1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
291 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
292 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
293 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
297 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
302 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
303 payment_id.hash(hasher);
304 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
310 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
312 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
315 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
316 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
317 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
322 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
323 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
324 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
325 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
326 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
328 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
334 struct ReceiveError {
340 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
341 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
343 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
344 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
345 pub enum FailureCode {
346 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
347 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
348 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
349 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
350 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
351 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
352 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
353 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
354 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
355 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
356 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
359 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
361 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
362 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
363 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
364 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
365 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
367 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
368 err: msgs::LightningError,
369 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
370 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
372 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
374 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
376 err: LightningError {
378 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
379 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
386 shutdown_finish: None,
390 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
391 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
394 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
396 err: LightningError {
398 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
399 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
405 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
406 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
410 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
413 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
415 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
416 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
420 log_level: Level::Warn,
423 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
427 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
438 shutdown_finish: None,
443 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
444 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
445 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
446 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
447 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
449 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
450 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
451 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
452 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
453 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
454 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
455 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
457 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
461 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
462 struct ClaimingPayment {
464 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
465 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
467 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
468 (0, amount_msat, required),
469 (2, payment_purpose, required),
470 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
473 struct ClaimablePayment {
474 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
475 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
478 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
479 struct ClaimablePayments {
480 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
481 /// failed/claimed by the user.
483 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
484 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
486 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
487 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
488 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
490 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
491 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
492 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
493 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
496 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
497 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
498 /// quite some time lag.
499 enum BackgroundEvent {
500 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
501 /// commitment transaction.
502 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
506 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
507 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
508 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
509 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
510 /// event can be generated.
511 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
512 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
513 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
516 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
517 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
518 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
521 /// State we hold per-peer.
522 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
523 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
525 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
526 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
528 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
529 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
530 latest_features: InitFeatures,
531 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
532 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
533 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
534 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
535 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
537 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
538 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
539 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
540 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
542 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
543 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
544 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
545 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
546 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
547 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
548 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
549 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
550 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
551 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
555 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
556 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
557 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
558 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
559 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
560 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
563 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
567 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
568 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
570 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
573 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
574 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
575 struct PendingInboundPayment {
576 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
577 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
578 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
579 /// this payment being removed.
581 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
582 user_payment_id: u64,
583 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
584 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
585 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
588 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
589 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
590 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
591 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
592 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
593 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
594 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
595 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
597 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
598 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
606 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
608 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
613 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
614 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
615 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
616 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
617 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
618 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
619 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
620 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
621 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
623 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
624 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
626 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
627 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
629 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
630 /// to individual Channels.
632 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
633 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
634 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
635 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
637 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
638 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
639 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
640 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
641 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
642 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
643 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
645 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
646 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
647 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
649 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
650 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
651 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
652 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
653 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
655 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
656 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
657 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
658 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
660 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
661 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
662 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
664 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
665 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
666 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
667 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
668 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
670 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
671 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
672 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
673 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
674 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
675 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
676 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
677 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
680 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
681 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
682 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
683 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
684 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
688 // `total_consistency_lock`
690 // |__`forward_htlcs`
692 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
694 // |__`per_peer_state`
696 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
698 // | |__`claimable_payments`
700 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
706 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
708 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
712 // | |__`pending_events`
714 // | |__`pending_background_events`
716 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
718 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
719 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
720 ES::Target: EntropySource,
721 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
722 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
727 default_configuration: UserConfig,
728 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
729 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
737 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
739 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
740 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
742 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
743 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
744 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
745 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
750 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
751 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
752 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
753 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
754 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
755 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
756 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
757 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
759 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
764 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
766 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
767 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
768 /// and via the classic SCID.
770 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
771 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
775 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
777 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
778 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
779 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
784 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
785 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
787 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
788 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
790 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
791 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
792 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
793 /// active channel list on load.
795 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
796 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
798 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
800 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
801 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
802 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
804 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
805 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
806 /// the handling of the events.
808 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
809 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
812 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
813 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
814 /// would break backwards compatability.
815 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
816 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
817 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
822 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
824 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
825 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
826 /// confirmation depth.
828 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
829 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
830 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
832 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
836 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
838 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
840 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
842 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
843 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
844 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
846 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
847 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
849 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
850 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
851 /// keeping additional state.
852 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
854 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
855 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
856 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
857 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
859 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
860 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
862 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
863 /// are currently open with that peer.
865 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
866 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
869 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
871 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
872 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
873 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
874 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
875 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
877 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
878 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
879 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
880 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
881 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
882 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
883 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
884 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
885 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
886 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
887 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
889 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
898 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
900 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
901 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
902 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
903 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
904 pub struct ChainParameters {
905 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
906 pub network: Network,
908 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
910 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
911 pub best_block: BestBlock,
914 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
920 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
921 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
922 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
923 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
924 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
925 /// updates are ready for persistence).
927 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
928 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
929 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
930 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
931 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
933 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
934 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
937 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
938 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
939 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
942 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
943 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
945 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
946 persistence_notifier: notifier,
947 should_persist: persist_check,
948 _read_guard: read_guard,
953 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
955 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
956 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
961 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
962 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
964 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
966 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
967 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
968 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
969 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
970 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
972 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
973 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
975 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
977 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
978 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
979 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
980 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
981 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
982 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
983 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
984 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
985 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
986 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
987 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
988 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
989 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
991 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
992 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
994 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
995 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
996 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
997 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
999 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1000 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1001 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1002 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1003 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1004 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1007 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1009 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1010 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1013 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1015 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1016 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1018 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1019 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1020 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1021 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1023 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1024 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1025 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1026 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1028 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1029 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1030 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1032 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1033 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1034 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1036 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1039 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1040 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1041 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1042 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1043 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1044 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1045 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1046 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1049 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1050 /// to better separate parameters.
1051 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1052 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1053 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1054 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1055 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1056 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1057 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1058 pub features: InitFeatures,
1059 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1060 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1061 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1063 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1065 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1066 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1067 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1068 /// payments to us through this channel.
1069 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1070 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1071 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1072 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1073 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1074 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1075 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1078 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1079 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1080 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1081 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1082 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1083 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1084 /// lifetime of the channel.
1085 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1086 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1087 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1088 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1089 /// our counterparty already.
1091 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1092 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1093 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1094 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1096 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1097 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1098 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1099 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1101 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1102 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1104 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1105 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1107 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1108 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1109 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1110 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1111 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1112 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1113 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1114 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1115 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1118 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1120 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1121 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1122 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1123 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1124 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1125 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1126 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1128 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1129 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1131 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1132 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1133 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1134 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1135 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1136 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1137 /// this value on chain.
1139 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1141 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1143 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1144 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1145 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1146 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1148 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1149 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1150 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1152 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1153 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1154 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1155 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1156 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1158 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1159 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1160 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1161 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1163 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1164 pub balance_msat: u64,
1165 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1166 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1167 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1168 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1170 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1172 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1173 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1174 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1175 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1176 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1177 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1178 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1179 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1181 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1182 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1183 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1184 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1185 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1186 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1187 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1189 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1190 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1191 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1192 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1193 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1194 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1195 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1196 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1197 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1199 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1201 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1202 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1203 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1204 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1205 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1207 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1208 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1209 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1210 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1211 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1212 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1213 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1215 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1216 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1217 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1218 pub is_outbound: bool,
1219 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1220 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1221 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1222 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1223 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1225 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1226 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1227 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1228 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1230 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1231 pub is_usable: bool,
1232 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1233 pub is_public: bool,
1234 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1235 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1236 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1237 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1238 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1239 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1241 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1242 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1245 impl ChannelDetails {
1246 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1247 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1248 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1250 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1251 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1252 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1253 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1256 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1257 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1258 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1260 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1261 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1262 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1263 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1266 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1267 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1269 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1270 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1271 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1273 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1274 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1275 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1276 features: latest_features,
1277 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1278 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1279 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1280 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1281 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1282 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1283 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1284 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1285 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1286 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1288 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1289 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1290 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1291 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1292 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1293 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1294 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1295 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1296 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1297 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1298 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1299 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1300 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1301 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1302 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1303 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1304 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1305 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1306 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1307 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1308 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1309 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1310 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1311 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1312 config: Some(channel.config()),
1317 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1318 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1319 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1320 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1321 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1323 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1325 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1326 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1327 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1330 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1331 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1332 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1334 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1336 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1338 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1339 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1340 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1342 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1343 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1347 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1349 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1351 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1352 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1353 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1354 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1356 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1357 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1358 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1361 macro_rules! handle_error {
1362 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1365 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1366 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1367 // entering the macro.
1368 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1369 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1371 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1373 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1374 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1375 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1376 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1380 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1381 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1382 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1383 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1388 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1389 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1391 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1392 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1393 action: err.action.clone()
1397 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1398 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1399 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1400 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1401 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1405 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1412 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1413 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1414 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1415 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1416 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1417 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1419 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1420 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1421 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1422 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1423 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1425 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1426 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1428 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1432 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1433 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1434 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1436 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1437 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1439 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1440 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1442 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1443 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1444 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1445 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1446 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1447 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1453 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1454 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1458 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1460 $entry.remove_entry();
1468 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1469 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1473 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1475 $entry.remove_entry();
1483 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1484 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1486 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1487 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1493 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1494 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1495 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1496 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1497 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1499 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1500 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1501 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1502 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1503 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1504 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1505 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1506 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1507 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1508 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1513 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1514 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1515 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1516 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1517 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1518 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1519 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1520 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1521 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1523 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1528 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1529 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1530 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1531 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1532 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1533 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1534 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1535 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1536 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1538 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1543 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1544 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1545 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1546 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1547 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1548 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1549 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1550 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1551 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1552 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1553 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1555 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1556 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1563 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1564 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1566 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1567 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1568 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1569 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1570 updates.announcement_sigs);
1571 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1572 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1575 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1576 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1577 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1579 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1581 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1582 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1584 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1585 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1586 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1587 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1592 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1593 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1594 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1595 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1596 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1598 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1599 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1600 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1603 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1604 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1605 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1606 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1607 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1608 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1609 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1610 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1614 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1615 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1616 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1617 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1618 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1620 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1626 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1627 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1631 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1633 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1634 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1635 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1636 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1637 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1638 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1642 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1644 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1645 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1647 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1649 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1650 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1651 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1654 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1655 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1656 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1657 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1658 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1659 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1660 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1661 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1663 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1664 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1665 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1670 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1672 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1673 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1674 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1675 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1676 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1677 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1678 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1681 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1684 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1685 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1687 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1689 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1691 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1693 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1694 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1695 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1696 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1706 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1707 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1708 &self.default_configuration
1711 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1712 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1713 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1716 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1717 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1719 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1721 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1725 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1730 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1732 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1733 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1734 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1735 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1736 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1738 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1739 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1741 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1742 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1743 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1745 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1746 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1747 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1748 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1749 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1750 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1752 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1753 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1754 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1755 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1756 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1757 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1760 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1761 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1762 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1767 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1769 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1771 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1772 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1773 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1774 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1775 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1776 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1780 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1785 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1787 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1788 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1789 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1793 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1799 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1800 node_id: their_network_key,
1803 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1806 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1807 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1808 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1809 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1810 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1811 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1812 // the same channel.
1813 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1815 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1817 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1820 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1821 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1822 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1830 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1831 /// more information.
1832 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1833 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1836 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1837 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1839 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1840 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1842 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1843 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1844 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1845 // really wanted anyway.
1846 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1849 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1850 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1851 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1854 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1855 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1856 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1857 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1858 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1861 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1867 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1868 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1870 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1871 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1872 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1874 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1875 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1876 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1877 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1878 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1879 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1880 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1881 total_msat: *total_msat,
1884 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1885 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1887 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1888 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1890 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1895 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1896 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1897 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1898 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1899 Some(transaction) => {
1900 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1904 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1905 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1906 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1907 reason: closure_reason
1911 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1914 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1915 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1919 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1925 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1926 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1927 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1928 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1929 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1931 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1932 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1933 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1934 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1935 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1939 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1940 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1941 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1942 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1943 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1946 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1947 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1948 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1949 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1953 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1961 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1962 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1963 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1964 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1967 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1971 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1972 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1973 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1975 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1976 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1978 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1979 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1980 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1981 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1983 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1985 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1986 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1987 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1988 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1989 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1990 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1993 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1994 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1995 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1997 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1998 /// the channel being closed or not:
1999 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2000 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2001 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2002 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2003 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2004 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2005 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2007 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2009 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2010 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2011 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2012 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2013 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2014 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2018 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2019 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2020 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2021 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2022 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2023 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2024 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2025 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2027 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2028 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2029 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2030 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2031 // ignore the result here.
2032 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2036 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2037 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2038 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2039 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2042 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2044 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2045 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2046 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2047 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2048 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2050 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2052 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2054 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2057 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2058 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2059 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2060 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2066 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2069 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2071 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2072 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2074 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2075 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2076 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2077 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2078 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2079 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2080 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2091 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2092 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2093 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2095 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2096 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2097 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2100 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2101 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2102 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2104 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2105 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2106 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2107 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2108 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2111 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2112 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2113 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2114 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2115 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2119 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2120 /// local transaction(s).
2121 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2122 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2123 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2127 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2128 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2130 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2131 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2132 return Err(ReceiveError {
2133 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2135 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2138 // final_expiry_too_soon
2139 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2140 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2142 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2143 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2144 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2145 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2146 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2147 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2148 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2149 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2152 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2155 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2156 return Err(ReceiveError {
2158 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2159 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2163 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2164 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2165 return Err(ReceiveError {
2166 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2167 err_data: Vec::new(),
2168 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2171 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, .. } => { // TODO: expose the payment_metadata to the user
2172 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2173 return Err(ReceiveError {
2174 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2175 err_data: Vec::new(),
2176 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2178 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2179 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2181 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2182 phantom_shared_secret,
2184 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2185 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2186 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2187 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2188 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2189 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2190 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2191 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2192 return Err(ReceiveError {
2193 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2194 err_data: Vec::new(),
2195 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2199 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2201 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2204 return Err(ReceiveError {
2205 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2206 err_data: Vec::new(),
2207 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2212 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2215 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2216 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2217 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2218 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2222 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2223 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2224 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2226 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2227 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2228 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2229 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2230 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2231 failure_code: $err_code,
2237 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2238 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2241 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2242 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2243 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2245 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2246 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2247 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2248 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2249 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2250 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2251 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2252 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2254 macro_rules! return_err {
2255 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2257 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2258 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2259 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2260 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2261 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2262 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2268 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2270 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2271 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2274 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2278 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2279 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2281 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2283 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2284 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2285 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2286 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2287 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2289 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2292 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2293 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2294 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2296 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2297 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2298 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2301 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2302 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2303 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2304 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2308 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2309 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2310 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2313 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2314 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2315 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2316 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2317 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2322 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2323 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2324 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2325 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2326 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2327 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2328 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2329 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2330 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2331 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2332 // phantom or an intercept.
2333 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2334 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2335 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2339 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2342 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2344 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2346 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2347 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2348 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2352 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2354 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2355 // have no consistency guarantees.
2356 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2360 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2361 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2362 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2363 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2364 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2366 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2367 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2368 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2369 // we don't have the channel here.
2370 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2372 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2374 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2375 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2376 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2377 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2378 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2379 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2380 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2382 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2383 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2385 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2386 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2390 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2391 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2392 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2393 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2395 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2402 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2403 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2404 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2405 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2406 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2407 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2409 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2410 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2412 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2413 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2414 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2415 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2416 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2417 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2418 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2419 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2420 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2421 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2427 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2428 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2429 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2430 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2432 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2433 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2435 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2436 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2437 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2439 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2440 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2441 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2442 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2443 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2444 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2445 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2449 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2454 pending_forward_info
2457 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2458 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2459 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2461 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2462 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2463 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2465 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2466 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2467 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2468 if !chan.should_announce() {
2469 return Err(LightningError {
2470 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2474 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2475 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2478 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2481 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2482 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2483 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2484 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2486 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2487 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2488 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2490 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2491 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2492 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2493 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2494 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2495 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2499 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2501 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2502 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2503 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2505 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2506 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2508 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2509 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2510 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2511 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2512 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2513 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2514 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2515 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2517 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2518 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2519 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2521 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2523 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2530 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2531 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2532 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2535 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2536 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2537 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2540 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2541 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2543 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2544 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2546 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2547 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2549 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2551 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2552 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2553 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2554 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2559 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2560 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2561 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2562 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2563 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2564 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2566 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2567 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2568 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2570 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2571 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2573 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2574 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2575 Some(monitor_update) => {
2576 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2577 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2578 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2581 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2582 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2583 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2584 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2585 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2586 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2587 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2588 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2594 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2595 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2596 // `channel_by_id` map.
2597 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2598 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2603 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2604 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2606 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2611 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2613 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2614 /// fields for more info.
2616 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2617 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2619 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2621 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2622 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2623 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2624 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2625 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2627 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2628 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2629 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2630 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2631 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2633 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2634 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2635 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2636 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2638 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2640 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2641 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2642 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2644 /// In general, a path may raise:
2645 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2646 /// node public key) is specified.
2647 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2648 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2650 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2651 /// relevant updates.
2653 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2654 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2655 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2658 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2659 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2660 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2661 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2662 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2664 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2665 self.pending_outbound_payments
2666 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2667 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2668 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2671 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2672 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2673 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2675 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2676 self.pending_outbound_payments
2677 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2678 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2679 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2680 &self.pending_events,
2681 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2682 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2686 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2687 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2688 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2689 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2690 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2691 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2695 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2696 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2697 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2701 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2702 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2703 /// retries are exhausted.
2705 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2706 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2708 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2709 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2710 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2712 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2713 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2716 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2717 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2718 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2719 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2722 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2723 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2724 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2725 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2726 /// never reach the recipient.
2728 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2729 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2731 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2732 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2734 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2736 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2737 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2738 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2740 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2741 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2742 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2743 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2744 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2747 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2748 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2750 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2753 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2754 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2755 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2756 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2757 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2758 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2759 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2760 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2761 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2762 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2765 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2766 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2767 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2768 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2769 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2770 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2771 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2772 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2773 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2776 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2779 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2780 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2783 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2784 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2785 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2786 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2787 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2788 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2789 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2790 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2796 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2798 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2800 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2801 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2802 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2803 } else { unreachable!(); })
2806 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2809 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2810 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2813 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2814 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2820 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2828 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2829 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2830 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2839 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2841 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2845 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2847 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2848 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2850 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2851 /// across the p2p network.
2853 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2854 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2856 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2857 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2858 /// keys per-channel).
2860 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2861 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2862 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2864 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2865 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2866 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2868 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2869 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2870 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2871 /// for more details.
2873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2875 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2878 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2879 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2880 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2881 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2886 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2887 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2888 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2889 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2890 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2896 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2897 let mut output_index = None;
2898 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2899 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2900 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2901 if output_index.is_some() {
2902 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2903 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2906 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2908 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2911 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2914 if output_index.is_none() {
2915 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2916 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2919 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2923 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2925 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2926 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2927 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2928 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2930 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2931 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2933 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2934 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2936 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2938 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2939 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2940 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2941 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2942 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2943 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2944 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2945 pub fn update_channel_config(
2946 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2947 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2948 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2950 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2955 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2959 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2963 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2964 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2965 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2969 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2970 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2971 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2974 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2976 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2978 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2986 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2987 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2989 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2990 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2992 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2993 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2994 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2995 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2996 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2998 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2999 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3001 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3004 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3005 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3006 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3007 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3008 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3009 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3011 let next_hop_scid = {
3012 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3013 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3014 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3015 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3016 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3019 if !chan.is_usable() {
3020 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3021 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3024 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3026 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3027 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3032 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3033 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3034 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3037 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3038 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3039 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3041 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3043 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3044 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3047 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3048 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3049 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3050 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3051 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3053 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3057 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3058 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3060 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3063 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3064 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3067 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3068 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3069 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3072 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3073 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3074 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3075 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3076 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3077 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3078 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3081 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3082 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3083 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3084 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3089 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3091 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3092 /// Will likely generate further events.
3093 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3096 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3097 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3098 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3100 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3101 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3103 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3104 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3105 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3107 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3108 match forward_info {
3109 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3110 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3111 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3112 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3113 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3116 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3118 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3120 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3121 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3122 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3123 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3124 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3125 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3128 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3129 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3131 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3134 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3135 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3141 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3142 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3144 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3148 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3149 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3151 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3155 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3156 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3157 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3158 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3159 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3161 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3162 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3163 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3164 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3165 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3167 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3169 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3170 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3174 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3175 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3176 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3177 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3183 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3186 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3189 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3190 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3191 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3192 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3193 // problem, not ours.
3199 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3200 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3202 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3206 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3207 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3208 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3209 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3212 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3213 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3214 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3216 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3219 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3220 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3221 match forward_info {
3222 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3223 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3224 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3225 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3226 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3230 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3231 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3232 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3233 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3234 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3235 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3236 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3238 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3239 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3240 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3242 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3245 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3247 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3248 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3249 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3250 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3256 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3258 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3260 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3261 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3263 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3266 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3268 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3269 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3270 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3279 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3280 match forward_info {
3281 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3282 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3283 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3284 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3287 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3288 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3289 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3290 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3292 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3293 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3295 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3298 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3299 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3300 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3301 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3302 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3303 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3304 phantom_shared_secret,
3306 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3307 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3308 // if routing nodes overpay
3309 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3310 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3312 total_value_received: None,
3313 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3318 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3320 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3321 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3322 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3323 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3324 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3325 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3327 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3328 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3330 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3332 phantom_shared_secret,
3334 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3335 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3339 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3340 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3341 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3342 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3343 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3346 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3347 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3348 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3350 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3351 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3352 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3355 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3356 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3357 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3360 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3361 .entry(payment_hash)
3362 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3363 .or_insert_with(|| {
3364 committed_to_claimable = true;
3366 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new()
3369 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3370 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3371 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3373 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3377 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3378 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3379 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3380 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3381 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3382 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3383 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3384 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3386 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3387 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3389 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3391 _ => unreachable!(),
3394 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3395 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3396 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3397 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3398 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3399 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3400 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3401 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3402 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3403 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3404 committed_to_claimable = true;
3406 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3407 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3408 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3409 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3410 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3411 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3415 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3416 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3417 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3419 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3421 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3422 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3424 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3425 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3426 committed_to_claimable = true;
3429 payment_claimable_generated
3433 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3434 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3435 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3436 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3437 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3438 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3439 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3440 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3441 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3442 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3443 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3444 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3445 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3446 Ok(result) => result,
3448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3449 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3453 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3454 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3455 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3456 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3457 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3458 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3462 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3464 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3465 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3466 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3470 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3472 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3473 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3474 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3475 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3476 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3477 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3478 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3480 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3481 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3482 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3486 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3487 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3492 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3493 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3500 if payment_data.is_none() {
3501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3505 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3506 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3508 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3509 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3510 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3511 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3512 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3514 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3515 if payment_claimable_generated {
3516 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3522 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3523 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3531 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3532 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3533 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3534 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3535 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3536 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3538 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3541 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3543 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3544 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3545 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3547 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3549 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3550 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3551 events.append(&mut new_events);
3554 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3556 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3557 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3559 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3560 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3561 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3562 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3563 if background_events.is_empty() {
3567 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3569 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3570 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3571 // monitor updating completing.
3572 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3579 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3580 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3581 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3582 self.process_background_events();
3585 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3586 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3587 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3588 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3589 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3590 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3591 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3593 if !chan.is_live() {
3594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3595 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3596 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3599 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3601 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3602 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3606 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3607 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3608 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3609 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3610 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3611 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3612 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3614 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3617 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3618 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3619 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3620 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3621 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3622 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3630 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3632 /// This currently includes:
3633 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3634 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3635 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3637 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3638 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3639 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3641 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3642 /// estimate fetches.
3644 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3645 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3646 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3647 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3648 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3649 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3651 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3653 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3654 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3655 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3657 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3658 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3659 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3660 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3661 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3662 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3663 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3664 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3665 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3667 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3668 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3669 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3670 if needs_close { return false; }
3673 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3674 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3675 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3676 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3677 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3678 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3679 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3680 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3684 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3685 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3687 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3689 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3693 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3694 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3699 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3703 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3704 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3709 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3710 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3711 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3712 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3713 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3714 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3715 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3716 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3717 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3718 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3719 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3721 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3722 // have no channels to the peer.
3723 let remove_entry = {
3724 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3725 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3728 entry.remove_entry();
3731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3736 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3737 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3738 // This should be unreachable
3739 debug_assert!(false);
3742 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3743 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3744 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3745 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3746 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3747 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3748 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3751 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3752 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3753 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3755 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3756 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3763 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3764 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3765 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3766 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3767 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3770 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3771 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3774 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3776 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3777 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3778 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3779 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3780 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3787 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3788 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3789 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3791 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3792 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3793 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3794 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3796 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3797 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3798 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3799 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3800 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3801 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3804 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3805 /// reason for the failure.
3807 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3808 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3811 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
3812 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
3813 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
3814 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3815 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3816 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3822 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3823 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3824 match failure_code {
3825 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3826 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3827 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3828 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3829 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3830 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3835 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3836 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3838 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3840 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3841 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3842 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3843 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3844 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3845 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3846 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3848 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3850 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3851 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3853 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3858 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3859 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3860 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3861 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3862 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3863 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3864 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3865 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3866 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3867 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3869 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3870 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3871 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3872 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3874 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3875 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3876 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3877 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3878 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3882 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3883 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3884 // be surfaced to the user.
3885 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3886 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3887 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3889 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3890 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3891 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3894 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3895 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3896 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3898 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3900 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3903 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3904 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3905 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3910 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3911 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3912 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3913 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3914 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3915 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3916 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3917 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3918 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3921 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3922 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3923 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3927 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3928 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3930 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3931 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3932 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3933 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3934 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3936 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3938 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3940 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3941 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3942 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3943 push_forward_ev = true;
3945 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3947 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3950 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3953 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3954 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3955 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3956 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3957 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3958 failed_next_destination: destination,
3964 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3965 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3967 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
3968 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
3969 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
3970 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
3972 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3973 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3974 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3975 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3977 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3978 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
3979 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3980 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3981 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3982 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3983 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3984 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3989 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3990 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
3991 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3992 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
3993 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3994 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3995 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3996 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4001 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4002 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4003 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4005 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4006 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4007 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4008 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4013 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4015 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4016 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4017 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4018 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4019 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4020 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4021 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4022 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4023 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4024 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4025 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4026 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4027 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4028 debug_assert!(false);
4032 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4034 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4035 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4036 debug_assert!(false);
4040 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4042 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4043 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4044 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4045 if sources.len() != 1 {
4046 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4047 debug_assert!(false);
4053 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4055 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4056 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4057 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4058 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4061 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4062 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4063 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4064 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4068 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4069 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4070 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4071 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4073 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4074 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4075 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4076 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4077 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4082 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4083 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4084 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4085 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4086 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4087 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4088 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4090 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4093 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4094 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4095 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4096 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4100 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4101 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4102 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4103 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4107 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4108 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4109 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4113 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4114 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4115 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4118 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4121 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4122 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4123 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4125 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4126 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4128 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4129 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4131 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4132 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4133 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4134 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4135 if let Err(e) = res {
4136 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4137 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4138 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4139 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4140 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4147 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4148 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4149 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4153 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4154 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4155 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4156 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4157 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4158 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4159 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4160 // again on restart.
4161 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4162 payment_preimage, update_res);
4164 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4165 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4166 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4167 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4168 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4169 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4173 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4174 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4177 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4179 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4180 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4182 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4183 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4184 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4185 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4186 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4187 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4188 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4191 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4192 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4194 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4196 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4199 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4203 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4204 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4205 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4211 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4212 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4213 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4216 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4217 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4219 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4220 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4221 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4222 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4223 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4227 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4228 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4234 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4235 /// update completion.
4236 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4237 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4238 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4239 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4240 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4241 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4243 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4244 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4245 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4246 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4247 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4248 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4250 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4252 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4253 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4254 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4255 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4258 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4259 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4261 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4262 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4263 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4268 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4269 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4270 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4271 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4276 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4277 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4278 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4279 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4280 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4285 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4289 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4295 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4296 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4297 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4303 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4309 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4310 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4312 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4313 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4315 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4316 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4317 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4318 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4319 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4325 let mut peer_state_lock;
4326 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4327 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4328 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4331 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4332 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4336 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4337 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4338 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4341 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4344 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4346 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4347 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4350 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4351 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4352 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4354 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4355 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4356 /// used to accept such channels.
4358 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4359 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4360 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4361 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4364 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4365 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4367 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4368 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4369 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4371 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4372 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4374 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4375 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4377 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4378 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4380 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4381 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4382 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4383 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4386 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4389 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4390 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4391 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4392 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4395 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4396 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4397 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4398 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4399 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4402 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4403 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4404 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4405 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4410 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4411 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4412 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4414 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4415 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4416 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4417 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4418 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4419 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4424 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4425 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4431 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4432 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4435 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4436 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4442 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4443 /// or 0-conf channels.
4445 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4446 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4447 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4448 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4449 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4450 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4452 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4453 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4454 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4455 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4456 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4457 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4458 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4462 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4465 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4466 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4468 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4469 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4470 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4471 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4473 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4476 num_unfunded_channels
4479 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4480 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4481 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4484 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4488 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4489 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4490 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4491 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4493 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4494 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4495 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4496 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4499 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4501 debug_assert!(false);
4502 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4504 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4507 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4508 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4509 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4510 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4511 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4512 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4515 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4516 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4519 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4520 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4521 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4522 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4523 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4526 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4527 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4528 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4531 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4532 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4536 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4538 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4539 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4542 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4543 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4546 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4547 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4548 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4551 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4552 pending_events.push(
4553 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4554 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4555 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4556 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4557 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4558 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4563 entry.insert(channel);
4569 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4570 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4571 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4572 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4574 debug_assert!(false);
4575 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4579 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4581 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4582 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4584 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4587 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4588 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4589 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4590 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4591 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4593 user_channel_id: user_id,
4598 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4599 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4602 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4604 debug_assert!(false);
4605 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4610 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4613 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4620 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4623 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4625 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4626 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4627 funding_msg.channel_id))
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4630 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4634 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4635 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4636 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4637 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4638 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4639 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4640 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4644 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4646 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4647 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4648 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4650 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4651 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4652 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4653 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4654 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4655 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4656 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4657 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4665 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4666 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4667 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4668 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4670 debug_assert!(false);
4671 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4674 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4675 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4676 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4678 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4679 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4680 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4681 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4682 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4683 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4684 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4685 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4686 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4687 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4696 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4697 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4698 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4700 debug_assert!(false);
4701 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4703 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4704 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4705 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4707 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4708 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4709 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4710 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4711 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4712 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4713 msg: announcement_sigs,
4715 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4716 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4717 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4718 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4719 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4720 // announcement_signatures.
4721 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4722 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4723 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4724 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4731 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4732 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4741 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4742 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4743 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4744 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4745 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4747 debug_assert!(false);
4748 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4755 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4756 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4757 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4758 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4761 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4762 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4763 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4764 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4766 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4767 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4768 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4769 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4770 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4771 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4776 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4777 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4778 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4779 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4780 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4787 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4788 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4789 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4790 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4796 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4797 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4798 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4800 debug_assert!(false);
4801 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4803 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4806 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4807 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4808 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4809 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4810 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4811 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4816 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4817 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4818 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4819 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4820 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4821 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4822 } else { (tx, None) }
4824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4827 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4828 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4829 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4831 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4832 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4839 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4844 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4845 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4846 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4847 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4849 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4850 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4851 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4852 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4854 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4858 debug_assert!(false);
4859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4866 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4867 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4868 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4869 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4870 match pending_forward_info {
4871 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4872 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4873 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4874 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4876 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4877 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4878 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4879 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4880 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4883 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4885 _ => pending_forward_info
4888 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4895 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4896 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4898 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4900 debug_assert!(false);
4901 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4903 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4904 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4905 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4907 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4912 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4916 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4917 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4920 debug_assert!(false);
4921 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4923 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4924 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4925 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4926 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4927 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4929 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4934 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4936 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4938 debug_assert!(false);
4939 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4943 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4945 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4946 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4947 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4949 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4956 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4958 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4960 debug_assert!(false);
4961 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4963 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4964 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4965 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4967 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4968 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4969 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4970 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4971 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4972 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4979 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4980 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4981 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4982 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4983 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4984 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4985 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4986 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4987 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4988 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4989 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4991 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4992 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4994 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4995 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4996 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4998 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4999 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5001 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5002 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5003 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5005 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5006 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5007 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5008 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5009 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5010 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5011 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5012 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5013 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5016 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5017 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5020 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5021 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5022 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5023 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5024 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5025 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5026 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5029 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5030 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5031 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5036 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5037 // payments are being processed.
5038 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5039 push_forward_event = true;
5041 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5042 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5049 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5050 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5053 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5054 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5055 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5057 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5061 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5062 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5063 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5064 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5065 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5067 if !forward_ev_exists {
5068 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5070 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5075 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5076 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5077 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5078 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5080 debug_assert!(false);
5081 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5082 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5084 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5085 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5086 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5087 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5088 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5089 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5090 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5091 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5092 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5094 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5097 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5101 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5103 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5105 debug_assert!(false);
5106 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5109 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5110 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5111 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5112 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5119 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5123 debug_assert!(false);
5124 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5130 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5134 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5135 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5136 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5137 msg, &self.default_configuration
5139 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5140 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5141 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5149 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5150 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5151 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5152 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5154 // It's not a local channel
5155 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5161 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5165 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5166 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5167 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5168 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5169 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5170 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5171 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5172 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5176 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5177 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5178 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5179 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5181 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5182 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5187 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5190 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5192 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5195 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5197 debug_assert!(false);
5198 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5200 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5201 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5202 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5204 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5205 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5206 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5207 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5208 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5209 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5210 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5211 let mut channel_update = None;
5212 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5213 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5214 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5217 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5218 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5219 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5220 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5221 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5222 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5223 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5228 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5229 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5230 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5231 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5232 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5233 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5241 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5242 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5245 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5246 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5251 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5252 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5253 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5255 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5256 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5257 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5258 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5259 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5260 match monitor_event {
5261 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5262 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5264 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5266 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5267 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5268 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5269 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5272 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5273 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5274 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5275 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5277 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5278 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5279 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5280 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5283 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5284 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5285 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5286 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5287 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5288 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5289 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5290 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5291 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5292 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5297 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5298 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5300 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5302 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5303 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5304 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5305 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5306 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5313 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5314 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5320 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5321 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5324 has_pending_monitor_events
5327 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5328 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5329 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5331 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5332 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5333 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5334 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5336 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5341 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5342 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5343 /// update was applied.
5344 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5345 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5346 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5347 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5349 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5350 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5351 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5352 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5354 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5355 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5357 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5358 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5359 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5360 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5361 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5362 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5363 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5364 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5365 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5367 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5368 has_monitor_update = true;
5370 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5371 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5372 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5373 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5374 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5375 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5376 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5378 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5380 continue 'peer_loop;
5389 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5390 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5391 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5394 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5395 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5401 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5402 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5403 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5404 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5405 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5406 let mut has_update = false;
5408 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5410 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5411 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5412 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5413 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5414 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5415 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5416 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5417 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5419 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5420 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5423 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5424 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5425 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5426 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5427 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5432 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5434 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5435 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5436 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5442 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5443 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5451 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5452 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5458 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5459 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5461 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5462 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5463 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5464 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5465 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5466 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5467 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5468 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5469 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5470 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5471 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5472 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5473 assert!(should_broadcast);
5474 } else { unreachable!(); }
5475 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5477 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5481 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5482 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5484 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5485 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5488 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5490 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5491 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5492 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5494 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5495 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5496 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5497 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5498 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5499 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5500 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5501 // never fail a payment too early.
5502 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5504 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5507 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5512 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5515 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5516 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5518 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5519 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5520 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5521 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5523 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5525 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5526 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5530 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5531 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5533 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5535 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5536 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5538 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5539 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5540 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5541 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5542 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5543 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5544 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5545 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5546 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5547 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5548 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5551 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5552 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5554 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5557 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5559 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5561 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5562 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5563 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5564 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5565 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5568 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5569 /// stored external to LDK.
5571 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5572 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5573 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5575 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5576 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5579 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5580 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5581 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5582 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5584 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5585 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5586 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5587 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5588 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5590 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5591 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5592 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5593 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5594 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5596 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5597 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5599 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5600 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5604 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5605 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5607 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5609 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5610 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5612 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5613 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5614 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5615 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5616 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5617 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5618 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5621 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5622 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5624 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5627 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5629 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5631 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5632 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5635 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5636 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5638 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5639 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5640 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5643 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5644 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5646 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5647 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5648 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5649 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5651 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5652 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5653 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5654 Some(_) => continue,
5655 None => return scid_candidate
5660 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5662 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5663 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5665 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5666 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5667 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5671 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5672 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5673 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5675 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5676 /// times to get a unique scid.
5677 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5678 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5679 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5681 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5682 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5683 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5684 return scid_candidate
5688 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5689 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5690 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5691 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5693 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5694 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5695 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5696 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5697 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5698 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5699 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5700 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5710 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5711 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5712 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5713 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5717 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5718 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5719 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5724 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5725 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5726 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5730 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5731 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5735 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5736 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5739 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5740 /// using the given event handler.
5742 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5743 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5746 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5747 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5748 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5750 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5752 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5753 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5754 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5755 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5758 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5759 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5760 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5763 for event in pending_events {
5764 handler(event).await;
5767 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5768 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5773 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5775 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5776 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5777 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5778 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5779 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5785 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5786 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5787 /// is always placed next to each other.
5789 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5790 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5791 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5792 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5794 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5795 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5796 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5797 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5798 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5799 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5800 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5802 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5803 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5804 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5805 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5808 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5809 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5811 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5812 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5815 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5817 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5818 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5819 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5820 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5821 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5825 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5826 events.replace(pending_events);
5835 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5837 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5838 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5839 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5840 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5841 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5842 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5846 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5848 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5849 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5850 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5852 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5854 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5855 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5856 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5857 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5860 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5861 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5862 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5865 for event in pending_events {
5866 handler.handle_event(event);
5874 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5876 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5877 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5878 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5879 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5880 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5885 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5887 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5888 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5889 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5890 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5891 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5894 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5895 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5898 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5900 let new_height = height - 1;
5902 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5903 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5904 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5905 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5906 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5907 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5910 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5914 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5916 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5918 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5919 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5920 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5925 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5926 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5927 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5928 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5930 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5931 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5934 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5935 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5937 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5938 if height < last_best_block_height {
5939 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5940 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5944 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5945 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5946 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5947 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5949 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5950 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5954 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5956 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5958 macro_rules! max_time {
5959 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5961 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5962 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5963 // having an explicit local time source.
5964 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5965 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5966 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5967 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5968 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5974 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5975 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5976 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5977 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5981 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5982 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5983 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5986 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5987 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5988 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5995 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5997 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5998 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5999 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6000 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6001 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6002 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6007 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6009 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6010 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6011 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6012 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6013 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6014 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6018 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6019 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6021 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6022 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6023 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6024 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6025 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6027 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6028 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6030 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6031 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6032 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6033 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6034 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6035 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6036 let res = f(channel);
6037 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6038 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6039 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6040 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6041 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6043 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6044 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6045 if channel.is_usable() {
6046 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6047 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6049 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6054 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6059 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6060 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6063 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6065 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6066 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6067 msg: announcement_sigs,
6069 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6070 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6071 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6073 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6074 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6075 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6080 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6081 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6082 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6083 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6084 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6085 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6086 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6087 // is always consistent.
6088 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6089 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6090 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6091 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6092 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6095 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6096 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6097 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6098 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6099 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6100 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6101 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6105 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6106 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6108 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6109 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6110 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6111 data: reason_message,
6121 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6122 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6123 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6124 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6125 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6126 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6127 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6128 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6129 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6130 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6132 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6133 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6134 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6138 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6141 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6142 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6143 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6144 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6145 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6146 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6147 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6148 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6149 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6152 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6153 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6154 _ => unreachable!(),
6156 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6157 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6158 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6165 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6167 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6172 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6174 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6175 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6177 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6178 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6181 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6182 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6183 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6186 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6187 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6188 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6189 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6192 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6193 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6194 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6195 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6198 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6199 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6201 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6202 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6203 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6204 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6205 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6208 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6209 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6210 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6211 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6214 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6215 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6216 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6217 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6220 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6221 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6222 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6223 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6227 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6228 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6230 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6231 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6232 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6233 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6234 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6235 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6239 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6240 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6241 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6244 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6246 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6249 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6254 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6259 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6261 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6264 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6266 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6269 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6274 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6276 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6279 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6280 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6281 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6284 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6286 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6289 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6290 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6291 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6294 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6295 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6296 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6299 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6300 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6301 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6304 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6306 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6309 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6310 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6311 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6314 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6315 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6316 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6319 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6324 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6325 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6326 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6329 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6330 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6331 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6332 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6334 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6335 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6336 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6339 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6340 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6341 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6342 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6343 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6344 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6349 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6352 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6355 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6357 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6363 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6364 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6365 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6367 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6371 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6374 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6375 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6376 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6377 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6380 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6382 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6384 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6385 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6389 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6390 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6391 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6397 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6398 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6399 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6400 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6401 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6402 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6405 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6406 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6408 if inbound_peer_limited {
6411 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6412 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6413 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6414 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6415 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6419 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6420 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6421 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6423 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6424 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6425 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6426 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6431 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6432 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6437 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6440 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6443 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6444 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6445 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6446 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6447 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6448 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6449 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6454 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6455 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6460 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6461 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6462 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6463 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6464 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6473 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6477 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6480 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6481 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6484 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6485 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6486 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6487 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6489 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6490 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6491 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6495 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6496 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6497 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6498 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6501 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6502 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6503 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6504 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6512 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6513 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6517 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6518 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6521 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6522 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6526 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6527 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6528 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6529 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6532 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6533 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6535 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6536 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6537 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6538 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6539 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6542 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6543 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6544 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6545 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6548 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6549 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6550 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6551 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6554 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6555 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6556 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6557 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6558 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6559 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6560 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6561 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6562 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6563 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6564 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6565 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6566 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6567 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6568 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6569 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6570 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6571 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6573 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6574 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6575 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6581 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6582 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6584 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6585 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6586 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6587 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6590 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6591 (2, node_id, required),
6592 (4, features, required),
6593 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6594 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6595 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6596 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6599 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6600 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6601 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6602 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6603 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6604 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6605 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6606 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6607 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6608 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6609 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6610 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6611 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6612 (7, self.config, option),
6613 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6614 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6615 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6616 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6617 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6618 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6619 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6620 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6621 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6622 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6623 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6624 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6625 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6626 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6627 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6628 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6629 (32, self.is_public, required),
6630 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6631 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6632 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6633 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6639 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6640 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6641 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6642 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6643 (2, channel_id, required),
6644 (3, channel_type, option),
6645 (4, counterparty, required),
6646 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6647 (6, funding_txo, option),
6648 (7, config, option),
6649 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6650 (9, confirmations, option),
6651 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6652 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6653 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6654 (16, balance_msat, required),
6655 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6656 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6657 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6658 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6659 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6660 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6661 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6662 (26, is_outbound, required),
6663 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6664 (30, is_usable, required),
6665 (32, is_public, required),
6666 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6667 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6668 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6669 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6672 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6673 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6674 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6675 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6676 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6680 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6682 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6683 outbound_scid_alias,
6687 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6688 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6690 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6691 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6692 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6693 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6694 confirmations_required,
6696 force_close_spend_delay,
6697 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6698 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6699 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6700 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6701 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6702 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6703 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6708 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6709 (2, channels, vec_type),
6710 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6711 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6714 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6716 (0, onion_packet, required),
6717 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6720 (0, payment_data, required),
6721 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6722 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6724 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6725 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6726 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6730 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6731 (0, routing, required),
6732 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6733 (4, payment_hash, required),
6734 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6735 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6736 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6740 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6741 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6743 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6745 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6746 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6747 reason.write(writer)?;
6749 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6750 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6753 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6754 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6755 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6756 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6763 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6764 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6765 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6768 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6769 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6771 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6775 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6776 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6778 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6779 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6783 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6784 // messages contained in the variants.
6785 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6786 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6787 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6789 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6791 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6792 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6793 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6796 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6798 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6799 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6800 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6802 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6807 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6813 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6814 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6815 (2, outpoint, required),
6816 (4, htlc_id, required),
6817 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6820 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6821 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6822 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6823 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6824 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6826 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6827 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6828 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6829 (2, self.value, required),
6830 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6831 (4, payment_data, option),
6832 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6833 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6834 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6840 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6841 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6842 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6844 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6845 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6846 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6847 let mut total_value_received = None;
6848 let mut total_msat = None;
6849 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6850 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6851 (0, prev_hop, required),
6852 (1, total_msat, option),
6853 (2, value, required),
6854 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6855 (4, payment_data, option),
6856 (5, total_value_received, option),
6857 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6858 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6860 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6862 if payment_data.is_some() {
6863 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6865 if total_msat.is_none() {
6866 total_msat = Some(value);
6868 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6871 if total_msat.is_none() {
6872 if payment_data.is_none() {
6873 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6875 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6877 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6881 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6884 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6885 total_value_received,
6886 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6893 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6894 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6895 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6899 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6900 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6901 let mut payment_id = None;
6902 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6903 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6904 (0, session_priv, required),
6905 (1, payment_id, option),
6906 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6907 (4, path, vec_type),
6908 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6910 if payment_id.is_none() {
6911 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6913 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6915 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6916 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6918 let path = path.unwrap();
6919 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6920 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6921 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6924 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6925 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6926 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6928 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6931 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6932 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6937 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6940 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
6942 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6944 (0, session_priv, required),
6945 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6946 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6947 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
6948 (4, *path, vec_type),
6949 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6952 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6954 field.write(writer)?;
6961 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6962 (0, forward_info, required),
6963 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6964 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6965 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6966 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6969 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6971 (0, htlc_id, required),
6972 (2, err_packet, required),
6977 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6978 (0, payment_secret, required),
6979 (2, expiry_time, required),
6980 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6981 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6982 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6985 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6987 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6988 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6989 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6990 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6991 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6992 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6996 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6997 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6999 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7001 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7003 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7004 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7005 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7008 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7011 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7012 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7013 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7016 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7017 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7019 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7020 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7021 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7022 unfunded_channels += 1;
7027 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7029 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7032 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7033 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7034 channel.write(writer)?;
7041 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7042 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7043 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7044 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7045 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7046 for forward in pending_forwards {
7047 forward.write(writer)?;
7052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7054 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7055 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7056 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7058 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7059 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7060 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7061 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7062 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7063 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7064 htlc.write(writer)?;
7066 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7069 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7070 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7071 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7072 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7073 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7074 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7075 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7078 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7079 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7080 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7081 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7082 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7084 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7085 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7086 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7087 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7088 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7089 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7090 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7095 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7096 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7097 for event in events.iter() {
7098 event.write(writer)?;
7101 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7102 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7103 for event in background_events.iter() {
7105 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7107 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7108 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7113 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7114 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7115 // likely to be identical.
7116 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7117 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7119 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7120 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7121 hash.write(writer)?;
7122 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7125 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7126 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7127 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7128 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7129 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7132 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7133 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7135 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7136 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7137 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7138 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7141 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7142 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7146 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7147 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7148 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7150 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7151 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7152 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7158 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7159 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7160 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7161 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7164 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7165 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7166 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7167 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7168 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7171 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7172 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7173 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7174 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7175 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7176 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7177 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7178 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7179 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7180 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7187 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7189 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7191 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7192 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7193 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7194 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7195 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7196 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7197 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7198 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7199 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7200 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7201 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7202 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7203 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7205 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7206 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7208 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7209 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7211 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7212 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7213 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7214 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7215 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7216 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7218 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7219 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7230 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7231 pub entropy_source: ES,
7233 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7234 pub node_signer: NS,
7236 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7237 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7239 pub signer_provider: SP,
7241 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7243 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7244 pub fee_estimator: F,
7245 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7247 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7248 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7249 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7250 pub chain_monitor: M,
7252 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7253 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7254 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7255 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7256 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7257 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7259 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7261 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7262 /// deserialization.
7264 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7265 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7266 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7268 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7269 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7271 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7272 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7273 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7274 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7276 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7279 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7280 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7283 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7284 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7286 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7287 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7288 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7289 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7290 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7291 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7295 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7296 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7297 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7298 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7299 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7301 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7302 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7307 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7308 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7309 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7310 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7312 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7313 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7314 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7315 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7316 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7317 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7321 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7322 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7323 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7327 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7328 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7330 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7331 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7332 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7333 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7334 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7335 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7339 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7340 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7342 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7343 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7344 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7348 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7350 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7351 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7352 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7353 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7354 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7355 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7356 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7357 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7359 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7360 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7361 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7362 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7363 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7364 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7365 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7366 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7367 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7368 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7369 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7370 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7371 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7372 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7373 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7374 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7375 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7376 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7377 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7378 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7379 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7380 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7381 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7382 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7383 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7384 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7385 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7386 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7388 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7389 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7390 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7391 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7392 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7394 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7395 let mut found_htlc = false;
7396 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7397 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7400 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7401 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7402 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7403 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7404 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7405 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7406 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7407 log_info!(args.logger,
7408 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7409 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7410 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7414 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7415 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7416 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7418 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7419 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7421 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7422 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7423 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7424 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7427 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7428 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7429 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7433 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7434 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7435 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7436 // safely discard the channel.
7437 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7438 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7439 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7440 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7441 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7444 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7445 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7446 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7447 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7448 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7449 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7453 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7454 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7455 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7456 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7457 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7459 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7463 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7464 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7466 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7467 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7469 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7470 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7471 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7473 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7476 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7478 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7479 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7481 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7482 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7483 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7485 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7488 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7490 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7491 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let peer_state = PeerState {
7493 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7494 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7495 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7496 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7497 is_connected: false,
7499 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7502 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7503 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7504 for _ in 0..event_count {
7505 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7506 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7511 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7513 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7515 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7516 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7517 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7518 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7520 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7523 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7527 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7528 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7530 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7532 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7533 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7534 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7538 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7540 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7541 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7542 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7543 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7544 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7546 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7547 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7551 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7552 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7553 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7554 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7555 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7556 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7557 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7558 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7559 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7560 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7561 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7562 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7563 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7564 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7565 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7566 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7567 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7568 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7569 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7570 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7572 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7573 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7576 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7577 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7580 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7581 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7584 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7585 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7586 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7587 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7588 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7589 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7591 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7593 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7594 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7595 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7599 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7600 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7601 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7602 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7603 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7604 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7605 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7607 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7608 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7609 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7610 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
7611 if path.is_empty() {
7612 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7613 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7616 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7617 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7618 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7619 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7621 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7622 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7623 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7626 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7627 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7628 retry_strategy: None,
7629 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7630 payment_params: None,
7631 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7632 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7633 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7634 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7635 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7636 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7637 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7638 total_msat: path_amt,
7639 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7641 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7642 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7647 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7649 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7650 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7651 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7652 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7654 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7655 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7656 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7657 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7658 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7659 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7660 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7661 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7662 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7663 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7664 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7669 !forwards.is_empty()
7671 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7672 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7673 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7674 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7675 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7676 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7677 intercepted_id != ev_id
7684 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7685 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7686 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7687 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7688 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7689 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7690 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7691 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7692 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7693 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7694 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7695 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7696 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7705 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7706 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7707 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7708 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7709 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7710 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7711 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7712 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7716 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7717 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7719 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7720 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7721 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7722 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7724 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7725 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7728 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7731 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7732 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7733 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7734 if htlcs.is_empty() {
7735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7737 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
7738 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7739 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7740 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7741 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7742 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7743 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7744 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7746 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7747 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7751 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7753 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7755 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7756 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7758 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
7764 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7765 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7767 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7769 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7771 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7772 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7773 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7774 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7778 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7779 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7780 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7781 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7782 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7783 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7784 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7786 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7787 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7788 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7790 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7791 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7792 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7793 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7794 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7797 if chan.is_usable() {
7798 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7799 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7800 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7801 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7808 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7810 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7811 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7812 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
7813 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7814 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7815 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7816 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7817 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7818 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7819 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7820 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7822 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
7823 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7825 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7826 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7827 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7828 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7830 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7831 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7832 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7833 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7835 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7836 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7837 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7838 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7840 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7841 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7842 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7843 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7844 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7845 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7846 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7849 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7850 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7853 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7856 purpose: payment.purpose,
7857 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7863 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7864 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7865 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7867 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7868 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7872 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7874 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7875 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7876 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7877 router: args.router,
7879 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7881 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7882 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7883 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7884 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7886 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7887 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7888 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7889 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7890 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7891 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7893 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7898 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7900 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7902 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7903 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7904 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7905 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7907 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7908 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7909 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7911 logger: args.logger,
7912 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7915 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7916 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7918 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7919 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7922 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7923 //connection or two.
7925 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7931 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7932 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7933 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7934 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7935 use core::time::Duration;
7936 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7937 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7938 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7939 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
7940 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7941 use crate::ln::msgs;
7942 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7943 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7944 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7945 use crate::util::test_utils;
7946 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7947 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7950 fn test_notify_limits() {
7951 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7952 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7953 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7954 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7955 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7956 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7958 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7959 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7960 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7962 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7964 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7966 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7967 // to connect messages with new values
7968 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7969 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7970 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7971 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7972 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7973 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7975 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7976 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7977 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7978 // ... but the last node should not.
7979 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7980 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7981 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7982 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7984 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7985 // about the channel.
7986 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7987 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7988 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7990 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7992 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7993 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7994 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7995 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7996 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7997 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7999 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8000 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8001 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8003 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8004 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8005 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8006 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8007 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8008 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8010 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8011 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8012 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8013 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8014 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8015 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8016 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8017 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8019 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8020 // the channel info has updated.
8021 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8022 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8023 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8024 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8025 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8026 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8030 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8031 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8036 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8037 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8039 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8040 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8041 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8042 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8044 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8045 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8046 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8047 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8048 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8049 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8050 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8051 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8052 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8053 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8055 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8057 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8058 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8059 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8061 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8063 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8064 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8067 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8068 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8071 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8072 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8073 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8074 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8075 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8076 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8077 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8078 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8079 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8081 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8082 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8083 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8085 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8087 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8089 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8090 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8091 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8092 // lightning messages manually.
8093 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8094 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8097 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8098 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8099 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8101 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8104 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8105 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8107 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8108 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8109 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8111 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8112 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8113 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8115 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8117 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8119 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8123 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8124 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8125 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8128 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8129 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8130 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8131 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8136 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8137 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8138 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8139 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8144 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8145 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8146 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8147 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8154 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8155 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8156 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8157 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8158 // fails as expected.
8159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8161 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8162 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8163 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8164 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8165 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8167 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8168 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8169 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8171 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8172 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8173 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8174 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8176 let route = find_route(
8177 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8178 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8180 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8181 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8183 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8184 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8185 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8186 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8190 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8191 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8192 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8193 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8195 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8196 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8197 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8199 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8200 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8201 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8203 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8205 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8208 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8209 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8210 let route = find_route(
8211 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8212 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8214 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8215 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8217 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8218 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8219 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8220 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8221 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8223 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8224 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8225 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8226 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8228 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8230 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8231 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8232 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8234 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8238 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8239 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8240 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8241 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8242 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8243 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8245 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8246 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8248 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8249 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8253 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8254 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8255 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8256 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8257 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8259 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8261 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8262 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8264 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8265 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8266 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8267 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8269 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8270 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8271 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8272 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8273 let route = find_route(
8274 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8275 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8278 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8279 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8280 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8281 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8282 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8283 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8286 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8287 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8288 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8289 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8290 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8291 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8292 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8294 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8298 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8299 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8305 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8306 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8308 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8309 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8310 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8311 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8313 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8314 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8315 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8316 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8317 let route = find_route(
8318 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8319 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8322 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8323 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8324 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8325 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8326 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8327 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8328 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8329 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8332 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8333 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8334 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8335 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8336 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8337 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8340 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8344 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8348 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8350 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8353 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8355 // Marshall an MPP route.
8356 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8357 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8358 route.paths.push(path);
8359 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8360 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8361 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8362 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8363 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8364 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8366 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8367 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8369 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8370 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8372 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8377 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8379 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8380 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8381 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8383 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8385 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8386 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8388 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8389 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8394 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8395 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8396 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8397 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8398 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8399 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8402 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8405 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8406 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8411 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8412 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8418 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8419 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8421 total_msat: 100_000,
8424 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8425 // payment verification fails as expected.
8426 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8427 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8428 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8429 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8431 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8435 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8436 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8440 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8441 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8442 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8443 // the channel is successfully closed.
8444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8449 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8450 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8451 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8452 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8453 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8455 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8456 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8458 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8459 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8464 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8466 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8467 // as it has the funding transaction.
8468 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8469 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8470 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8473 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8475 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8477 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8479 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8480 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8481 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8483 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8486 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8487 // as it has the funding transaction.
8488 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8489 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8490 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8493 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8494 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8496 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8497 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8498 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8499 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8501 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8502 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8503 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8504 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8506 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8509 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8510 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8511 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8512 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8513 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8514 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8515 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8519 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8520 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8521 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8522 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8523 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8524 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8525 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8528 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8530 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8531 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8532 // closing transaction).
8533 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8534 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8535 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8537 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8538 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8539 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8540 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8541 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8544 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8546 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8548 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8549 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8550 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8552 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8554 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8555 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8558 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8559 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8560 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8563 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8564 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8565 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8568 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8570 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8571 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8573 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8574 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8576 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8577 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8582 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8583 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8584 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8585 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8586 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8587 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8588 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8592 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8593 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8594 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8596 // Test the API functions.
8597 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8599 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8601 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8603 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8605 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8607 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8609 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8613 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8614 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8615 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8616 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8617 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8618 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8620 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8622 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8623 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8625 let mut funding_tx = None;
8626 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8628 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8631 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8632 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8633 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8634 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8635 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8637 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8639 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8643 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8645 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8647 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8650 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8651 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8653 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8654 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8656 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8657 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8659 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8660 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8661 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8662 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8663 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8664 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8665 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8667 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8668 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8669 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8670 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8672 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8673 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8674 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8676 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8677 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8678 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8680 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8681 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8682 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8683 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8685 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8686 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8687 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8688 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8690 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8691 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8693 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8694 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8695 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8696 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8697 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8700 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8701 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8703 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8704 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8705 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8707 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8708 // "protected" and can connect again.
8709 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8710 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8711 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8712 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8714 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8716 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8717 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8721 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8722 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8726 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8728 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8730 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8731 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8733 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8734 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8735 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8736 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8739 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8741 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8742 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8743 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8745 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8746 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8747 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8749 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8751 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8752 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8756 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8757 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8758 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8761 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8762 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8764 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8766 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8768 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8769 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8771 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8772 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8773 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8774 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8775 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8776 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8778 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8779 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8781 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8782 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8786 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8787 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8790 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8791 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8792 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8793 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8794 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8795 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8796 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8798 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8799 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8800 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8801 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8805 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8807 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8808 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8810 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8811 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8812 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8814 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8815 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8819 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8824 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8825 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8826 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8827 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8828 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8829 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8830 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8831 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8832 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8836 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8837 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8838 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8840 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8841 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8843 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8844 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8849 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8850 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8852 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8853 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8855 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8859 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8861 use crate::chain::Listen;
8862 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8863 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8864 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8865 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
8866 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8867 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8868 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8869 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
8870 use crate::util::test_utils;
8871 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8873 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8874 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8875 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8877 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8881 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8882 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8883 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8884 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8885 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8886 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8887 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8888 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8893 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8894 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8897 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8898 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8899 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8901 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8903 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8904 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8905 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8906 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8907 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8909 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8910 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8912 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8913 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8914 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8915 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8917 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8919 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8921 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8922 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8923 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8924 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8925 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8927 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8929 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8931 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8932 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8933 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8934 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8935 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8938 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8939 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8940 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8942 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8943 } else { panic!(); }
8945 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8946 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8947 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8949 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8950 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8955 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8956 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8957 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8959 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8960 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8965 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8968 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8971 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8972 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8974 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8975 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8976 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8977 match msg_events[0] {
8978 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8979 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8980 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8984 match msg_events[1] {
8985 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8989 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8990 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8992 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8993 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8998 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8999 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9001 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9002 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9007 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9008 macro_rules! send_payment {
9009 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9010 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9011 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
9012 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9013 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9015 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9016 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9018 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9019 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9020 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9021 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9022 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9023 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9024 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9025 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9026 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9027 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9028 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9031 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9032 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9033 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9035 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9036 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9037 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9038 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9039 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9041 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9044 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9045 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9046 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9047 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9049 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9054 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9055 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);