1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
38 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner, Recipient};
54 use util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
58 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
74 use util::crypto::sign;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
98 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
99 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
102 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
107 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
113 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
114 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
115 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
116 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
117 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
118 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
123 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
124 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
127 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
128 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
129 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
130 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
131 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
134 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
136 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
138 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
139 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
140 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
143 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
144 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
146 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
155 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
156 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
157 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
158 short_channel_id: u64,
160 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
161 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
163 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
164 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
169 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
171 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
172 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
173 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
175 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
176 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
179 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
180 struct ClaimableHTLC {
181 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
183 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
185 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
187 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
191 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
192 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
193 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
194 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
196 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
197 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
202 impl Readable for PaymentId {
203 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
204 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
208 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
209 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
210 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
211 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
212 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
215 session_priv: SecretKey,
216 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
217 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
218 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
219 payment_id: PaymentId,
220 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
221 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
224 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
225 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
226 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
228 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
230 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
232 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
235 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
236 payment_id.hash(hasher);
237 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
238 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
239 payment_params.hash(hasher);
244 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
247 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
248 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
250 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
251 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
252 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
253 payment_secret: None,
254 payment_params: None,
259 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
260 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
262 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
270 struct ReceiveError {
276 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
277 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
279 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
284 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
286 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
287 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
288 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
289 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
290 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
292 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
293 err: msgs::LightningError,
294 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
295 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
297 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
299 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
301 err: LightningError {
303 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
304 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
311 shutdown_finish: None,
315 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
317 err: LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
322 shutdown_finish: None,
326 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
327 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
330 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
332 err: LightningError {
334 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
335 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
341 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
342 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
346 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
349 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
352 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
356 log_level: Level::Warn,
359 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
363 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
365 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
366 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
374 shutdown_finish: None,
379 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
380 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
381 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
382 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
383 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
385 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
386 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
387 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
388 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
389 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
391 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
393 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
397 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
398 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
399 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
400 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) to the real channel id. Outbound SCID aliases are added
401 /// here once the channel is available for normal use, with SCIDs being added once the funding
402 /// transaction is confirmed at the channel's required confirmation depth.
403 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
404 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
406 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
407 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
408 /// and via the classic SCID.
410 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
411 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
412 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
413 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
414 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
415 /// failed/claimed by the user.
417 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
418 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
420 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
421 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
422 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
423 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
426 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
427 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
428 /// quite some time lag.
429 enum BackgroundEvent {
430 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
431 /// commitment transaction.
432 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
435 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
436 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
438 latest_features: InitFeatures,
441 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
442 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
444 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
447 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
448 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
449 struct PendingInboundPayment {
450 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
451 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
452 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
453 /// this payment being removed.
455 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
456 user_payment_id: u64,
457 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
458 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
459 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
462 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
463 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
464 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
466 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
470 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
471 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
472 pending_amt_msat: u64,
473 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
474 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
475 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
477 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
478 starting_block_height: u32,
480 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
481 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
482 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
484 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
485 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
487 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
488 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
489 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
490 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
491 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
493 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
495 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
496 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
500 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
501 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
503 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
507 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
513 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
519 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
521 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
526 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
528 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
529 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
530 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
535 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
536 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
537 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
538 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
539 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
540 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
541 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
544 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
545 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
548 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
549 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
550 let our_payment_hash;
551 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
552 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
553 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
555 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
557 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
561 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
565 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
566 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
567 let remove_res = match self {
568 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
571 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
572 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
576 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
577 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
588 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
589 let insert_res = match self {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
592 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
594 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
595 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
598 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
599 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
600 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
601 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
602 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
609 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
611 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
612 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
613 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
614 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
621 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
622 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
623 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
624 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
625 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
626 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
627 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
629 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
630 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
632 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
633 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
634 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
635 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
636 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
637 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
638 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
639 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
641 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
644 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
645 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
647 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
648 /// to individual Channels.
650 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
651 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
652 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
653 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
655 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
656 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
657 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
658 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
659 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
660 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
661 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
663 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
664 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
665 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
666 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
669 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
670 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
671 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
672 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
673 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
675 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
676 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
677 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
678 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
679 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
680 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
681 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
682 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
683 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
684 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
687 default_configuration: UserConfig,
688 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
694 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
696 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
697 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
699 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
700 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
701 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
702 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
704 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
705 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
706 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
707 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
708 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
709 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
711 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
712 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
713 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
714 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
715 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
716 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
717 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
718 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
720 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
722 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
723 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
725 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
726 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
727 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
728 /// active channel list on load.
729 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
731 our_network_key: SecretKey,
732 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
734 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
736 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
737 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
738 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
740 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
741 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
743 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
744 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
745 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
747 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
748 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
749 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
750 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
752 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
753 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
754 /// are currently open with that peer.
755 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
756 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
759 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
760 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
762 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
763 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
764 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
765 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
766 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
767 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
768 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
769 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
770 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
772 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
779 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
781 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
782 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
783 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
784 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
785 pub struct ChainParameters {
786 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
787 pub network: Network,
789 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
791 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
792 pub best_block: BestBlock,
795 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
801 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
802 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
803 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
804 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
805 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
806 /// updates are ready for persistence).
808 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
809 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
810 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
811 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
812 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
814 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
815 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
818 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
819 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
820 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
823 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
824 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
826 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
827 persistence_notifier: notifier,
828 should_persist: persist_check,
829 _read_guard: read_guard,
834 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
836 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
837 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
842 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
843 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
845 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
847 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
848 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
849 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
850 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
851 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
853 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
854 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
856 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
858 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
859 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
860 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
861 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
862 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
863 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
864 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
865 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
866 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
867 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
868 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
869 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
870 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
872 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
873 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
875 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
876 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
877 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
878 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
880 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
881 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
882 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
883 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
884 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
885 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
888 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
890 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
891 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
894 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
896 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
897 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
898 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
900 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
901 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
903 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
904 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
905 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
906 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
907 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
908 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
909 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
910 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
911 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
912 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
913 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
916 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
917 /// to better separate parameters.
918 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
919 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
920 /// The node_id of our counterparty
921 pub node_id: PublicKey,
922 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
923 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
924 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
925 pub features: InitFeatures,
926 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
927 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
928 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
930 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
932 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
933 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
934 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
935 /// payments to us through this channel.
936 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
937 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
938 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
939 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
940 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
941 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
942 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
945 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
946 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
947 pub struct ChannelDetails {
948 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
949 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
950 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
951 /// lifetime of the channel.
952 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
953 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
954 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
955 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
956 /// our counterparty already.
958 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
959 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
960 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
961 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
963 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
964 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
965 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
966 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
968 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
969 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
971 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
972 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
974 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
975 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
976 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
977 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
978 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
979 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
980 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
981 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
982 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
985 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
987 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
988 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
989 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
990 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
991 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
992 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
993 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
995 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
996 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
998 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
999 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1000 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1001 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1002 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1003 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1004 /// this value on chain.
1006 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1008 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1010 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1011 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1012 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1013 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1014 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1015 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1016 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1018 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1019 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1020 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1021 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1023 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1024 pub balance_msat: u64,
1025 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1026 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1027 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1028 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1030 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1032 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1033 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1034 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1035 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1036 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1037 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1038 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1039 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1041 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1042 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1043 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1044 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1045 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1046 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1047 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1049 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1050 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1051 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1052 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1053 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1054 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1055 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1056 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1057 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1059 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1061 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1062 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1063 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1064 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1065 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1066 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1067 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1068 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1069 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1071 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1072 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1073 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1074 pub is_outbound: bool,
1075 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1076 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1077 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1078 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1079 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1081 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1082 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1083 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1084 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1086 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1087 pub is_usable: bool,
1088 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1089 pub is_public: bool,
1090 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1091 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1092 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1093 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1094 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1095 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1097 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1098 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1101 impl ChannelDetails {
1102 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1103 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1104 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1106 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1107 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1108 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1109 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1112 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1113 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1114 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1116 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1117 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1118 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1119 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1123 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1124 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1125 /// states for more.
1126 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1127 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1128 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1129 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1130 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1131 ParameterError(APIError),
1132 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1133 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1134 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1135 /// payment in full.
1137 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1139 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1140 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1141 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1142 /// paths than the ones selected).
1143 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1144 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1145 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1146 /// in over-/re-payment.
1148 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1149 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1150 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1152 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1153 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1154 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1155 /// with the latest update_id.
1157 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1158 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1159 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1160 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1161 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1162 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1163 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1164 payment_id: PaymentId,
1168 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1170 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1172 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1173 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1174 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1175 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1177 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1178 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1179 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1182 macro_rules! handle_error {
1183 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1186 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1187 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1189 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1190 // entering the macro.
1191 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1192 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1195 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1197 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1198 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1199 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1200 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1204 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1205 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1206 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1207 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1212 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1213 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1215 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1216 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1217 action: err.action.clone()
1221 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1222 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1225 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1232 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1233 ($self: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1234 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1235 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1237 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1238 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1239 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1240 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1241 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1243 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1244 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1246 $short_to_id.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1250 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1251 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1252 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1254 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1255 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1257 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1258 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1260 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1261 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1262 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $channel);
1263 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1264 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1265 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1271 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1272 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1276 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1278 $entry.remove_entry();
1286 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1287 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1291 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1293 $entry.remove_entry();
1301 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1302 ($self: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1304 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1305 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel_state.short_to_id, channel);
1311 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1312 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1314 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1315 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1316 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $short_to_id, $chan);
1317 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1318 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1319 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1320 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1321 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1322 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1323 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1324 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1325 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1326 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1327 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1330 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1331 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1332 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1333 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1334 match $action_type {
1335 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1336 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1338 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1339 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1341 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1342 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1343 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1344 if !$resend_commitment {
1345 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1348 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1350 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1351 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1355 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1356 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1358 $entry.remove_entry();
1362 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1363 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1364 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1366 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1367 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1369 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1370 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1372 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1373 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1375 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1376 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1380 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1381 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1382 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1385 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1389 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1390 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1392 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1393 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1396 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1401 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1402 ($short_to_id: expr, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {
1403 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1404 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1405 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1407 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1408 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1409 let outbound_alias_insert = $short_to_id.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), $channel.channel_id());
1410 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1411 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1412 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1413 let scid_insert = $short_to_id.insert(real_scid, $channel.channel_id());
1414 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == $channel.channel_id(),
1415 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1420 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1421 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1422 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1423 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1424 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1426 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1427 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1428 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1430 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1431 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1432 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1433 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1436 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1437 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1438 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1439 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1440 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1441 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1442 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1443 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1444 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1445 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1446 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1447 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1450 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1451 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1452 // before it should be allowed to.
1453 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1454 send_channel_ready!($channel_state.short_to_id, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1456 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1457 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1458 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1463 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1464 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1465 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1466 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1467 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1468 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1469 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1470 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1471 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1472 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1473 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1474 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1475 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1476 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1477 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1478 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1479 let mut order = $order;
1481 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1483 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1487 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1488 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1489 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1490 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1495 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1496 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1497 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1498 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1499 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1504 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1508 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1513 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1514 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1515 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1520 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1521 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1522 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1523 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1524 assert!(res.is_ok());
1527 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1531 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1532 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1533 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1535 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1537 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1538 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1543 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1544 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1545 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1546 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1550 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1552 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1553 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1555 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1557 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1558 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1559 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1560 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1561 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1562 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1563 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1564 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1566 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1567 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1568 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1572 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1574 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1575 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1576 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1577 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1578 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1579 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1581 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1582 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1583 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1585 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1586 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1589 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1590 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1592 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1593 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1595 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1597 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1598 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1599 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1600 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1608 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1609 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1610 &self.default_configuration
1613 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1614 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1615 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1618 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1619 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1621 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1623 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1627 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1632 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1634 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1635 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1636 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1637 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1638 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1641 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1642 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1644 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1645 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1646 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1648 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1649 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1650 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1651 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1652 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1653 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1655 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1656 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1657 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1658 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1659 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1660 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1665 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1666 Some(peer_state) => {
1667 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1668 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1669 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1670 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1671 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1672 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1673 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1677 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1682 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1685 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1688 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1689 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1691 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1692 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1693 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1698 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1704 node_id: their_network_key,
1707 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1710 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1711 let mut res = Vec::new();
1713 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1714 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1715 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1716 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1717 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1718 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1719 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1720 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1721 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1722 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1723 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1724 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1725 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1726 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1727 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1728 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1729 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1730 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1731 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1732 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1733 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1735 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1736 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1737 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1738 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1739 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1740 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1741 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1742 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1743 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1744 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1745 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1746 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1747 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1748 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1749 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1750 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1751 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1752 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1753 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1754 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1755 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1756 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1757 config: Some(channel.config()),
1761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1762 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1763 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1764 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1770 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1771 /// more information.
1772 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1773 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1776 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1777 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1779 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1780 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1783 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1784 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1785 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1786 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1787 // really wanted anyway.
1788 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1791 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1792 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1793 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1794 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1795 Some(transaction) => {
1796 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1800 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1801 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1802 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1803 reason: closure_reason
1807 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1810 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1811 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1812 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1813 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1814 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1816 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1817 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1820 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1821 Some(peer_state) => {
1822 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1823 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1824 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1826 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1828 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1830 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1831 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1832 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1833 let (result, is_permanent) =
1834 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1836 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1842 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1843 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1847 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1848 let channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
1849 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1850 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1854 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1862 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1863 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1866 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1870 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1871 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1872 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1874 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1875 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1877 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1878 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1879 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1880 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1882 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1884 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1885 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1886 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1887 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1888 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1891 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1892 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1893 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1895 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1896 /// the channel being closed or not:
1897 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1898 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1899 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1900 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1901 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1902 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1903 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1905 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1907 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1908 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1909 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1910 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1911 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1915 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1916 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1917 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1918 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1921 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1922 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1923 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1924 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1925 // ignore the result here.
1926 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1930 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1931 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1932 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1933 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1935 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1936 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1937 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1938 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1939 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1941 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1942 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1944 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1946 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan)
1948 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1951 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1952 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
1953 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1954 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1960 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1963 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1965 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
1966 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1967 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1968 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1969 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1970 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1971 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1981 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
1982 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
1983 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
1985 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1986 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1987 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
1990 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
1991 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
1992 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
1994 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
1995 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
1996 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
1997 -> Result<(), APIError> {
1998 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2001 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2002 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2003 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2004 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2005 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2009 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2010 /// local transaction(s).
2011 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2012 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2013 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2017 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2018 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2020 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2021 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2022 return Err(ReceiveError {
2023 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2025 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2028 // final_expiry_too_soon
2029 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2030 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2031 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2032 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2033 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2034 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2035 return Err(ReceiveError {
2037 err_data: Vec::new(),
2038 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2041 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2042 return Err(ReceiveError {
2044 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2045 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2049 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2050 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2051 return Err(ReceiveError {
2052 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2053 err_data: Vec::new(),
2054 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2057 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2058 return Err(ReceiveError {
2059 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2060 err_data: Vec::new(),
2061 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2064 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2065 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2066 return Err(ReceiveError {
2067 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2068 err_data: Vec::new(),
2069 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2071 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2072 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2074 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2075 phantom_shared_secret,
2077 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2078 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2079 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2080 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2081 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2082 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2083 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2084 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2085 return Err(ReceiveError {
2086 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2087 err_data: Vec::new(),
2088 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2092 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2094 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2098 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2105 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2108 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2109 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2110 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2114 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2115 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2116 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2118 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2119 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2120 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2121 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2122 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2123 failure_code: $err_code,
2124 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2129 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2130 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2133 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2135 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2136 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2137 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2138 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2139 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2140 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2141 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2142 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2145 let mut channel_state = None;
2146 macro_rules! return_err {
2147 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2149 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2150 if channel_state.is_none() {
2151 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2153 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2154 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2155 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2156 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2157 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2162 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2164 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2165 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2167 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2168 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2172 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2173 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2175 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2177 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2178 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2179 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2180 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2181 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2183 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2186 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2187 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2188 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2190 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2191 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2192 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2195 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2196 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2197 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2198 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2199 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2203 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2204 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2205 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2208 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2209 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2210 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2211 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2216 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2217 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2218 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2219 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2220 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2221 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2222 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2223 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2224 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2225 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2226 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2228 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2231 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2234 Some(id) => Some(id.clone()),
2236 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2237 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2238 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2239 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2240 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2241 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2242 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2244 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2245 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2246 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2247 // we don't have the channel here.
2248 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2250 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2252 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2253 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2254 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2255 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2256 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2257 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2258 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2260 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2261 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2263 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2264 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2268 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2270 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2277 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2278 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2279 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2280 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2281 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2282 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2284 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2285 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2287 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2288 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2289 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2290 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2291 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2292 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2293 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2294 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2295 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2296 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2302 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2303 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2304 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2305 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2307 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2308 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2310 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2311 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2312 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2314 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2315 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2316 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2318 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2323 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2326 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2327 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2328 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2330 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2331 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2332 if !chan.should_announce() {
2333 return Err(LightningError {
2334 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2338 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2339 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2342 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2345 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2346 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2347 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2348 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2349 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2350 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2352 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2353 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2357 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2359 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2361 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2363 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2364 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2366 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2367 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2368 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2369 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2370 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2371 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2372 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2373 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2376 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2377 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2379 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2385 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2386 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2387 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2388 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2389 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2390 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2392 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2393 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2394 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2395 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2396 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2398 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2402 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2405 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2406 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2407 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2408 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2409 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2410 err: "Payment already completed"
2415 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2416 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2417 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2420 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2422 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2423 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2424 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2425 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2426 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2427 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2428 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2429 total_msat: total_value,
2431 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2435 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2436 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2438 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2439 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2441 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2442 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2444 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2445 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2447 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2448 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2450 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2451 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2452 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2453 channel_state, chan)
2455 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2456 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2457 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2458 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2459 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2460 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2461 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2462 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2463 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2464 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2466 insert_outbound_payment!();
2468 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2469 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2470 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2471 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2472 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2473 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2474 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2475 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2481 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2483 } else { unreachable!(); }
2487 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2488 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2490 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2495 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2497 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2498 /// fields for more info.
2500 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2501 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2502 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2503 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2504 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2505 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2507 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2509 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2510 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2511 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2513 /// In general, a path may raise:
2514 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2515 /// node public key) is specified.
2516 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2517 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2519 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2520 /// relevant updates.
2522 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2523 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2524 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2526 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2527 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2528 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2529 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2531 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2532 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2533 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2534 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2535 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2538 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2539 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2540 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2542 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2543 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2545 let mut total_value = 0;
2546 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2547 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2548 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2549 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2550 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2551 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2552 continue 'path_check;
2554 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2555 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2556 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2557 continue 'path_check;
2560 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2561 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2563 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2564 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2566 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2567 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2568 total_value = amt_msat;
2571 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2572 let mut results = Vec::new();
2573 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2574 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2576 let mut has_ok = false;
2577 let mut has_err = false;
2578 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2579 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2580 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2581 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2582 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2583 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2584 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2588 } else if res.is_err() {
2589 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2590 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2593 if has_err && has_ok {
2594 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2597 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2598 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2599 Some(RouteParameters {
2600 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2601 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2602 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2608 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2609 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2610 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2611 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2617 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2619 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2620 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2621 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2622 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2623 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2625 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2626 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2627 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2628 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2629 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2630 if path.len() == 0 {
2631 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2632 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2637 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2638 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2639 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2641 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2642 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2644 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2645 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2646 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2647 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2650 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2652 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2653 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2654 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2657 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2658 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2659 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2662 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2663 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2664 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2669 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2670 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2674 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2677 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2679 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2680 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2681 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2682 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2684 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2685 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2686 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2688 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2689 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2690 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2691 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2694 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2695 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2696 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2697 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2698 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2700 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2708 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2709 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2710 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2711 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2712 /// never reach the recipient.
2714 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2716 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2717 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2719 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2721 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2722 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2723 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2725 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2727 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2728 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2729 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2734 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2735 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2736 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2737 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2738 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2740 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2742 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2744 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2745 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2746 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2747 } else { unreachable!(); })
2750 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2752 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2753 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2756 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2757 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2762 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2763 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2764 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2767 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2768 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2769 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2779 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2780 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2781 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2785 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2787 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2788 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2790 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2791 /// across the p2p network.
2793 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2794 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2796 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2797 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2798 /// keys per-channel).
2800 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2801 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2802 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2804 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2805 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2806 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2808 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2809 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2810 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2811 /// for more details.
2813 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2814 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2815 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2818 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2819 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2820 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2821 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2826 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2827 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2828 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2829 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2830 // TODO: updated if/when https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-bitcoin/pull/994 landed and rust-bitcoin bumped.
2831 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == 0xffffffff) && funding_transaction.lock_time < 500_000_000 && funding_transaction.lock_time > height + 2 {
2832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2833 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2837 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2838 let mut output_index = None;
2839 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2840 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2841 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2842 if output_index.is_some() {
2843 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2844 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2847 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2848 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2849 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2852 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2855 if output_index.is_none() {
2856 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2857 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2860 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2865 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2866 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2867 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2869 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2872 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2873 // smaller than 500:
2874 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2876 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2877 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2878 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2879 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2880 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2881 /// our network addresses.
2883 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2884 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2886 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2887 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2888 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2889 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2891 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2893 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2894 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2897 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2898 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2901 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2902 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2903 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2905 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2906 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2907 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2908 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2909 rgb, alias, addresses,
2910 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2911 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2913 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2914 let node_announce_sig = sign(&self.secp_ctx, &msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2916 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2917 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2919 let mut announced_chans = false;
2920 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2921 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
2922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2924 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2929 announced_chans = true;
2931 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached channel_ready, check the
2932 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2933 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2937 if announced_chans {
2938 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2939 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2940 signature: node_announce_sig,
2941 contents: announcement
2947 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2949 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2950 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2951 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2952 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2954 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2955 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2957 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2958 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2960 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2962 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2963 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2964 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2965 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2966 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2967 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2968 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2969 pub fn update_channel_config(
2970 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2971 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2972 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2974 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2979 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2982 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2983 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2984 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2985 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
2986 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2987 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
2989 .get_counterparty_node_id();
2990 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
2991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2992 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
2996 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2997 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2998 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3001 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3002 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3003 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3005 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3014 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3016 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3017 /// Will likely generate further events.
3018 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3021 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3022 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3023 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3024 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3026 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3027 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3029 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3030 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3031 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3032 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3034 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3035 match forward_info {
3036 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3037 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3038 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3039 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3040 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3042 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3043 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3044 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3045 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3046 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3047 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3048 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3050 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3051 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data }
3057 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3058 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3059 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3060 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3061 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3063 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3064 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3065 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3066 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3067 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3069 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3071 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3072 fail_forward!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3076 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3077 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3078 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3079 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => fail_forward!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3085 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3088 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3091 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3092 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3093 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3094 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3095 // problem, not ours.
3102 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3103 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3104 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3105 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3106 match forward_info {
3107 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3108 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3110 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3111 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3112 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3113 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3114 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3115 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3116 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3117 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3118 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3119 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3121 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3123 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3124 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3126 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3128 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3129 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3130 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data }
3136 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3138 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3139 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3140 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3141 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3142 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3143 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3144 // this channel currently :/.
3150 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3151 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3153 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3155 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3157 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3160 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3162 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3163 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3164 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3167 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3169 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3170 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3171 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3172 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3173 // messages when we can.
3174 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3175 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3176 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3183 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3184 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3187 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3188 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3189 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3190 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3191 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3192 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3194 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3196 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan);
3197 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3198 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3201 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3205 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3206 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3209 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3210 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3212 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3213 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3214 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3215 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3216 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3217 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3219 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3227 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3228 match forward_info {
3229 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3230 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3231 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3232 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3233 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3234 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3235 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3237 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3238 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3240 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3243 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3244 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3245 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3246 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3247 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3248 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3249 phantom_shared_secret,
3251 value: amt_to_forward,
3253 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3258 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3260 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3261 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3262 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3264 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3265 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3266 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3267 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3268 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3269 phantom_shared_secret,
3271 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3276 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3277 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3278 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3280 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3281 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3282 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3285 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3286 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3287 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3288 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3289 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3290 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3294 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3295 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3296 total_value += htlc.value;
3297 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3298 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3299 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3302 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3304 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3306 _ => unreachable!(),
3309 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3311 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3312 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3313 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3314 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3315 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3318 amount_msat: total_value,
3320 payment_received_generated = true;
3322 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3323 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3325 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3327 payment_received_generated
3331 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3332 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3333 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3334 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3335 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3336 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3337 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3338 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3340 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3341 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3342 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3343 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3344 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3346 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3350 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3352 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3353 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3355 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3356 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3357 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3359 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3365 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3371 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3372 if payment_data.is_none() {
3373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3374 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3377 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3378 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3379 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3380 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3381 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3383 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3384 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3386 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3387 if payment_received_generated {
3388 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3394 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3395 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3403 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3404 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3406 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3408 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3409 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3412 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3413 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3414 events.append(&mut new_events);
3417 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3419 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3420 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3422 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3423 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3424 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3425 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3426 if background_events.is_empty() {
3430 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3432 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3433 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3434 // monitor updating completing.
3435 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3442 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3443 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3444 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3445 self.process_background_events();
3448 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3449 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3450 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3451 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3453 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3454 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3456 if !chan.is_live() {
3457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3458 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3459 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3461 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3462 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3464 let mut retain_channel = true;
3465 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3468 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3469 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3473 let ret_err = match res {
3474 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3475 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3476 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3477 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3480 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3481 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3482 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3483 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3484 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3485 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3486 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3487 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3497 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3501 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3502 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3503 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3504 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3505 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3506 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3507 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3509 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3511 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3513 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3514 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3515 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3516 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3517 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3518 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3519 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3521 handle_errors.push(err);
3531 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3533 /// This currently includes:
3534 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3535 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3536 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3538 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3539 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3541 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3542 /// estimate fetches.
3543 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3544 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3545 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3546 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3548 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3550 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3551 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3553 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3555 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3556 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3557 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3558 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3559 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3560 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3562 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3564 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3566 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3567 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3568 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3569 if needs_close { return false; }
3572 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3573 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3574 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3575 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3576 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3577 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3578 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3583 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3586 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3587 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3592 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3593 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3598 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3603 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3604 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3605 // This should be unreachable
3606 debug_assert!(false);
3609 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3610 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3611 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3612 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3614 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3615 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3616 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3618 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3626 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3627 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() });
3630 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3631 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3637 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3638 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3639 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3641 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3642 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3643 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3644 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3646 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3647 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3648 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3649 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3650 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3653 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3654 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3655 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3656 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3657 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3658 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3659 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3660 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3661 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3662 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3663 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3668 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3669 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3671 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3673 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3674 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3675 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3676 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3677 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3678 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3679 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3681 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3683 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3684 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3686 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3691 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3692 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3693 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3694 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3695 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3696 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3697 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3698 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3699 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3701 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3702 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3703 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3704 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3706 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3707 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3708 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3709 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3710 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3714 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3715 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3716 // be surfaced to the user.
3717 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3718 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3719 _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3721 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3723 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3724 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3725 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3726 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3727 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3729 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3731 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3732 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3733 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3735 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3736 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3737 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3738 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3739 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3740 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3741 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3742 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3743 Some(RouteParameters {
3744 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3745 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3746 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3749 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3750 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3751 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3753 rejected_by_dest: false,
3754 network_update: None,
3755 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3757 short_channel_id: None,
3764 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3765 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3767 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3780 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3781 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3782 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3783 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3784 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3785 /// still-available channels.
3786 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3787 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3788 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3789 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3792 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3793 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3794 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3796 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3797 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3798 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3799 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3800 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3801 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3802 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3803 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3807 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3808 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3811 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3812 all_paths_failed = true;
3813 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3814 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3816 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3822 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3825 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3826 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3827 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3828 Some(RouteParameters {
3829 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3830 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3831 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3834 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3836 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3837 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3839 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3841 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3842 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3843 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3844 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3845 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3846 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3847 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3848 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3855 error_code: onion_error_code,
3857 error_data: onion_error_data
3860 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3866 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3867 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3868 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
3869 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3871 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3872 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3873 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3874 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3875 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3876 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3877 network_update: None,
3880 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3883 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3885 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3889 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3890 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3891 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3893 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3894 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3895 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3897 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
3898 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3899 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
3900 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
3902 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3903 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3906 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3908 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3912 let mut forward_event = None;
3913 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3914 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3916 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3918 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3921 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3924 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3925 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3926 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3927 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3928 time_forwardable: time
3935 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3936 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3938 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3939 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3940 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3942 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3943 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3944 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3945 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3947 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3948 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3949 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3950 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3951 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3952 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3953 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3954 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3958 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3959 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3960 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3961 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3963 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3964 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3965 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3966 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3968 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3969 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3970 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3971 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3972 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3974 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3975 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3976 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3977 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3978 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3982 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3983 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3984 debug_assert!(false);
3988 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3989 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3990 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3991 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3992 if sources.len() != 1 {
3993 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3994 debug_assert!(false);
4000 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4002 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4003 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4006 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4007 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4008 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4012 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4013 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4014 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4016 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4017 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4018 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4019 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4020 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
4021 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4022 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
4024 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4025 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4026 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4027 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4028 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4029 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4030 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4031 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4033 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4034 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4035 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4036 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4037 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4038 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4040 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4045 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4046 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4048 purpose: payment_purpose,
4049 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4053 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
4054 // which were generated.
4055 channel_state.take();
4057 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4058 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4059 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4064 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4065 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4066 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4067 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4068 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4070 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4074 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4075 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4076 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4077 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4078 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4079 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4080 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4081 payment_preimage, e);
4082 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4083 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4084 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4085 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4088 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4089 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4090 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4091 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4092 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4093 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4094 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4095 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4096 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4097 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4103 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4105 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4108 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4109 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4110 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4111 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4112 payment_preimage, e);
4114 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4115 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4117 chan.remove_entry();
4119 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4122 } else { unreachable!(); }
4125 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4126 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4127 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4128 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4129 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4130 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4131 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4132 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4133 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4134 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4135 pending_events.push(
4136 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4138 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4143 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4151 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4153 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4154 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4155 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4156 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4157 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4158 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4159 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4160 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4161 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4162 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4163 pending_events.push(
4164 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4165 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4171 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4175 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4176 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4177 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4179 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4180 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4181 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4182 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4183 pending_events.push(
4184 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4192 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4200 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4201 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4202 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4203 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4204 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4205 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4206 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4209 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4210 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4211 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4212 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4213 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4216 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4217 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4218 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4219 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4220 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4221 payment_preimage, e);
4223 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4224 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4225 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4226 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4229 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4230 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4231 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4232 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4236 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4237 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4238 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4241 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4242 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4243 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4245 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4247 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4257 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4258 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4259 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4262 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4265 let chan_restoration_res;
4266 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4267 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4269 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4271 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4273 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4277 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4278 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4279 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4280 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4281 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4282 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4284 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4285 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4286 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4291 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4292 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4293 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4295 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4297 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4298 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4299 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4300 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4304 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4306 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4307 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4310 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4311 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4312 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4314 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4315 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4316 /// used to accept such channels.
4318 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4319 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4320 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4321 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4324 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4325 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4327 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4328 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4329 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4331 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4332 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4334 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4335 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4337 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4338 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4340 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4341 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4342 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4343 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4346 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4349 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4353 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4354 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4356 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4357 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4360 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4361 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4362 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4363 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4368 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4369 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, channel);
4370 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4373 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4374 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4375 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4379 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4385 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4386 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4390 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4391 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4394 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4395 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4396 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4397 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4400 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4407 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4408 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4409 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4410 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4412 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4413 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4414 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4417 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4418 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4419 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4422 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4423 pending_events.push(
4424 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4425 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4426 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4427 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4428 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4429 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4434 entry.insert(channel);
4440 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4441 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4442 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4443 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4444 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4446 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4449 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4450 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4455 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4456 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4457 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4458 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4459 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4461 user_channel_id: user_id,
4466 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4467 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4468 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4469 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4470 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4471 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4473 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4474 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4476 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4478 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4481 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4482 // lock before watch_channel
4483 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4485 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4486 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4487 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4488 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4489 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4490 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4491 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4492 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4493 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4494 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4495 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4497 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4498 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4499 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4500 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4501 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4502 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4503 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4507 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4508 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4509 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4515 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4518 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4519 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4527 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4529 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4530 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4531 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4532 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4533 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4534 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4535 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4537 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4538 Ok(update) => update,
4539 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4541 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4542 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4543 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4544 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4545 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4546 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4547 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4548 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4553 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4554 send_channel_ready!(channel_state.short_to_id, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4558 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4561 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4562 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4566 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4568 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4569 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4571 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4572 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4574 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4575 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4576 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4578 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4579 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4580 msg: announcement_sigs,
4582 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4583 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4584 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4585 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4586 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4587 // announcement_signatures.
4588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4589 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4590 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4591 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4602 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4603 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4604 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4605 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4606 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4608 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4610 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4611 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4614 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4615 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4616 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4617 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4620 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4621 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4623 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4624 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4625 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4626 let (result, is_permanent) =
4627 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4629 remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
4635 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4636 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4637 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4644 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4647 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4648 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4651 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4655 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4656 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4657 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4661 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4665 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4667 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4672 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4673 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4674 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4675 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4676 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4677 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry)))
4678 } else { (tx, None) }
4680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4683 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4684 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4685 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4687 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4688 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4689 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4690 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4694 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4699 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4700 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4701 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4702 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4704 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4705 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4706 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4707 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4709 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4710 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4712 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4713 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4714 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4718 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4719 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4720 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4721 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4722 match pending_forward_info {
4723 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4724 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4725 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4726 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4728 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4730 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4731 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4732 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4735 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4737 _ => pending_forward_info
4740 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4747 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4748 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4749 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4750 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4751 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4753 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4754 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4756 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4761 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4765 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4766 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4767 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4770 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4773 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4780 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4781 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4785 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4788 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4789 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4790 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4792 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4799 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4800 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4801 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4802 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4803 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4804 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4807 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4808 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4809 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4810 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4811 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4812 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4813 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4818 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4819 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4821 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4822 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4823 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4825 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4827 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4828 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4829 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4830 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4831 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4832 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4834 commitment_signed: msg,
4840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4845 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4846 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4847 let mut forward_event = None;
4848 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4849 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4850 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4851 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4853 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4854 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4855 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4856 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4857 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4859 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4860 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4861 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4864 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4865 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4870 match forward_event {
4872 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4873 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4874 time_forwardable: time
4882 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4883 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4885 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4886 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4887 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4888 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4889 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4890 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4892 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4893 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4894 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4895 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4896 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4897 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4898 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4899 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4900 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4901 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4902 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4904 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4905 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4906 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
4907 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4908 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4910 } else { unreachable!(); }
4913 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4914 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4915 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4919 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4920 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4921 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4922 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
4923 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4928 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
4930 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4931 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4933 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4934 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4936 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4937 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4944 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4945 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4946 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4947 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4949 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4950 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4952 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4959 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4963 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4965 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4966 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4968 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4973 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
4974 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4975 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4976 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4977 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4980 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4985 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4986 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4987 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4988 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4989 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4990 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4992 // It's not a local channel
4993 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4996 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4998 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4999 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5000 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5001 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5002 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5003 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5007 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5008 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5009 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5010 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5012 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
5015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
5017 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5020 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5021 let chan_restoration_res;
5022 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5024 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5026 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5028 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5029 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5031 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5032 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5033 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5034 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5035 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5036 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5037 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), channel_state, chan);
5038 let mut channel_update = None;
5039 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5041 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5044 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5045 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5046 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5047 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5048 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5049 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5050 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5055 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5056 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5057 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5058 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5059 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5060 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5062 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5067 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5068 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5070 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5071 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5076 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5077 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5078 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5079 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5080 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5081 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5082 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5083 match monitor_event {
5084 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5085 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5086 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5087 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5090 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5093 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5094 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5095 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5097 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5098 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5099 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5100 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, channel_state, chan_entry);
5101 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5102 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5103 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5107 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5108 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5110 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5112 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5114 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5115 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5116 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5121 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5122 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5128 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5129 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5132 has_pending_monitor_events
5135 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5136 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5137 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5139 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5140 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5143 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5144 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5145 /// update was applied.
5147 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5148 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5149 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5150 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5151 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5152 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5153 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5154 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5156 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5157 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5158 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5159 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5160 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5162 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5163 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5164 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5165 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5167 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5169 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5172 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5173 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5174 has_monitor_update = true;
5175 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5176 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5177 if close_channel { return false; }
5179 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5180 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5181 updates: commitment_update,
5188 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5189 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5190 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5197 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5198 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5199 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5202 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5203 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5209 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5210 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5211 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5212 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5213 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5214 let mut has_update = false;
5216 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5217 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5218 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5219 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5220 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5222 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5223 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5224 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5225 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5227 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5228 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5231 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5232 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5233 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5234 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5235 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5240 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5242 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5243 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5244 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5250 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
5251 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5258 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5259 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5265 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5266 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5268 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5269 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5270 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5271 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5272 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5273 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5274 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5275 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5276 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5277 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5278 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5279 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5280 assert!(should_broadcast);
5281 } else { unreachable!(); }
5282 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5284 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5288 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5289 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5291 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5292 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5295 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5298 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5299 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5301 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5302 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5303 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5304 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5305 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5306 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5307 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5308 // never fail a payment too early.
5309 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5311 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5314 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5319 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5322 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5323 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5325 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5326 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5327 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5329 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5331 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5332 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5336 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5337 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5339 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5341 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5342 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5343 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5344 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5345 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5346 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5349 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5350 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5352 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5355 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5357 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5359 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5360 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5361 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5362 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5363 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5366 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5367 /// stored external to LDK.
5369 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5370 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5371 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5373 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5374 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5377 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5378 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5379 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5380 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5382 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5383 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5384 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5385 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5386 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5388 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5389 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5390 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5391 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5392 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5394 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5395 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5397 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5398 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5402 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5403 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5405 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5407 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5408 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5409 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5410 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5413 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5414 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5416 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5419 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5421 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5423 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5424 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5427 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5428 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5430 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5431 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5432 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5435 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5436 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5438 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5439 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5440 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5441 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5443 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block.height(), &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5444 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5445 match channel_state.short_to_id.entry(scid_candidate) {
5446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => continue,
5447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return scid_candidate
5452 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5454 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5455 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5457 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5458 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5459 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5463 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5464 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5465 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5466 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5467 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5472 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5473 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5477 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5478 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5482 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5483 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5485 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5489 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5490 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5491 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5492 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5494 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5495 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5496 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5497 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5500 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5501 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5503 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5504 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5507 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5508 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5509 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5511 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5512 events.replace(pending_events);
5521 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5523 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5524 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5525 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5526 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5529 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5531 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5532 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5534 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5535 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5536 /// restarting from an old state.
5537 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5539 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5541 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5542 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5543 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5544 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5547 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5548 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5549 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5552 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5553 handler.handle_event(&event);
5561 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5563 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5564 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5565 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5566 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5569 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5571 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5572 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5573 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5574 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5575 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5578 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5579 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5582 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5584 let new_height = height - 1;
5586 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5587 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5588 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5589 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5590 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5591 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5594 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5598 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5600 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5601 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5602 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5603 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5606 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5607 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5608 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5609 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5611 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5612 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5615 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5616 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5618 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5619 if height < last_best_block_height {
5620 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5621 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5625 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5626 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5627 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5628 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5630 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5631 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5635 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5637 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5639 macro_rules! max_time {
5640 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5642 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5643 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5644 // having an explicit local time source.
5645 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5646 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5647 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5648 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5649 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5655 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5656 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5657 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5658 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5659 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5662 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5663 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5664 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5665 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5666 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5667 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5668 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5669 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5670 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5678 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5679 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5680 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5681 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5682 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5683 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5689 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5690 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5691 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5692 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5693 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5694 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5695 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5696 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5701 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5703 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5704 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5705 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5706 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5709 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5710 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5712 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5713 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5714 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5715 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5716 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5718 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5719 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5721 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5722 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5723 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5724 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5725 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5726 let res = f(channel);
5727 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5728 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5729 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5730 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5734 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5735 send_channel_ready!(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5736 if channel.is_usable() {
5737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5738 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5739 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5740 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5748 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5750 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5751 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5752 msg: announcement_sigs,
5754 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5755 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5756 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5758 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5759 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5760 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5765 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5766 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5767 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5768 // to the short_to_id map here. Note that we check whether we can relay
5769 // using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e. enforce option_scid_alias
5770 // then), and if the funding tx is ever un-confirmed we force-close the
5771 // channel, ensuring short_to_id is always consistent.
5772 let scid_insert = short_to_id.insert(real_scid, channel.channel_id());
5773 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == channel.channel_id(),
5774 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5775 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5778 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5779 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, channel);
5780 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5781 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5782 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5783 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5784 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5788 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5789 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5790 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5791 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5792 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5793 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5794 data: reason_message,
5802 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5803 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
5804 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5805 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5806 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5807 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5808 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5809 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5810 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5811 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5812 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5813 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5814 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5819 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5824 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5826 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5827 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5831 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5832 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5833 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5836 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5837 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5838 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5839 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5842 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5843 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5845 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5846 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5849 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5850 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5851 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5852 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5853 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5857 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5858 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5859 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5860 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5864 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5865 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5866 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5867 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5868 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5872 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5874 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5877 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5879 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5882 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5884 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5887 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5889 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5892 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
5893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5894 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5897 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5899 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5902 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5904 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5907 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5909 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5912 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5914 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5917 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5919 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5922 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5924 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5927 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5929 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5932 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5934 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5937 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5939 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5942 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5944 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5947 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5948 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5949 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5952 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5957 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5959 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5962 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5964 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5965 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5967 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5968 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5969 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5970 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5971 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
5972 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
5973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5974 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5975 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5976 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5977 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, short_to_id, chan);
5978 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5981 no_channels_remain = false;
5986 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5988 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5989 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5990 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5991 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5992 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5994 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5996 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5997 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5998 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5999 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6000 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6001 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6002 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6003 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6004 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6005 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6006 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6007 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6011 if no_channels_remain {
6012 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6015 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6016 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6020 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
6021 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6026 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6027 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6029 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6030 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6034 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6039 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6040 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6041 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6042 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6043 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6044 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6045 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6046 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6047 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6051 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6052 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6053 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6059 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6062 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6065 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6067 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6068 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6069 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6074 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6075 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6076 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6077 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6080 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6082 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6090 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6091 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6096 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
6097 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
6098 struct PersistenceNotifier {
6099 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
6100 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
6101 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
6104 impl PersistenceNotifier {
6107 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
6113 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6114 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6119 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
6120 let result = *guard;
6128 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6129 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6130 let current_time = Instant::now();
6132 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
6133 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
6138 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
6139 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
6140 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
6141 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
6142 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
6144 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
6145 let result = *guard;
6146 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
6150 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
6151 None => return result,
6157 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
6159 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
6160 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6161 *persistence_lock = true;
6162 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
6167 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6168 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6170 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6171 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6172 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6173 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6176 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6177 (2, node_id, required),
6178 (4, features, required),
6179 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6180 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6181 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6182 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6185 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6186 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6187 (2, channel_id, required),
6188 (3, channel_type, option),
6189 (4, counterparty, required),
6190 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6191 (6, funding_txo, option),
6192 (7, config, option),
6193 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6194 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6195 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6196 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6197 (16, balance_msat, required),
6198 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6199 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6200 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6201 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap())),
6202 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6203 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6204 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6205 (26, is_outbound, required),
6206 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6207 (30, is_usable, required),
6208 (32, is_public, required),
6209 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6210 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6213 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6214 (2, channels, vec_type),
6215 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6216 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6219 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6221 (0, onion_packet, required),
6222 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6225 (0, payment_data, required),
6226 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6227 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6229 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6230 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6231 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6235 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6236 (0, routing, required),
6237 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6238 (4, payment_hash, required),
6239 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6240 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6244 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6245 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6247 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6249 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6250 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6251 reason.write(writer)?;
6253 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6254 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6257 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6258 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6259 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6260 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6267 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6268 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6269 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6272 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6273 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6274 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6275 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6279 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6280 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6281 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6282 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6283 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6286 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6287 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6288 // messages contained in the variants.
6289 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6290 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6291 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6293 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6294 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6295 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6296 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6297 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6300 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6301 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6302 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6303 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6304 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6306 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6311 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6316 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6317 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6318 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6319 (2, outpoint, required),
6320 (4, htlc_id, required),
6321 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6324 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6325 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6326 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6327 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6328 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6330 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6331 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6332 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6333 (2, self.value, required),
6334 (4, payment_data, option),
6335 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6336 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6342 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6343 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6344 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6346 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6347 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6348 let mut total_msat = None;
6349 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6350 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6351 (0, prev_hop, required),
6352 (1, total_msat, option),
6353 (2, value, required),
6354 (4, payment_data, option),
6355 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6356 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6358 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6360 if payment_data.is_some() {
6361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6363 if total_msat.is_none() {
6364 total_msat = Some(value);
6366 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6369 if total_msat.is_none() {
6370 if payment_data.is_none() {
6371 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6373 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6375 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6379 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6382 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6389 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6390 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6391 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6394 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6395 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6396 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6397 let mut payment_id = None;
6398 let mut payment_secret = None;
6399 let mut payment_params = None;
6400 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6401 (0, session_priv, required),
6402 (1, payment_id, option),
6403 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6404 (3, payment_secret, option),
6405 (4, path, vec_type),
6406 (5, payment_params, option),
6408 if payment_id.is_none() {
6409 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6411 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6413 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6414 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6415 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6416 path: path.unwrap(),
6417 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6422 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6423 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6428 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6429 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6433 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6434 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6435 (0, session_priv, required),
6436 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6437 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6438 (3, payment_secret, option),
6439 (4, path, vec_type),
6440 (5, payment_params, option),
6443 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6445 field.write(writer)?;
6452 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6453 (0, LightningError) => {
6457 (0, failure_code, required),
6458 (2, data, vec_type),
6462 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6464 (0, forward_info, required),
6465 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6466 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6467 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6470 (0, htlc_id, required),
6471 (2, err_packet, required),
6475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6476 (0, payment_secret, required),
6477 (2, expiry_time, required),
6478 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6479 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6480 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6483 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6485 (0, session_privs, required),
6488 (0, session_privs, required),
6489 (1, payment_hash, option),
6492 (0, session_privs, required),
6493 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6494 (2, payment_hash, required),
6495 (4, payment_secret, option),
6496 (6, total_msat, required),
6497 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6498 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6501 (0, session_privs, required),
6502 (2, payment_hash, required),
6506 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6507 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6508 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6509 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6510 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6514 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6516 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6518 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6520 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6521 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6522 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6525 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6526 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6527 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6528 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6529 unfunded_channels += 1;
6532 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6533 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6534 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6535 channel.write(writer)?;
6539 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6540 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6541 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6542 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6543 for forward in pending_forwards {
6544 forward.write(writer)?;
6548 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6549 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6550 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6551 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6552 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6553 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6554 htlc.write(writer)?;
6556 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6559 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6560 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6561 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6562 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6563 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6564 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6567 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6568 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6569 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6570 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6571 for event in events.iter() {
6572 event.write(writer)?;
6575 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6576 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6577 for event in background_events.iter() {
6579 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6581 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6582 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6587 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6588 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6590 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6591 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6592 hash.write(writer)?;
6593 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6596 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6597 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6598 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6599 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6600 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6603 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6604 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6606 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6607 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6608 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6609 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6612 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6613 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6617 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6618 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6619 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6621 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6622 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6623 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6628 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6629 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6630 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6631 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6632 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6633 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6640 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6642 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6644 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6645 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6646 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6647 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6648 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6649 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6650 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6651 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6652 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6653 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6654 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6655 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6656 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6658 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6659 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6661 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6662 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6664 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6665 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6666 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6667 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6668 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6669 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6671 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6672 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6673 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6674 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6675 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6676 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6679 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6680 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6682 pub keys_manager: K,
6684 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6686 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6687 pub fee_estimator: F,
6688 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6690 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6691 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6692 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6693 pub chain_monitor: M,
6695 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6696 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6697 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6698 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6699 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6700 /// deserialization.
6702 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6703 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6704 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6706 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6707 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6709 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6710 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6711 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6712 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6714 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6717 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6718 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6721 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6722 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6723 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6724 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6725 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6729 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6730 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6731 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6732 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6733 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6735 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6736 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6741 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6742 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6743 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6744 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6745 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6746 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6747 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6748 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6751 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6752 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6753 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6757 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6758 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6759 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6760 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6761 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6762 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6765 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6766 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6768 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6769 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6770 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6772 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6774 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6776 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6777 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6778 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6779 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6780 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6781 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6782 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6783 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6784 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6785 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6786 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6787 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6788 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6789 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6790 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6791 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6792 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6793 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6794 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6795 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6796 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6797 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6798 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6799 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6800 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6801 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6802 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6803 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6804 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6805 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6806 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6807 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6808 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6809 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6810 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6811 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6812 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6815 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6816 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6817 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6819 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6822 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6823 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6824 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6825 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6826 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6827 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6831 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6832 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6833 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6834 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6838 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6839 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6841 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6842 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6845 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6846 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6848 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6851 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6853 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6854 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6857 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6858 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
6860 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
6863 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6865 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6866 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let peer_state = PeerState {
6868 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6870 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6873 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6875 for _ in 0..event_count {
6876 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6877 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6881 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6882 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6883 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6884 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6885 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6886 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6887 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6888 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6892 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6894 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6895 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6896 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6897 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6901 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6906 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6907 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6908 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6912 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6914 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6915 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6916 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6918 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6920 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6921 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6925 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6926 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6927 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6928 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6929 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6930 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
6931 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6932 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6933 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6934 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
6935 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
6936 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6938 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
6939 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6942 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6943 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6944 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6945 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6946 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6947 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6949 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6951 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6952 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6953 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6954 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6955 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6956 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6957 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6959 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
6960 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6961 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6962 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6963 if path.is_empty() {
6964 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6965 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6967 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6968 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6969 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6970 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6971 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6972 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6973 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6974 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6977 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6978 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6979 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6980 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6982 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6983 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6984 total_msat: path_amt,
6985 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6987 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6988 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6997 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6998 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7000 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7001 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7002 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7003 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7005 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7006 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7009 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7010 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7011 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7012 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7013 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7015 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7016 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7017 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7018 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7019 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7020 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7021 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7022 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7024 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7025 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7029 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7031 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7033 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7034 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7036 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7040 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7041 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7043 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7044 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7047 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7049 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7051 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7052 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7053 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7054 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7055 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7059 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7060 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7061 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7062 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7064 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7065 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7066 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7068 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7069 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7070 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7071 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7072 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7073 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7075 if chan.is_usable() {
7076 if short_to_id.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), *chan_id).is_some() {
7077 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7078 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7079 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7080 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7085 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7086 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7087 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7088 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7089 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7090 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7091 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7093 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7094 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7095 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7096 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7098 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7099 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7100 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7101 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7103 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7104 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7105 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7106 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7108 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7109 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7110 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7112 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7113 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &args.fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7116 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7118 purpose: payment_purpose,
7119 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7125 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7127 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
7128 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7129 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7131 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7133 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7138 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7140 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7141 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7142 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7144 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7145 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7151 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
7152 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7154 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7156 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7157 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7158 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7159 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
7161 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7162 logger: args.logger,
7163 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7166 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7167 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
7170 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7171 //connection or two.
7173 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7179 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7180 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7181 use core::time::Duration;
7182 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7183 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7184 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7185 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
7186 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
7187 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7189 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7190 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7191 use util::errors::APIError;
7192 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7193 use util::test_utils;
7194 use chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7196 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7198 fn test_wait_timeout() {
7199 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
7201 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
7204 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
7205 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
7207 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
7208 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
7209 thread::spawn(move || {
7211 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
7212 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7213 *persistence_lock = true;
7216 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
7222 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
7223 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
7225 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
7228 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7233 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
7235 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
7238 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
7245 fn test_notify_limits() {
7246 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7247 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7251 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7253 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7254 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7255 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7256 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7257 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7259 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7261 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7262 // to connect messages with new values
7263 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7264 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7265 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7266 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7268 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7269 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7270 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7271 // ... but the last node should not.
7272 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7273 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7274 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7275 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7277 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7278 // about the channel.
7279 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7280 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7281 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7283 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7285 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7286 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7287 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7288 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7289 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7290 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7292 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7293 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7294 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7296 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7297 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7298 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7299 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7300 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7301 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7303 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7304 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7305 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7306 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7307 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7308 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7309 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7310 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7312 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7313 // the channel info has updated.
7314 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7315 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7316 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7317 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7318 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7319 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7323 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7324 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7329 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7330 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7332 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7333 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7334 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7335 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7336 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7337 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7338 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7342 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7344 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7345 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7347 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7348 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7349 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7350 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7353 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7354 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7355 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7357 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7358 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7359 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7360 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7361 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7362 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7363 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7364 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7365 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7367 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7368 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
7369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7370 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7371 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7372 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7374 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7375 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7376 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7377 // lightning messages manually.
7378 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7379 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7382 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7384 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7386 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7387 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7389 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7390 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7392 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7393 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7394 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7396 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7397 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7398 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7400 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7402 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7404 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7405 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7408 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7409 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7410 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7411 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7413 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7414 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7415 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7416 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7418 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7421 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7422 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7423 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7424 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7429 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7430 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7431 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7432 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7439 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7440 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7441 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7442 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7443 // fails as expected.
7444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7447 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7448 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7449 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7450 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7452 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7453 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7454 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7456 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7457 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7458 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7459 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7460 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7462 let route = find_route(
7463 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7464 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7466 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7468 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7469 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7470 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7471 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7472 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7474 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7475 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7476 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7478 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7479 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7480 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7481 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7482 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7483 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7484 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7485 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7486 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7488 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7489 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7491 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7492 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7493 let route = find_route(
7494 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7495 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7497 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
7498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7499 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7501 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7502 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7503 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7505 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7506 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7507 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7511 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7512 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7513 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7516 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7517 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7519 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7520 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7522 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7523 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7524 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7527 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7529 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7530 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7534 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7535 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7536 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7542 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7543 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7544 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7545 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7547 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7548 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7549 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7550 final_value_msat: 10000,
7551 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7553 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7554 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7555 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7556 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7557 let route = find_route(
7558 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7559 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7562 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7563 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7564 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7567 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7568 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7569 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7570 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7571 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7572 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7575 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7579 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7580 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7586 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7587 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7588 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7589 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7591 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7592 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7593 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7594 final_value_msat: 10000,
7595 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7597 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7598 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7599 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7600 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7601 let route = find_route(
7602 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7603 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7606 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7607 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7608 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7609 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7612 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7613 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7614 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7615 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7616 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7617 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7618 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7620 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7624 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7628 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7630 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7631 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7632 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7633 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7635 // Marshall an MPP route.
7636 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7637 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7638 route.paths.push(path);
7639 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7640 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7641 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7642 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7643 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7644 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7646 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7647 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7648 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7649 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7654 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7655 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7659 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7661 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7662 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7664 total_msat: 100_000,
7667 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7668 // payment verification fails as expected.
7669 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7670 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7671 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7672 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7674 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7678 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7679 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7683 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
7686 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7687 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
7688 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7689 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7690 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7691 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7692 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
7693 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7694 use util::test_utils;
7695 use util::config::UserConfig;
7696 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
7698 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7699 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7700 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7702 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7706 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7707 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7708 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7709 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7710 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7711 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7712 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7717 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7718 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7721 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7722 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7723 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7725 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7726 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7728 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7729 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7731 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7732 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7734 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7735 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7736 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7737 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7738 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7740 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7742 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7744 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7745 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7746 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7747 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7748 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7750 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7752 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7754 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7755 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
7756 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7757 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7758 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7761 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7762 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7763 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7765 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7766 } else { panic!(); }
7768 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7769 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7771 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7774 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7777 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7778 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7780 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7781 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7782 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7783 match msg_events[0] {
7784 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
7785 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7786 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7790 match msg_events[1] {
7791 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7795 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
7797 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7798 macro_rules! send_payment {
7799 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7800 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7801 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7802 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7803 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7804 let seed = [3u8; 32];
7805 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
7806 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7807 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
7808 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7810 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7811 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7813 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7814 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7816 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7817 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7818 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7819 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7820 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7821 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7822 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7823 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7826 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7827 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7828 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
7830 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7831 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7832 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7833 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7834 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7836 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7839 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7840 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7841 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7842 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7844 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7849 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7850 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);