 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4189 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4190 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4192 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4196 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4197 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4198 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4199 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4200 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4201 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4202 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4203 payment_preimage, e);
4204 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4205 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4206 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4207 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4210 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4211 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4212 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4213 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4214 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4215 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4216 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4217 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4218 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4219 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4225 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4227 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4230 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4231 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4232 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4233 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4234 payment_preimage, e);
4236 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4237 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4239 chan.remove_entry();
4241 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4244 } else { unreachable!(); }
4247 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4248 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4249 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4250 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4251 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4252 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4253 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4254 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4255 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4256 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4257 pending_events.push(
4258 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4260 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4265 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4273 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4276 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4277 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4278 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4279 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4280 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4282 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4283 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4284 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4285 pending_events.push(
4286 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4287 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4293 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4297 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4298 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4299 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4301 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4302 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4303 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4304 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4305 pending_events.push(
4306 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4314 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4322 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4323 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4324 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4325 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4326 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4327 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4328 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4331 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4332 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4333 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4334 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4335 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4338 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4339 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4340 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4341 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4342 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4343 payment_preimage, e);
4345 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4346 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4347 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4348 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4351 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4352 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4353 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4354 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4358 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4359 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4360 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4363 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4364 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4365 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4367 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4369 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4379 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4380 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4381 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4384 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4387 let chan_restoration_res;
4388 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4389 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4390 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4391 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4395 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4399 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4400 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4401 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4402 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4403 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4404 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4405 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4407 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4408 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4409 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4414 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4415 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4416 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4419 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4421 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4422 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4423 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4424 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4425 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4429 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4431 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4432 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4435 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4436 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4437 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4439 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4440 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4441 /// used to accept such channels.
4443 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4444 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4445 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4446 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4449 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4450 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4452 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4453 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4454 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4456 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4457 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4459 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4460 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4462 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4463 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4465 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4466 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4467 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4468 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4471 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4472 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4474 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4475 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4476 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4477 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4478 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4481 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4485 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4486 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4487 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4488 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4490 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4493 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4494 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4495 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4498 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4499 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4500 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4504 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4510 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4511 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4515 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4516 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4519 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4520 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4521 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4522 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4525 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4530 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4532 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4533 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4534 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4535 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4538 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4539 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4540 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4543 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4544 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4547 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4548 pending_events.push(
4549 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4550 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4551 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4552 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4553 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4554 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4559 entry.insert(channel);
4565 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4566 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4567 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4571 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4572 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4574 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4575 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4580 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4581 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4582 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4583 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4584 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4586 user_channel_id: user_id,
4591 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4592 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4593 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4594 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4598 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4601 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4606 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4607 // lock before watch_channel
4608 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4610 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4611 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4612 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4613 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4614 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4615 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4616 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4617 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4618 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4619 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4620 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4622 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4623 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4624 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4625 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4626 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4627 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4628 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4632 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4633 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4634 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4635 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4636 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4639 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4640 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4643 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4644 funding_msg.channel_id))
4646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4647 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4651 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4655 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4663 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4665 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4666 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4667 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4668 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4669 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4670 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4673 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4674 Ok(update) => update,
4675 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4677 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4678 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4679 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4680 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4681 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4682 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4683 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4684 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4689 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4690 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_chan_info, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4697 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4698 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4702 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4703 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4704 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4705 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4707 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4710 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4711 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4712 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4714 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4715 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4716 msg: announcement_sigs,
4718 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4719 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4720 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4721 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4722 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4723 // announcement_signatures.
4724 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4725 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4726 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4727 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4734 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4738 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4739 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4740 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4742 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4744 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4746 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4747 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4750 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4751 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4752 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4753 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4756 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4757 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4759 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4760 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4761 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4762 let (result, is_permanent) =
4763 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_chan_info, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4765 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4771 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4772 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4773 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4783 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4784 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4788 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4792 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4793 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4794 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4795 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4796 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4797 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4798 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4801 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4802 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4804 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4809 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4810 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4811 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4812 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4813 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4814 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4815 } else { (tx, None) }
4817 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4820 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4821 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4822 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4824 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4825 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4826 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4831 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4836 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4837 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4838 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4839 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4841 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4842 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4843 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4844 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4846 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4847 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4848 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4850 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4852 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4856 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4857 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4858 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4859 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4860 match pending_forward_info {
4861 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4862 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4863 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4864 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4866 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4868 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4869 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4870 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4873 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4875 _ => pending_forward_info
4878 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4885 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4886 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4887 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4889 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4891 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4894 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4899 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4903 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4904 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4905 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4908 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4911 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4918 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4919 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4920 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4921 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4923 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4924 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4926 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4927 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4928 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4930 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4937 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4938 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4940 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4942 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4943 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4945 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4946 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4947 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4948 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4949 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4950 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4951 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4956 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4957 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4959 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4960 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4961 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4963 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4964 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4965 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4966 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4967 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4968 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4969 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4970 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4972 commitment_signed: msg,
4978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4983 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4984 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4985 let mut forward_event = None;
4986 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4987 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4988 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4989 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4991 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4992 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4993 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4994 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4995 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4998 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4999 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5002 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5003 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5008 match forward_event {
5010 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5011 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5012 time_forwardable: time
5020 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5021 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5024 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5025 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5027 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5028 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5030 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5031 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5032 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
5033 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5034 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
5035 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
5036 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5037 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5038 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5039 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5040 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5042 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
5043 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5044 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5045 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5046 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5048 } else { unreachable!(); }
5051 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5053 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5057 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5058 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5059 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5060 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5061 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5066 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5068 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5069 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5071 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5072 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5073 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5075 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5076 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5083 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5084 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5085 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5086 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5088 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5091 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
5093 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5098 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5099 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5100 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5102 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5103 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5104 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5105 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5107 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5111 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5112 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5113 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
5114 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5115 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5116 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5124 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5125 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5126 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5127 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5128 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5129 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5131 // It's not a local channel
5132 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5135 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5137 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5138 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5139 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5140 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5141 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5142 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5144 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5146 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5147 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5148 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5149 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5151 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5152 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5155 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5157 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5160 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5161 let chan_restoration_res;
5162 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5163 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5164 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5166 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5167 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5168 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5169 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5171 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5172 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5173 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5174 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5175 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5176 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5177 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5178 let mut channel_update = None;
5179 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5180 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5181 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5184 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5185 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5186 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5187 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5188 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5189 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5190 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5195 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5196 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5197 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5198 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5199 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5200 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5202 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5204 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5207 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5208 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5210 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5211 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5216 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5217 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5218 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5219 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5220 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5221 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5222 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5223 match monitor_event {
5224 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5225 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5226 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5227 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5230 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5231 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5234 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5235 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5236 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5238 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5239 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5240 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5241 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5242 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5243 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5244 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5248 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5249 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5251 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5253 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5254 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5255 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5256 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5257 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5262 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5263 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5269 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5270 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5273 has_pending_monitor_events
5276 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5277 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5278 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5280 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5281 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5284 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5285 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5286 /// update was applied.
5288 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5289 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5290 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5291 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5292 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5293 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5294 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5295 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5297 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5298 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5299 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5300 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5301 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5303 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5304 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5305 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5306 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5308 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5310 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5313 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5314 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5315 has_monitor_update = true;
5316 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5317 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5318 if close_channel { return false; }
5320 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5321 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5322 updates: commitment_update,
5329 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5330 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5331 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5338 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5339 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5340 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5343 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5344 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5350 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5351 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5352 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5353 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5354 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5355 let mut has_update = false;
5357 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5358 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5359 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5360 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5361 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5363 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5364 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5365 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5366 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5368 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5369 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5372 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5373 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5374 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5375 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5376 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5381 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5383 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5384 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5385 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
5391 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_chan_info, chan, channel_id);
5392 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5399 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5400 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5406 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5407 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5409 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5410 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5411 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5412 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5413 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5414 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5415 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5416 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5417 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5418 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5419 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5420 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5421 assert!(should_broadcast);
5422 } else { unreachable!(); }
5423 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5425 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5429 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5430 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5432 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5433 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5436 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5439 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5440 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5442 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5443 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5444 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5445 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5446 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5447 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5448 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5449 // never fail a payment too early.
5450 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5452 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5460 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5463 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5464 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5466 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5467 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5468 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5470 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5472 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5473 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5477 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5478 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5480 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5482 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5483 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5484 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5485 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5486 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5487 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5490 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5491 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5493 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5496 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5498 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5500 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5501 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5502 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5503 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5504 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5507 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5508 /// stored external to LDK.
5510 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5511 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5512 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5514 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5515 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5518 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5519 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5520 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5521 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5523 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5524 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5525 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5526 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5527 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5529 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5530 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5531 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5532 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5533 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5535 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5536 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5538 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5539 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5543 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5544 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5546 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5548 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5549 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5550 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5551 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5554 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5555 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5557 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5560 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5562 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5564 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5565 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5568 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5569 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5571 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5572 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5573 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5576 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5577 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5579 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5580 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5581 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5582 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5584 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5585 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5586 match channel_state.short_to_chan_info.entry(scid_candidate) {
5587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5588 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5593 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5595 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5596 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5598 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5599 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5600 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5604 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5605 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5606 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5607 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5608 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5613 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5614 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5618 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5619 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5623 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5624 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5626 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5627 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5630 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5631 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5632 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5633 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5635 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5636 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5637 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5638 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5641 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5642 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5644 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5645 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5648 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5649 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5650 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5652 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5653 events.replace(pending_events);
5662 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5664 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5665 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5666 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5667 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5670 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5672 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5673 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5674 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5675 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5676 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5678 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5679 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5680 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5681 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5684 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5685 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5686 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5689 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5690 handler.handle_event(&event);
5698 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5700 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5701 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5702 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5703 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5706 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5708 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5709 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5710 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5711 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5712 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5715 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5716 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5719 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5721 let new_height = height - 1;
5723 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5724 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5725 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5726 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5727 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5728 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5731 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5735 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5737 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5738 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5739 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5743 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5744 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5745 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5746 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5748 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5749 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5752 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5753 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5755 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5756 if height < last_best_block_height {
5757 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5758 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5762 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5763 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5764 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5765 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5767 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5768 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5772 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5774 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5776 macro_rules! max_time {
5777 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5779 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5780 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5781 // having an explicit local time source.
5782 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5783 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5784 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5785 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5786 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5792 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5793 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5794 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5795 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5796 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5799 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5800 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5801 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5802 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5803 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5804 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5805 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5806 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5807 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5815 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5816 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5817 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_chan_info.len());
5818 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5819 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5820 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5826 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5827 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5828 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5829 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5830 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5831 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5832 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5833 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5838 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5840 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5841 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5842 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5843 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5846 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5847 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5849 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5850 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5851 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5852 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5853 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5855 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5856 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5858 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5859 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5860 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
5861 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5862 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5863 let res = f(channel);
5864 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5865 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5866 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5867 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5869 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5871 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5872 send_channel_ready!(short_to_chan_info, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5873 if channel.is_usable() {
5874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5875 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5877 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5885 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5887 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5888 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5889 msg: announcement_sigs,
5891 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5892 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5893 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5895 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5896 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5897 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5902 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5903 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5904 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5905 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5906 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5907 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5908 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5909 // is always consistent.
5910 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5911 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5912 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5913 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5916 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5917 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, channel);
5918 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5919 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5920 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5921 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5922 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5926 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5927 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5928 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5929 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5930 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5931 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5932 data: reason_message,
5940 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5941 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5942 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5943 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5944 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5945 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5946 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5947 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5948 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5949 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5951 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5952 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5953 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5954 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
5958 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5963 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5965 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
5970 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5971 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5972 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5975 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5977 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5978 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5981 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5982 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5984 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5985 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5988 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
5989 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
5990 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
5991 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
5992 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
5995 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5996 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5997 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6000 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6001 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6002 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6003 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6007 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6008 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6009 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6011 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6012 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6015 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6020 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6021 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6022 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6025 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6027 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6030 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6031 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6032 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6035 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6036 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6037 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6040 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6042 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6045 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6046 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6047 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6050 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6051 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6052 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6055 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6057 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6060 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6062 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6065 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6067 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6070 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6072 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6075 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6077 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6080 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6081 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6082 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6085 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6086 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6087 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6090 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6091 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6092 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6095 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6100 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6101 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6102 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6105 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6107 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6108 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6112 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6113 let short_to_chan_info = &mut channel_state.short_to_chan_info;
6114 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6115 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6116 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6117 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6118 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6119 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6120 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_chan_info, chan);
6121 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6124 no_channels_remain = false;
6129 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6134 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6137 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6142 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6143 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6144 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6145 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6146 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6148 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6154 if no_channels_remain {
6155 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6158 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6159 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6163 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6164 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6170 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6171 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6172 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6173 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6177 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6182 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6183 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6184 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6185 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6186 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6187 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6188 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6189 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6190 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6195 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6196 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6202 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6205 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6206 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6209 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6210 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6211 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6212 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6217 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6218 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6219 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6220 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6223 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6225 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6233 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6234 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6239 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6240 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6242 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6243 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6244 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6245 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6248 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6249 (2, node_id, required),
6250 (4, features, required),
6251 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6252 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6253 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6254 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6258 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6259 (2, channel_id, required),
6260 (3, channel_type, option),
6261 (4, counterparty, required),
6262 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6263 (6, funding_txo, option),
6264 (7, config, option),
6265 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6266 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6267 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6268 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6269 (16, balance_msat, required),
6270 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6271 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6272 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6273 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6274 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6275 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6276 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6277 (26, is_outbound, required),
6278 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6279 (30, is_usable, required),
6280 (32, is_public, required),
6281 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6282 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6285 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6286 (2, channels, vec_type),
6287 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6288 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6291 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6293 (0, onion_packet, required),
6294 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6297 (0, payment_data, required),
6298 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6299 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6301 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6302 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6303 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6307 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6308 (0, routing, required),
6309 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6310 (4, payment_hash, required),
6311 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6312 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6316 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6317 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6319 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6321 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6322 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6323 reason.write(writer)?;
6325 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6326 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6329 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6330 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6331 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6332 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6339 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6340 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6341 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6344 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6345 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6346 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6347 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6351 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6352 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6353 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6354 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6355 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6358 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6359 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6360 // messages contained in the variants.
6361 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6362 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6363 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6365 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6367 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6368 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6369 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6372 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6373 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6374 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6375 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6376 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6378 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6383 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6388 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6389 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6390 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6391 (2, outpoint, required),
6392 (4, htlc_id, required),
6393 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6396 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6398 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6399 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6400 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6402 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6403 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6404 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6405 (2, self.value, required),
6406 (4, payment_data, option),
6407 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6408 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6414 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6415 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6416 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6418 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6419 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6420 let mut total_msat = None;
6421 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6422 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6423 (0, prev_hop, required),
6424 (1, total_msat, option),
6425 (2, value, required),
6426 (4, payment_data, option),
6427 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6428 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6430 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6432 if payment_data.is_some() {
6433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6435 if total_msat.is_none() {
6436 total_msat = Some(value);
6438 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6441 if total_msat.is_none() {
6442 if payment_data.is_none() {
6443 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6445 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6447 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6451 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6454 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6461 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6462 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6463 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6467 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6468 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6469 let mut payment_id = None;
6470 let mut payment_secret = None;
6471 let mut payment_params = None;
6472 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6473 (0, session_priv, required),
6474 (1, payment_id, option),
6475 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6476 (3, payment_secret, option),
6477 (4, path, vec_type),
6478 (5, payment_params, option),
6480 if payment_id.is_none() {
6481 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6483 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6485 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6486 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6487 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6488 path: path.unwrap(),
6489 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6494 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6495 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6500 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6501 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6503 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6505 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6506 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6507 (0, session_priv, required),
6508 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6509 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6510 (3, payment_secret, option),
6511 (4, path, vec_type),
6512 (5, payment_params, option),
6515 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6517 field.write(writer)?;
6524 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6525 (0, LightningError) => {
6529 (0, failure_code, required),
6530 (2, data, vec_type),
6534 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6536 (0, forward_info, required),
6537 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6538 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6539 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6542 (0, htlc_id, required),
6543 (2, err_packet, required),
6547 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6548 (0, payment_secret, required),
6549 (2, expiry_time, required),
6550 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6551 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6552 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6555 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6557 (0, session_privs, required),
6560 (0, session_privs, required),
6561 (1, payment_hash, option),
6564 (0, session_privs, required),
6565 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6566 (2, payment_hash, required),
6567 (4, payment_secret, option),
6568 (6, total_msat, required),
6569 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6570 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6573 (0, session_privs, required),
6574 (2, payment_hash, required),
6578 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6579 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6581 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6585 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6586 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6588 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6590 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6592 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6593 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6594 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6597 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6598 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6599 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6600 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6601 unfunded_channels += 1;
6604 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6605 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6606 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6607 channel.write(writer)?;
6611 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6612 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6613 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6614 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6615 for forward in pending_forwards {
6616 forward.write(writer)?;
6620 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6621 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6622 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6623 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6624 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6625 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6626 htlc.write(writer)?;
6628 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6632 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6633 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6634 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6635 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6636 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6639 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6640 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6641 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6642 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6643 for event in events.iter() {
6644 event.write(writer)?;
6647 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6648 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6649 for event in background_events.iter() {
6651 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6653 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6654 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6659 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6660 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6662 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6663 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6664 hash.write(writer)?;
6665 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6668 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6669 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6670 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6671 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6672 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6675 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6676 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6678 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6679 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6680 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6681 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6684 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6685 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6689 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6690 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6691 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6693 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6694 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6695 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6700 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6701 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6702 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6703 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6704 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6705 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6706 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6713 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6715 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6717 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6718 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6719 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6720 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6721 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6722 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6723 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6724 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6725 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6726 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6727 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6728 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6729 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6731 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6732 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6734 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6735 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6737 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6738 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6739 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6740 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6741 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6742 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6744 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6745 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6746 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6747 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6748 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6749 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6752 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6753 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6755 pub keys_manager: K,
6757 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6759 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6760 pub fee_estimator: F,
6761 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6763 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6764 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6765 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6766 pub chain_monitor: M,
6768 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6769 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6770 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6771 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6772 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6773 /// deserialization.
6775 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6776 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6777 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6779 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6780 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6782 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6783 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6784 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6785 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6787 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6790 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6791 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6794 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6795 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6796 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6798 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6799 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6802 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6803 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6804 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6805 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6806 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6808 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6809 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6814 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6815 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6816 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6817 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6818 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6819 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6820 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6824 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6825 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6826 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6830 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6831 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6832 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6833 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6834 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6835 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6838 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6839 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6841 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6842 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6847 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6849 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6850 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6851 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6852 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6853 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6854 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6855 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6856 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6857 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6858 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6859 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6860 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6861 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6862 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6863 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6864 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6865 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6866 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6867 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6868 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6869 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6871 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6872 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6873 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6874 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6875 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6876 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6877 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6878 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6879 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6880 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6881 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6882 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6883 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6884 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6885 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6886 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6889 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6890 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6891 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6893 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6894 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
6896 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6899 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6900 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6901 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6902 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6903 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6904 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6908 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6909 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6910 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6911 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6915 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6916 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6918 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6919 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6922 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6923 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6925 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6928 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6930 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6931 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6934 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6935 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6937 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6940 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6942 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6943 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let peer_state = PeerState {
6945 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6950 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6952 for _ in 0..event_count {
6953 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6954 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6958 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6959 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6960 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6961 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6962 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6963 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6964 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6965 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6969 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6971 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6972 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6973 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6974 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6978 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6983 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6984 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6985 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6989 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6991 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6992 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6993 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6995 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6997 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6998 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7002 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7003 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7004 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7005 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7006 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7007 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7008 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7009 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7010 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7011 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7012 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7013 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7014 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7015 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7017 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7018 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7021 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7022 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7025 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7026 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7027 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7028 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7029 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7030 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7032 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7034 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7035 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7036 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7037 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7038 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7039 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7040 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7042 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7043 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7044 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7045 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7046 if path.is_empty() {
7047 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7048 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7050 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7051 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7052 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7053 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7054 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7055 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7056 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7057 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7059 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7060 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7061 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7062 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7063 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7065 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7066 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7067 total_msat: path_amt,
7068 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7070 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7071 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7080 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7081 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7083 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7084 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7085 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7088 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7089 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7092 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7093 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7094 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7095 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7096 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7098 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7099 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7100 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7101 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7102 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7103 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7104 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7105 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7107 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7108 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7112 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7114 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7116 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7117 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7119 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7123 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7124 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7126 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7127 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7130 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7132 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7134 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7135 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7136 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7137 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7142 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7143 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7144 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7145 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7147 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7148 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7149 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7151 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7152 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7153 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7154 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7155 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7156 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7158 if chan.is_usable() {
7159 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7160 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7161 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7162 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7168 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7170 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7171 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7172 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7173 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7174 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7175 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7176 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7178 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7179 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7180 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7181 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7183 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7184 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7185 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7186 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7188 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7189 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7190 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7191 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7193 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7194 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7195 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7197 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7198 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7201 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7203 purpose: payment_purpose,
7204 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7210 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7212 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7213 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7214 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7216 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7218 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7223 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7225 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7226 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7227 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7229 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7230 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7231 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7233 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7239 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7240 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7242 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7244 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7245 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7246 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7247 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7249 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7250 logger: args.logger,
7251 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7254 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7255 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7256 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7257 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7260 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7261 //connection or two.
7263 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7269 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7270 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7271 use core::time::Duration;
7272 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7273 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7274 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7275 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7276 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7277 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7279 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7280 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7281 use util::errors::APIError;
7282 use util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7283 use util::test_utils;
7284 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7287 fn test_notify_limits() {
7288 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7289 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7293 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7295 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7296 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7297 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7298 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7299 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7301 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7303 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7304 // to connect messages with new values
7305 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7306 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7307 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7308 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7310 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7311 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7312 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7313 // ... but the last node should not.
7314 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7315 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7316 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7317 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7319 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7320 // about the channel.
7321 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7322 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7323 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7325 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7327 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7328 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7329 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7330 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7331 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7332 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7334 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7335 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7338 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7339 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7340 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7341 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7342 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7343 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7345 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7346 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7347 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7348 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7349 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7350 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7351 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7352 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7354 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7355 // the channel info has updated.
7356 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7357 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7358 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7359 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7360 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7361 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7365 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7366 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7372 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7374 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7375 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7376 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7377 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7378 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7379 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7380 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7382 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7384 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7386 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7387 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7389 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7390 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7391 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7392 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7393 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7395 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7396 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7397 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7399 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7400 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7401 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7402 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7403 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7404 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7405 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7406 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7407 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7409 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7410 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7412 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7413 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7414 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7416 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7417 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7418 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7419 // lightning messages manually.
7420 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7421 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7424 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7425 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7426 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7428 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7429 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7431 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7432 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7434 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7435 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7436 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7438 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7439 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7440 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7442 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7444 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7446 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7450 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7451 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7452 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7453 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7455 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7456 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7457 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7458 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7463 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7464 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7465 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7466 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7471 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7472 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7473 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7474 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7481 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7482 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7483 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7484 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7485 // fails as expected.
7486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7489 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7490 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7491 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7492 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7494 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7495 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7496 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7498 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7499 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7500 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7501 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7502 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7504 let route = find_route(
7505 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7506 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7508 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7510 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7511 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7512 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7517 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7518 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7519 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7520 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7522 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7524 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7525 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7526 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7527 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7528 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7529 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7530 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7532 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7533 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7535 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7536 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7537 let route = find_route(
7538 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7539 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7541 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7543 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7545 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7546 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7547 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7549 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7550 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7551 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7553 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7554 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7555 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7556 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7557 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7559 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7561 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7563 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7564 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7565 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7566 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7567 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7568 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7569 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7570 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7571 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7573 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7574 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7578 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7579 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7580 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7586 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7587 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7588 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7589 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7591 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7592 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7593 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7594 final_value_msat: 10000,
7595 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7597 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7598 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7599 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7600 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7601 let route = find_route(
7602 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7603 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7606 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7607 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7608 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7611 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7612 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7613 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7614 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7615 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7616 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7619 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7623 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7624 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7628 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7630 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7631 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7632 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7633 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7635 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7636 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7637 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7638 final_value_msat: 10000,
7639 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7641 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7642 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7643 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7644 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7645 let route = find_route(
7646 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7647 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7650 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7651 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7652 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7653 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7656 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7657 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7658 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7659 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7660 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7661 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7664 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7668 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7672 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7674 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7675 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7676 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7677 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7679 // Marshall an MPP route.
7680 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7681 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7682 route.paths.push(path);
7683 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7684 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7685 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7686 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7687 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7688 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7690 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7691 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7692 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7693 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7698 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7699 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7706 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7708 total_msat: 100_000,
7711 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7712 // payment verification fails as expected.
7713 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7714 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7715 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7716 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7718 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7722 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7723 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7727 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7728 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7729 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7730 // the channel is successfully closed.
7731 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7732 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7734 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7736 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7737 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7738 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7739 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7740 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7742 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7743 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7745 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7746 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7747 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7748 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7751 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7753 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7754 // as it has the funding transaction.
7755 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7756 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7757 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7762 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7764 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7766 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7768 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7770 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7771 // as it has the funding transaction.
7772 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7773 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7774 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7777 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7778 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7780 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7781 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7782 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7784 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7785 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7786 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7787 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7789 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7790 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7792 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7793 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7794 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7795 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7796 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7797 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7798 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7800 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7801 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7802 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7803 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7804 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7805 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7806 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7809 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7811 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7812 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7813 // closing transaction).
7814 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7815 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7816 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7818 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7819 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7820 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7821 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7822 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7825 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7827 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
7829 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
7830 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
7831 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7833 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7835 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7836 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7840 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7843 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7844 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7845 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7846 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7847 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7848 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7849 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7850 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7851 use util::test_utils;
7852 use util::config::UserConfig;
7853 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7855 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7856 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7857 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
7859 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7863 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7864 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7865 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7866 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7867 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7868 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7869 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7874 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7875 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7878 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7879 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7880 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7882 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7883 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7885 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7886 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7888 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7889 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7891 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7892 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7893 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7894 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7895 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7897 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7899 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7901 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7902 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7903 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7904 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7905 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7907 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7909 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7911 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7912 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7913 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7914 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7915 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7918 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7919 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7920 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7922 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7923 } else { panic!(); }
7925 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7926 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7928 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7931 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7934 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7935 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7937 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7938 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7939 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7940 match msg_events[0] {
7941 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7942 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7943 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7947 match msg_events[1] {
7948 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7952 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7954 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7955 macro_rules! send_payment {
7956 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7957 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7958 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7959 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7960 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7961 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7962 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7963 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7964 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7965 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7967 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7968 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7970 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7971 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7973 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7974 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7975 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7976 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7977 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7978 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7979 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7980 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7983 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7984 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7985 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7987 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7988 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7989 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7990 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7991 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7993 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7996 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7997 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7998 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7999 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8001 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8006 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8007 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);