1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
33 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
61 use crate::util::events;
62 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
63 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
64 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
65 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
66 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
68 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
71 use crate::prelude::*;
73 use core::cell::RefCell;
75 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
76 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
77 use core::time::Duration;
80 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
81 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
111 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
114 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
115 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
121 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
122 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
123 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
126 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
131 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
132 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
135 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
138 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
139 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
142 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
143 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
145 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
146 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
147 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
150 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
151 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
153 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
154 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
157 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
158 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
161 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
165 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
166 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
167 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
168 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
169 short_channel_id: u64,
171 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
172 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
175 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
180 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
182 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
183 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
184 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
187 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
190 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
191 struct ClaimableHTLC {
192 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
194 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
196 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
198 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
202 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
221 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
222 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
223 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
225 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
226 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
231 impl Readable for InterceptId {
232 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
233 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
238 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
239 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
240 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
241 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
242 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
245 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
247 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
248 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
249 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
251 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
252 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
256 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
257 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
258 (0, short_channel_id, required),
259 (2, htlc_id, required),
261 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
262 (0, session_priv, required),
267 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
268 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
269 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
270 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
271 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
274 session_priv: SecretKey,
275 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
276 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
277 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
278 payment_id: PaymentId,
279 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
280 /// Note that this is now "deprecated" - we write it for forwards (and read it for
281 /// backwards) compatibility reasons, but prefer to use the data in the
282 /// [`super::outbound_payment`] module, which stores per-payment data once instead of in
284 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
287 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
288 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
289 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
291 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
293 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
295 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
298 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
299 payment_id.hash(hasher);
300 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
301 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
302 payment_params.hash(hasher);
307 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
310 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
311 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
313 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
314 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
315 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
316 payment_secret: None,
317 payment_params: None,
322 struct ReceiveError {
328 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
329 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
331 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
332 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
333 pub enum FailureCode {
334 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
335 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
336 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
337 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
338 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
339 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
340 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
341 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
342 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
343 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
344 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
347 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
349 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
350 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
351 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
352 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
353 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
355 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
356 err: msgs::LightningError,
357 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
358 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
360 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
362 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
364 err: LightningError {
366 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
367 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
378 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
379 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
382 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
393 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
394 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
398 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
401 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
403 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
404 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
408 log_level: Level::Warn,
411 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
413 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
415 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
417 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
418 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
426 shutdown_finish: None,
431 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
432 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
433 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
434 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
435 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
437 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
438 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
439 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
440 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
441 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
442 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
443 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
445 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
449 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
450 struct ClaimingPayment {
452 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
453 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
455 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
456 (0, amount_msat, required),
457 (2, payment_purpose, required),
458 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
461 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
462 struct ClaimablePayments {
463 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
464 /// failed/claimed by the user.
466 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
467 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
469 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
470 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
471 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
473 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
474 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
475 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
476 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
479 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
480 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
481 /// quite some time lag.
482 enum BackgroundEvent {
483 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
484 /// commitment transaction.
485 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
489 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
490 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
491 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
492 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
493 /// event can be generated.
494 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
495 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
496 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
499 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
500 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
501 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
504 /// State we hold per-peer.
505 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
506 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
508 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
509 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
511 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
512 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
513 latest_features: InitFeatures,
514 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
515 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
516 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
517 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
518 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
520 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
521 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
522 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
523 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
525 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
526 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
527 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
528 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
529 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
530 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
531 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
532 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
533 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
534 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
538 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
539 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
540 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
541 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
542 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
543 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
546 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
550 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
551 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
553 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
556 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
557 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
558 struct PendingInboundPayment {
559 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
560 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
561 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
562 /// this payment being removed.
564 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
565 user_payment_id: u64,
566 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
567 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
568 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
571 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
572 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
573 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
574 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
575 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
576 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
577 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
579 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
580 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
588 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
590 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
595 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
596 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
597 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
598 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
599 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
600 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
601 /// that implements KeysInterface or Router for its keys manager and router, respectively, but this
602 /// type alias chooses the concrete types of KeysManager and DefaultRouter.
604 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
605 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
607 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
608 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
610 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
611 /// to individual Channels.
613 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
614 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
615 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
616 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
618 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
619 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
620 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
621 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
622 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
623 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
624 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
626 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
627 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
628 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
629 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
632 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
633 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
634 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
635 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
636 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
638 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, ChannelManager limits the number of inbound connections and
639 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
640 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
641 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
643 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
644 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
645 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
647 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
648 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
649 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
650 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
651 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
654 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
655 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
656 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
657 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
658 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
662 // `total_consistency_lock`
664 // |__`forward_htlcs`
666 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
668 // |__`per_peer_state`
670 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
672 // | |__`claimable_payments`
674 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
686 // | |__`pending_events`
688 // | |__`pending_background_events`
690 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
694 ES::Target: EntropySource,
695 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
701 default_configuration: UserConfig,
702 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
703 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
709 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
713 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
714 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
716 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
717 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
718 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
719 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
721 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
722 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
724 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
725 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
726 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
727 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
728 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
729 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
730 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
731 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
733 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
736 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
738 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
740 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
741 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
742 /// and via the classic SCID.
744 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
745 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
749 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
751 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
752 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
753 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
755 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
756 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
758 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
759 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
764 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
765 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
766 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
767 /// active channel list on load.
769 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
772 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
774 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
775 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
776 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
778 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
779 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
780 /// the handling of the events.
782 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
783 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
786 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
787 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
788 /// would break backwards compatability.
789 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
790 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
791 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
794 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
796 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
798 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
799 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
800 /// confirmation depth.
802 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
803 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
804 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
806 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
808 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
810 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
812 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
814 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
816 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
817 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
818 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
820 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
821 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
823 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
824 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
825 /// keeping additional state.
826 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
828 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
829 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
830 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
831 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
833 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
834 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
836 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
837 /// are currently open with that peer.
839 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
840 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
843 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
847 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
848 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
849 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
851 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
855 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
856 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
857 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
858 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
859 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
860 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
861 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
863 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
872 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
874 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
875 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
876 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
877 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
878 pub struct ChainParameters {
879 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
880 pub network: Network,
882 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
884 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
885 pub best_block: BestBlock,
888 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
894 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
895 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
896 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
897 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
898 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
899 /// updates are ready for persistence).
901 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
902 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
903 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
904 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
905 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
907 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
908 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
911 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
912 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
913 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
916 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
917 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
919 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
920 persistence_notifier: notifier,
921 should_persist: persist_check,
922 _read_guard: read_guard,
927 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
929 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
930 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
935 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
936 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
938 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
940 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
941 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
942 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
943 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
944 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
946 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
947 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
949 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
951 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
952 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
953 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
954 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
955 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
956 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
957 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
958 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
959 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
960 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
961 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
962 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
963 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
965 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
966 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
968 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
969 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
970 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
971 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
973 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
974 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
975 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
976 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
977 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
978 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
981 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
983 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
984 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
987 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
989 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
990 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
992 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
993 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
994 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
995 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
997 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
998 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
999 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1000 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1002 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1003 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1004 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1006 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1007 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1008 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1010 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1011 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1013 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1014 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1015 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1016 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1017 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1018 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1019 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1020 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1023 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1024 /// to better separate parameters.
1025 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1026 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1027 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1028 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1029 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1030 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1031 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1032 pub features: InitFeatures,
1033 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1034 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1035 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1037 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1039 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1040 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1041 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1042 /// payments to us through this channel.
1043 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1044 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1045 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1046 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1048 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1049 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1052 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1053 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1054 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1055 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1056 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1057 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1058 /// lifetime of the channel.
1059 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1060 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1061 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1062 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1063 /// our counterparty already.
1065 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1066 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1067 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1068 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1070 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1071 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1072 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1073 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1075 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1076 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1078 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1079 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1081 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1082 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1083 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1084 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1085 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1086 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1087 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1088 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1089 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1092 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1094 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1098 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1099 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1100 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1102 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1103 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1105 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1106 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1108 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1109 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1110 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1111 /// this value on chain.
1113 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1115 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1117 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1118 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1120 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1122 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1123 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1124 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1125 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1127 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1128 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1129 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1130 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1132 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1133 pub balance_msat: u64,
1134 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1135 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1136 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1137 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1139 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1142 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1143 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1144 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1145 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1146 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1147 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1148 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1150 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1151 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1152 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1153 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1154 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1155 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1156 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1160 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1163 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1164 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1165 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1166 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1168 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1170 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1171 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1172 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1173 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1174 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1176 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1177 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1178 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1179 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1180 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1181 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1182 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1184 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1185 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1186 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1187 pub is_outbound: bool,
1188 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1189 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1190 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1191 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1192 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1194 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1195 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1196 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1197 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1199 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1200 pub is_usable: bool,
1201 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1202 pub is_public: bool,
1203 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1204 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1205 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1206 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1207 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1208 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1210 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1211 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1214 impl ChannelDetails {
1215 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1216 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1217 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1219 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1220 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1221 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1222 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1227 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1236 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1237 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1238 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1239 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1240 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1242 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1244 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1245 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1246 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1249 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1250 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1251 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1253 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1254 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1255 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1257 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1258 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1259 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1261 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1262 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1266 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1268 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1270 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1271 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1272 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1273 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1275 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1276 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1277 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1280 macro_rules! handle_error {
1281 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1284 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1285 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1286 // entering the macro.
1287 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1288 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1290 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1292 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1293 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1294 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1295 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1299 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1300 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1301 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1302 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1307 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1308 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1310 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1311 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1312 action: err.action.clone()
1316 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1317 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1318 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1319 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1324 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1331 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1332 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1333 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1334 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1335 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1336 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1338 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1339 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1340 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1341 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1342 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1344 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1345 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1347 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1351 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1352 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1353 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1355 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1356 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1358 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1359 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1362 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1363 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1364 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1365 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1366 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1372 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1373 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1377 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1379 $entry.remove_entry();
1387 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1388 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1392 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1394 $entry.remove_entry();
1402 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1403 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1405 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1406 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1412 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1413 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1414 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1415 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1416 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1418 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1419 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1420 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1421 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1422 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1423 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1424 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1425 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1426 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1427 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1432 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1433 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1434 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1436 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1437 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1438 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1439 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1440 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1441 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1444 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1449 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1450 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1451 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1452 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1453 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1454 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1455 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1456 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1457 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1458 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1459 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1461 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1462 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1463 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1469 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1470 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1472 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1473 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1474 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1475 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1476 updates.announcement_sigs);
1477 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1478 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1481 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1482 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1483 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1485 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1487 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1488 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1490 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1491 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1492 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1493 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1498 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1499 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1500 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1501 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1502 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1504 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1505 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1506 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1510 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1511 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1512 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1513 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1514 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1515 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1516 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1520 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1521 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1522 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1523 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1524 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1526 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1532 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1533 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1537 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1539 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1540 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1541 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1542 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1543 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1544 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1548 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1550 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1551 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1553 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1555 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1556 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1557 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1558 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1559 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1560 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1561 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1562 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1564 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1565 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1566 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1571 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1573 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1574 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1575 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1576 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1577 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1578 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1579 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1580 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1582 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1585 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1586 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1588 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1590 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1592 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1594 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1595 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1596 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1597 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1607 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1608 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1609 &self.default_configuration
1612 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1613 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1614 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1617 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1618 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1620 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1622 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1626 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1631 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1633 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1634 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1635 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1636 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1637 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1639 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1640 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1642 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1643 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1644 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1646 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1647 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1648 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1649 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1650 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1651 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1653 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1654 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1655 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1656 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1657 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1661 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1662 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1663 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1667 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1668 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1670 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1672 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1673 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1674 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1675 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1676 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1677 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1681 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1686 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1688 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1689 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1692 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1694 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1700 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1701 node_id: their_network_key,
1704 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1707 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1708 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1709 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1710 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1711 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1712 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1713 // the same channel.
1714 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1716 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1717 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1718 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1719 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1720 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1721 for (channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1722 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1723 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1724 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1725 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1726 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1727 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1728 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1729 features: peer_state.latest_features.clone(),
1730 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1731 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1732 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1733 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1734 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1735 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1736 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1737 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1738 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1739 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1741 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1742 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1743 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1744 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1745 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1746 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1747 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1748 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1749 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1750 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1751 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1752 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1753 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1754 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1755 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1756 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1757 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1758 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1759 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1760 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1761 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1762 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1763 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1764 config: Some(channel.config()),
1772 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1773 /// more information.
1774 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1775 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1778 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1779 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1781 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1782 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1785 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1786 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1787 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1788 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1789 // really wanted anyway.
1790 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1793 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1794 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1796 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1797 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1798 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1800 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1801 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1802 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1803 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1804 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1805 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1806 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1807 total_msat: *total_msat,
1810 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1811 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1813 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1814 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1816 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1821 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1822 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1823 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1824 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1825 Some(transaction) => {
1826 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1830 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1831 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1832 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1833 reason: closure_reason
1837 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1840 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1841 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1845 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1849 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1851 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1852 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1853 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1854 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1855 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1857 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1858 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1859 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1860 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1861 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1865 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1866 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1867 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1868 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1869 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1872 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1873 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1874 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1879 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1887 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1888 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1889 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1890 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1893 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1897 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1898 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1899 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1901 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1902 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1904 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1905 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1906 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1907 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1909 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1911 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1912 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1913 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1914 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1915 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1918 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1919 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1920 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1922 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1923 /// the channel being closed or not:
1924 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1925 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1926 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1927 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1928 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1929 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1930 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1932 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1934 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1935 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1936 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1937 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1938 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1942 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1943 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1944 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1945 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1946 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1947 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1948 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1951 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1952 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1953 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1954 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1955 // ignore the result here.
1956 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1960 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1961 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1962 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1963 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1964 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1965 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1966 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1970 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1971 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1972 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1974 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1976 remove_channel!(self, chan)
1978 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
1981 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1982 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1983 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1984 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1990 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1993 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1995 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1996 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1998 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1999 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2001 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2002 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2004 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2015 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2016 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2017 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2019 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2020 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2021 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2024 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2025 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2026 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2028 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2029 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2030 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2031 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2032 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2035 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2036 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2037 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2038 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2039 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2043 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2044 /// local transaction(s).
2045 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2046 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2047 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2051 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2052 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2054 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2055 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2056 return Err(ReceiveError {
2057 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2059 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2062 // final_expiry_too_soon
2063 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2064 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2066 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2067 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2068 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2069 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2070 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2071 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2072 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2073 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2074 return Err(ReceiveError {
2075 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2076 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2079 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2080 return Err(ReceiveError {
2082 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2083 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2087 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2088 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2089 return Err(ReceiveError {
2090 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2091 err_data: Vec::new(),
2092 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2095 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2096 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2102 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2103 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2105 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2106 phantom_shared_secret,
2108 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2109 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2110 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2111 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2112 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2113 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2114 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2115 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2116 return Err(ReceiveError {
2117 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2118 err_data: Vec::new(),
2119 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2123 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2125 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 return Err(ReceiveError {
2129 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2130 err_data: Vec::new(),
2131 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2136 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2139 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2140 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2141 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2142 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2146 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2147 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2148 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2150 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2151 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2152 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2153 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2154 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2155 failure_code: $err_code,
2161 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2162 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2165 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2166 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2167 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2169 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2170 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2171 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2172 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2173 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2174 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2175 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2176 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2178 macro_rules! return_err {
2179 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2181 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2182 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2183 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2184 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2185 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2186 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2192 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2194 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2195 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2197 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2198 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2202 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2203 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2205 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2207 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2208 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2209 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2210 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2211 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2213 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2216 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2217 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2218 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2220 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2221 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2222 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2225 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2226 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2227 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2228 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2232 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2233 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2234 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2237 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2238 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2239 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2240 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2241 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2246 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2247 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2248 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2249 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2250 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2251 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2252 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2253 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2254 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2255 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2256 // phantom or an intercept.
2257 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2258 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2259 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2263 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2266 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2268 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2270 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2271 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2272 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2274 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2275 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2276 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2278 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2279 // have no consistency guarantees.
2280 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2284 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2285 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2286 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2287 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2288 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2290 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2291 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2292 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2293 // we don't have the channel here.
2294 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2296 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2298 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2299 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2300 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2301 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2302 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2303 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2304 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2306 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2307 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2309 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2310 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2314 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2315 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2316 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2317 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2319 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2326 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2327 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2328 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2329 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2330 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2331 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2333 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2334 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2336 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2337 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2338 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2339 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2340 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2341 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2342 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2343 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2344 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2345 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2351 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2352 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2353 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2354 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2356 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2357 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2359 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2360 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2361 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2363 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2364 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2365 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2366 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2367 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2368 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2369 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2373 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2378 pending_forward_info
2381 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2382 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2383 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2385 /// Note that in `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the `peer_state`
2386 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2387 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2388 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2389 if !chan.should_announce() {
2390 return Err(LightningError {
2391 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2395 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2396 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2398 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2399 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2402 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2403 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2404 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2405 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2407 /// Note that through `internal_closing_signed`, this function is called without the
2408 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2409 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2410 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2412 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2413 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2417 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2419 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2421 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2423 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2424 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2426 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2427 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2428 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2429 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2430 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2431 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2432 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2433 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2435 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2436 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2437 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2439 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2441 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2448 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2449 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2450 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2453 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2454 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2455 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2458 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2459 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2461 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2462 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2463 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2464 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2465 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2467 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2469 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2470 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2471 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2472 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2477 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2480 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2481 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2482 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2484 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2485 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2486 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2488 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2489 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2491 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2492 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2493 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2494 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2495 Some(monitor_update) => {
2496 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2497 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2498 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2501 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2502 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2503 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2504 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2505 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2506 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2507 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2508 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2514 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2515 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2516 // `channel_by_id` map.
2517 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2518 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2523 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2524 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2526 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2531 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2533 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2534 /// fields for more info.
2536 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2537 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2539 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2541 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2542 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2543 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2544 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2545 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2547 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2548 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2549 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2550 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2551 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2553 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2554 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2555 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2556 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2558 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2560 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2561 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2562 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2564 /// In general, a path may raise:
2565 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2566 /// node public key) is specified.
2567 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2568 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2570 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2571 /// relevant updates.
2573 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2574 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2575 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2577 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2579 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2580 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2581 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2582 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2583 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2585 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2586 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2587 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2589 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2590 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2591 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2592 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2593 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2596 self.pending_outbound_payments
2597 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2598 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2599 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2602 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2603 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2604 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2605 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2607 self.pending_outbound_payments
2608 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2609 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2610 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2611 &self.pending_events,
2612 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2613 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2617 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2618 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2620 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2621 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2622 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2626 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2627 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2628 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2632 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2633 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2634 /// retries are exhausted.
2636 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2637 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2639 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2640 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2641 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2643 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2644 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2646 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2647 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2648 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2649 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2650 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2653 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2654 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2655 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2656 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2657 /// never reach the recipient.
2659 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2660 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2662 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2663 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2665 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2667 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2668 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2671 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2672 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2674 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2675 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2678 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2679 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2681 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2684 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2685 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2688 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2689 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2690 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2691 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2692 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2693 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2696 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2697 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2698 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2699 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2700 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2701 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2702 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2703 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2704 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2707 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2710 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2711 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2714 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2715 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2716 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2717 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2718 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2720 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2721 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2727 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2729 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2731 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2732 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2733 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2734 } else { unreachable!(); })
2737 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2740 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2741 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2744 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2745 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2751 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2754 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2756 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2759 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2760 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2761 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2770 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2771 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2772 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2776 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2778 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2779 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2781 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2782 /// across the p2p network.
2784 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2785 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2787 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2788 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2789 /// keys per-channel).
2791 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2792 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2793 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2795 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2796 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2797 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2799 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2800 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2801 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2802 /// for more details.
2804 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2805 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2806 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2807 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2809 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2810 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2811 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2812 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2817 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2818 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2819 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2820 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2821 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2822 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2823 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2827 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2828 let mut output_index = None;
2829 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2830 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2831 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2832 if output_index.is_some() {
2833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2834 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2837 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2839 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2842 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2845 if output_index.is_none() {
2846 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2847 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2850 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2854 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2856 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2857 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2858 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2859 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2861 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2862 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2864 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2865 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2867 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2869 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2870 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2871 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2872 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2873 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2874 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2875 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2876 pub fn update_channel_config(
2877 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2878 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2879 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2886 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2888 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2889 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2890 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2893 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2894 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2895 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2896 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2900 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2901 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2902 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2905 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2906 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2907 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2908 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2909 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2917 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2918 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2920 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2921 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2923 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2924 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2925 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2926 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2927 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2929 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2930 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2932 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2935 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2936 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2937 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2938 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2939 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2940 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2942 let next_hop_scid = {
2943 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2944 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2945 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2950 if !chan.is_usable() {
2951 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2952 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2955 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2957 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2958 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
2963 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2964 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
2965 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
2968 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
2969 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
2970 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
2972 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
2974 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
2975 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
2978 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
2979 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
2980 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
2981 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
2982 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
2984 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
2988 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
2989 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
2991 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2994 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2995 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2998 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
2999 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3000 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3003 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3004 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3005 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3006 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3007 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3008 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3009 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3012 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3013 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3015 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3020 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3022 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3023 /// Will likely generate further events.
3024 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3027 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3028 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3029 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3031 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3032 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3034 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3035 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3036 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3038 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3039 match forward_info {
3040 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3041 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3042 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3043 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3044 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3047 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3048 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3049 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3051 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3052 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3053 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3054 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3055 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3056 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3059 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3060 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3062 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3065 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3066 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3072 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3073 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3075 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3079 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3080 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3082 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3086 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3087 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3088 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3089 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3090 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3092 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3093 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3094 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3095 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3096 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3098 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3100 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3101 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3105 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3106 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3107 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3108 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3114 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3117 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3120 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3121 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3122 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3123 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3124 // problem, not ours.
3130 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3131 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3133 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3138 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3139 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3140 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3145 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3147 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3151 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3152 match forward_info {
3153 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3154 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3155 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3156 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3157 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3160 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3161 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3162 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3163 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3164 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3165 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3166 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3167 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3169 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3170 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3171 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3173 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3176 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3178 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3179 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3180 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3181 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3186 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3187 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3189 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3190 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3191 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3192 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3194 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3197 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3199 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3200 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3201 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3210 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3211 match forward_info {
3212 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3213 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3214 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3215 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3218 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3219 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3220 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3221 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3223 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3224 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3226 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3229 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3230 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3231 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3232 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3235 phantom_shared_secret,
3237 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3244 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3245 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3246 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3247 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3248 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3250 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3251 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3252 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3253 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3254 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3255 phantom_shared_secret,
3257 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3258 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3262 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3263 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3264 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3265 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3266 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3269 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3270 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3271 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3273 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3274 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3275 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3278 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3279 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3280 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3283 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3284 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3285 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3286 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3288 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3292 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3293 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3294 total_value += htlc.value;
3295 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3296 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3297 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3298 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3299 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3300 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3302 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3304 _ => unreachable!(),
3307 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3308 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3309 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3310 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3311 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3312 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3313 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3314 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3315 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3318 amount_msat: total_value,
3319 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3320 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3322 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3324 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3325 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3327 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3329 payment_claimable_generated
3333 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3334 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3335 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3336 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3337 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3338 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3339 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3340 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3342 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3343 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3344 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3345 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3346 Ok(result) => result,
3348 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3349 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3353 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3354 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3355 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3356 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3357 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3358 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3362 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3364 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3365 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3366 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3370 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3372 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3373 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3374 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3375 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3376 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3378 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3380 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3381 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3393 if payment_data.is_none() {
3394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3395 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3398 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3399 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3402 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3403 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3404 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3405 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3407 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3408 if payment_claimable_generated {
3409 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3415 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3416 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3424 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3425 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3426 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3427 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3428 |path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3429 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_params, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3431 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3432 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3434 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3436 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3437 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3438 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3440 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3442 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3443 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3444 events.append(&mut new_events);
3447 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3449 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3450 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3452 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3453 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3454 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3455 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3456 if background_events.is_empty() {
3460 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3462 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3463 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3464 // monitor updating completing.
3465 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3472 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3473 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3474 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3475 self.process_background_events();
3478 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3479 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3480 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3481 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3483 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3484 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3486 if !chan.is_live() {
3487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3488 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3489 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3491 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3492 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3494 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3495 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3499 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3500 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3501 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3502 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3503 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3504 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3505 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3507 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3510 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3511 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3512 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3513 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3514 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3515 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3523 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3525 /// This currently includes:
3526 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3527 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3528 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3530 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3531 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3532 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3534 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3535 /// estimate fetches.
3536 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3537 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3538 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3539 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3541 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3543 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3544 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3545 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3547 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3548 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3551 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3552 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3553 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3554 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3555 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3557 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3558 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3559 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3560 if needs_close { return false; }
3563 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3564 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3565 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3566 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3567 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3568 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3569 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3574 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3575 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3583 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3589 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3593 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3594 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3599 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3600 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3601 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3602 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3603 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3604 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3605 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3606 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3607 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3608 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3609 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3611 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3612 // have no channels to the peer.
3613 let remove_entry = {
3614 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3615 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3618 entry.remove_entry();
3621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3626 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3627 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3628 // This should be unreachable
3629 debug_assert!(false);
3632 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3633 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3634 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3635 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3637 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3638 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3639 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3641 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3648 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3649 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3650 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3651 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3655 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3656 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3659 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3661 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3662 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3663 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3664 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3665 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3672 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3673 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3674 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3676 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3677 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3678 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3679 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3681 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3682 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3683 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3684 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3685 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3686 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3689 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3690 /// reason for the failure.
3692 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3693 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3696 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3697 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3698 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3699 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3700 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3701 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3702 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3707 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3708 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3709 match failure_code {
3710 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3711 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3712 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3713 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3714 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3715 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3720 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3721 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3723 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3725 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3726 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3727 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3728 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3729 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3730 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3731 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3733 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3735 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3736 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3738 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3743 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3744 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3745 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3746 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3747 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3748 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3749 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3750 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3751 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3752 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3754 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3755 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3756 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3757 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3759 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3760 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3761 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3762 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3763 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3767 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3768 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3769 // be surfaced to the user.
3770 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3771 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3772 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3774 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3776 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3781 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3785 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3788 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3789 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3790 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3791 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3795 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3796 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3797 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3798 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3799 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3800 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3801 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3802 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3803 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3806 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3807 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3808 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3811 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3812 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3813 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3815 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3816 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3817 session_priv, payment_id, payment_params, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3818 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3819 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3821 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3823 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3825 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3826 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3827 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3828 push_forward_ev = true;
3830 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3832 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3835 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3838 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3839 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3840 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3841 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3842 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3843 failed_next_destination: destination,
3849 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3850 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3852 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3853 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3854 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3856 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3857 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3858 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3859 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3861 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3862 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3863 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3864 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3865 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3866 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3867 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3872 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3873 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3874 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3875 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3876 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3877 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3878 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3879 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3884 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3885 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3886 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3888 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3889 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3890 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3891 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3896 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3898 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3899 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3900 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3901 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3902 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3904 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3905 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3907 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3908 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3909 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3910 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3911 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3913 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3914 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3915 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3916 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3918 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3919 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3920 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3927 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3928 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3936 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3941 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3942 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3943 debug_assert!(false);
3948 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3949 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3950 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3951 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3952 if sources.len() != 1 {
3953 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3954 debug_assert!(false);
3960 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
3962 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3963 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
3964 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3965 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
3968 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
3969 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
3970 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
3971 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
3975 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3976 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
3977 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
3978 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
3980 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3981 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3982 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3983 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3984 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3989 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3990 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3991 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3992 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3993 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3994 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
3995 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3997 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4000 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4001 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4002 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4003 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4007 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4008 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4009 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4010 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4012 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4013 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4014 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4015 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4019 let mut peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4020 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4021 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4025 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4026 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4027 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4028 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4029 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4030 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4032 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4033 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4035 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4036 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4038 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4039 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4040 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4041 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4042 if let Err(e) = res {
4043 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4044 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4045 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4046 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4047 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4053 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4054 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4055 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4059 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4060 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4061 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4062 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4063 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4064 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4065 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4066 // again on restart.
4067 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4068 payment_preimage, update_res);
4070 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4071 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4072 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4073 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4074 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4075 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4079 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4080 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4083 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4085 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4086 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4088 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4089 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4090 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4091 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4092 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4093 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4094 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4097 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4098 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4100 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4102 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4108 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4109 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4110 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4116 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4117 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4118 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4121 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4122 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4124 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4125 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4126 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4127 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4128 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4132 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4133 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4139 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4140 /// update completion.
4141 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4142 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4143 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4144 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4145 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4146 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4148 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4149 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4150 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4151 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4152 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4153 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4155 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4157 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4158 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4159 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4160 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4163 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4164 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4166 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4167 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4168 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4173 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4175 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4176 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4177 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4178 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4183 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4184 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4185 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4186 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4187 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4192 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4196 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4202 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4203 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4204 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4210 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4211 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4213 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4214 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4216 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4217 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4218 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4219 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4220 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4225 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4226 let mut peer_state_lock;
4227 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4228 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4229 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4230 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4232 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4237 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4238 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4239 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4242 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4245 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4247 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4248 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4251 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4252 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4253 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4255 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4256 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4257 /// used to accept such channels.
4259 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4260 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4261 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4262 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4265 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4266 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4268 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4269 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4270 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4272 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4273 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4275 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4276 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4278 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4279 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4281 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4282 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4283 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4284 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4287 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4290 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4292 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4293 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4296 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4297 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4299 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4300 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4303 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4304 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4305 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4306 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4307 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4308 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4312 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4313 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4315 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4316 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4317 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4318 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4319 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4320 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4322 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4325 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4326 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4327 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4331 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4332 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4333 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4336 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4337 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4343 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4344 /// or 0-conf channels.
4346 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4347 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4348 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4349 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4350 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4353 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4354 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4355 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4356 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4357 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4358 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4359 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4363 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4366 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4367 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4369 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4370 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4371 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4372 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4374 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4377 num_unfunded_channels
4380 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4381 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4385 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4389 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4390 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4391 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4392 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4394 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4395 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4396 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4397 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4399 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4400 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4402 debug_assert!(false);
4403 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4405 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4406 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4408 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4409 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4410 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4411 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4412 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4413 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4416 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4417 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4420 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4421 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4423 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4424 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4427 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4428 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4429 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4432 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4437 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4439 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4440 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4443 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4444 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4445 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4447 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4449 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4452 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4453 pending_events.push(
4454 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4455 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4456 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4457 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4458 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4459 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4464 entry.insert(channel);
4470 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4471 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4473 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4475 debug_assert!(false);
4476 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4480 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4482 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4483 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4485 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4488 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4489 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4490 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4491 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4492 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4494 user_channel_id: user_id,
4499 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4500 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4502 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4503 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4505 debug_assert!(false);
4506 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4509 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4510 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4511 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4512 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4514 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4516 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4519 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4520 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4521 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4524 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4525 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4526 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4527 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4528 funding_msg.channel_id))
4530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4531 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4535 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4536 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4537 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4538 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4539 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4540 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4541 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4545 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4547 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4548 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4549 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4551 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4552 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4553 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4554 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4555 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4556 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4557 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4558 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4566 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4568 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4571 debug_assert!(false);
4572 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4578 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4579 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4580 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4581 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4582 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4583 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4584 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4585 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4586 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4587 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4588 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4597 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4601 debug_assert!(false);
4602 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4604 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4605 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4606 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4608 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4609 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4610 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4612 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4614 msg: announcement_sigs,
4616 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4617 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4618 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4619 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4620 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4621 // announcement_signatures.
4622 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4623 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4624 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4631 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4639 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4640 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4641 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4643 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4645 debug_assert!(false);
4646 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4650 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4653 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4654 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4655 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4656 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4659 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4660 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4661 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4662 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4664 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4665 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4666 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4667 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4668 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4669 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4674 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4675 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4676 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4677 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4678 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4685 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4686 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4687 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4688 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4694 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4695 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4696 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4698 debug_assert!(false);
4699 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4701 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4702 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4703 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4704 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4706 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4707 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4708 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4714 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4715 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4716 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4717 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4718 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4719 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4720 } else { (tx, None) }
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4725 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4726 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4727 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4729 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4730 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4731 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4732 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4733 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4737 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4742 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4743 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4744 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4745 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4747 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4748 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4749 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4750 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4752 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4753 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4754 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4756 debug_assert!(false);
4757 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4759 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4760 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4761 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4762 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4764 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4765 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4766 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4767 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4768 match pending_forward_info {
4769 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4770 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4771 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4772 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4774 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4775 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4776 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4777 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4778 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4781 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4783 _ => pending_forward_info
4786 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4788 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4793 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4794 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4796 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4798 debug_assert!(false);
4799 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4805 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4810 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4814 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4816 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4818 debug_assert!(false);
4819 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4821 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4822 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4825 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4832 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4833 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4836 debug_assert!(false);
4837 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4843 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4844 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4845 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4847 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4850 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4854 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4858 debug_assert!(false);
4859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4865 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4866 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4867 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4868 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4869 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4870 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4877 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4878 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4879 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4880 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4881 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4882 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4883 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4884 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4885 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4886 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4887 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4889 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4890 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4892 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4893 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4894 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4896 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4897 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4900 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4901 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4903 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4904 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4905 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4906 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4907 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4908 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4909 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4910 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4911 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4914 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4915 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4918 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4919 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4920 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4921 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4922 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4923 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4924 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4927 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4928 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4929 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4934 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4935 // payments are being processed.
4936 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4937 push_forward_event = true;
4939 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4940 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4947 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4948 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4951 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4952 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4953 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4955 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4959 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
4960 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
4961 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4962 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
4963 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
4965 if !forward_ev_exists {
4966 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4968 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
4973 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4974 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
4975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4976 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4978 debug_assert!(false);
4979 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4980 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
4981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4982 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4983 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4984 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4985 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4986 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4987 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4988 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
4989 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4990 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
4992 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4995 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4999 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5001 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5003 debug_assert!(false);
5004 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5006 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5007 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5008 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5009 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5010 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5017 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5019 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5021 debug_assert!(false);
5022 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5026 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5028 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5029 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5032 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5033 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5034 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5035 msg, &self.default_configuration
5037 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5038 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5039 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5047 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5048 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5049 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5050 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5052 // It's not a local channel
5053 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5056 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5057 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5058 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5059 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5063 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5065 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5066 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5067 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5068 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5069 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5070 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5072 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5074 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5075 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5076 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5077 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5079 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5080 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5083 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5085 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5088 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5090 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5091 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5095 debug_assert!(false);
5096 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5102 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5103 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5104 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5105 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5106 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5107 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5108 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5109 let mut channel_update = None;
5110 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5111 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5112 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5115 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5116 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5117 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5118 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5119 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5120 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5121 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5126 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5127 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5128 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5129 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5130 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5131 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5139 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5140 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5143 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5144 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5149 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5150 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5151 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5153 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5154 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5155 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5156 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5157 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5158 match monitor_event {
5159 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5160 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5161 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5162 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5164 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5165 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5166 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5167 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5170 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5171 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5172 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5173 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5175 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5176 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5177 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5178 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5181 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5182 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5183 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5184 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5185 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5186 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5187 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5188 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5189 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5190 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5191 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5195 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5196 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5198 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5200 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5201 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5202 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5203 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5204 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5211 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5212 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5218 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5219 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5222 has_pending_monitor_events
5225 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5226 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5227 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5229 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5230 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5231 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5232 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5234 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5239 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5240 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5241 /// update was applied.
5242 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5243 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5244 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5245 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5247 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5248 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5249 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5250 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5252 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5253 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5256 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5257 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5258 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5259 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5260 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5261 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5262 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5263 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5265 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5266 has_monitor_update = true;
5268 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5269 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5270 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5271 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5272 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5273 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5274 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5276 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5278 continue 'peer_loop;
5287 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5288 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5289 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5292 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5293 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5299 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5300 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5301 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5302 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5303 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5304 let mut has_update = false;
5306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5308 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5311 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5312 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5313 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5314 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5315 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5318 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5321 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5322 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5323 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5324 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5325 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5330 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5332 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5333 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5334 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5340 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5341 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5349 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5350 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5356 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5357 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5359 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5360 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5361 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5362 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5363 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5364 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5365 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5366 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5367 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5368 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5369 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5370 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5371 assert!(should_broadcast);
5372 } else { unreachable!(); }
5373 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5375 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5379 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5380 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5382 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5383 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5386 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5388 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5389 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5390 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5392 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5393 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5394 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5395 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5396 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5397 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5398 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5399 // never fail a payment too early.
5400 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5402 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5410 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5413 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5414 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5416 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5417 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5418 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5419 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5421 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5423 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5424 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5428 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5429 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5431 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5433 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5434 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5436 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5437 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5438 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5439 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5440 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5441 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5442 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5443 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5444 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5445 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5446 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5449 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5450 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5452 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5455 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5457 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5459 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5460 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5461 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5462 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5463 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5466 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5467 /// stored external to LDK.
5469 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5470 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5471 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5473 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5474 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5477 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5478 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5479 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5480 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5482 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5483 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5484 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5485 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5486 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5488 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5489 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5490 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5491 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5492 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5494 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5495 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5497 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5498 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5502 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5503 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5505 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5507 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5508 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5510 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5511 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5512 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5513 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5514 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5515 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5516 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5519 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5520 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5522 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5525 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5527 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5529 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5530 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5533 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5534 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5536 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5537 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5538 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5541 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5542 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5544 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5545 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5546 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5547 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5549 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5550 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5551 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5552 Some(_) => continue,
5553 None => return scid_candidate
5558 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5560 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5561 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5563 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5564 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5565 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5569 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5570 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5571 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5573 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5574 /// times to get a unique scid.
5575 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5576 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5577 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5579 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5580 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5581 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5582 return scid_candidate
5586 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5587 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5588 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5589 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5591 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5592 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5593 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5594 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5595 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5596 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5597 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5598 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5607 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5608 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5609 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5610 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5611 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5615 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5616 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5617 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5622 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5623 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5624 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5628 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5629 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5633 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5634 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5637 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5638 /// using the given event handler.
5640 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5641 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5644 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5645 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5646 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5648 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5650 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5651 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5652 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5653 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5656 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5657 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5658 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5661 for event in pending_events {
5662 handler(event).await;
5665 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5666 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5671 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5673 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5674 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5675 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5676 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5677 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5678 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5682 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5683 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5684 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5685 /// is always placed next to each other.
5687 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5688 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5689 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5690 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5692 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5693 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5694 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5695 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5696 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5697 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5698 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5700 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5701 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5702 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5703 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5706 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5707 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5709 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5710 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5713 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5715 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5718 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5719 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5723 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5724 events.replace(pending_events);
5733 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5735 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5737 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5738 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5739 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5740 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5744 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5746 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5747 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5748 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5749 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5750 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5752 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5753 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5754 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5759 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5760 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5763 for event in pending_events {
5764 handler.handle_event(event);
5772 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5774 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5775 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5776 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5777 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5778 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5779 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5783 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5785 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5786 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5787 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5788 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5789 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5792 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5793 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5796 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5798 let new_height = height - 1;
5800 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5801 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5802 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5803 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5804 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5805 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5808 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5812 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5823 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5824 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5825 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5826 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5828 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5829 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5831 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5832 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5833 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5835 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5836 if height < last_best_block_height {
5837 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5838 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5842 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5843 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5844 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5845 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5847 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5848 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5850 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5852 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5854 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5856 macro_rules! max_time {
5857 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5859 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5860 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5861 // having an explicit local time source.
5862 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5863 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5864 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5865 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5866 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5872 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5873 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5874 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5875 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5879 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5881 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5882 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5883 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5884 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5885 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5886 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5893 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5895 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5896 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5897 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5898 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5899 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5900 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5905 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5907 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5908 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5909 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5910 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5911 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5916 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5917 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5919 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5920 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5921 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5922 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5923 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5925 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5926 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5928 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5929 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5930 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5931 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5932 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5933 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5934 let res = f(channel);
5935 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5936 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5937 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5938 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5939 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5941 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5942 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5943 if channel.is_usable() {
5944 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5945 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5946 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5947 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5956 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5958 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5961 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5962 msg: announcement_sigs,
5964 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5965 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
5966 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5968 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5969 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5970 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
5975 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5976 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5977 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5978 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5979 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5980 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5981 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5982 // is always consistent.
5983 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5984 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5985 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5986 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5987 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5990 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5991 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
5992 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5993 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5994 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5995 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5996 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6000 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6001 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6002 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6003 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6004 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6005 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6006 data: reason_message,
6016 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6017 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6018 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6019 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6020 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6021 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6022 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6023 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6024 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6025 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6027 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6028 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6029 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6033 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6036 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6037 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6038 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6039 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6040 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6041 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6042 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6043 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6044 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6047 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6048 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6049 _ => unreachable!(),
6051 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6052 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6053 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6060 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6062 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6063 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6067 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6068 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6069 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6070 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6072 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6074 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6075 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6076 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6077 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6078 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6079 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6082 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6083 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6084 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6086 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6087 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6088 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6089 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6092 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6093 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6094 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6095 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6096 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6099 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6100 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6101 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6104 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6105 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6106 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6107 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6110 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6111 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6112 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6113 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6116 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6117 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6119 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6120 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6121 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6122 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6123 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6126 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6127 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6128 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6129 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6132 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6133 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6134 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6135 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6138 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6139 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6140 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6141 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6145 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6146 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6148 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6149 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6150 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6151 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6152 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6153 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6157 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6158 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6162 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6167 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6172 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6173 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6177 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6182 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6183 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6184 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6187 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6192 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6194 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6197 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6207 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6217 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6219 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6222 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6224 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6227 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6229 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6232 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6233 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6234 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6237 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6242 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6244 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6247 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6249 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6250 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6252 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6253 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6254 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6257 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6258 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6259 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6260 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6261 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6262 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6267 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6269 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6270 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6271 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6272 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6273 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6274 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6275 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6276 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6281 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6282 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6283 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6285 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6292 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6293 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6294 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6295 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6298 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6300 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6302 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6303 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6307 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6308 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6309 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6315 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6316 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6317 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6318 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6319 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6320 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6323 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6324 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6325 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6326 if inbound_peer_limited {
6329 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6330 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6331 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6332 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6333 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6338 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6339 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6341 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6342 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6343 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6344 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6349 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6350 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6355 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6358 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6361 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6362 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6363 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6364 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6365 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6366 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6367 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6371 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6372 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6373 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6378 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6379 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6380 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6381 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6382 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6391 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6395 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6398 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6399 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6402 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6405 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6407 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6408 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6409 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6413 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6415 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6416 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6419 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6420 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6421 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6422 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6430 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6431 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6435 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6436 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6439 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6440 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6444 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6445 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6446 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6447 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6450 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6451 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6453 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6454 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6455 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6456 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6457 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6460 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6461 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6462 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6463 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6466 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6468 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6469 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6472 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6473 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6474 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6475 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6476 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6477 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6478 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6479 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6480 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6481 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6482 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6483 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6484 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6485 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6486 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6487 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6488 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6489 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6491 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6492 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6493 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6499 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6500 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6502 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6503 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6504 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6505 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6508 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6509 (2, node_id, required),
6510 (4, features, required),
6511 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6512 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6513 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6514 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6517 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6518 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6519 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6520 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6521 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6522 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6523 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6524 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6525 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6526 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6527 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6528 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6529 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6530 (7, self.config, option),
6531 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6532 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6533 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6534 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6535 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6536 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6537 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6538 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6539 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6540 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6541 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6542 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6543 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6544 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6545 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6546 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6547 (32, self.is_public, required),
6548 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6549 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6550 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6556 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6557 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6558 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6559 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6560 (2, channel_id, required),
6561 (3, channel_type, option),
6562 (4, counterparty, required),
6563 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6564 (6, funding_txo, option),
6565 (7, config, option),
6566 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6567 (9, confirmations, option),
6568 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6569 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6570 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6571 (16, balance_msat, required),
6572 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6573 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6574 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6575 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6576 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6577 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6578 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6579 (26, is_outbound, required),
6580 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6581 (30, is_usable, required),
6582 (32, is_public, required),
6583 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6584 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6585 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6588 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6589 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6590 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6591 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6592 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6596 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6598 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6599 outbound_scid_alias,
6603 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6604 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6606 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6607 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6608 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6609 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6610 confirmations_required,
6612 force_close_spend_delay,
6613 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6614 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6615 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6616 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6617 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6618 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6623 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6624 (2, channels, vec_type),
6625 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6626 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6629 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6631 (0, onion_packet, required),
6632 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6635 (0, payment_data, required),
6636 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6637 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6639 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6640 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6641 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6645 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6646 (0, routing, required),
6647 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6648 (4, payment_hash, required),
6649 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6650 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6651 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6655 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6656 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6658 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6660 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6661 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6662 reason.write(writer)?;
6664 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6665 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6668 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6669 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6670 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6671 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6678 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6679 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6680 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6684 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6685 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6686 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6690 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6691 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6692 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6693 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6694 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6697 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6698 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6699 // messages contained in the variants.
6700 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6701 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6702 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6704 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6705 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6706 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6707 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6708 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6711 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6712 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6713 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6714 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6715 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6717 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6722 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6728 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6729 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6730 (2, outpoint, required),
6731 (4, htlc_id, required),
6732 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6735 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6737 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6738 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6739 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6741 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6742 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6743 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6744 (2, self.value, required),
6745 (4, payment_data, option),
6746 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6747 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6753 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6754 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6755 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6757 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6758 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6759 let mut total_msat = None;
6760 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6761 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6762 (0, prev_hop, required),
6763 (1, total_msat, option),
6764 (2, value, required),
6765 (4, payment_data, option),
6766 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6767 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6769 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6771 if payment_data.is_some() {
6772 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6774 if total_msat.is_none() {
6775 total_msat = Some(value);
6777 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6780 if total_msat.is_none() {
6781 if payment_data.is_none() {
6782 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6784 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6786 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6790 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6793 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6800 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6801 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6802 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6805 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6806 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6807 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6808 let mut payment_id = None;
6809 let mut payment_secret = None;
6810 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6811 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6812 (0, session_priv, required),
6813 (1, payment_id, option),
6814 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6815 (3, payment_secret, option),
6816 (4, path, vec_type),
6817 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6819 if payment_id.is_none() {
6820 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6822 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6824 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6827 let path = path.unwrap();
6828 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6829 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6830 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6833 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6834 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6835 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6837 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6842 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6843 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6848 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6849 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6851 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6853 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6854 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6855 (0, session_priv, required),
6856 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6857 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6858 (3, payment_secret, option),
6859 (4, *path, vec_type),
6860 (5, payment_params, option),
6863 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6865 field.write(writer)?;
6872 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6873 (0, forward_info, required),
6874 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6875 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6876 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6877 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6880 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6882 (0, htlc_id, required),
6883 (2, err_packet, required),
6888 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6889 (0, payment_secret, required),
6890 (2, expiry_time, required),
6891 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6892 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6893 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6896 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6898 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6899 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6900 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6901 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6903 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6907 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6908 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6910 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6912 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6914 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6915 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6916 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6919 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6921 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6922 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6923 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6924 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6927 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6928 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6930 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6931 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6932 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6933 unfunded_channels += 1;
6938 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6940 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6943 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6944 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6945 channel.write(writer)?;
6952 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6953 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6954 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6955 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6956 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6957 for forward in pending_forwards {
6958 forward.write(writer)?;
6963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6965 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6966 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6967 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6969 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6970 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6971 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6972 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6973 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6974 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6975 htlc.write(writer)?;
6977 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6980 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
6981 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
6982 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6983 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
6984 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
6985 // per_peer_state lock at all.
6986 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
6989 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
6990 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
6991 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
6992 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
6993 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
6995 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6996 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6997 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6998 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
6999 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7000 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7001 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7006 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7007 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7008 for event in events.iter() {
7009 event.write(writer)?;
7012 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7013 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7014 for event in background_events.iter() {
7016 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7018 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7019 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7024 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7025 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7026 // likely to be identical.
7027 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7028 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7030 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7031 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7032 hash.write(writer)?;
7033 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7036 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7037 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7038 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7039 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7040 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7043 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7044 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7046 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7047 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7048 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7049 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7052 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7053 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7057 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7058 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7059 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7061 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7062 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7063 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7069 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7070 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7071 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7072 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7075 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7076 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7077 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7078 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7079 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7082 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7083 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7084 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7085 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7086 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7087 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7088 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7089 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7090 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7091 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7098 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7100 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7102 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7103 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7104 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7105 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7106 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7107 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7108 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7109 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7110 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7111 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7112 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7113 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7114 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7116 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7117 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7119 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7120 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7122 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7123 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7124 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7125 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7126 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7127 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7129 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7130 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7132 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7133 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7134 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7135 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7136 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7137 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7141 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7142 pub entropy_source: ES,
7144 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7145 pub node_signer: NS,
7147 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7148 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7150 pub signer_provider: SP,
7152 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7154 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7155 pub fee_estimator: F,
7156 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7158 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7159 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7160 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7161 pub chain_monitor: M,
7163 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7164 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7165 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7166 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7167 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7168 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7170 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7172 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7173 /// deserialization.
7175 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7176 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7177 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7179 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7180 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7182 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7183 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7184 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7185 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7187 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7190 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7191 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7194 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7195 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7197 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7198 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7199 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7200 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7201 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7202 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7206 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7207 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7208 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7209 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7210 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7212 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7213 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7218 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7219 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7220 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7221 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7223 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7224 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7225 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7226 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7227 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7232 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7233 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7234 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7238 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7239 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7241 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7243 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7244 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7245 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7246 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7250 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7251 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7253 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7254 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7255 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7257 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7259 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7260 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7261 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7262 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7263 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7264 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7265 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7266 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7267 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7269 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7270 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7271 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7272 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7273 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7274 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7275 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7276 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7277 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7278 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7279 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7280 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7281 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7282 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7283 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7285 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7286 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7287 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7288 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7289 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7290 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7291 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7292 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7293 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7294 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7295 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7296 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7297 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7298 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7299 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7300 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7302 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7303 let mut found_htlc = false;
7304 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7305 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7308 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7309 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7310 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7311 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7312 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7313 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7314 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7315 log_info!(args.logger,
7316 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7317 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7318 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7322 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7323 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7324 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7326 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7327 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7329 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7331 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7332 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7335 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7336 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7337 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7341 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7342 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7343 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7344 // safely discard the channel.
7345 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7346 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7347 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7348 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7349 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7352 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7353 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7354 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7355 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7356 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7357 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7361 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7362 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7363 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7364 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7368 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7369 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7371 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7372 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7375 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7376 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7378 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7381 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7383 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7384 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7387 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7388 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7390 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7393 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7395 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7396 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7397 let peer_state = PeerState {
7398 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7399 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7400 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7401 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7402 is_connected: false,
7404 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7407 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7409 for _ in 0..event_count {
7410 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7411 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7416 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7417 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7418 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7419 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7420 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7421 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7425 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7426 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7430 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7431 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7436 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7437 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7438 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7439 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7440 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7442 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7444 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7445 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7449 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7450 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7451 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7452 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7453 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7454 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7455 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7456 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7457 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7458 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7459 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7460 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7461 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7462 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7463 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7464 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7465 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7466 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7467 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7468 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7470 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7471 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7474 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7475 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7478 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7479 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7482 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7483 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7484 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7485 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7486 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7487 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7489 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7491 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7492 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7493 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7497 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7498 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7499 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7500 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7501 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7502 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7503 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7505 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7506 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7507 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7508 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7509 if path.is_empty() {
7510 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7514 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7515 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7516 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7517 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7519 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7520 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7521 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7524 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7525 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7526 retry_strategy: None,
7527 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7528 payment_params: None,
7529 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7530 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7532 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7533 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7534 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7535 total_msat: path_amt,
7536 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7538 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7539 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7544 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7546 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7547 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7548 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7549 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7551 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7552 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7553 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7554 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7555 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7556 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7557 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7558 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7559 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7560 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7561 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7566 !forwards.is_empty()
7568 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7569 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7570 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7571 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7572 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7573 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7574 intercepted_id != ev_id
7581 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7582 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7583 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7584 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7585 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7586 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7587 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7588 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7589 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7590 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7591 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7592 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7593 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7602 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7603 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7604 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7605 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7606 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7607 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7608 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7609 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7613 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7614 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7616 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7617 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7618 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7619 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7621 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7622 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7625 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7626 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7627 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7628 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7629 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7631 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7632 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7633 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7634 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7635 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7636 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7637 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7638 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7640 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7641 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7645 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7647 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7649 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7650 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7652 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7656 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7657 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7659 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7661 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7663 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7664 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7665 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7666 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7670 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7671 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7672 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7673 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7674 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7675 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7676 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7678 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7679 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7680 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7682 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7683 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7684 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7685 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7686 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7687 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7689 if chan.is_usable() {
7690 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7691 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7692 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7693 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7694 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7700 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7702 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7703 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7704 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7705 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7706 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7707 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7708 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7709 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7710 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7711 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7712 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7714 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7715 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7717 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7718 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7719 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7720 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7722 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7723 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7724 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7725 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7727 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7728 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7729 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7730 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7732 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7733 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7734 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7737 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7738 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7741 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7742 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7745 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7748 purpose: payment_purpose,
7749 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7755 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7756 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7757 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7759 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7760 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7764 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7766 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7767 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7768 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7769 router: args.router,
7771 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7773 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7774 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7775 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7776 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7778 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7779 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7780 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7781 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7782 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7783 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7785 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7790 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7792 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7794 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7795 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7796 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7797 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7799 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7800 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7801 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7803 logger: args.logger,
7804 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7807 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7808 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7809 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7810 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7811 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7814 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7815 //connection or two.
7817 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7823 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7824 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7825 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7826 use core::time::Duration;
7827 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7828 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7829 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7830 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7831 use crate::ln::msgs;
7832 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7833 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7834 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7835 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7836 use crate::util::test_utils;
7837 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7838 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7841 fn test_notify_limits() {
7842 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7843 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7846 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7847 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7849 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7850 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7851 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7852 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7853 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7855 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7857 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7858 // to connect messages with new values
7859 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7860 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7861 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7862 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7864 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7865 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7866 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7867 // ... but the last node should not.
7868 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7869 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7870 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7871 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7873 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7874 // about the channel.
7875 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7876 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7877 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7879 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7881 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7882 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7883 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7884 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7885 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7886 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7888 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7889 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7890 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7892 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7893 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7894 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7895 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7896 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7897 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7899 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7900 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7901 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7902 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7903 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7905 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7906 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7908 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7909 // the channel info has updated.
7910 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7911 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7912 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7913 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7914 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7915 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7919 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7920 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7922 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7923 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7924 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7925 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7926 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7928 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7929 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7930 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7931 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7933 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7934 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7935 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7936 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7937 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7938 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7940 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7941 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7942 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7944 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7945 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7947 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7949 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7950 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7951 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7953 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7957 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7958 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7959 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7960 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7961 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7962 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7963 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7964 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7965 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7967 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7968 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7972 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7974 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7975 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7976 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7977 // lightning messages manually.
7978 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7979 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7982 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7983 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7984 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7986 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7987 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7989 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7992 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7993 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7994 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7996 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7997 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7998 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8000 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8004 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8005 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8008 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8009 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8010 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8011 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8013 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8014 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8015 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8016 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8021 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8022 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8023 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8024 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8026 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8029 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8030 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8031 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8032 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8039 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8040 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8041 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8042 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8043 // fails as expected.
8044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8048 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8049 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8050 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8052 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8053 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8054 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8056 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8057 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8058 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8059 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8061 let route = find_route(
8062 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8063 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8065 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8067 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8069 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8070 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8071 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8074 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8075 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8077 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8079 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8080 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8081 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8082 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8083 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8084 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8087 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8089 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8090 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8092 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8093 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8094 let route = find_route(
8095 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8096 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8098 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8100 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8101 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8102 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8103 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8104 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8106 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8107 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8108 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8110 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8111 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8112 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8113 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8116 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8120 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8121 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8123 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8126 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8127 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8130 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8135 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8136 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8137 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8143 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8144 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8146 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8147 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8148 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8149 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8151 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8152 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8153 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8154 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8155 let route = find_route(
8156 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8157 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8160 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8161 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8162 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8163 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8166 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8167 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8168 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8169 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8170 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8171 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8172 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8174 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8178 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8179 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8185 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8186 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8188 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8189 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8190 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8191 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8193 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8194 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8195 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8196 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8197 let route = find_route(
8198 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8199 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8202 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8203 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8204 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8205 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8206 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8209 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8210 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8211 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8212 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8213 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8214 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8215 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8217 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8221 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8225 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8227 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8228 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8229 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8230 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8232 // Marshall an MPP route.
8233 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8234 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8235 route.paths.push(path);
8236 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8237 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8238 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8239 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8240 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8241 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8243 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8244 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8245 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8246 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8251 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8257 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8259 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8260 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8262 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8263 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8264 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8265 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8268 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8269 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8270 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8271 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8272 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8273 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8276 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8279 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8280 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8285 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8286 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8290 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8292 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8293 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8295 total_msat: 100_000,
8298 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8299 // payment verification fails as expected.
8300 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8301 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8302 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8303 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8305 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8309 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8310 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8314 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8315 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8316 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8317 // the channel is successfully closed.
8318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8321 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8323 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8324 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8325 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8326 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8327 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8329 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8330 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8332 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8333 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8334 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8335 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8338 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8340 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8341 // as it has the funding transaction.
8342 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8343 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8344 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8347 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8349 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8351 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8353 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8354 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8355 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8359 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8360 // as it has the funding transaction.
8361 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8362 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8363 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8366 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8367 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8369 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8370 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8371 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8373 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8374 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8375 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8376 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8378 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8381 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8382 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8383 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8384 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8385 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8386 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8387 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8391 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8392 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8393 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8394 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8395 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8396 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8397 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8400 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8402 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8403 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8404 // closing transaction).
8405 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8406 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8407 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8409 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8410 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8411 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8412 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8413 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8416 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8418 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8420 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8421 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8422 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8424 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8426 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8427 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8430 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8431 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8432 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8435 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8436 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8437 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8440 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8442 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8443 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8445 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8446 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8448 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8449 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8454 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8455 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8456 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8457 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8458 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8459 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8460 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8464 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8465 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8466 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8468 // Test the API functions.
8469 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8471 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8473 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8475 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8477 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8479 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8481 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8485 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8486 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8487 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8488 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8489 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8490 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8492 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8494 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8495 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8497 let mut funding_tx = None;
8498 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8499 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8500 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8503 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8504 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8505 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8506 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8507 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8509 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8511 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8513 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8516 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8519 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8520 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8521 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8522 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8523 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8525 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8526 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8528 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8529 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8530 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8531 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8532 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8533 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8534 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8536 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8537 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8538 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8539 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8541 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8542 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8543 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8545 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8546 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8547 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8549 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8550 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8551 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8552 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8554 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8555 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8556 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8557 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8559 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8560 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8562 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8563 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8564 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8565 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8566 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8568 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8569 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8570 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8572 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8573 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8574 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8576 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8577 // "protected" and can connect again.
8578 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8579 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8580 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8581 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8583 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8585 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8586 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8590 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8591 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8597 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8599 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8600 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8603 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8604 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8605 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8608 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8611 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8612 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8614 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8615 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8616 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8619 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8620 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8621 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8625 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8626 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8627 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8628 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8629 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8630 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8631 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8635 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8637 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8638 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8640 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8641 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8642 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8643 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8644 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8645 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8647 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8648 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8650 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8651 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8655 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8656 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8659 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8660 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8661 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8662 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8663 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8665 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8667 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8668 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8669 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8670 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8674 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8676 assert_eq!(get_err_msg!(nodes[1], last_random_pk).channel_id,
8677 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8679 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8680 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8681 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8683 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8684 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8688 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8693 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8694 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8695 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8696 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8699 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8700 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8701 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8705 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8706 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8707 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8709 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8710 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8712 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8713 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8718 let error_msg = get_err_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8719 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8721 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8728 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8730 use crate::chain::Listen;
8731 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8732 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8733 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8734 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8735 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8736 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8737 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8738 use crate::util::test_utils;
8739 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8740 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8742 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8743 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8744 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8746 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8750 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8751 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8752 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8753 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8754 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8755 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8756 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8757 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8762 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8763 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8766 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8767 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8768 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8770 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8772 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8773 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8774 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8775 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8776 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8778 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8779 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8781 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8782 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8783 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8784 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8786 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8788 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8790 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8791 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8792 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8793 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8794 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8796 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8798 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8800 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8801 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8802 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8803 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8804 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8807 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8808 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8809 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8811 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8812 } else { panic!(); }
8814 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8815 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8817 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8820 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8823 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8824 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8826 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8827 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8828 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8829 match msg_events[0] {
8830 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8831 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8832 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8836 match msg_events[1] {
8837 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8841 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8842 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8844 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8845 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8850 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8851 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8853 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8854 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8856 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8859 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8861 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8862 macro_rules! send_payment {
8863 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8864 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8865 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8866 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8867 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8868 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8869 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8870 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8871 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8872 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8874 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8875 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8877 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8878 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8880 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8881 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8882 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8883 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8884 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8885 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8886 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8887 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8889 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8890 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8891 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8892 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8894 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8895 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8896 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8897 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8898 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8900 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8903 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8904 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8905 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8906 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8908 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8913 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8914 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);