1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::Route;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
80 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
81 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
82 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
83 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
84 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
85 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
86 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
89 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
90 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
91 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
92 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
95 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
96 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
97 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
98 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
102 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
104 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
106 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
110 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
117 short_channel_id: u64,
119 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
123 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
124 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
125 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
128 session_priv: SecretKey,
129 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
130 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
131 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
136 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
137 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
138 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
139 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
140 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
145 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
146 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
148 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
157 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
158 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
159 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
160 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
161 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
163 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
165 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
166 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
167 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
168 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
169 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
171 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
172 err: msgs::LightningError,
173 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
175 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
177 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
179 err: LightningError {
181 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
182 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
184 data: err.to_string()
188 shutdown_finish: None,
192 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
198 shutdown_finish: None,
202 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
203 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
206 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
208 err: LightningError {
210 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
211 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
213 data: err.to_string()
217 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
221 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
224 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
226 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
228 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
231 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
233 data: msg.to_string()
237 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
239 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
240 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
242 data: msg.to_string()
247 shutdown_finish: None,
252 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
253 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
254 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
255 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
256 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
258 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
259 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
260 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
261 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
262 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
263 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
264 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
266 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
270 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
271 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
272 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
273 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
274 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
275 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
276 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
277 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
278 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
279 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
280 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
281 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
282 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
284 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
285 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
286 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
287 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
290 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
291 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
293 latest_features: InitFeatures,
296 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
297 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
299 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
300 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
301 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
302 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
303 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
304 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
305 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
306 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
308 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
309 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
310 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
311 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
312 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
313 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
314 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
315 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
316 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
318 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
319 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
321 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
322 /// to individual Channels.
324 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
325 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
326 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
327 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
329 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
330 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
331 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
332 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
333 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
334 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
335 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
337 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
338 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
339 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
340 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
343 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
344 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
345 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
346 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
347 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
349 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
350 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
351 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
352 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
353 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
354 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
355 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
356 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
357 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
358 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
360 default_configuration: UserConfig,
361 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
367 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
369 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
370 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
371 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
374 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
376 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
377 our_network_key: SecretKey,
379 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
380 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
381 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
383 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
384 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
385 /// are currently open with that peer.
386 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
387 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
389 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
391 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
392 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
393 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
394 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
395 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
402 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
403 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
404 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
405 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
406 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
408 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
409 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
410 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
411 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
412 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
413 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
414 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
416 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
417 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
418 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
419 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
420 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
421 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
424 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
426 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
427 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
430 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
432 macro_rules! secp_call {
433 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
436 Err(_) => return Err($err),
441 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
442 pub struct ChannelDetails {
443 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
444 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
445 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
446 /// lifetime of the channel.
447 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
448 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
449 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
450 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
451 /// The node_id of our counterparty
452 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
453 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
454 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
455 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
456 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
457 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
458 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
459 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
461 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
462 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
463 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
464 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
465 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
466 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
467 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
468 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
469 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
470 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
471 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
472 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
473 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
477 macro_rules! handle_error {
478 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
481 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
484 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
485 // entering the macro.
486 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
489 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
491 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
492 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
493 if let Some(update) = update_option {
494 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
500 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
501 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
503 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
504 node_id: $their_node_id,
505 action: err.action.clone()
509 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
510 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
513 // Return error in case higher-API need one
520 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
521 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
524 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
525 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
527 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
528 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
529 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
530 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
531 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
533 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
534 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
539 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
540 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
543 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
544 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
546 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
547 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
548 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
549 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
550 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
552 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
554 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
555 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
556 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
557 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
558 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
560 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
562 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
563 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
564 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
565 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
566 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
567 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
570 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
571 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
577 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
578 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
579 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
581 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
583 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
584 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
585 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
586 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
587 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
589 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
590 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
591 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
592 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
593 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
594 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
595 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
596 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
597 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
598 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
601 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
602 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
603 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
604 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
606 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
607 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
609 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
610 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
612 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
613 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
614 if !$resend_commitment {
615 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
618 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
620 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
621 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
627 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
628 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
629 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
631 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
632 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
636 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
637 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
638 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
639 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
640 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
643 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
648 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
649 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
651 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
654 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
656 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
657 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
659 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
661 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
663 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
664 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
666 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
667 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
668 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
669 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
670 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
672 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
673 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
675 let res = ChannelManager {
676 default_configuration: config.clone(),
677 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
678 fee_estimator: fee_est,
682 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
683 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
686 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
687 by_id: HashMap::new(),
688 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
689 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
690 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
691 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
693 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
695 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
697 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
699 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
700 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
710 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
712 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
713 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
714 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
715 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
717 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
718 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
720 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
721 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
722 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
723 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
724 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
727 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
728 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
729 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
731 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
732 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
733 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
735 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
736 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
738 panic!("RNG is bad???");
741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
744 node_id: their_network_key,
750 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
751 let mut res = Vec::new();
753 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
754 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
755 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
756 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
757 res.push(ChannelDetails {
758 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
759 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
760 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
761 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
762 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
763 inbound_capacity_msat,
764 outbound_capacity_msat,
765 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
766 is_live: channel.is_live(),
770 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
771 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
772 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
773 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
779 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
780 /// more information.
781 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
782 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
785 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
786 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
788 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
789 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
790 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
791 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
792 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
793 // really wanted anyway.
794 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
797 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
798 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
799 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
801 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
802 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
803 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
805 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
806 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
807 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
810 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
811 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
812 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
815 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
816 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
817 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
819 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
820 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
826 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
828 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
829 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
834 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
835 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
845 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
846 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
847 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
848 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
849 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
851 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
852 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
853 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
854 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
855 // ignore the result here.
856 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
860 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
861 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
862 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
863 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
866 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
867 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
868 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
869 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
870 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
877 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
878 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
879 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
880 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
881 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
887 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
888 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
889 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
890 for chan in self.list_channels() {
891 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
895 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
896 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
897 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
899 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
900 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
901 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
902 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
903 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
904 failure_code: $err_code,
905 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
910 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
911 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
914 let shared_secret = {
915 let mut arr = [0; 32];
916 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
919 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
921 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
922 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
923 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
924 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
925 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
926 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
927 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
928 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
931 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
932 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
933 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
934 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
935 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
938 let mut channel_state = None;
939 macro_rules! return_err {
940 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
942 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
943 if channel_state.is_none() {
944 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
946 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
947 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
948 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
949 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
950 })), channel_state.unwrap());
955 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
956 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
957 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
958 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
960 let error_code = match err {
961 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
962 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
963 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
964 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
965 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
967 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
970 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
971 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
972 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
979 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
982 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
983 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
984 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
985 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
986 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
987 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
988 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
989 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
990 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
991 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
992 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
993 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
997 // final_expiry_too_soon
998 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
999 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1001 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1002 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1003 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1005 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1006 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1007 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1010 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1011 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1012 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1013 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1015 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1016 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {},
1017 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1018 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1019 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1020 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1023 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1024 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1025 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1027 // Check two things:
1028 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1029 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1030 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1032 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1034 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1035 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1036 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1038 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1040 let blinding_factor = {
1041 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1042 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1043 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1044 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1047 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1049 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1051 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1054 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1055 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1058 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1059 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1060 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1061 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1062 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1066 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1067 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1068 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1069 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1071 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1072 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1073 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1074 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1078 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1079 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1080 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1081 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1082 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1083 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1084 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1085 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1086 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1087 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1089 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1091 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1092 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1094 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1095 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1096 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1097 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1098 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1099 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1100 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1102 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1103 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1105 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1106 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1107 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1109 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1110 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1112 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1113 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1114 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1115 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1117 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1118 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1123 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1124 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1125 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1126 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1128 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1129 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1131 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1132 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1134 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1136 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1141 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1144 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1145 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1146 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1147 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1148 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1152 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1154 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1155 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1156 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1157 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1158 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1159 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1160 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1161 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1162 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1163 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1166 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1167 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1169 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1175 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1177 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1178 /// fields for more info.
1180 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1181 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1182 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1183 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1184 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1185 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1187 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1189 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1190 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1191 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1192 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1193 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1194 /// relevant updates.
1196 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1197 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1198 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1199 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1200 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1201 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1202 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1203 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1205 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1206 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1207 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1208 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1212 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1214 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1216 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1217 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1218 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1219 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1220 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1222 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1224 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1226 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1228 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1229 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1230 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1233 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1234 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1236 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1237 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1239 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1240 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1242 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1243 route: route.clone(),
1244 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1245 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1246 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1248 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1249 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1250 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1251 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1252 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1253 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1254 // something else in case we will resend later!
1255 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1258 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1259 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1260 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1261 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1262 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1263 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1264 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1272 } else { unreachable!(); }
1276 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1277 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1278 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1282 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1284 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1285 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1287 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1289 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1290 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1291 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1292 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1294 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1295 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1297 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1298 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1299 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1300 } else { unreachable!(); })
1305 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1306 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1307 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1309 Err(_) => { return; }
1312 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1313 // lock before add_monitor
1314 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1316 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1317 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1318 Err(_) => { return; },
1319 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1322 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1323 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1324 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1325 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1327 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1332 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1333 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1334 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1337 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1339 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1347 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1348 if !chan.should_announce() {
1349 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1353 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1355 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1357 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1358 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1360 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1361 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1362 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1363 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1364 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1369 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1370 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1371 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1373 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1376 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1377 // smaller than 500:
1378 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1380 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1381 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1382 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1384 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1385 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1387 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1388 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1389 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1390 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1392 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1393 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1394 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1396 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1397 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1400 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1401 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1402 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1403 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1404 rgb, alias, addresses,
1405 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1406 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1408 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1410 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1411 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1412 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1413 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1414 contents: announcement
1419 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1421 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1422 /// Will likely generate further events.
1423 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1424 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1426 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1427 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1428 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1433 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1434 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1435 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1436 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1438 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1439 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1440 match forward_info {
1441 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1442 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1443 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1444 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1445 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1447 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1449 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1450 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1451 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1452 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1453 // problem, not ours.
1460 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1461 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1462 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1463 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1464 match forward_info {
1465 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1466 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1468 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1469 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1470 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1471 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1472 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1473 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1475 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1477 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1478 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1480 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1482 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1483 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1488 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1490 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1491 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1492 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1493 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1494 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1495 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1496 // this channel currently :/.
1502 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1503 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1505 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1506 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1507 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1509 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1510 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1512 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1514 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1515 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1516 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1519 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1521 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1522 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1523 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1524 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1525 // messages when we can.
1526 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1527 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1528 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1535 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1536 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1539 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1540 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1541 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1542 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1543 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1544 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1546 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1547 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1548 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1549 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1550 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1552 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1554 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1556 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1560 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1561 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1565 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1566 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1567 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1568 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1569 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1570 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1572 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1580 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1581 match forward_info {
1582 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1583 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { },
1584 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1585 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1586 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1587 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1588 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1590 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
1591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1594 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1595 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1596 amt: amt_to_forward,
1599 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1600 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1602 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1603 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1611 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1613 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1614 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1618 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1619 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1622 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1623 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1624 events.append(&mut new_events);
1627 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1628 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1629 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1631 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1632 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1633 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1634 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1636 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1637 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1638 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1639 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1644 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1646 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1647 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1652 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1653 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1654 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1655 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1656 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1657 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1658 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1660 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1661 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1662 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1663 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1664 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1665 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1666 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1667 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1673 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1674 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1675 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1676 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1677 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1678 /// still-available channels.
1679 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1680 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1681 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1682 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1685 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1686 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1687 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1688 match &onion_error {
1689 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1691 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1693 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1694 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1695 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1696 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1697 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1698 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1699 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1704 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1705 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1706 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1707 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1709 error_code: onion_error_code
1713 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1717 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1718 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1719 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1720 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1722 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1723 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1724 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1725 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1726 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1727 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1729 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1735 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1736 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1737 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1738 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1739 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1740 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1742 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1743 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1744 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1748 let mut forward_event = None;
1749 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1750 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1752 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1754 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1757 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1760 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1761 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1762 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1763 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1764 time_forwardable: time
1771 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1772 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1773 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1775 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1776 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1777 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1778 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1779 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1780 /// motivated attackers.
1782 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1783 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1784 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1788 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1789 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1790 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1791 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1792 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1793 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1794 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1795 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1796 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1797 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1798 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1799 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1801 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1807 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1808 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1810 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1811 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1812 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1813 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1817 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1818 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1819 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1821 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1822 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1824 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1825 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1826 // why it's missing.
1831 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1832 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1833 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1834 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1835 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1836 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1837 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1838 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1840 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1844 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1846 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1847 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1848 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1849 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1850 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1851 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1859 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1860 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1861 //TODO: Do something with e?
1865 } else { unreachable!(); }
1871 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1872 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1875 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1876 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1877 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1880 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1881 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1884 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1885 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1887 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1888 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1889 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1890 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1892 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1893 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1894 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1895 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1896 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1897 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1898 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1899 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1900 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1901 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1903 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1904 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1905 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1906 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1909 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1910 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1911 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1912 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1913 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1917 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1921 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1922 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1923 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1925 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1927 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1928 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1929 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1930 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1935 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1936 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1937 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1938 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1939 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1944 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1948 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1953 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1954 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1955 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1956 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1959 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1961 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1964 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1966 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1967 msg: announcement_sigs,
1970 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1974 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1976 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1977 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1979 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1981 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1982 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1986 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1987 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1988 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1991 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1992 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1993 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1994 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1995 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1998 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1999 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2000 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2002 entry.insert(channel);
2008 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2009 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2010 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2011 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2012 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2013 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2014 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2015 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2018 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2023 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2024 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2025 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2026 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2027 output_script: output_script,
2028 user_channel_id: user_id,
2033 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2034 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2035 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2037 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2038 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2039 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2040 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2042 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2047 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2048 // lock before add_monitor
2049 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2051 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2052 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2053 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2054 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2055 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2058 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2059 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2060 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2061 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2062 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2063 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2067 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2068 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2069 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2071 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2073 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2074 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2075 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2084 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2085 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2086 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2088 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2089 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2090 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2093 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2094 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2095 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2096 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2097 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2098 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2101 Ok(update) => update,
2103 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2104 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2106 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2111 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2112 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2113 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2114 user_channel_id: user_id,
2119 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2122 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2123 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2124 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2125 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2127 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2128 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2129 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2130 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2131 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2132 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2133 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2134 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2135 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2136 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2137 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2138 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2139 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2140 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2141 msg: announcement_sigs,
2146 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2150 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2151 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2155 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2157 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2160 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2161 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2162 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2163 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2167 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2168 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2169 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2173 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2174 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2175 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2177 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2178 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2183 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2184 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2186 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2187 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2188 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2189 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2197 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2198 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2199 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2200 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2201 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2203 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2206 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2207 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2209 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2214 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2215 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2216 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2217 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2218 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2219 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2220 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2222 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2223 } else { (tx, None) }
2225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2228 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2229 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2230 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2232 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2233 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2234 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2243 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2244 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2245 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2246 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2248 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2249 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2250 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2251 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2253 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2256 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2257 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2258 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2259 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2261 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2262 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2263 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2264 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2265 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2266 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2267 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2268 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2269 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2270 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2271 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2272 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2273 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2274 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2276 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2277 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2278 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2279 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2283 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2284 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2285 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2286 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2287 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2288 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2293 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2300 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2301 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2304 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2305 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2306 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2307 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2309 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2311 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2318 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2319 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2320 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2321 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2323 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2324 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2326 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2333 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2334 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2335 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2338 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2339 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2341 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2342 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2343 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2345 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2348 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2352 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2353 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2354 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2355 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2356 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2357 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2358 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2360 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2361 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2362 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2363 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2364 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2365 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2366 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2371 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2372 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2373 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2375 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2376 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2377 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2379 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2380 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2381 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2382 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2383 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2384 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2385 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2386 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2388 commitment_signed: msg,
2392 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2393 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2394 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2405 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2406 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2407 let mut forward_event = None;
2408 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2409 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2410 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2411 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2413 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2414 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2415 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2416 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2418 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2419 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2422 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2427 match forward_event {
2429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2430 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2431 time_forwardable: time
2439 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2440 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2441 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2442 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2443 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2445 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2446 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2448 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2449 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2450 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2451 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2452 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2453 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2456 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2459 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2461 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2465 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2466 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2467 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2471 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2476 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2477 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2479 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2484 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2485 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2486 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2487 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2488 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2489 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2490 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2492 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2499 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2500 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2501 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2503 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2504 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2505 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2506 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2508 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2512 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2513 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2514 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2516 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2517 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2518 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2519 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2520 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2521 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2524 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2527 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2528 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2529 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2530 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2531 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2532 contents: announcement,
2534 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2542 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2546 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2547 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2548 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2549 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2551 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2552 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2553 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2554 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2555 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2556 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2557 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2558 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2559 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2561 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2562 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2564 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2565 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2568 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2569 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2570 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2574 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2575 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2576 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2577 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2582 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2583 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2584 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2585 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2591 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2595 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2600 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2601 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2602 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2612 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2613 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2614 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2615 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2617 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2618 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2620 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2621 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2622 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2624 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2627 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2630 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2631 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2633 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2634 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2636 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2637 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2638 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2640 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2643 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2644 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2645 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2646 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2647 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2648 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2649 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2650 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2660 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2661 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2662 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2667 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2668 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2670 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2671 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2673 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2674 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2675 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2676 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2678 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2679 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2680 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2681 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2682 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2684 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2685 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2690 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2691 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2692 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2697 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2698 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2699 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2700 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2701 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2703 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2704 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2705 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2706 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2708 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2709 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2710 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2711 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2712 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2714 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2715 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2720 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2721 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2722 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2727 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2728 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2729 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2731 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2732 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2734 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2735 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2736 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2737 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2738 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2740 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2741 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2742 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2743 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2744 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2745 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2746 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2748 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2749 msg: funding_locked,
2751 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2752 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2753 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2754 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2755 msg: announcement_sigs,
2758 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2760 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2761 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2762 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2763 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2764 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2768 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2769 for tx in txn_matched {
2770 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2771 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2772 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2773 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2774 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2776 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2777 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2778 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2779 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
2780 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2781 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2790 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2791 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2792 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2794 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2795 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2796 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2797 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
2798 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2808 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2809 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2811 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2812 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2814 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
2815 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
2816 // having an explicit local time source.
2817 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
2818 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
2819 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
2820 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
2821 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
2827 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2828 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2829 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2830 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2832 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2833 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2834 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2835 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2836 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2837 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2838 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2839 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2841 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
2842 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2853 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2854 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2856 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2857 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2861 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2862 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2863 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2864 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2865 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2866 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2868 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2869 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2870 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2873 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2874 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2875 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2878 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2879 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2880 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2883 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2884 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2885 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2888 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2889 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2890 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2893 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2894 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2895 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2898 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2899 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2900 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2903 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2904 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2905 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2908 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2909 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2910 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2913 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2914 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2915 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2918 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2919 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2920 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2923 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2924 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2925 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2928 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2929 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2930 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2933 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2934 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2935 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2938 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2939 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2940 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2943 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2944 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2945 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2948 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2949 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2950 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2951 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2952 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2956 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2957 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2958 if no_connection_possible {
2959 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2960 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2961 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2962 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2963 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2965 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2966 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2977 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2978 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2979 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2980 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2981 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2982 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2983 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2984 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2986 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2987 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2988 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2992 no_channels_remain = false;
2998 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3000 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3001 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3002 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3003 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3004 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3005 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3006 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3008 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3011 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3012 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3013 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3014 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3015 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3019 if no_channels_remain {
3020 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3023 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3024 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3026 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3027 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3028 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3033 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3034 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3036 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3039 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3040 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3041 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3042 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3043 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3047 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3052 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3053 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3054 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3055 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3056 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3057 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3058 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3059 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3060 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3064 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3065 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3066 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3072 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3075 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3076 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3078 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3079 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3080 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3081 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3085 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3090 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3091 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3093 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3094 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3095 match &self.routing {
3096 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3098 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3099 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3101 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { } => {
3105 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3106 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3107 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3108 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3113 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3114 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3115 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3116 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3117 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3118 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3119 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3121 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { },
3122 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3124 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3125 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3126 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3127 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3132 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3133 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3135 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3137 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3139 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3141 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3148 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3149 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3150 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3151 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3152 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3153 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3158 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3159 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3161 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3163 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3165 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3167 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3174 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3175 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3176 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3177 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3178 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3179 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3184 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3187 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3190 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3191 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3193 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3195 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3197 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3199 route.write(writer)?;
3200 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3201 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3208 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3209 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3210 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3211 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3212 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3213 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3214 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3215 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3217 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3222 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3223 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3225 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3229 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3231 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3232 data.write(writer)?;
3239 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3240 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3241 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3242 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3243 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3244 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3245 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3247 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3252 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3253 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3255 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3257 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3258 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3259 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3261 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3263 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3264 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3271 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3272 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3273 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3274 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3275 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3276 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3277 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3279 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3280 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3281 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3283 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3288 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3289 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3290 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3291 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3294 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3295 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3297 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3298 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3300 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3301 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3302 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3304 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3305 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3306 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3307 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3308 unfunded_channels += 1;
3311 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3312 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3313 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3314 channel.write(writer)?;
3318 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3319 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3320 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3321 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3322 for forward in pending_forwards {
3323 forward.write(writer)?;
3327 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3328 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3329 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3330 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3331 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3332 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3333 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3337 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3338 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3339 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3340 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3341 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3342 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3345 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3351 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3353 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3355 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3356 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3357 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3358 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3359 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3360 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3361 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3362 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3363 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3364 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3365 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3366 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3367 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3368 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3369 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3370 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3373 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3374 /// deserialization.
3375 pub keys_manager: K,
3377 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3379 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3380 pub fee_estimator: F,
3381 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3383 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3384 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3385 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3388 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3389 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3390 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3391 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3392 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3393 /// deserialization.
3394 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3395 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3396 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3397 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3399 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3400 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3402 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3403 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3404 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3405 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3407 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3409 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3412 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3413 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3414 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3415 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3416 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3417 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3418 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3421 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3422 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3423 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3427 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3428 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3429 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3430 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3431 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3432 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3434 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3435 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3436 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3437 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3438 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3441 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3442 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3443 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3445 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3447 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3448 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3449 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3450 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3451 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3452 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3453 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3457 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3458 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3459 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3460 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3461 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3462 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3463 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3464 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3466 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3467 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3468 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3469 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3470 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3471 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3472 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3473 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3475 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3476 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3478 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3481 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3485 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3486 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3487 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3491 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3492 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3493 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3494 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3495 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3496 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3497 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3498 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3500 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3503 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3504 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3505 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3506 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3507 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3508 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3509 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3510 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3512 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3515 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3516 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3517 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3518 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let peer_state = PeerState {
3520 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3522 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3525 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3527 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3529 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3530 monitor: args.monitor,
3531 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3533 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3534 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3535 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3537 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3542 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3544 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3546 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3548 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3550 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3551 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3552 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3553 logger: args.logger,
3554 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3557 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3558 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3561 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3562 //connection or two.
3564 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))