1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
103 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
104 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
108 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
109 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
110 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
111 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
112 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
113 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
114 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
119 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
120 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
123 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
124 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
125 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
126 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
127 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
130 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
132 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
134 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
135 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
136 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
138 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
140 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
144 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
149 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
150 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
151 short_channel_id: u64,
153 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
155 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
156 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
161 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
162 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
163 /// are part of the same payment.
164 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
165 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
166 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
169 struct ClaimableHTLC {
170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
173 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
176 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
177 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
178 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
179 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
182 session_priv: SecretKey,
183 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
184 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
190 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
191 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
193 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
194 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
202 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
211 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
213 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
218 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
220 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
221 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
222 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
223 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
224 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
226 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 err: msgs::LightningError,
228 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
230 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
232 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
234 err: LightningError {
236 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
237 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
243 shutdown_finish: None,
247 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
249 err: LightningError {
251 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
253 shutdown_finish: None,
257 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
258 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
261 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
263 err: LightningError {
265 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
266 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
272 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
276 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
279 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
281 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
283 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
294 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
295 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
302 shutdown_finish: None,
307 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
308 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
309 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
310 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
311 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
313 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
314 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
315 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
316 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
318 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
319 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
321 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
325 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
326 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
327 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
328 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
329 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
332 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
333 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
334 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
335 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
336 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
338 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
339 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
340 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
341 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
344 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
345 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
346 /// quite some time lag.
347 enum BackgroundEvent {
348 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
349 /// commitment transaction.
350 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
353 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
354 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
356 latest_features: InitFeatures,
359 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
360 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
362 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
364 struct PendingInboundPayment {
365 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
366 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
367 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
368 /// this payment being removed.
370 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
371 user_payment_id: u64,
372 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
373 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
374 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
377 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
378 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
379 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
380 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
381 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
382 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
383 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
384 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
386 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
387 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
388 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
389 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
390 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
391 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
392 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
393 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
394 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
396 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
397 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
399 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
400 /// to individual Channels.
402 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
403 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
404 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
405 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
407 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
408 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
409 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
410 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
411 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
412 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
413 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
415 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
416 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
417 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
418 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
421 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
422 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
423 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
424 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
425 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
427 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
428 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
429 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
430 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
431 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
432 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
433 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
434 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
435 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
436 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
439 default_configuration: UserConfig,
440 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
446 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
448 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
449 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
451 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
452 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
453 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
454 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
456 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
457 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
458 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
459 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
460 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
461 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
463 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
464 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
465 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
466 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
467 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
468 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
469 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
470 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
472 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
473 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
475 our_network_key: SecretKey,
476 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
478 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
479 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
480 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
482 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
483 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
484 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
485 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
487 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
488 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
489 /// are currently open with that peer.
490 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
491 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
493 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
495 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
496 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
497 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
498 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
499 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
500 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
501 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
502 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
503 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
505 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
512 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
514 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
515 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
516 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
517 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
518 pub struct ChainParameters {
519 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
520 pub network: Network,
522 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
524 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
525 pub best_block: BestBlock,
528 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
534 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
535 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
536 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
537 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
538 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
539 /// updates are ready for persistence).
541 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
542 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
543 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
544 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
545 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
547 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
548 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
551 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
552 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
553 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
556 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
557 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
559 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
560 persistence_notifier: notifier,
561 should_persist: persist_check,
562 _read_guard: read_guard,
567 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
569 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
570 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
575 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
576 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
578 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
580 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
581 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
582 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
583 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
584 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
586 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
587 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
589 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
591 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
592 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
593 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
594 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
595 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
596 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
597 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
599 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
600 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
602 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
603 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
604 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
605 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
607 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
608 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
609 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
610 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
611 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
612 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
615 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
617 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
618 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
621 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
623 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
624 /// to better separate parameters.
625 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
626 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
627 /// The node_id of our counterparty
628 pub node_id: PublicKey,
629 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
630 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
631 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
632 pub features: InitFeatures,
633 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
634 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
635 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
637 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
639 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
640 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
641 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
642 /// payments to us through this channel.
643 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
646 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
647 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
648 pub struct ChannelDetails {
649 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
650 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
651 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
652 /// lifetime of the channel.
653 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
654 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
655 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
656 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
657 /// our counterparty already.
659 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
660 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
661 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
662 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
663 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
664 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
665 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
666 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
667 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
668 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
669 /// this value on chain.
671 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
673 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
675 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
676 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
677 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
679 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
680 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
681 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
682 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
684 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
685 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
686 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
687 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
688 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
689 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
690 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
691 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
692 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
694 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
695 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
696 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
697 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
698 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
699 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
700 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
701 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
702 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
704 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
706 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
707 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
708 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
709 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
710 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
711 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
712 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
713 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
714 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
716 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
717 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
718 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
719 pub is_outbound: bool,
720 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
721 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
722 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
723 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
724 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
726 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
727 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
728 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
729 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
731 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
733 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
737 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
738 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
740 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
741 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
742 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
743 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
744 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
745 ParameterError(APIError),
746 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
747 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
748 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
751 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
753 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
754 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
755 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
756 /// paths than the ones selected).
757 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
758 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
759 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
760 /// in over-/re-payment.
762 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
763 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
764 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
766 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
767 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
768 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
769 /// with the latest update_id.
770 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
773 macro_rules! handle_error {
774 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
777 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
780 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
781 // entering the macro.
782 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
785 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
787 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
788 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
789 if let Some(update) = update_option {
790 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
796 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
797 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
799 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
800 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
801 action: err.action.clone()
805 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
806 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
809 // Return error in case higher-API need one
816 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
817 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
818 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
820 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
821 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
823 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
824 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
825 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
826 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
828 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
829 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
831 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
832 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
833 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
834 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
836 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
837 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
843 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
844 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
848 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
850 $entry.remove_entry();
858 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
859 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
863 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
865 $entry.remove_entry();
873 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
874 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
875 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
877 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
879 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
880 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
881 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
882 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
884 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
885 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
886 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
887 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
888 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
889 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
890 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
891 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
892 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
893 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
894 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
897 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
898 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
899 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
900 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
902 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
903 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
905 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
906 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
908 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
909 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
910 if !$resend_commitment {
911 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
914 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
916 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
917 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
921 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
922 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
924 $entry.remove_entry();
930 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
931 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
932 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
934 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
935 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
939 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
940 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
942 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
943 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
946 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
951 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
952 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
953 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
954 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
955 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
956 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
958 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
959 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
961 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
962 if !forwards.is_empty() {
963 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
964 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
967 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
968 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
969 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
970 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
971 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
972 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
973 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
974 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
975 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
976 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
977 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
978 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
981 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
982 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
983 // before it should be allowed to.
984 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
985 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
986 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
989 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
990 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
991 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
992 msg: announcement_sigs,
995 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
998 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
999 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1000 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1001 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1002 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1003 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1004 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1005 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1006 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1007 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1008 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1009 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1010 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1011 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1012 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1013 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1014 let mut order = $order;
1016 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1018 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1022 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1023 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1024 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1025 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1030 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1031 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1032 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1033 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1034 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1039 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1043 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1048 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1049 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1050 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1055 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1056 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1057 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1058 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1059 assert!(res.is_ok());
1062 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1066 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1067 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1068 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1070 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1072 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1073 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1078 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1079 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1080 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1081 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1085 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1087 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1088 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1090 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1092 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1094 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1095 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1096 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1097 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1098 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1099 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1102 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1103 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1104 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1108 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1110 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1111 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1112 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1113 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1114 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1115 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1117 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1118 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1120 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1121 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1124 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1125 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1127 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1129 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1130 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1131 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1132 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1140 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1141 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1142 &self.default_configuration
1145 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1147 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1148 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1149 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1150 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1151 /// otherwise ignored.
1153 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1154 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1156 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1157 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1159 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1160 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1161 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1162 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1163 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1164 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1167 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1168 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1169 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1171 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1172 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1173 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1175 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1176 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1178 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1179 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1181 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1184 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1186 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1187 node_id: their_network_key,
1193 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1194 let mut res = Vec::new();
1196 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1197 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1198 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1199 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1200 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1201 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1202 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1203 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1204 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1205 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1206 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1207 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1208 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1210 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1211 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1212 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1213 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1214 inbound_capacity_msat,
1215 outbound_capacity_msat,
1216 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1217 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1218 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1219 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1220 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1221 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1222 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1226 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1227 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1228 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1229 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1235 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1236 /// more information.
1237 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1238 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1241 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1242 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1244 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1245 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1247 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1248 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1249 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1250 // really wanted anyway.
1251 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1254 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1255 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1256 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1258 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1259 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1262 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1263 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1264 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1265 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1267 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1268 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1269 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1272 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1273 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1274 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1276 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1277 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1279 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1282 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1283 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1285 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1286 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1289 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1290 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1300 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1301 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1302 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1303 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1304 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1306 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1307 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1308 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1309 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1310 // ignore the result here.
1311 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1315 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1317 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1318 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1319 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1320 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1321 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1322 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1325 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1326 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1328 chan.remove_entry().1
1330 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1333 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1334 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1335 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1336 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1337 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1342 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1345 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1346 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1347 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1349 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1350 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1351 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1352 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1353 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1354 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1355 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1365 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1366 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1367 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1368 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1369 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1373 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1374 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1375 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1377 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1378 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1379 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1380 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1381 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1382 failure_code: $err_code,
1383 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1388 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1389 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1392 let shared_secret = {
1393 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1394 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1397 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1399 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1400 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1401 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1402 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1403 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1404 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1405 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1406 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1409 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1410 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1411 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1412 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1413 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1416 let mut channel_state = None;
1417 macro_rules! return_err {
1418 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1420 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1421 if channel_state.is_none() {
1422 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1424 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1425 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1426 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1427 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1428 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1433 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1434 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1435 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1436 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1438 let error_code = match err {
1439 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1440 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1441 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1442 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1443 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1445 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1448 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1449 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1450 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1457 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1460 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1461 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1462 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1463 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1464 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1465 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1466 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1467 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1468 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1469 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1470 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1471 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1475 // final_expiry_too_soon
1476 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1477 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1478 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1479 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1480 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1481 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1482 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1484 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1485 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1486 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1488 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1489 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1490 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1493 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1494 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1495 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1496 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1497 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1498 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1499 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1500 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1502 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1504 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1505 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1506 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1507 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1508 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1509 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1510 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1511 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1512 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1515 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1517 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1520 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1525 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1526 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1527 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1528 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1530 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1532 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1533 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1534 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1535 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1538 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1539 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1540 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1542 // Check two things:
1543 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1544 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1545 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1547 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1549 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1550 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1551 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1553 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1555 let blinding_factor = {
1556 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1557 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1558 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1559 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1562 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1564 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1566 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1569 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1570 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1573 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1574 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1575 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1576 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1577 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1581 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1582 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1583 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1586 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1587 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1588 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1589 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1593 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1594 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1595 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1596 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1597 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1598 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1599 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1600 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1601 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1602 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1603 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1605 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1608 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1610 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1611 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1612 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1613 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1614 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1617 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1618 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1619 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1620 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1621 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1622 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1623 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1625 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1626 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1628 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1629 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1630 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1631 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1632 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1634 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1635 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1637 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1638 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1639 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1640 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1641 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1643 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1644 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1646 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1647 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1648 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1649 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1656 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1657 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1658 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1660 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1661 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1663 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1664 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1665 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1667 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1669 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1674 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1677 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1678 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1679 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1681 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1682 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1683 if !chan.should_announce() {
1684 return Err(LightningError {
1685 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1686 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1690 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1693 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1694 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1695 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1696 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1697 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1698 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1700 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1701 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1705 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1707 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1708 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1710 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1711 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1712 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1713 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1714 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1715 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1716 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1717 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1720 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1721 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1723 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1729 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1730 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1731 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1732 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1733 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1734 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1736 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1737 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1738 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1739 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1740 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1742 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1745 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1747 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1748 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1749 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1750 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1751 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1755 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1757 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1758 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1760 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1763 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1765 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1766 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1767 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1769 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1770 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1771 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1772 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1773 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1774 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1775 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1776 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1777 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1780 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1781 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1782 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1783 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1784 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1785 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1786 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1787 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1795 } else { unreachable!(); }
1799 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1800 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1802 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1807 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1809 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1810 /// fields for more info.
1812 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1813 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1814 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1815 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1816 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1817 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1819 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1821 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1822 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1823 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1825 /// In general, a path may raise:
1826 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1827 /// node public key) is specified.
1828 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1829 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1831 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1832 /// relevant updates.
1834 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1835 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1836 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1838 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1839 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1840 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1841 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1843 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1844 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1845 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1846 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1847 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1850 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1851 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1852 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1854 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1855 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1856 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1857 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1858 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1860 let mut total_value = 0;
1861 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1862 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1863 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1864 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1865 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1866 continue 'path_check;
1868 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1869 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1870 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1871 continue 'path_check;
1874 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1875 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1877 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1878 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1881 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1882 let mut results = Vec::new();
1883 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1884 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, &keysend_preimage));
1886 let mut has_ok = false;
1887 let mut has_err = false;
1888 for res in results.iter() {
1889 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1890 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1891 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1892 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1899 if has_err && has_ok {
1900 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1902 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1908 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
1909 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
1910 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
1911 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
1912 /// never reach the recipient.
1914 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
1915 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
1917 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1918 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
1919 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
1921 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
1923 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
1924 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
1925 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
1930 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1931 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1932 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1933 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1935 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1937 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1939 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1940 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1941 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1942 } else { unreachable!(); })
1945 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1947 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1948 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1951 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1952 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1957 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1959 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1964 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1974 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1975 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1976 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1980 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1982 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1983 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1985 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1987 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1988 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1989 /// keys per-channel).
1991 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1992 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1993 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1995 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1996 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1997 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1999 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2000 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2003 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2004 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2005 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2006 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2010 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2011 let mut output_index = None;
2012 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2013 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2014 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2015 if output_index.is_some() {
2016 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2017 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2020 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2022 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2025 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2028 if output_index.is_none() {
2029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2030 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2033 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2037 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2038 if !chan.should_announce() {
2039 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2043 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2045 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2047 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2048 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2050 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2051 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2052 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2053 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2054 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2059 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2060 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2061 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2063 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2066 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2067 // smaller than 500:
2068 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2070 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2071 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2072 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2073 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2074 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2075 /// our network addresses.
2077 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2078 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2080 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2081 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2082 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2083 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2085 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2087 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2088 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2091 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2092 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2095 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2096 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2097 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2099 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2100 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2101 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2102 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2103 rgb, alias, addresses,
2104 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2105 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2107 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2108 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2113 let mut announced_chans = false;
2114 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2115 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2118 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2123 announced_chans = true;
2125 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2126 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2127 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2131 if announced_chans {
2132 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2133 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2134 signature: node_announce_sig,
2135 contents: announcement
2141 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2143 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2144 /// Will likely generate further events.
2145 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2146 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2148 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2149 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2150 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2152 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2155 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2156 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2157 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2158 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2160 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2161 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2162 match forward_info {
2163 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2164 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2165 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2166 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2167 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2168 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2171 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2172 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2175 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2176 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2177 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2178 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2179 // problem, not ours.
2186 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2187 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2188 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2189 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2190 match forward_info {
2191 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2192 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2194 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2195 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2196 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2197 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2198 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2199 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2200 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2201 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2203 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2205 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2208 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2210 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2211 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2212 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2218 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2220 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2221 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2222 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2223 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2224 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2225 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2226 // this channel currently :/.
2232 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2233 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2235 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2236 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2237 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2239 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2240 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2242 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2244 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2245 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2246 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2249 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2251 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2252 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2253 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2254 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2255 // messages when we can.
2256 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2257 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2258 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2265 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2266 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2269 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2270 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2271 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2272 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2273 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2274 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2276 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2278 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2279 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2280 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2282 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2284 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2286 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2290 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2291 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2294 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2295 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2296 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2297 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2298 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2299 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2300 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2301 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2302 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2304 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2312 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2313 match forward_info {
2314 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2315 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2316 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2317 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2318 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2319 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2320 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2321 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2323 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2326 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2327 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2328 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2329 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2330 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2331 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2333 value: amt_to_forward,
2338 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2340 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2341 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2342 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2344 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2345 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2346 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2347 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2348 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2350 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2355 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2356 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2357 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2358 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2359 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2360 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2361 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2362 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2364 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2365 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2369 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2370 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2372 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2373 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2375 amt: amt_to_forward,
2376 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2381 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2389 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2396 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2397 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2398 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2399 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2401 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2402 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2404 let mut total_value = 0;
2405 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2406 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2407 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2408 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2410 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2414 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2415 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2416 total_value += htlc.value;
2417 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2418 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2419 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2421 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2422 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2424 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2426 _ => unreachable!(),
2429 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2430 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2431 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2432 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2435 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2436 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2438 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2439 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2440 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2441 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2445 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2446 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2448 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2450 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2451 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2458 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2459 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2467 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2468 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2471 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2472 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2475 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2476 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2477 events.append(&mut new_events);
2480 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2482 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2483 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2485 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2486 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2487 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2488 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2489 if background_events.is_empty() {
2493 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2495 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2496 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2497 // monitor updating completing.
2498 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2505 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2506 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2507 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2508 self.process_background_events();
2511 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2512 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2513 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2515 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2517 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2518 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2519 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2520 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2521 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2523 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2524 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2525 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2526 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2527 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2528 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2529 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2530 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2531 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2532 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2533 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2537 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2538 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2540 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2541 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2542 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2546 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2547 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2557 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2558 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2559 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2560 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2561 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2562 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2565 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2566 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2567 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2568 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2569 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2570 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2571 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2572 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2573 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2574 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2575 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2581 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2582 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2583 // be surfaced to the user.
2584 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2585 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2587 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2588 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2589 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2591 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2592 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2594 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2599 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2600 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2601 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2603 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2605 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2606 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2607 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2609 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2610 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2612 rejected_by_dest: false,
2620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2627 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2628 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2629 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2630 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2631 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2632 /// still-available channels.
2633 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2634 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2635 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2636 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2639 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2640 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2641 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2643 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2645 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2646 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2647 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2649 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2652 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2653 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2654 match &onion_error {
2655 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2657 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2659 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2660 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2661 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2662 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2663 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2664 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2665 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2670 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2671 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2672 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2673 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2675 error_code: onion_error_code,
2677 error_data: onion_error_data
2681 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2687 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2688 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2689 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2690 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2692 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2693 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2694 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2695 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2696 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2697 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2699 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2701 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2707 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2708 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2709 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2710 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2711 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2712 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2714 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2715 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2716 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2720 let mut forward_event = None;
2721 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2722 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2724 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2726 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2729 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2732 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2733 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2734 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2735 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2736 time_forwardable: time
2743 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2744 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2745 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2747 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2748 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2749 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2750 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2752 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2754 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2755 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2756 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2757 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2761 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2762 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2763 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2764 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2766 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2767 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2768 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2769 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2771 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2772 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2773 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2774 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2775 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2777 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2778 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2779 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2785 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2786 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2787 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2789 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2790 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2791 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2792 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2793 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2794 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2795 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2797 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2798 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
2799 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
2800 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2801 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2802 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
2803 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2804 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
2806 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2807 _ => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2812 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2813 // which were generated.
2814 channel_state.take();
2816 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2817 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2818 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2825 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
2826 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2827 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2828 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2829 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2831 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
2835 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2836 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2837 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
2838 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
2839 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2840 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
2841 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2842 payment_preimage, e);
2843 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
2844 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2845 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
2846 Some(htlc_value_msat)
2849 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2850 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2851 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2852 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2853 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2854 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2855 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2856 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2857 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2858 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2864 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
2866 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
2869 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
2870 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2871 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
2872 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
2873 payment_preimage, e);
2875 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2876 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
2878 chan.remove_entry();
2880 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
2883 } else { unreachable!(); }
2886 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
2888 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2889 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2891 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2892 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2893 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2895 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2896 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2900 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2903 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2904 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2905 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
2906 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
2907 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
2908 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
2909 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
2912 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
2913 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2914 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2915 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2916 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2919 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2920 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2921 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2922 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2923 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2924 payment_preimage, e);
2926 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
2927 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
2928 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
2929 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
2932 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2933 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
2934 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2935 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
2939 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
2940 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
2941 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
2944 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2945 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
2947 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
2955 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2956 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2957 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2960 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2961 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2964 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2965 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2967 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2968 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2969 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2970 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2972 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2973 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2974 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2975 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2976 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2977 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2978 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2979 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2980 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2983 let chan_restoration_res;
2984 let mut pending_failures = {
2985 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2987 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2991 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2995 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2996 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2997 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2998 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2999 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3000 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3001 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3002 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3003 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3006 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3007 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3012 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3013 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3014 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3018 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3019 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3023 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3024 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3025 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3026 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3030 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3031 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3032 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3034 entry.insert(channel);
3040 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3041 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3042 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3043 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3044 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3046 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3047 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3049 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
3050 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3055 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3056 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3057 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3058 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3060 user_channel_id: user_id,
3065 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3066 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3067 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3068 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3069 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3070 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3071 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3072 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3073 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3075 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3077 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3080 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3081 // lock before watch_channel
3082 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3084 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3085 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3086 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3087 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3088 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3089 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3090 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3091 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3092 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3093 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3096 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3097 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3098 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3099 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3100 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3101 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3105 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3106 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3107 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3108 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3109 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3112 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3113 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3122 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3124 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3125 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3127 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3128 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3129 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3130 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3132 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3133 Ok(update) => update,
3134 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3136 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3137 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3144 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3145 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3149 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3150 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3157 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3158 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3159 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3160 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3161 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3162 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3163 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3164 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3165 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3166 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3167 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3168 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3169 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3170 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3171 msg: announcement_sigs,
3173 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3174 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3175 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3176 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3185 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3186 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3187 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3192 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3195 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3196 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3197 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3198 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3202 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3204 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3208 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3209 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3210 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3212 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3213 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3215 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3218 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3219 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3221 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3222 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3223 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3232 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3233 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3234 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3235 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3236 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3238 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3241 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3242 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3243 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3244 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3249 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3250 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3251 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3252 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3253 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3254 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3255 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3257 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3258 } else { (tx, None) }
3260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3263 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3264 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3265 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3267 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3268 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3269 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3270 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3278 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3279 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3280 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3281 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3283 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3284 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3285 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3286 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3288 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3289 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3293 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3294 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3297 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3298 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3299 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3300 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3301 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3302 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3303 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3304 match pending_forward_info {
3305 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3306 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3307 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3308 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3309 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3310 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3311 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3315 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3316 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3317 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3318 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3319 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3320 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3321 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3322 // no problem just calling this
3323 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3324 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3326 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3327 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3328 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3331 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3333 _ => pending_forward_info
3336 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3343 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3344 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3345 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3347 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3348 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3349 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3350 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3352 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3357 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3361 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3362 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3364 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3366 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3369 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3371 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3376 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3377 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3378 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3379 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3381 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3384 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3385 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3386 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3388 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3391 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3395 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3396 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3398 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3399 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3400 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3403 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3404 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3405 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3406 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3407 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3408 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3409 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3414 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3415 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3416 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3420 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3422 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3423 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3424 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3425 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3426 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3427 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3428 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3429 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3431 commitment_signed: msg,
3435 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3436 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3437 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3443 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3448 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3449 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3450 let mut forward_event = None;
3451 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3452 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3453 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3454 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3456 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3457 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3458 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3459 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3460 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3462 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3463 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3464 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3466 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3467 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3468 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3473 match forward_event {
3475 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3476 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3477 time_forwardable: time
3485 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3486 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3488 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3490 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3492 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3493 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3495 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3496 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3497 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3498 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3499 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3500 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3501 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3502 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3504 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3506 } else { unreachable!(); }
3509 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3510 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3511 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3515 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3516 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3517 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3521 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3526 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3528 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3529 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3530 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3532 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3539 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3540 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3541 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3542 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3543 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3544 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3545 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3547 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3554 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3555 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3556 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3558 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3560 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3563 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3564 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3567 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3568 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3569 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3570 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3571 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3579 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3580 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3581 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3582 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3583 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3584 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3586 // It's not a local channel
3587 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3590 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3592 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3593 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3594 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3595 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3596 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3597 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3599 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3601 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3602 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3603 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3604 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3606 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3611 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3614 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3615 let chan_restoration_res;
3616 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3617 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3622 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3625 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3626 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3627 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3628 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3629 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3630 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3631 let mut channel_update = None;
3632 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3633 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3634 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3637 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3638 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3639 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3640 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3641 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3642 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3643 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3646 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3647 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3648 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3649 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3651 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3656 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3657 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3659 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3660 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3665 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3666 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3667 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3668 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3669 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3671 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3672 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3673 let counterparty_node_id;
3674 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3675 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3676 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3678 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3680 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3681 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3682 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3684 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3685 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3687 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3688 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3690 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3691 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3692 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3694 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3697 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3698 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3699 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3700 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3701 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3702 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3703 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3704 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3705 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3715 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3716 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3717 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3721 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3722 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3723 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3724 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3725 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3726 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3727 match monitor_event {
3728 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3729 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3731 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3733 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3737 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3738 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3740 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3741 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3742 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3743 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3744 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3745 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3747 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3748 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3749 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3753 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3754 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3755 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3756 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3764 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3765 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3768 has_pending_monitor_events
3771 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3772 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3773 /// update was applied.
3775 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3776 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3777 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3778 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3779 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3780 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3781 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3782 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3784 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3785 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3786 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3787 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3788 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3790 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3791 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3792 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3793 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3794 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3796 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3797 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3798 has_monitor_update = true;
3799 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3800 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3801 if close_channel { return false; }
3803 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3804 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3805 updates: commitment_update,
3812 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3813 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3820 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3821 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3822 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3825 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3826 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3832 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3833 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3835 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3836 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3837 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3838 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3839 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3840 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3841 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3842 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3843 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3844 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3845 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3846 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3847 assert!(should_broadcast);
3848 } else { unreachable!(); }
3849 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3851 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3855 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3856 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3858 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3860 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3861 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3862 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3864 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3865 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3866 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3867 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3868 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3869 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3870 // never fail a payment too early.
3871 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3873 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3881 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3884 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3885 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3887 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3888 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3889 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3891 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3893 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3894 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3895 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3896 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3897 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3898 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3899 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3902 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3903 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3906 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3907 /// stored external to LDK.
3909 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3910 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3911 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3913 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3914 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3916 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
3917 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3918 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3919 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3920 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3922 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3923 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3924 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3925 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3927 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3928 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3929 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3930 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3931 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3933 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3934 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3935 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3936 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3937 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3939 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3940 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3941 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3943 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3945 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3946 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3948 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3949 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3950 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
3951 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3952 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3955 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3956 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3957 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3958 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3959 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3964 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3965 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3966 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3967 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3971 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3972 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3973 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3974 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3976 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3977 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3978 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3979 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3982 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3983 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3986 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3987 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3988 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3990 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3991 events.replace(pending_events);
4000 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4002 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4003 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4004 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4005 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4008 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4010 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4011 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4013 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4014 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4015 /// restarting from an old state.
4016 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4017 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4018 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4020 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4021 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4022 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4023 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4026 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4027 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4028 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4031 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4032 handler.handle_event(event);
4040 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4042 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4043 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4044 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4045 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4048 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4050 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4051 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4052 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4053 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4054 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4057 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4058 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4059 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4062 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4063 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4064 let new_height = height - 1;
4066 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4067 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4068 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4069 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4070 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4071 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4074 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4078 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4080 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4081 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4082 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4083 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4086 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4087 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4088 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4089 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4091 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4092 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4095 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4098 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4099 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4100 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4101 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4103 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4104 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4106 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4108 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4110 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4112 macro_rules! max_time {
4113 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4115 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4116 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4117 // having an explicit local time source.
4118 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4119 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4120 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4121 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4122 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4128 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4129 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4130 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4131 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4132 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4136 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4137 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4138 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4139 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4140 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4141 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4147 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4148 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4149 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4150 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4151 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4152 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4153 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4154 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4159 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4161 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4162 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4163 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4164 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4167 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4168 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4170 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4171 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4172 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4173 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4174 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4176 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4177 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4181 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4182 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4183 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4184 let res = f(channel);
4185 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4186 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4187 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4188 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4189 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4193 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4195 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4196 msg: funding_locked,
4198 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4200 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4201 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4202 msg: announcement_sigs,
4204 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4205 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4206 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4207 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4208 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4213 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4215 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4216 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4217 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4219 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4220 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4221 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4222 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4223 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4227 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4228 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4229 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4236 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4237 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4238 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4239 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4240 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4241 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4242 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4243 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4244 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4245 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4246 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4247 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4248 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4253 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4258 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4260 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4261 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4265 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4266 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4267 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4269 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4270 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4271 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4272 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4275 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4276 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4278 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4279 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4282 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4283 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4284 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4285 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4286 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4290 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4291 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4292 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4293 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4297 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4298 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4299 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4300 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4301 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4302 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4305 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4307 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4310 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4311 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4312 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4315 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4317 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4320 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4322 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4325 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4327 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4330 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4332 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4335 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4336 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4337 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4340 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4345 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4347 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4350 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4352 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4355 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4356 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4357 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4360 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4362 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4365 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4367 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4370 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4372 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4375 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4376 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4377 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4380 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4381 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4382 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4385 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4390 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4395 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4397 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4398 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4400 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4401 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4402 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4403 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4404 if no_connection_possible {
4405 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4406 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4407 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4408 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4409 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4411 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4412 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4413 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4423 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4424 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4425 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4426 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4427 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4428 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4429 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4433 no_channels_remain = false;
4439 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4441 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4442 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4443 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4445 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4446 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4447 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4448 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4449 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4450 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4452 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4453 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4454 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4455 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4456 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4457 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4458 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4459 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4460 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4464 if no_channels_remain {
4465 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4468 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4469 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4473 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4474 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4479 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4480 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4482 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4483 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4487 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4493 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4494 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4495 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4496 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4497 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4498 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4499 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4500 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4505 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4506 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4512 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4515 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4518 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4519 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4520 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4521 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4522 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4526 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4527 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4532 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4533 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4534 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4535 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4536 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4537 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4540 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4543 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4549 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4550 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4555 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4556 let result = *guard;
4564 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4565 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4566 let current_time = Instant::now();
4568 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4569 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4574 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4575 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4576 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4577 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4578 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4580 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4581 let result = *guard;
4582 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4586 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4587 None => return result,
4593 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4595 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4596 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4597 *persistence_lock = true;
4598 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4603 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4604 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4606 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4608 (0, onion_packet, required),
4609 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4612 (0, payment_data, required),
4613 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4615 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4616 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4617 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4621 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4622 (0, routing, required),
4623 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4624 (4, payment_hash, required),
4625 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4626 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4629 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4633 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4638 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4639 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4640 (2, outpoint, required),
4641 (4, htlc_id, required),
4642 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4645 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4646 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4647 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4648 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4651 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4652 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4653 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4658 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4659 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4660 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4666 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4667 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4668 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4670 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4671 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4672 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4676 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4677 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4678 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4680 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4682 if payment_data.is_some() {
4683 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4685 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4688 if payment_data.is_none() {
4689 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4691 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4695 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4703 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4704 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4705 (0, session_priv, required),
4706 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4707 (4, path, vec_type),
4709 (1, PreviousHopData)
4712 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4713 (0, LightningError) => {
4717 (0, failure_code, required),
4718 (2, data, vec_type),
4722 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4724 (0, forward_info, required),
4725 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4726 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4727 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4730 (0, htlc_id, required),
4731 (2, err_packet, required),
4735 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4736 (0, payment_secret, required),
4737 (2, expiry_time, required),
4738 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4739 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4740 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4743 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4744 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4745 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4746 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4750 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4751 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4753 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4755 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4757 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4758 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4759 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4762 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4763 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4764 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4765 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4766 unfunded_channels += 1;
4769 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4770 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4771 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4772 channel.write(writer)?;
4776 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4777 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4778 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4779 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4780 for forward in pending_forwards {
4781 forward.write(writer)?;
4785 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4786 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4787 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4788 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4789 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4790 htlc.write(writer)?;
4794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4795 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4796 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4797 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4798 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4799 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4802 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4803 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4804 for event in events.iter() {
4805 event.write(writer)?;
4808 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4809 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4810 for event in background_events.iter() {
4812 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4814 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4815 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4820 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4821 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4823 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4824 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4825 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4826 hash.write(writer)?;
4827 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4830 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4831 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4832 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4833 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4836 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4842 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4844 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4846 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4847 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4848 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4849 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4850 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4851 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4852 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4853 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4854 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4855 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4856 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4858 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4859 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4861 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4862 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4863 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4864 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4865 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4866 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4867 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4868 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4869 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4870 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4871 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4874 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4875 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4877 pub keys_manager: K,
4879 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4881 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4882 pub fee_estimator: F,
4883 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4885 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4886 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4887 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4888 pub chain_monitor: M,
4890 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4891 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4892 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4893 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4894 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4895 /// deserialization.
4897 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4898 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4899 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4901 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4902 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4904 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4905 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4906 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4907 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4909 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4912 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4913 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4916 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4917 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4918 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4919 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4920 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4921 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4924 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4925 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4926 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4927 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4928 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4930 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4931 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4936 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4937 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4938 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4939 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4940 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4941 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4942 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4946 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4947 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4948 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4952 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4953 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4954 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4955 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4956 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4957 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4960 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4961 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4963 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4964 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4965 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4967 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4969 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4970 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4971 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4972 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4973 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4974 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4975 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4976 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4977 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4978 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4979 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4980 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4981 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4982 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4983 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4984 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4985 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4986 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4987 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4988 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4989 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4990 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4991 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4992 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4993 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4994 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4995 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4996 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4997 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4998 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5000 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5001 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5003 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5006 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5007 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5008 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5009 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5010 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5015 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5016 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5017 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5021 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5022 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5023 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5024 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5025 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5026 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5027 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5028 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5029 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5031 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5034 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5035 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5036 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5037 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5038 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5039 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5040 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5041 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5043 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5046 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5047 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5048 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5049 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5050 let peer_state = PeerState {
5051 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5053 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5056 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5057 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5058 for _ in 0..event_count {
5059 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5060 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5065 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5066 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5067 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5068 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5069 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5070 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5074 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5075 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5077 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5078 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5079 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5080 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5081 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5085 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5086 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5087 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
5088 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
5089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5093 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
5095 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5096 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5098 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5100 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5101 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5102 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5104 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5106 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5111 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5113 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5114 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
5116 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5117 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5120 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5121 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5123 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5125 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5126 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5127 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5128 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5130 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5131 logger: args.logger,
5132 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5135 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5136 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5139 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5140 //connection or two.
5142 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5148 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5149 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5150 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5151 use core::time::Duration;
5152 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5153 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5154 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5155 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5157 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5158 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5159 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5160 use util::test_utils;
5164 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5166 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5167 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5168 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5170 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5171 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5172 thread::spawn(move || {
5174 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5175 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5176 *persistence_lock = true;
5179 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5185 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5186 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5188 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5191 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5196 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5198 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5201 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5208 fn test_notify_limits() {
5209 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5210 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5214 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5216 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5218 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5219 // to connect messages with new values
5220 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5221 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5222 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5223 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5225 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5226 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5227 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5228 // ... but the last node should not.
5229 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5230 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5231 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5232 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5234 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5235 // about the channel.
5236 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5237 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5238 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5240 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5242 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5243 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5244 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5245 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5246 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5247 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5249 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5250 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5251 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5253 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5254 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5255 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5256 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5257 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5258 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5260 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5261 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5262 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5263 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5264 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5265 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5266 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5267 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5269 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5270 // the channel info has updated.
5271 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5272 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5273 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5274 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5275 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5276 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5280 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5281 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5288 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5290 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5291 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5292 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5293 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5294 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5295 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5296 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5297 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5299 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5301 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5303 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5304 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5306 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5308 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5309 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5310 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5312 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5313 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5314 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5316 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5317 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5319 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5320 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5321 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5322 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5323 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5324 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5326 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5327 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
5328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5329 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5331 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5333 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5334 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5335 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5336 // lightning messages manually.
5337 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5339 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5341 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5343 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5344 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5346 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5347 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5349 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5350 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5351 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5353 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5354 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5355 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5357 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5359 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5361 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5362 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5365 // There's an existing bug that generates a PaymentSent event for each MPP path, so handle that here.
5366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5368 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5369 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5374 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5375 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5382 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5383 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5384 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5385 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5386 // fails as expected.
5387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5390 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5391 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5392 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5394 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5395 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5396 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5398 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5399 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5400 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5402 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5403 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5404 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5405 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5406 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5408 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5409 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5410 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5412 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5413 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5414 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5415 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5416 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5417 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5420 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5422 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5423 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5425 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5426 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5427 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5428 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5430 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5432 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5433 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5434 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5436 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5437 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5438 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5439 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5440 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5441 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5442 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5443 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5446 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5447 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5448 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5450 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5451 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5452 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5453 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5454 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5455 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5456 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5458 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
5460 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5461 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5465 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5466 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5467 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5473 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5474 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5475 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5476 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5478 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5479 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5480 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5481 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5482 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5483 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5485 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5486 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5487 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5490 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5491 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5492 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5493 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5494 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5495 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5496 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5498 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5502 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5503 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5509 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5510 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5511 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5512 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5514 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5515 let network_graph = nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
5516 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5517 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, &network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5518 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5519 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5521 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5522 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5523 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5524 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5527 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5528 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5529 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5530 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5531 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5532 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5533 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5535 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5539 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5542 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5543 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5544 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5545 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5546 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5547 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5548 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5549 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5550 use routing::router::get_route;
5551 use util::test_utils;
5552 use util::config::UserConfig;
5553 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5555 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5556 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5557 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5559 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5563 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5564 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5565 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5566 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5567 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5568 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5569 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5574 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5575 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5578 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5579 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5580 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5582 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5583 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5585 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5586 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5588 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5589 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5591 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5592 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5593 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5594 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5595 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5597 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5599 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5601 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5602 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5603 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5604 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5605 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5607 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5609 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5611 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5612 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5613 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5616 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5617 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5618 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5620 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5621 } else { panic!(); }
5623 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5624 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5626 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5629 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5632 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5633 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5635 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5636 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5637 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5638 match msg_events[0] {
5639 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5640 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5641 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5645 match msg_events[1] {
5646 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5650 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5652 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5653 macro_rules! send_payment {
5654 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5655 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5656 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5657 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5659 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5660 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5662 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5663 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5665 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5666 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5667 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5668 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5669 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5670 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5671 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5672 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5675 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5676 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5678 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5679 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5680 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5681 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5682 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5684 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5687 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5688 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5689 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5690 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5692 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5697 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5698 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);