1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
123 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
124 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
125 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
130 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
131 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
134 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
135 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
136 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
137 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
138 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
141 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
142 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
144 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
145 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
146 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
149 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
150 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
152 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
153 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
156 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
157 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
160 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
164 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
165 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
166 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
167 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
168 short_channel_id: u64,
170 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
171 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
173 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
174 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
179 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
181 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
182 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
183 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
186 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
189 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
190 struct ClaimableHTLC {
191 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
193 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
195 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
197 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
201 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
203 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
204 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
205 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
207 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
213 impl Readable for PaymentId {
214 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
215 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
220 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for InterceptId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
240 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
241 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
242 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
243 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
246 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
249 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
250 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
253 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
257 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
258 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
259 (0, short_channel_id, required),
260 (2, htlc_id, required),
262 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
263 (0, session_priv, required),
268 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
269 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
270 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
271 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
272 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
275 session_priv: SecretKey,
276 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
277 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
278 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
279 payment_id: PaymentId,
280 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
283 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
284 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
285 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
287 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
289 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
291 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
294 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
295 payment_id.hash(hasher);
296 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
297 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
302 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
305 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
306 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
308 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
309 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
310 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
311 payment_secret: None,
316 struct ReceiveError {
322 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
323 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
325 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
326 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
327 pub enum FailureCode {
328 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
329 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
330 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
331 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
332 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
333 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
334 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
335 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
336 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
337 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
338 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
341 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
343 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
344 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
345 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
346 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
347 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
349 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
350 err: msgs::LightningError,
351 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
352 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
354 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
356 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
358 err: LightningError {
360 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
361 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
368 shutdown_finish: None,
372 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
373 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
376 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
381 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
387 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
388 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
392 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
395 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
397 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
398 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
402 log_level: Level::Warn,
405 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
409 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
411 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
412 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
420 shutdown_finish: None,
425 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
426 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
427 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
428 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
429 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
431 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
432 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
433 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
434 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
435 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
436 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
437 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
439 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
443 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
444 struct ClaimingPayment {
446 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
447 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
449 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
450 (0, amount_msat, required),
451 (2, payment_purpose, required),
452 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
455 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
456 struct ClaimablePayments {
457 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
458 /// failed/claimed by the user.
460 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
461 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
463 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
464 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
465 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
467 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
468 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
469 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
470 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
473 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
474 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
475 /// quite some time lag.
476 enum BackgroundEvent {
477 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
478 /// commitment transaction.
479 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
483 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
484 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
485 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
486 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
487 /// event can be generated.
488 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
489 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
490 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
493 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
494 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
495 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
498 /// State we hold per-peer.
499 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
500 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
502 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
503 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
505 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
506 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
507 latest_features: InitFeatures,
508 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
509 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
510 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
511 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
512 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
514 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
515 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
516 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
517 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
519 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
520 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
521 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
522 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
523 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
524 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
525 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
526 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
527 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
528 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
532 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
533 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
534 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
535 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
536 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
537 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
540 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
544 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
545 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
547 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
550 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
551 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
552 struct PendingInboundPayment {
553 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
554 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
555 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
556 /// this payment being removed.
558 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
559 user_payment_id: u64,
560 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
561 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
562 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
565 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
566 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
567 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
568 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
569 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
570 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
571 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
572 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
574 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
575 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
583 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
585 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
590 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
591 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
592 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
593 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
594 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
595 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
596 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
597 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
598 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
600 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
601 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
603 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
604 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
606 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
607 /// to individual Channels.
609 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
610 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
611 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
612 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
614 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
615 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
616 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
617 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
618 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
619 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
620 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
622 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
623 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
624 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
626 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
627 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
628 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
629 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
630 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
632 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
633 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
634 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
635 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
637 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
638 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
639 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
641 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
642 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
643 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
644 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
645 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
647 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
648 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
649 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
650 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
651 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
652 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
653 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
654 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
657 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
658 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
659 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
660 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
661 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
665 // `total_consistency_lock`
667 // |__`forward_htlcs`
669 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
671 // |__`per_peer_state`
673 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
675 // | |__`claimable_payments`
677 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
683 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
685 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
689 // | |__`pending_events`
691 // | |__`pending_background_events`
693 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
695 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
696 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
697 ES::Target: EntropySource,
698 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
699 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
704 default_configuration: UserConfig,
705 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
706 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
712 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
714 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
716 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
717 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
719 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
720 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
721 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
722 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
724 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
725 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
727 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
728 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
729 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
730 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
731 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
732 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
733 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
734 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
736 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
738 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
739 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
741 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
743 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
744 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
745 /// and via the classic SCID.
747 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
748 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
750 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
752 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
754 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
755 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
756 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
758 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
759 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
761 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
762 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
764 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
765 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
767 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
768 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
769 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
770 /// active channel list on load.
772 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
773 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
775 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
777 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
778 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
779 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
781 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
782 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
783 /// the handling of the events.
785 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
786 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
789 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
790 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
791 /// would break backwards compatability.
792 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
793 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
794 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
796 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
797 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
799 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
801 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
802 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
803 /// confirmation depth.
805 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
806 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
807 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
809 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
811 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
813 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
815 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
817 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
819 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
820 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
821 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
823 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
824 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
826 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
827 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
828 /// keeping additional state.
829 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
831 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
832 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
833 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
834 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
836 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
837 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
839 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
840 /// are currently open with that peer.
842 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
843 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
846 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
848 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
849 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
850 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
851 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
852 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
856 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
857 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
858 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
859 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
860 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
861 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
862 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
863 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
864 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
866 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
875 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
877 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
878 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
879 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
880 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
881 pub struct ChainParameters {
882 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
883 pub network: Network,
885 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
887 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
888 pub best_block: BestBlock,
891 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
897 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
898 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
899 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
900 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
901 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
902 /// updates are ready for persistence).
904 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
905 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
906 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
907 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
908 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
910 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
911 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
914 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
915 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
916 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
919 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
920 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
922 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
923 persistence_notifier: notifier,
924 should_persist: persist_check,
925 _read_guard: read_guard,
930 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
932 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
933 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
938 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
939 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
941 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
944 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
945 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
946 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
947 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
949 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
950 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
952 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
954 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
955 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
956 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
957 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
958 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
959 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
960 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
961 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
962 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
963 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
964 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
965 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
966 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
968 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
969 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
971 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
972 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
973 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
974 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
976 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
977 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
978 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
979 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
980 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
981 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
984 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
986 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
987 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
990 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
992 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
993 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
995 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
996 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
997 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
998 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1000 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1001 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1002 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1003 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1005 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1006 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1007 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1009 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1010 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1011 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1013 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1014 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1015 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1016 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1017 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1018 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1019 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1020 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1021 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1022 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1023 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1026 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1027 /// to better separate parameters.
1028 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1029 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1030 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1031 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1032 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1033 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1034 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1035 pub features: InitFeatures,
1036 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1037 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1038 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1040 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1042 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1043 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1044 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1045 /// payments to us through this channel.
1046 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1047 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1048 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1049 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1050 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1051 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1052 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1055 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1056 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1057 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1058 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1059 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1060 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1061 /// lifetime of the channel.
1062 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1063 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1064 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1065 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1066 /// our counterparty already.
1068 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1069 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1070 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1071 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1073 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1074 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1075 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1076 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1078 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1079 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1081 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1082 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1084 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1085 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1086 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1087 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1088 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1089 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1090 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1091 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1092 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1095 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1097 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1098 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1099 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1100 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1101 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1102 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1103 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1105 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1106 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1108 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1109 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1110 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1111 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1112 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1113 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1114 /// this value on chain.
1116 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1118 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1120 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1121 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1122 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1123 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1125 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1126 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1127 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1129 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1130 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1131 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1132 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1133 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1135 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1136 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1137 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1138 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1140 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1141 pub balance_msat: u64,
1142 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1143 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1144 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1145 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1147 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1149 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1150 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1151 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1152 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1153 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1154 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1155 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1156 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1158 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1159 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1160 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1161 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1162 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1163 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1164 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1166 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1167 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1168 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1169 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1170 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1171 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1172 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1173 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1174 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1176 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1178 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1180 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1181 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1182 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1184 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1185 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1186 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1187 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1188 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1189 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1190 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1192 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1193 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1194 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1195 pub is_outbound: bool,
1196 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1197 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1198 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1199 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1200 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1202 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1203 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1204 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1205 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1207 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1208 pub is_usable: bool,
1209 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1210 pub is_public: bool,
1211 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1212 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1213 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1214 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1215 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1216 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1218 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1219 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1222 impl ChannelDetails {
1223 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1224 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1225 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1227 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1228 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1229 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1230 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1233 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1234 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1235 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1237 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1238 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1239 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1240 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1243 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1244 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1246 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1247 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1248 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1250 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1251 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1252 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1253 features: latest_features,
1254 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1255 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1256 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1257 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1258 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1259 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1260 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1261 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1262 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1263 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1265 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1266 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1267 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1268 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1269 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1270 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1271 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1272 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1273 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1274 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1275 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1276 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1277 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1278 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1279 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1280 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1281 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1282 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1283 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1284 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1285 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1286 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1287 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1288 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1289 config: Some(channel.config()),
1294 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1295 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1296 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1297 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1298 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1300 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1302 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1303 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1304 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1307 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1308 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1309 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1311 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1312 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1313 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1315 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1316 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1317 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1319 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1320 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1324 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1326 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1328 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1329 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1330 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1331 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1333 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1334 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1335 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1338 macro_rules! handle_error {
1339 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1342 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1343 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1344 // entering the macro.
1345 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1346 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1348 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1350 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1351 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1352 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1353 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1357 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1358 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1359 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1360 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1365 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1366 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1368 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1369 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1370 action: err.action.clone()
1374 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1375 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1376 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1377 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1382 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1389 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1390 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1391 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1392 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1393 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1394 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1396 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1397 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1398 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1399 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1400 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1402 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1403 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1405 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1409 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1410 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1411 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1414 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1416 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1417 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1419 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1420 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1421 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1422 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1423 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1424 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1430 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1431 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1435 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1437 $entry.remove_entry();
1445 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1446 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1450 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1452 $entry.remove_entry();
1460 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1461 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1463 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1464 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1470 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1471 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1472 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1473 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1474 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1476 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1477 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1478 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1479 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1480 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1481 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1482 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1483 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1484 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1485 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1490 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1491 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1492 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1494 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1495 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1496 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1497 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1498 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1499 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1502 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1507 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1508 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1509 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1510 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1511 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1512 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1513 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1514 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1515 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1516 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1517 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1519 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1520 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1521 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1527 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1528 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1530 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1531 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1532 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1533 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1534 updates.announcement_sigs);
1535 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1536 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1539 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1540 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1541 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1543 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1545 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1546 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1548 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1549 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1550 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1551 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1556 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1557 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1558 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1559 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1560 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1562 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1563 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1564 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1567 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1568 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1569 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1570 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1571 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1572 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1573 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1574 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1578 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1579 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1580 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1581 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1582 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1584 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1590 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1591 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1595 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1597 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1598 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1599 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1600 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1601 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1602 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1606 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1608 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1609 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1611 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1613 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1614 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1615 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1618 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1619 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1620 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1621 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1622 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1623 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1624 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1625 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1627 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1628 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1629 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1634 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1636 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1637 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1638 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1639 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1640 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1641 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1642 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1643 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1645 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1648 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1649 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1651 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1653 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1655 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1657 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1658 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1659 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1660 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1670 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1671 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1672 &self.default_configuration
1675 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1676 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1677 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1680 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1681 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1683 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1685 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1689 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1694 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1696 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1697 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1698 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1699 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1700 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1702 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1703 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1705 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1706 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1707 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1709 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1711 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1712 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1713 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1714 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1716 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1717 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1718 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1719 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1720 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1721 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1725 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1726 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1731 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1733 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1735 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1736 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1737 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1738 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1739 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1740 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1744 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1749 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1751 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1755 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1757 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1760 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1763 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1764 node_id: their_network_key,
1767 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1770 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1771 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1772 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1773 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1774 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1775 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1776 // the same channel.
1777 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1779 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1780 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1781 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1782 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1783 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1784 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1785 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1786 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1794 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1795 /// more information.
1796 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1797 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1800 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1801 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1803 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1804 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1806 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1808 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1809 // really wanted anyway.
1810 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1813 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1814 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1818 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1819 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1820 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1821 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1822 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1825 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1831 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1832 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1834 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1835 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1836 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1838 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1839 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1840 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1841 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1842 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1843 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1844 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1845 total_msat: *total_msat,
1848 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1849 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1851 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1852 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1854 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1859 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1860 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1861 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1862 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1863 Some(transaction) => {
1864 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1868 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1869 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1870 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1871 reason: closure_reason
1875 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1878 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1879 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1882 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1883 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1885 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1886 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1887 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1889 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1890 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1891 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1892 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1893 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1895 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1896 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1897 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1899 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1903 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1904 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1905 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1906 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1907 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1910 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1911 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1912 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1913 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1917 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1925 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1926 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1927 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1928 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1931 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1935 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1936 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1937 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1939 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1940 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1942 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1943 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1944 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1945 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1947 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1949 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1950 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1951 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1952 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1953 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1954 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1962 /// the channel being closed or not:
1963 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1964 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1965 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1966 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1967 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1968 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1969 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1971 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1973 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1974 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1975 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1976 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1977 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1978 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1982 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1983 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1984 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1985 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1986 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1987 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1988 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1989 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1991 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1992 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1993 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1994 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1995 // ignore the result here.
1996 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2000 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2001 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2002 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2003 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2005 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2006 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2008 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2009 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2010 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2011 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2012 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2014 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2016 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2018 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2021 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2022 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2023 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2024 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2030 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2033 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2034 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2035 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2036 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2037 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2038 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2039 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2041 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2042 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2043 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2044 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2055 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2056 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2057 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2059 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2060 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2061 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2064 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2065 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2066 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2068 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2069 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2070 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2071 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2072 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2075 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2076 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2077 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2078 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2079 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2083 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2084 /// local transaction(s).
2085 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2086 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2087 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2091 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2092 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2094 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2095 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2096 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2099 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2102 // final_expiry_too_soon
2103 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2104 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2106 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2107 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2108 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2109 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2110 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2111 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2112 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2113 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2114 return Err(ReceiveError {
2115 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2116 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2119 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2120 return Err(ReceiveError {
2122 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2123 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2127 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2128 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2129 return Err(ReceiveError {
2130 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2131 err_data: Vec::new(),
2132 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2135 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2136 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2137 return Err(ReceiveError {
2138 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2139 err_data: Vec::new(),
2140 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2142 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2143 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2145 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2146 phantom_shared_secret,
2148 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2149 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2150 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2151 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2152 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2153 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2154 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2155 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2157 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2158 err_data: Vec::new(),
2159 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2163 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2165 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 return Err(ReceiveError {
2169 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2170 err_data: Vec::new(),
2171 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2176 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2179 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2180 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2181 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2182 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2186 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2187 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2188 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2190 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2191 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2192 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2193 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2194 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2195 failure_code: $err_code,
2201 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2202 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2205 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2206 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2207 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2209 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2210 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2211 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2212 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2213 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2214 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2215 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2216 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2218 macro_rules! return_err {
2219 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2221 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2222 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2223 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2224 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2225 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2226 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2232 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2234 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2235 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2237 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2238 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2242 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2243 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2245 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2247 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2248 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2249 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2250 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2251 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2253 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2256 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2257 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2258 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2260 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2261 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2262 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2265 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2266 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2267 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2268 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2272 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2273 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2274 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2277 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2278 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2279 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2280 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2281 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2286 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2287 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2288 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2289 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2290 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2291 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2292 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2293 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2294 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2295 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2296 // phantom or an intercept.
2297 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2298 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2299 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2303 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2306 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2308 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2310 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2311 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2312 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2316 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2318 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2319 // have no consistency guarantees.
2320 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2324 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2325 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2326 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2327 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2328 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2330 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2331 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2332 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2333 // we don't have the channel here.
2334 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2336 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2338 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2339 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2340 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2341 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2342 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2343 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2344 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2346 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2347 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2349 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2350 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2354 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2355 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2356 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2357 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2359 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2366 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2367 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2368 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2369 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2370 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2371 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2373 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2374 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2376 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2377 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2378 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2379 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2380 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2381 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2382 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2383 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2384 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2385 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2391 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2392 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2393 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2394 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2396 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2397 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2399 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2400 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2401 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2403 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2404 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2405 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2406 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2407 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2408 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2409 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2413 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2418 pending_forward_info
2421 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2422 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2423 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2425 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2426 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2427 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2429 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2430 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2431 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2432 if !chan.should_announce() {
2433 return Err(LightningError {
2434 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2435 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2438 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2439 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2442 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2445 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2446 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2447 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2448 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2450 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2451 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2452 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2454 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2455 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2456 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2458 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2459 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2463 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2465 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2467 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2469 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2470 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2472 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2473 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2474 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2475 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2476 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2477 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2478 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2479 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2481 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2482 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2483 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2485 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2487 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2494 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2495 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2496 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2499 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2500 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2501 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2504 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2505 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2507 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2508 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2509 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2510 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2511 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2513 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2515 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2516 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2517 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2518 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2522 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2523 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2526 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2527 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2528 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2530 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2531 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2532 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2534 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2535 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2537 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2538 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2539 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2540 Some(monitor_update) => {
2541 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2542 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2543 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2546 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2547 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2548 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2549 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2550 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2551 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2552 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2553 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2559 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2560 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2561 // `channel_by_id` map.
2562 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2563 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2568 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2569 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2571 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2576 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2578 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2579 /// fields for more info.
2581 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2582 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2584 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2586 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2587 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2588 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2589 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2590 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2592 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2593 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2594 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2595 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2596 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2598 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2599 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2600 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2601 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2603 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2605 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2606 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2607 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2609 /// In general, a path may raise:
2610 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2611 /// node public key) is specified.
2612 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2613 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2615 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2616 /// relevant updates.
2618 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2619 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2620 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2622 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2624 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2625 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2626 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2627 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2628 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2630 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2631 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2632 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2634 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2635 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2636 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2637 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2638 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2639 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2640 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2642 self.pending_outbound_payments
2643 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2644 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2645 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2648 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2649 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2650 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2651 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2653 self.pending_outbound_payments
2654 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2655 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2656 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2657 &self.pending_events,
2658 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2659 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2663 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2666 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2667 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2668 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2672 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2674 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2678 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2679 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2680 /// retries are exhausted.
2682 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2683 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2685 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2686 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2687 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2689 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2690 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2692 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2693 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2694 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2696 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2699 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2700 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2701 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2702 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2703 /// never reach the recipient.
2705 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2706 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2708 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2709 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2711 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2713 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2714 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2715 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2716 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2717 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2718 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2720 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2721 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2724 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2725 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2727 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2730 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2731 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2732 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2733 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2734 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2735 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2736 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2737 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2738 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2739 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2742 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2743 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2744 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2745 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2746 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2747 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2749 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2750 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2753 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2756 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2757 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2760 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2761 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2762 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2763 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2764 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2773 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2775 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2777 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2778 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2779 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2780 } else { unreachable!(); })
2783 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2786 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2787 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2790 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2791 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2797 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2800 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2801 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2802 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2805 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2806 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2807 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2816 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2817 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2818 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2822 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2824 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2825 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2827 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2828 /// across the p2p network.
2830 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2831 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2833 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2834 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2835 /// keys per-channel).
2837 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2838 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2839 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2841 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2842 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2843 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2845 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2846 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2847 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2848 /// for more details.
2850 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2851 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2852 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2855 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2856 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2857 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2858 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2863 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2864 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2865 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2866 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2867 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2868 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2869 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2873 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2874 let mut output_index = None;
2875 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2876 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2877 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2878 if output_index.is_some() {
2879 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2880 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2883 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2885 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2888 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2891 if output_index.is_none() {
2892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2893 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2896 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2900 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2902 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2903 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2904 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2905 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2907 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2908 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2910 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2911 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2913 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2915 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2916 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2917 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2918 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2919 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2920 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2921 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2922 pub fn update_channel_config(
2923 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2924 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2925 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2926 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2927 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2932 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2936 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2939 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2940 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2941 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2942 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2946 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2947 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2948 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2951 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2952 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2953 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2954 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2955 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2963 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2964 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2966 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2967 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2969 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2970 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2971 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2972 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2973 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2975 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2976 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2978 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2981 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2982 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2983 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2984 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2985 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2988 let next_hop_scid = {
2989 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2990 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2991 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2994 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2996 if !chan.is_usable() {
2997 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2998 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3001 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3003 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3004 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3009 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3010 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3011 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3014 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3015 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3016 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3018 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3020 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3021 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3024 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3025 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3026 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3027 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3028 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3030 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3034 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3035 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3037 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3040 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3041 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3042 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3044 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3045 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3046 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3049 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3050 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3051 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3052 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3053 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3054 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3055 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3058 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3059 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3060 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3061 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3066 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3068 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3069 /// Will likely generate further events.
3070 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3071 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3073 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3074 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3075 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3077 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3078 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3080 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3081 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3082 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3084 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3085 match forward_info {
3086 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3087 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3088 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3089 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3090 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3093 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3094 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3095 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3097 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3098 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3099 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3100 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3101 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3102 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3105 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3106 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3108 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3111 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3112 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3118 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3119 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3121 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3125 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3126 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3128 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3132 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3133 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3134 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3135 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3136 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3138 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3139 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3140 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3141 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3142 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3144 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3146 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3147 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3151 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3152 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3153 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3154 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3160 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3163 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3166 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3167 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3168 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3169 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3170 // problem, not ours.
3176 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3177 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3179 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3183 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3184 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3185 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3186 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3189 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3190 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3191 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3193 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3197 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3198 match forward_info {
3199 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3200 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3201 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3202 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3203 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3207 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3208 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3209 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3210 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3211 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3212 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3213 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3215 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3216 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3217 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3219 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3220 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3222 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3224 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3225 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3226 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3227 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3232 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3233 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3235 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3237 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3238 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3240 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3243 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3245 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3246 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3247 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3256 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3257 match forward_info {
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3259 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3260 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3261 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3264 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3265 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3266 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3267 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3269 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3270 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3272 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3275 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3276 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3277 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3278 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3279 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3280 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3281 phantom_shared_secret,
3283 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3285 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3290 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3291 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3292 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3293 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3294 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3296 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3297 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3298 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3299 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3300 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3301 phantom_shared_secret,
3303 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3304 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3308 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3309 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3310 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3311 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3312 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3315 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3316 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3317 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3319 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3320 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3321 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3324 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3325 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3326 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3329 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3330 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3331 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3332 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3333 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3334 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3338 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3339 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3340 total_value += htlc.value;
3341 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3342 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3343 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3345 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3346 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3348 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3350 _ => unreachable!(),
3353 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3354 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3355 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3356 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3357 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3358 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3359 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3360 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3361 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3364 amount_msat: total_value,
3365 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3366 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3368 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3370 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3371 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3373 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3375 payment_claimable_generated
3379 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3380 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3381 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3382 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3383 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3384 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3385 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3386 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3388 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3389 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3390 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3391 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3392 Ok(result) => result,
3394 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3395 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3399 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3400 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3401 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3403 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3404 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3408 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3410 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3411 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3412 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3413 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3416 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3417 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3418 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3419 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3420 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3421 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3422 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3424 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3426 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3427 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3432 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3439 if payment_data.is_none() {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3441 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3444 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3445 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3447 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3448 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3449 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3450 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3451 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3453 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3454 if payment_claimable_generated {
3455 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3461 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3462 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3470 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3471 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3472 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3473 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3474 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3475 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3477 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3478 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3480 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3482 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3483 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3484 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3486 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3488 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3489 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3490 events.append(&mut new_events);
3493 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3495 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3496 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3498 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3499 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3500 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3501 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3502 if background_events.is_empty() {
3506 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3508 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3509 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3510 // monitor updating completing.
3511 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3518 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3519 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3520 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3521 self.process_background_events();
3524 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3525 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3526 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3527 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3529 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3530 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3532 if !chan.is_live() {
3533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3534 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3535 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3538 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3540 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3541 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3545 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3546 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3547 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3548 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3549 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3550 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3551 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3553 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3555 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3556 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3557 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3558 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3559 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3560 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3561 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3569 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3571 /// This currently includes:
3572 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3573 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3574 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3576 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3577 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3578 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3580 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3581 /// estimate fetches.
3583 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3584 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3585 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3586 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3587 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3588 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3590 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3592 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3593 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3594 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3597 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3598 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3599 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3600 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3601 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3602 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3603 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3604 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3606 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3607 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3608 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3609 if needs_close { return false; }
3612 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3613 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3614 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3615 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3616 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3617 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3618 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3623 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3624 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3626 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3627 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3632 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3633 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3638 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3642 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3643 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3648 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3649 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3650 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3651 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3652 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3653 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3654 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3655 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3656 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3657 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3658 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3659 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3660 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3661 // have no channels to the peer.
3662 let remove_entry = {
3663 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3664 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3667 entry.remove_entry();
3670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3675 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3676 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3677 // This should be unreachable
3678 debug_assert!(false);
3681 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3682 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3683 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3684 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3686 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3687 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3688 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3690 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3697 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3698 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3699 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3700 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3704 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3705 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3708 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3710 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3711 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3712 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3713 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3714 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3721 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3722 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3723 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3725 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3726 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3727 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3728 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3730 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3731 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3732 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3733 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3734 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3735 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3738 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3739 /// reason for the failure.
3741 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3742 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3743 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3745 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3746 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3747 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3748 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3749 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3750 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3751 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3756 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3757 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3758 match failure_code {
3759 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3760 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3761 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3762 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3763 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3764 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3769 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3770 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3772 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3774 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3775 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3776 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3777 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3778 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3779 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3780 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3782 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3784 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3785 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3787 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3792 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3793 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3794 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3795 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3796 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3797 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3798 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3799 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3800 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3801 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3803 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3804 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3805 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3806 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3808 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3809 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3810 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3811 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3812 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3816 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3817 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3818 // be surfaced to the user.
3819 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3820 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3821 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3823 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3824 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3825 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3828 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3830 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3834 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3837 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3838 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3839 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3840 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3844 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3845 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3846 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3847 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3848 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3849 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3850 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3851 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3852 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3855 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3856 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3857 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3860 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3861 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3862 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3864 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3865 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3866 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3867 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3868 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3870 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3871 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3872 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3874 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3875 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3876 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3877 push_forward_ev = true;
3879 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3881 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3884 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3887 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3888 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3889 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3890 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3891 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3892 failed_next_destination: destination,
3898 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3899 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3901 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3902 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3903 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3905 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3906 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3907 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3908 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3910 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3911 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3912 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3913 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3914 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3915 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3916 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3921 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3922 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3923 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3924 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3925 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3926 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3927 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3928 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3933 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3934 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3935 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3937 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3938 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3939 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3940 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3945 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3947 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3948 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3949 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3950 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3951 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3953 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3954 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3956 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3957 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3958 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3959 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3960 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3962 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3963 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3964 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3965 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3967 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3968 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3969 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3976 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3977 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3982 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3983 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3985 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3990 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3991 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3992 debug_assert!(false);
3997 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3998 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3999 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4000 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4001 if sources.len() != 1 {
4002 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4003 debug_assert!(false);
4009 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4011 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4012 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4013 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4014 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4017 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4018 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4019 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4020 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4024 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4025 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4026 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4027 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4029 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4030 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4031 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4032 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4033 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4038 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4039 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4040 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4041 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4042 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4043 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4044 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4046 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4049 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4050 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4051 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4052 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4056 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4057 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4058 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4059 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4061 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4062 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4063 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4064 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4068 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4069 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4070 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4074 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4077 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4078 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4079 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4081 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4082 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4084 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4085 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4087 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4088 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4089 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4090 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4091 if let Err(e) = res {
4092 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4093 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4094 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4095 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4096 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4102 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4103 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4104 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4108 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4109 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4110 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4111 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4112 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4113 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4114 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4115 // again on restart.
4116 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4117 payment_preimage, update_res);
4119 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4120 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4121 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4122 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4123 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4124 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4128 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4129 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4132 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4134 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4135 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4138 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4139 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4140 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4141 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4142 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4143 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4146 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4147 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4149 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4151 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4157 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4158 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4159 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4165 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4166 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4167 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4170 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4171 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4173 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4174 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4175 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4176 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4177 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4181 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4182 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4188 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4189 /// update completion.
4190 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4191 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4192 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4193 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4194 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4195 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4197 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4198 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4199 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4200 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4201 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4202 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4204 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4206 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4207 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4208 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4209 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4212 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4213 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4215 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4216 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4217 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4222 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4224 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4225 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4226 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4227 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4232 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4233 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4234 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4235 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4236 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4241 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4245 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4251 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4252 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4253 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4259 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4260 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4262 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4263 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4265 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4266 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4267 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4268 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4269 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4274 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4275 let mut peer_state_lock;
4276 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4277 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4278 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4281 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4282 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4286 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4287 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4288 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4291 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4294 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4296 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4297 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4300 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4301 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4302 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4304 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4305 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4306 /// used to accept such channels.
4308 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4309 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4310 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4311 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4314 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4315 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4317 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4318 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4319 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4321 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4322 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4324 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4325 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4327 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4328 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4330 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4331 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4332 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4333 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4336 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4337 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4339 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4341 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4342 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4345 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4346 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4348 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4349 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4352 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4353 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4354 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4355 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4360 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4361 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4362 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4364 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4365 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4366 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4367 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4368 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4369 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4370 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4371 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4374 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4375 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4376 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4380 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4381 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4382 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4386 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4392 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4393 /// or 0-conf channels.
4395 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4396 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4397 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4398 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4399 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4400 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4402 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4403 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4404 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4405 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4406 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4407 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4408 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4412 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4415 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4416 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4418 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4419 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4420 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4421 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4423 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4426 num_unfunded_channels
4429 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4430 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4431 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4434 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4438 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4439 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4440 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4441 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4443 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4444 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4445 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4446 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4448 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4449 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4451 debug_assert!(false);
4452 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4457 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4458 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4459 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4460 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4461 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4462 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4464 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4465 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4466 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4469 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4470 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4471 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4472 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4473 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4476 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4477 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4478 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4481 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4486 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4488 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4492 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4493 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4494 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4496 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4497 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4498 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4501 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4502 pending_events.push(
4503 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4504 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4505 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4506 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4507 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4508 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4513 entry.insert(channel);
4519 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4520 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4522 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4524 debug_assert!(false);
4525 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4529 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4530 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4531 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4532 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4537 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4538 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4539 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4540 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4541 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4543 user_channel_id: user_id,
4548 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4549 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4552 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4554 debug_assert!(false);
4555 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4560 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4561 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4563 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4568 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4570 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4573 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4574 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4575 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4576 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4577 funding_msg.channel_id))
4579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4580 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4584 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4585 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4586 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4587 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4588 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4589 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4590 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4594 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4596 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4597 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4598 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4600 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4601 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4602 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4603 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4604 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4605 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4606 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4607 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4615 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4616 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4617 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4618 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4620 debug_assert!(false);
4621 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4624 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4625 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4626 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4628 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4629 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4630 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4631 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4632 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4633 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4634 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4635 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4636 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4637 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4646 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4650 debug_assert!(false);
4651 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4653 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4655 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4656 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4657 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4658 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4659 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4660 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4661 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4662 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4663 msg: announcement_sigs,
4665 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4666 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4667 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4668 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4669 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4670 // announcement_signatures.
4671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4672 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4673 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4674 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4680 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4684 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4688 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4689 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4690 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4692 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4694 debug_assert!(false);
4695 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4697 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4698 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4699 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4700 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4702 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4703 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4704 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4705 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4708 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4709 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4710 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4711 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4713 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4714 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4715 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4716 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4717 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4718 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4723 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4724 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4725 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4726 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4727 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4734 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4735 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4736 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4737 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4743 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4747 debug_assert!(false);
4748 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4750 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4753 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4755 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4756 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4757 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4758 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4763 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4764 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4765 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4766 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4767 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4768 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4769 } else { (tx, None) }
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4774 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4775 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4776 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4778 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4779 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4782 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4786 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4791 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4792 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4793 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4794 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4796 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4797 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4798 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4799 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4801 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4803 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4805 debug_assert!(false);
4806 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4810 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4811 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4813 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4814 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4815 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4816 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4817 match pending_forward_info {
4818 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4819 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4820 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4821 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4823 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4824 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4825 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4826 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4827 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4830 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4832 _ => pending_forward_info
4835 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4842 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4843 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4845 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4847 debug_assert!(false);
4848 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4852 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4854 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4859 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4863 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4864 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4865 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4867 debug_assert!(false);
4868 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4872 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4874 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4881 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4883 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4885 debug_assert!(false);
4886 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4888 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4889 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4890 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4891 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4892 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4893 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4894 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4896 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4903 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4904 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4905 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4907 debug_assert!(false);
4908 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4910 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4911 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4912 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4914 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4915 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4916 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4917 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4918 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4919 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4926 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4927 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4928 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4929 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4930 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4931 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4932 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4933 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4934 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4935 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4936 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4938 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4939 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4941 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4942 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4943 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4945 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4946 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4949 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4950 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4952 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4953 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4954 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4956 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4957 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4958 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4959 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4960 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4963 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4964 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4967 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4968 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4969 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4970 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4971 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4972 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4973 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4976 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4977 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4978 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4983 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4984 // payments are being processed.
4985 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4986 push_forward_event = true;
4988 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4989 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4996 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5000 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5001 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5002 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5004 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5008 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5009 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5010 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5011 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5012 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5014 if !forward_ev_exists {
5015 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5017 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5022 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5023 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5025 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5027 debug_assert!(false);
5028 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5029 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5030 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5031 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5033 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5034 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5035 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5036 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5037 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5038 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5039 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5044 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5048 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5050 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5052 debug_assert!(false);
5053 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5057 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5059 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5061 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5066 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5067 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5068 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5070 debug_assert!(false);
5071 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5075 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5077 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5078 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5081 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5082 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5083 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5084 msg, &self.default_configuration
5086 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5087 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5088 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5091 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5096 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5097 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5098 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5099 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5101 // It's not a local channel
5102 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5105 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5106 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5107 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5108 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5112 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5114 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5115 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5116 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5117 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5118 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5119 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5121 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5123 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5124 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5125 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5126 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5128 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5129 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5134 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5137 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5139 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5142 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5144 debug_assert!(false);
5145 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5147 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5148 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5149 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5150 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5151 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5152 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5153 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5154 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5155 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5156 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5157 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5158 let mut channel_update = None;
5159 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5160 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5161 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5164 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5165 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5166 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5167 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5168 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5169 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5170 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5175 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5176 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5177 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5178 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5179 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5180 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5188 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5189 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5192 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5193 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5198 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5199 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5200 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5202 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5203 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5204 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5205 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5206 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5207 match monitor_event {
5208 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5209 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5211 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5213 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5214 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5215 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5216 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5219 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5220 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5221 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5222 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5224 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5225 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5226 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5227 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5230 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5231 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5232 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5233 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5234 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5235 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5236 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5237 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5238 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5239 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5240 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5244 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5245 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5247 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5249 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5250 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5251 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5252 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5253 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5260 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5261 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5267 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5268 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5271 has_pending_monitor_events
5274 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5275 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5276 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5278 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5279 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5280 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5281 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5283 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5288 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5289 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5290 /// update was applied.
5291 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5292 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5293 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5294 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5296 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5297 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5298 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5299 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5302 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5305 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5306 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5307 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5308 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5309 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5310 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5311 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5312 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5314 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5315 has_monitor_update = true;
5317 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5318 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5319 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5320 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5321 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5322 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5323 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5325 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5327 continue 'peer_loop;
5336 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5337 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5338 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5341 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5342 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5348 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5349 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5350 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5351 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5352 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5353 let mut has_update = false;
5355 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5357 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5358 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5359 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5360 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5361 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5362 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5363 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5364 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5366 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5367 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5370 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5371 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5372 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5373 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5374 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5379 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5381 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5382 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5383 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5389 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5390 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5398 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5399 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5405 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5406 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5408 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5409 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5410 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5411 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5412 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5413 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5414 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5415 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5416 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5417 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5418 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5419 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5420 assert!(should_broadcast);
5421 } else { unreachable!(); }
5422 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5424 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5428 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5429 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5431 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5435 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5437 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5438 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5439 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5440 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5441 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5442 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5443 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5444 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5445 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5446 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5447 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5448 // never fail a payment too early.
5449 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5451 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5454 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5459 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5462 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5463 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5465 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5466 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5467 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5468 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5470 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5472 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5473 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5477 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5478 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5480 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5482 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5483 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5485 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5486 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5487 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5488 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5489 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5490 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5491 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5492 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5493 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5494 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5495 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5498 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5499 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5501 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5504 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5506 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5508 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5509 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5510 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5511 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5512 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5515 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5516 /// stored external to LDK.
5518 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5519 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5520 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5522 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5523 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5526 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5527 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5528 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5529 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5531 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5532 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5533 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5534 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5535 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5537 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5538 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5539 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5540 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5541 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5543 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5544 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5546 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5547 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5551 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5552 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5554 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5556 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5557 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5559 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5560 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5561 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5562 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5563 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5564 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5565 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5568 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5569 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5571 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5574 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5576 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5578 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5579 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5582 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5583 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5585 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5586 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5587 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5590 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5591 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5593 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5594 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5595 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5596 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5598 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5599 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5600 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5601 Some(_) => continue,
5602 None => return scid_candidate
5607 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5609 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5610 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5612 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5613 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5614 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5618 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5619 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5620 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5622 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5623 /// times to get a unique scid.
5624 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5625 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5626 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5628 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5629 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5630 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5631 return scid_candidate
5635 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5636 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5637 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5638 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5640 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5641 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5644 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5645 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5646 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5647 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5656 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5657 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5658 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5659 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5660 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5664 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5665 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5666 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5671 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5672 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5673 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5677 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5678 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5682 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5683 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5686 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5687 /// using the given event handler.
5689 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5690 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5693 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5694 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5695 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5697 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5699 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5700 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5701 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5702 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5705 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5706 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5707 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5710 for event in pending_events {
5711 handler(event).await;
5714 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5715 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5720 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5722 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5723 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5725 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5726 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5727 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5731 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5732 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5733 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5734 /// is always placed next to each other.
5736 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5737 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5738 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5739 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5741 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5742 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5743 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5744 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5745 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5746 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5747 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5749 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5750 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5751 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5752 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5755 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5756 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5759 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5762 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5764 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5768 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5772 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5773 events.replace(pending_events);
5782 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5784 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5785 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5786 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5787 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5788 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5789 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5793 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5795 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5796 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5797 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5798 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5799 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5801 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5802 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5803 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5804 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5807 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5808 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5812 for event in pending_events {
5813 handler.handle_event(event);
5821 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5823 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5824 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5825 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5826 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5827 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5832 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5834 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5835 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5836 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5837 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5838 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5841 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5842 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5845 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5847 let new_height = height - 1;
5849 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5850 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5851 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5852 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5853 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5854 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5857 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5861 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5863 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5864 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5865 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5866 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5867 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5868 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5872 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5873 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5874 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5875 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5877 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5878 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5880 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5881 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5882 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5884 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5885 if height < last_best_block_height {
5886 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5887 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5891 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5892 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5893 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5894 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5896 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5897 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5901 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5903 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5905 macro_rules! max_time {
5906 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5908 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5909 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5910 // having an explicit local time source.
5911 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5912 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5913 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5914 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5915 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5921 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5922 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5923 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5924 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5928 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5929 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5930 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5933 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5934 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5935 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5942 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5944 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5945 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5946 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5947 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5948 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5949 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5954 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5956 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5958 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5959 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5960 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5965 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5966 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5968 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5969 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5970 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5971 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5972 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5974 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5975 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5978 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5981 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5982 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5983 let res = f(channel);
5984 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5985 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5986 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5987 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5988 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5990 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5991 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5992 if channel.is_usable() {
5993 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5994 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5995 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5996 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6001 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6005 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6007 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6008 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6009 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6010 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6011 msg: announcement_sigs,
6013 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6014 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6015 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6017 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6018 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6019 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6024 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6025 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6026 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6027 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6028 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6029 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6030 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6031 // is always consistent.
6032 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6033 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6034 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6035 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6036 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6039 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6040 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6041 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6042 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6043 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6044 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6045 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6049 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6050 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6052 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6053 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6054 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6055 data: reason_message,
6065 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6066 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6067 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6068 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6069 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6070 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6071 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6072 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6073 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6074 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6076 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6077 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6078 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6082 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6085 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6086 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6087 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6088 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6089 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6090 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6091 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6092 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6093 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6096 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6097 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6098 _ => unreachable!(),
6100 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6101 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6102 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6103 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6109 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6111 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6112 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6116 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6117 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6118 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6119 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6121 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6123 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6124 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6125 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6126 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6127 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6128 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6131 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6132 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6133 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6135 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6136 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6137 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6138 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6141 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6142 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6143 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6144 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6145 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6148 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6149 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6150 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6153 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6154 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6155 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6156 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6159 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6160 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6161 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6162 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6165 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6166 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6168 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6169 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6170 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6171 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6172 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6175 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6176 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6177 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6178 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6181 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6182 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6183 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6184 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6187 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6188 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6189 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6190 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6194 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6195 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6197 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6198 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6199 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6200 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6201 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6202 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6206 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6211 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6216 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6217 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6218 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6221 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6223 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6226 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6231 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6233 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6236 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6238 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6241 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6246 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6248 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6251 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6253 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6256 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6258 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6261 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6262 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6263 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6266 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6268 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6271 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6273 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6276 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6281 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6282 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6283 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6286 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6291 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6293 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6296 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6298 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6299 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6301 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6302 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6303 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6304 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6305 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6306 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6307 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6308 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6309 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6310 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6311 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6316 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6341 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6342 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6343 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6344 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6347 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6349 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6351 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6352 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6356 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6357 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6358 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6362 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6364 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6365 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6366 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6367 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6368 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6369 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6372 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6373 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6375 if inbound_peer_limited {
6378 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6379 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6380 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6381 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6382 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6387 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6388 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6390 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6391 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6392 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6393 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6398 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6399 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6404 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6407 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6411 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6412 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6413 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6414 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6415 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6416 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6421 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6422 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6427 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6428 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6429 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6430 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6431 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6440 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6444 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6445 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6447 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6448 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6450 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6451 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6453 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6454 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6456 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6457 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6458 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6462 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6463 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6464 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6465 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6468 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6469 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6470 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6471 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6479 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6480 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6484 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6485 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6488 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6489 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6493 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6494 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6495 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6496 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6499 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6500 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6502 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6503 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6504 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6505 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6506 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6509 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6510 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6511 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6512 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6515 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6516 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6517 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6518 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6521 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6522 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6523 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6524 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6525 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6526 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6527 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6528 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6529 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6530 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6531 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6532 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6533 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6534 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6535 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6536 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6537 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6538 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6540 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6541 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6542 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6548 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6549 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6551 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6552 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6553 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6554 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6557 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6558 (2, node_id, required),
6559 (4, features, required),
6560 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6561 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6562 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6563 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6566 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6567 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6568 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6569 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6570 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6571 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6572 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6573 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6574 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6575 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6576 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6577 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6578 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6579 (7, self.config, option),
6580 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6581 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6582 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6583 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6584 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6585 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6586 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6587 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6588 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6589 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6590 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6591 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6592 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6593 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6594 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6595 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6596 (32, self.is_public, required),
6597 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6598 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6599 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6600 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6606 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6607 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6608 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6609 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6610 (2, channel_id, required),
6611 (3, channel_type, option),
6612 (4, counterparty, required),
6613 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6614 (6, funding_txo, option),
6615 (7, config, option),
6616 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6617 (9, confirmations, option),
6618 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6619 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6620 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6621 (16, balance_msat, required),
6622 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6623 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6624 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6625 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6626 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6627 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6628 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6629 (26, is_outbound, required),
6630 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6631 (30, is_usable, required),
6632 (32, is_public, required),
6633 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6634 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6635 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6636 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6639 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6640 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6641 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6642 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6643 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6647 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6649 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6650 outbound_scid_alias,
6654 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6655 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6657 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6658 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6659 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6660 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6661 confirmations_required,
6663 force_close_spend_delay,
6664 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6665 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6666 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6667 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6668 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6669 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6670 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6675 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6676 (2, channels, vec_type),
6677 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6678 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6681 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6683 (0, onion_packet, required),
6684 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6687 (0, payment_data, required),
6688 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6689 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6691 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6692 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6693 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6698 (0, routing, required),
6699 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6700 (4, payment_hash, required),
6701 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6702 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6703 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6707 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6708 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6710 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6712 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6713 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6714 reason.write(writer)?;
6716 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6717 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6720 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6721 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6722 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6723 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6730 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6731 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6732 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6735 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6736 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6737 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6738 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6742 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6743 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6744 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6746 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6749 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6750 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6751 // messages contained in the variants.
6752 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6753 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6754 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6756 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6758 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6759 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6760 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6763 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6765 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6766 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6767 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6769 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6774 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6779 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6780 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6781 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6782 (2, outpoint, required),
6783 (4, htlc_id, required),
6784 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6787 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6788 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6789 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6790 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6791 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6793 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6794 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6795 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6796 (2, self.value, required),
6797 (4, payment_data, option),
6798 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6799 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6805 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6806 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6807 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6809 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6810 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6811 let mut total_msat = None;
6812 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6813 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6814 (0, prev_hop, required),
6815 (1, total_msat, option),
6816 (2, value, required),
6817 (4, payment_data, option),
6818 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6819 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6821 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6823 if payment_data.is_some() {
6824 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6826 if total_msat.is_none() {
6827 total_msat = Some(value);
6829 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6832 if total_msat.is_none() {
6833 if payment_data.is_none() {
6834 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6836 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6838 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6842 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6845 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6852 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6853 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6854 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6858 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6859 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6860 let mut payment_id = None;
6861 let mut payment_secret = None;
6862 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6863 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6864 (0, session_priv, required),
6865 (1, payment_id, option),
6866 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6867 (3, payment_secret, option),
6868 (4, path, vec_type),
6869 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6871 if payment_id.is_none() {
6872 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6874 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6876 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6877 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6879 let path = path.unwrap();
6880 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6881 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6882 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6885 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6886 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6887 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6889 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6893 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6894 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6899 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6900 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6902 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6904 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6905 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6906 (0, session_priv, required),
6907 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6908 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6909 (3, payment_secret, option),
6910 (4, *path, vec_type),
6911 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6914 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6916 field.write(writer)?;
6923 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6924 (0, forward_info, required),
6925 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6926 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6927 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6928 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6931 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6933 (0, htlc_id, required),
6934 (2, err_packet, required),
6939 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6940 (0, payment_secret, required),
6941 (2, expiry_time, required),
6942 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6943 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6944 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6947 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6949 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6950 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6951 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6952 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6953 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6954 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6959 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6961 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6963 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6965 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6966 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6967 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6970 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6973 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6974 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6975 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6976 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6977 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6978 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6979 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6981 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6982 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6983 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6984 unfunded_channels += 1;
6989 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6991 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6994 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6995 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6996 channel.write(writer)?;
7003 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7004 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7005 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7006 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7007 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7008 for forward in pending_forwards {
7009 forward.write(writer)?;
7014 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7016 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7017 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7018 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7020 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7021 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7022 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7023 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7024 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7025 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7026 htlc.write(writer)?;
7028 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7031 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7032 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7033 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7034 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7035 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7036 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7037 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7040 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7041 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7042 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7043 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7044 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7046 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7047 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7048 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7049 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7050 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7051 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7052 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7057 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7058 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7059 for event in events.iter() {
7060 event.write(writer)?;
7063 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7064 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7065 for event in background_events.iter() {
7067 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7069 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7070 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7075 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7076 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7077 // likely to be identical.
7078 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7079 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7081 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7082 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7083 hash.write(writer)?;
7084 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7087 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7088 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7089 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7090 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7091 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7094 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7095 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7097 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7098 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7099 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7100 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7103 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7104 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7108 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7109 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7110 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7112 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7113 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7114 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7120 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7121 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7122 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7123 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7126 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7127 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7128 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7129 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7130 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7133 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7134 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7135 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7136 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7137 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7138 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7139 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7140 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7141 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7142 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7149 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7151 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7153 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7154 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7155 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7156 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7157 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7158 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7159 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7160 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7161 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7162 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7163 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7164 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7165 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7167 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7168 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7170 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7171 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7173 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7174 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7175 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7176 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7177 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7178 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7180 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7181 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7192 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7193 pub entropy_source: ES,
7195 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7196 pub node_signer: NS,
7198 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7199 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7201 pub signer_provider: SP,
7203 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7205 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7206 pub fee_estimator: F,
7207 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7209 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7210 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7211 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7212 pub chain_monitor: M,
7214 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7215 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7216 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7217 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7218 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7219 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7221 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7223 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7224 /// deserialization.
7226 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7227 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7228 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7230 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7231 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7233 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7234 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7235 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7236 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7238 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7241 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7242 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7245 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7246 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7248 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7249 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7250 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7251 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7252 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7253 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7257 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7258 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7259 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7260 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7261 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7263 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7264 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7269 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7270 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7271 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7272 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7274 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7275 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7276 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7277 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7278 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7283 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7284 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7285 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7289 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7290 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7292 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7293 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7294 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7295 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7296 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7297 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7301 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7302 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7304 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7305 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7306 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7310 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7311 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7312 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7313 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7314 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7315 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7316 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7317 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7318 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7320 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7321 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7322 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7323 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7324 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7325 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7326 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7327 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7328 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7329 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7330 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7331 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7332 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7333 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7334 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7335 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7336 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7337 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7338 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7339 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7340 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7341 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7342 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7343 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7344 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7345 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7346 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7347 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7348 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7349 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7350 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7351 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7353 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7354 let mut found_htlc = false;
7355 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7356 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7359 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7360 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7361 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7362 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7363 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7364 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7365 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7366 log_info!(args.logger,
7367 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7368 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7369 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7373 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7374 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7375 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7377 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7378 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7380 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7382 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7383 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7386 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7387 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7388 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7392 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7393 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7394 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7395 // safely discard the channel.
7396 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7397 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7398 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7399 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7400 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7403 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7404 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7405 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7406 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7407 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7408 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7412 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7413 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7414 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7415 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7419 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7420 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7421 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7422 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7423 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7424 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7426 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7427 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7429 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7432 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7434 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7435 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7437 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7438 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7439 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7441 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7444 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7446 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7447 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let peer_state = PeerState {
7449 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7450 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7451 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7452 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7453 is_connected: false,
7455 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7458 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7459 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7460 for _ in 0..event_count {
7461 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7462 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7467 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7469 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7470 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7471 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7472 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7476 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7477 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7481 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7482 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7483 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7487 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7489 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7490 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7491 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7493 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7495 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7496 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7500 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7501 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7502 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7503 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7504 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7505 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7506 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7507 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7508 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7509 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7510 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7511 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7512 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7513 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7514 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7515 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7516 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7517 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7518 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7519 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7521 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7522 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7525 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7526 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7529 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7530 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7533 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7534 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7535 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7536 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7537 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7538 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7540 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7542 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7543 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7544 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7548 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7549 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7550 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7551 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7552 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7553 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7554 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7556 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7557 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7558 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7559 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7560 if path.is_empty() {
7561 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7562 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7565 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7566 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7567 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7568 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7569 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7570 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7571 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7572 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7575 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7576 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7577 retry_strategy: None,
7578 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7579 payment_params: None,
7580 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7581 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7583 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7584 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7585 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7586 total_msat: path_amt,
7587 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7589 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7590 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7595 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7597 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7598 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7599 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7600 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7602 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7603 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7604 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7605 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7606 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7607 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7608 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7609 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7610 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7611 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7612 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7617 !forwards.is_empty()
7619 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7620 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7621 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7622 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7623 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7624 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7625 intercepted_id != ev_id
7632 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7633 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7634 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7635 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7636 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7637 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7638 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7639 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7640 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7641 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7642 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7643 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7644 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7653 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7654 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7655 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7656 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7657 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7658 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7659 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7660 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7664 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7665 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7667 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7668 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7669 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7670 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7672 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7673 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7676 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7677 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7678 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7679 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7682 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7683 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7684 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7685 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7686 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7687 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7688 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7689 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7691 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7696 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7698 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7700 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7701 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7703 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7707 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7708 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7710 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7712 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7714 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7715 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7716 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7717 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7721 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7722 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7723 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7724 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7725 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7726 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7727 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7729 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7730 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7731 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7733 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7734 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7735 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7736 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7737 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7740 if chan.is_usable() {
7741 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7742 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7743 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7744 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7751 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7753 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7754 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7755 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7756 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7757 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7758 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7759 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7760 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7761 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7762 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7763 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7765 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7766 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7768 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7769 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7770 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7771 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7773 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7774 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7775 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7776 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7778 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7779 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7780 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7781 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7783 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7784 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7785 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7788 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7789 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7792 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7793 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7796 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7799 purpose: payment_purpose,
7800 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7806 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7807 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7808 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7810 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7811 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7815 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7817 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7818 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7819 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7820 router: args.router,
7822 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7824 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7825 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7826 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7827 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7829 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7830 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7831 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7832 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7833 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7834 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7836 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7841 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7843 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7845 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7846 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7847 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7848 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7850 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7851 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7852 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7854 logger: args.logger,
7855 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7858 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7859 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7860 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7861 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7862 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7865 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7866 //connection or two.
7868 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7874 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7875 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7876 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7877 use core::time::Duration;
7878 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7879 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7880 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7881 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7882 use crate::ln::msgs;
7883 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7884 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7885 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7886 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7887 use crate::util::test_utils;
7888 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7889 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7892 fn test_notify_limits() {
7893 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7894 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7898 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7900 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7901 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7902 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7903 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7906 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7908 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7909 // to connect messages with new values
7910 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7911 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7912 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7913 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7914 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7915 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7917 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7918 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7919 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 // ... but the last node should not.
7921 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7922 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7923 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7924 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7926 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7927 // about the channel.
7928 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7929 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7930 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7932 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7934 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7935 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7937 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7938 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7939 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7941 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7942 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7943 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7945 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7946 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7947 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7948 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7949 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7950 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7952 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7953 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7954 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7955 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7956 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7957 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7958 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7959 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7961 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7962 // the channel info has updated.
7963 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7964 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7965 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7966 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7967 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7968 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7972 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7973 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7975 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7976 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7977 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7978 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7979 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7981 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7982 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7983 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7984 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7986 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7987 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7988 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7989 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7990 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7991 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7993 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7994 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7995 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7997 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7998 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8000 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8002 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8003 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8004 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8006 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8010 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8011 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8012 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8013 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8014 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8015 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8016 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8017 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8018 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8020 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8021 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8023 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8025 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8027 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8028 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8029 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8030 // lightning messages manually.
8031 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8032 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8035 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8036 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8037 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8039 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8040 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8042 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8043 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8045 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8047 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8049 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8050 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8051 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8053 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8055 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8057 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8058 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8061 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8062 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8063 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8064 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8066 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8067 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8068 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8069 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8071 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8074 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8075 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8076 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8077 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8082 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8083 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8084 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8085 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8087 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8092 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8093 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8094 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8095 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8096 // fails as expected.
8097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8100 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8101 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8102 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8103 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8105 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8106 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8107 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8109 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8110 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8111 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8112 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8114 let route = find_route(
8115 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8116 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8118 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8122 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8123 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8124 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8125 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8127 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8128 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8129 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8130 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8132 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8133 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8134 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8135 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8136 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8137 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8138 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8140 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8142 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8143 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8145 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8146 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8147 let route = find_route(
8148 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8149 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8151 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8155 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8156 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8157 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8159 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8160 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8161 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8163 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8165 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8166 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8167 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8169 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8170 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8171 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8173 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8174 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8175 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8176 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8177 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8178 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8179 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8180 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8181 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8183 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8184 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8188 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8189 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8190 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8191 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8192 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8193 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8194 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8196 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8197 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8199 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8200 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8201 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8202 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8204 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8205 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8206 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8207 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8208 let route = find_route(
8209 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8210 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8213 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8214 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8215 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8216 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8219 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8220 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8221 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8222 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8223 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8224 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8225 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8227 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8231 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8232 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8233 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8234 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8235 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8236 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8238 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8239 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8241 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8242 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8243 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8244 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8246 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8247 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8248 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8249 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8250 let route = find_route(
8251 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8252 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8255 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8256 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8257 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8258 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8259 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8262 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8263 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8264 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8265 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8266 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8267 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8270 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8274 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8278 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8280 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8281 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8282 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8283 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8285 // Marshall an MPP route.
8286 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8287 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8288 route.paths.push(path);
8289 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8290 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8291 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8292 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8293 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8294 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8296 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8297 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8298 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8300 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8305 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8309 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8311 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8313 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8316 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8317 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8322 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8323 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8324 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8325 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8326 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8327 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8330 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8333 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8334 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8339 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8340 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8344 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8346 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8347 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8349 total_msat: 100_000,
8352 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8353 // payment verification fails as expected.
8354 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8355 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8356 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8357 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8359 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8363 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8364 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8368 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8369 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8370 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8371 // the channel is successfully closed.
8372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8375 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8377 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8378 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8379 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8380 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8383 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8384 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8386 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8387 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8388 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8389 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8392 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8394 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8395 // as it has the funding transaction.
8396 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8397 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8398 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8401 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8403 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8405 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8407 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8408 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8409 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8413 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8414 // as it has the funding transaction.
8415 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8416 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8417 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8419 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8420 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8421 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8423 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8424 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8425 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8427 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8429 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8430 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8432 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8433 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8435 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8436 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8437 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8438 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8439 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8440 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8441 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8445 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8446 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8447 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8448 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8449 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8450 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8451 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8454 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8456 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8457 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8458 // closing transaction).
8459 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8460 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8461 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8463 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8464 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8465 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8466 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8467 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8470 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8474 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8475 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8476 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8478 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8480 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8481 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8484 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8485 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8486 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8489 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8490 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8491 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8494 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8496 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8497 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8499 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8500 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8502 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8503 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8508 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8509 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8510 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8511 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8512 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8513 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8514 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8518 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8519 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8520 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8522 // Test the API functions.
8523 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8525 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8527 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8529 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8531 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8533 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8535 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8539 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8540 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8544 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8546 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8548 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8549 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8551 let mut funding_tx = None;
8552 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8553 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8554 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8558 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8559 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8560 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8561 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8563 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8565 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8567 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8570 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8573 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8574 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8575 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8576 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8577 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8579 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8580 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8582 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8583 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8584 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8585 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8586 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8588 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8590 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8591 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8593 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8595 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8596 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8597 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8598 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8599 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8600 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8601 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8603 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8604 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8605 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8606 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8608 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8609 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8610 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8611 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8613 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8614 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8616 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8617 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8619 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8620 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8622 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8623 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8624 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8626 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8627 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8628 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8630 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8631 // "protected" and can connect again.
8632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8633 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8634 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8635 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8637 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8639 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8640 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8644 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8645 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8649 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8651 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8653 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8654 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8656 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8658 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8659 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8662 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8664 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8665 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8666 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8668 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8669 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8670 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8672 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8673 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8674 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8675 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8679 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8680 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8681 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8684 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8685 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8689 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8691 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8692 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8694 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8695 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8696 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8697 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8698 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8699 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8701 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8702 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8704 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8705 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8709 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8710 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8713 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8714 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8715 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8716 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8717 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8718 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8719 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8721 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8722 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8723 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8724 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8728 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8730 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8731 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8733 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8734 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8735 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8737 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8738 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8742 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8747 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8748 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8749 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8750 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8751 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8752 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8753 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8754 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8755 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8759 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8760 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8761 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8763 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8764 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8766 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8767 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8769 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8772 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8773 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8775 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8776 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8778 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8782 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8784 use crate::chain::Listen;
8785 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8786 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8787 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8788 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8789 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8790 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8791 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8792 use crate::util::test_utils;
8793 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8794 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8796 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8797 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8798 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8800 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8804 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8805 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8806 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8807 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8808 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8809 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8810 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8811 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8816 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8817 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8820 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8821 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8822 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8824 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8826 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8827 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8828 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8829 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8830 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8832 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8833 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8835 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8836 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8837 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8838 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8840 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8842 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8844 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8845 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8846 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8847 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8848 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8850 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8852 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8854 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8855 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8856 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8857 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8858 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8861 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8862 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8863 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8865 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8866 } else { panic!(); }
8868 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8869 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8871 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8874 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8877 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8878 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8880 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8881 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8882 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8883 match msg_events[0] {
8884 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8885 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8886 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8890 match msg_events[1] {
8891 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8895 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8896 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8898 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8899 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8904 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8905 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8907 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8908 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8913 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8915 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8916 macro_rules! send_payment {
8917 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8918 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8919 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8920 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8921 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8922 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8923 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8924 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8925 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8926 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8928 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8929 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8931 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8932 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8934 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8935 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8936 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8937 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8938 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8939 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8940 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8941 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8944 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8945 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8946 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8948 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8949 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8950 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8951 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8952 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8954 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8957 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8958 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8959 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8960 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8962 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8967 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8968 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);