1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
39 // construct one themselves.
40 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
41 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
42 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
43 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
44 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
46 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
47 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
49 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
50 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
51 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
54 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
55 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
56 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
57 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
58 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
59 use crate::util::events;
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
63 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
64 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
66 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
69 use crate::prelude::*;
71 use core::cell::RefCell;
73 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
74 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
75 use core::time::Duration;
78 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
79 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
81 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
83 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
84 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
85 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
87 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
88 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
89 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
90 // before we forward it.
92 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
93 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
94 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
95 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
96 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
101 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
102 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
103 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
104 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
107 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
108 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
109 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
112 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
113 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
118 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
119 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
120 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
121 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
122 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
123 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
124 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
129 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
130 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
133 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
136 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
137 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
140 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
141 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
143 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
144 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
145 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
148 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
149 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
151 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
152 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
155 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
156 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
159 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
163 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
164 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
165 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
166 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
167 short_channel_id: u64,
169 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
170 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
172 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
173 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
178 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
180 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
181 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
182 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
184 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
185 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
188 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
189 struct ClaimableHTLC {
190 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
192 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
194 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
196 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
200 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
205 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
206 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
211 impl Readable for PaymentId {
212 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
213 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
218 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
219 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
220 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
221 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
223 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
224 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
229 impl Readable for InterceptId {
230 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
231 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
236 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
237 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
238 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
239 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
240 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
243 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
245 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
246 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
247 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
249 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
250 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
254 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
255 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
256 (0, short_channel_id, required),
257 (2, htlc_id, required),
259 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
260 (0, session_priv, required),
265 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
266 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
267 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
268 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
269 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
272 session_priv: SecretKey,
273 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
274 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
275 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
276 payment_id: PaymentId,
277 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
280 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
281 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
282 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
284 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
286 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
288 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
291 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
292 payment_id.hash(hasher);
293 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
294 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
299 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
302 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
303 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
305 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
306 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
307 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
308 payment_secret: None,
313 struct ReceiveError {
319 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
320 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
322 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
324 pub enum FailureCode {
325 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
326 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
327 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
328 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
329 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
330 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
331 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
332 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
333 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
334 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
335 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
338 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
340 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
341 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
342 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
343 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
344 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
346 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
347 err: msgs::LightningError,
348 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
349 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
351 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
353 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
355 err: LightningError {
357 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
358 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
365 shutdown_finish: None,
369 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
370 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
373 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
375 err: LightningError {
377 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
378 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
384 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
385 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
389 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
392 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
395 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
399 log_level: Level::Warn,
402 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
404 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
406 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
417 shutdown_finish: None,
422 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
423 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
424 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
425 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
426 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
428 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
429 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
430 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
431 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
432 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
433 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
434 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
436 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
440 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
441 struct ClaimingPayment {
443 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
444 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
446 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
447 (0, amount_msat, required),
448 (2, payment_purpose, required),
449 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
452 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
453 struct ClaimablePayments {
454 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
455 /// failed/claimed by the user.
457 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
458 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
460 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
461 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
462 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
464 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
465 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
466 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
467 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
470 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
471 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
472 /// quite some time lag.
473 enum BackgroundEvent {
474 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
475 /// commitment transaction.
476 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
480 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
481 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
482 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
483 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
484 /// event can be generated.
485 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
486 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
487 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
490 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
491 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
492 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
495 /// State we hold per-peer.
496 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
497 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
499 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
500 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
502 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
503 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
504 latest_features: InitFeatures,
505 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
506 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
507 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
508 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
509 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
511 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
512 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
513 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
514 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
516 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
517 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
518 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
519 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
520 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
521 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
522 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
523 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
524 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
525 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
529 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
530 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
531 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
532 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
533 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
534 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
537 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
541 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
542 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
544 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
547 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
548 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
549 struct PendingInboundPayment {
550 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
551 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
552 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
553 /// this payment being removed.
555 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
556 user_payment_id: u64,
557 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
558 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
559 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
562 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
563 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
564 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
565 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
566 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
567 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
568 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
569 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
571 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
572 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
580 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
582 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
587 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
588 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
589 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
590 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
591 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
592 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
593 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
594 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
595 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
597 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
598 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
600 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
601 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
603 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
604 /// to individual Channels.
606 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
607 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
608 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
609 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
611 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
612 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
613 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
614 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
615 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
616 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
617 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
619 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
620 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
621 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
623 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
624 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
625 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
626 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
627 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
629 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
630 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
631 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
632 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
634 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
635 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
636 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
638 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
639 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
640 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
641 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
642 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
644 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
645 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
646 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
647 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
648 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
649 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
650 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
651 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
654 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
655 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
656 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
657 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
658 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
662 // `total_consistency_lock`
664 // |__`forward_htlcs`
666 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
668 // |__`per_peer_state`
670 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
672 // | |__`claimable_payments`
674 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
680 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
682 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
686 // | |__`pending_events`
688 // | |__`pending_background_events`
690 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
692 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
693 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
694 ES::Target: EntropySource,
695 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
701 default_configuration: UserConfig,
702 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
703 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
709 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
711 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
713 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
714 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
716 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
717 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
718 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
719 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
721 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
722 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
724 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
725 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
726 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
727 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
728 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
729 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
730 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
731 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
733 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
735 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
736 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
738 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
740 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
741 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
742 /// and via the classic SCID.
744 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
745 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
749 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
751 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
752 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
753 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
755 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
756 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
758 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
759 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
764 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
765 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
766 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
767 /// active channel list on load.
769 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
770 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
772 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
774 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
775 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
776 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
778 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
779 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
780 /// the handling of the events.
782 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
783 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
786 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
787 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
788 /// would break backwards compatability.
789 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
790 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
791 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
793 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
794 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
796 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
798 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
799 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
800 /// confirmation depth.
802 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
803 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
804 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
806 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
808 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
810 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
812 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
814 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
816 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
817 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
818 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
820 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
821 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
823 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
824 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
825 /// keeping additional state.
826 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
828 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
829 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
830 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
831 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
833 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
834 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
836 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
837 /// are currently open with that peer.
839 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
840 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
843 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
845 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
846 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
847 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
848 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
849 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
851 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
852 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
854 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
855 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
856 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
857 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
858 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
859 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
860 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
861 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
863 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
872 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
874 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
875 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
876 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
877 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
878 pub struct ChainParameters {
879 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
880 pub network: Network,
882 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
884 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
885 pub best_block: BestBlock,
888 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
894 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
895 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
896 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
897 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
898 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
899 /// updates are ready for persistence).
901 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
902 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
903 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
904 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
905 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
907 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
908 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
911 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
912 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
913 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
916 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
917 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
919 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
920 persistence_notifier: notifier,
921 should_persist: persist_check,
922 _read_guard: read_guard,
927 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
929 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
930 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
935 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
936 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
938 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
940 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
941 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
942 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
943 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
944 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
946 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
947 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
949 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
951 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
952 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
953 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
954 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
955 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
956 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
957 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
958 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
959 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
960 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
961 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
962 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
963 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
965 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
966 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
968 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
969 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
970 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
971 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
973 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
974 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
975 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
976 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
977 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
978 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
981 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
983 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
984 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
987 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
989 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
990 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
992 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
993 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
994 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
995 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
997 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
998 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
999 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1000 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1002 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1003 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1004 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1006 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1007 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1008 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1010 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1011 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1012 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1013 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1014 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1015 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1016 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1017 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1018 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1019 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1020 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1023 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1024 /// to better separate parameters.
1025 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1026 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1027 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1028 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1029 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1030 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1031 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1032 pub features: InitFeatures,
1033 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1034 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1035 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1037 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1039 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1040 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1041 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1042 /// payments to us through this channel.
1043 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1044 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1045 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1046 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1047 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1048 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1049 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1052 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1053 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1054 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1055 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1056 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1057 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1058 /// lifetime of the channel.
1059 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1060 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1061 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1062 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1063 /// our counterparty already.
1065 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1066 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1067 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1068 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1070 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1071 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1072 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1073 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1075 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1076 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1078 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1079 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1081 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1082 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1083 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1084 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1085 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1086 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1087 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1088 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1089 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1092 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1094 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1095 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1096 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1097 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1098 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1099 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1100 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1102 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1103 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1105 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1106 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1107 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1108 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1109 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1110 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1111 /// this value on chain.
1113 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1115 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1117 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1118 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1120 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1122 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1123 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1124 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1125 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1127 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1128 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1129 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1130 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1132 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1133 pub balance_msat: u64,
1134 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1135 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1136 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1137 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1139 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1142 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1143 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1144 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1145 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1146 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1147 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1148 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1150 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1151 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1152 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1153 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1154 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1155 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1156 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1160 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1163 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1164 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1165 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1166 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1168 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1170 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1171 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1172 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1173 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1174 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1176 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1177 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1178 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1179 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1180 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1181 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1182 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1184 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1185 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1186 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1187 pub is_outbound: bool,
1188 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1189 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1190 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1191 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1192 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1194 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1195 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1196 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1197 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1199 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1200 pub is_usable: bool,
1201 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1202 pub is_public: bool,
1203 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1204 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1205 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1206 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1207 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1208 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1210 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1211 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1214 impl ChannelDetails {
1215 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1216 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1217 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1219 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1220 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1221 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1222 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1225 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1226 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1227 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1229 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1230 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1231 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1232 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1235 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1236 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1238 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1239 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1240 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1242 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1243 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1244 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1245 features: latest_features,
1246 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1247 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1248 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1249 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1250 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1251 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1252 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1253 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1254 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1255 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1257 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1258 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1259 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1260 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1261 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1262 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1263 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1264 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1265 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1266 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1267 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1268 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1269 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1270 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1271 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1272 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1273 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1274 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1275 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1276 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1277 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1278 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1279 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1280 config: Some(channel.config()),
1285 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1286 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1287 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1288 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1289 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1291 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1293 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1294 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1295 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1298 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1299 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1300 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1302 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1303 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1304 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1306 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1307 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1308 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1310 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1311 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1315 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1317 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1319 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1320 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1321 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1322 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1324 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1325 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1326 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1329 macro_rules! handle_error {
1330 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1333 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1334 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1335 // entering the macro.
1336 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1337 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1339 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1341 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1342 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1343 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1344 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1348 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1349 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1350 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1351 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1356 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1357 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1359 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1360 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1361 action: err.action.clone()
1365 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1366 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1367 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1368 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1369 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1373 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1380 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1381 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1382 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1383 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1384 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1385 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1387 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1388 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1389 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1390 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1391 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1393 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1394 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1396 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1400 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1401 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1402 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1404 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1405 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1407 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1408 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1410 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1411 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1412 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1413 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1414 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1415 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1421 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1422 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1426 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1428 $entry.remove_entry();
1436 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1437 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1441 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1443 $entry.remove_entry();
1451 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1452 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1454 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1455 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1461 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1462 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1463 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1464 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1465 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1467 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1468 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1469 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1470 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1471 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1472 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1473 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1474 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1475 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1476 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1481 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1482 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1483 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1485 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1486 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1487 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1488 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1489 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1490 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1493 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1498 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1499 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1500 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1501 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1502 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1503 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1504 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1505 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1506 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1507 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1508 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1510 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1511 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1512 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1518 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1519 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1521 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1522 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1523 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1524 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1525 updates.announcement_sigs);
1526 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1527 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1530 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1531 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1532 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1534 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1536 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1537 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1539 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1540 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1541 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1542 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1547 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1548 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1549 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1550 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1551 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1553 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1554 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1555 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1558 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1559 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1560 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1561 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1562 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1563 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1564 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1565 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1569 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1570 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1571 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1572 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1573 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1575 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1581 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1582 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1586 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1588 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1589 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1590 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1591 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1592 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1593 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1597 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1599 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1600 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1602 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1604 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1605 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1606 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1609 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1610 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1611 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1612 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1613 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1614 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1615 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1616 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1618 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1619 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1620 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1625 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1627 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1628 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1629 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1630 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1631 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1632 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1633 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1639 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1640 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1642 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1644 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1646 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1648 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1649 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1650 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1651 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1661 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1662 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1663 &self.default_configuration
1666 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1667 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1668 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1671 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1672 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1674 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1676 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1680 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1685 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1687 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1688 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1689 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1690 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1691 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1693 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1694 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1696 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1697 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1698 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1700 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1701 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1702 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1703 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1704 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1705 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1707 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1708 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1709 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1710 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1711 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1716 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1717 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1719 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1721 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1722 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1724 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1726 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1727 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1728 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1729 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1730 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1731 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1735 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1740 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1742 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1743 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1748 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1751 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1754 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1755 node_id: their_network_key,
1758 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1761 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1762 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1763 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1764 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1765 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1766 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1767 // the same channel.
1768 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1770 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1772 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1775 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1776 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1777 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1785 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1786 /// more information.
1787 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1788 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1791 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1792 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1794 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1795 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1797 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1798 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1799 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1800 // really wanted anyway.
1801 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1804 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1805 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1806 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1807 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1809 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1810 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1811 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1812 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1813 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1816 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1822 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1823 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1825 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1826 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1827 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1829 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1830 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1831 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1832 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1833 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1834 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1835 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1836 total_msat: *total_msat,
1839 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1840 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1842 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1843 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1845 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1850 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1851 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1852 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1853 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1854 Some(transaction) => {
1855 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1859 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1860 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1861 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1862 reason: closure_reason
1866 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1869 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1870 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1873 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1874 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1878 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1880 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1881 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1882 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1883 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1884 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1886 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1887 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1888 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1889 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1890 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1894 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1895 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1896 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1897 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1898 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1901 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1902 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1903 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1904 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1908 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1916 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1917 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1918 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1919 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1922 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1926 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1927 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1928 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1930 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1931 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1933 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1934 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1935 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1936 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1938 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1940 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1941 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1942 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1943 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1944 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1945 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1948 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1949 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1950 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1952 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1953 /// the channel being closed or not:
1954 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1955 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1957 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1958 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1959 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1960 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1962 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1965 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1966 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1967 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::util::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1968 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1969 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1973 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1974 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1975 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1976 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1977 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1978 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1979 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1980 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1982 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1983 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1984 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1985 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1986 // ignore the result here.
1987 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
1991 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1992 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1993 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1994 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1996 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
1997 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
1999 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2001 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2002 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2003 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2005 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2007 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2012 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2013 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2014 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2015 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2016 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2021 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2024 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2025 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2026 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2027 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2028 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2029 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2030 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2031 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2032 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2033 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2034 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2035 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2046 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2047 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2048 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2050 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2051 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2052 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2055 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2056 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2057 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2059 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2060 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2061 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2062 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2063 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2066 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2067 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2068 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2069 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2070 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2074 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2075 /// local transaction(s).
2076 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2077 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2078 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2082 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2083 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2085 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2086 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2087 return Err(ReceiveError {
2088 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2090 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2093 // final_expiry_too_soon
2094 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2095 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2097 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2098 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2099 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2100 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2101 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2102 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2103 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2104 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2105 return Err(ReceiveError {
2106 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2107 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2110 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2113 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2114 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2118 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2119 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2120 return Err(ReceiveError {
2121 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2122 err_data: Vec::new(),
2123 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2126 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2127 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2128 return Err(ReceiveError {
2129 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2130 err_data: Vec::new(),
2131 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2133 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2134 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2136 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2137 phantom_shared_secret,
2139 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2140 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2141 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2142 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2143 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2144 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2145 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2146 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2147 return Err(ReceiveError {
2148 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2149 err_data: Vec::new(),
2150 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2154 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2156 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2160 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2161 err_data: Vec::new(),
2162 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2167 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2170 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2171 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2172 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2173 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2177 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2178 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2179 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2181 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2182 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2183 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2184 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2185 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2186 failure_code: $err_code,
2192 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2193 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2196 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2197 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2198 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2200 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2201 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2202 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2203 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2204 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2205 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2206 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2207 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2209 macro_rules! return_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2217 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2223 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2225 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2226 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2228 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2229 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2233 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2234 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2236 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2238 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2239 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2240 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2241 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2242 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2244 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2247 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2248 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2249 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2251 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2252 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2253 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2256 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2257 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2258 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2259 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2263 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2264 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2265 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2268 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2269 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2270 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2271 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2272 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2277 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2278 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2279 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2280 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2281 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2282 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2283 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2284 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2285 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2286 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2287 // phantom or an intercept.
2288 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2289 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2290 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2294 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2297 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2299 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2301 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2302 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2303 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2307 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2309 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2310 // have no consistency guarantees.
2311 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2315 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2316 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2317 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2318 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2319 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2321 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2322 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2323 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2324 // we don't have the channel here.
2325 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2327 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2329 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2330 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2331 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2332 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2333 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2334 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2335 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2337 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2338 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2340 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2341 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2345 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2346 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2347 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2348 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2350 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2357 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2358 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2359 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2360 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2361 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2362 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2364 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2365 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2367 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2368 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2369 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2370 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2371 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2372 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2373 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2374 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2375 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2376 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2382 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2383 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2384 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2385 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2387 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2388 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2390 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2391 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2392 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2394 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2395 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2396 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2397 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2398 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2399 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2400 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2404 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2409 pending_forward_info
2412 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2413 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2414 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2416 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2417 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2418 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2420 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2421 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2422 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2423 if !chan.should_announce() {
2424 return Err(LightningError {
2425 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2429 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2430 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2432 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2433 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2436 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2437 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2438 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2439 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2441 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2442 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2443 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2445 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2446 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2447 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2449 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2450 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2454 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2456 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2457 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2458 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2460 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2461 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2463 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2464 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2465 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2466 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2467 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2468 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2469 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2470 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2472 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2473 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2474 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2476 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2478 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2485 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2486 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2487 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2490 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2491 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2492 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2494 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2495 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2496 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2498 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2499 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2500 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2501 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2502 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2504 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2506 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2507 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2508 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2509 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2514 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2517 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2518 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2519 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2521 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2522 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2523 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2525 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2526 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2528 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2529 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2530 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2531 Some(monitor_update) => {
2532 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2533 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2534 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2537 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2538 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2539 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2540 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2541 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2542 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2543 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2544 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2550 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2551 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2552 // `channel_by_id` map.
2553 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2554 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2559 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2560 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2562 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2567 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2569 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2570 /// fields for more info.
2572 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2573 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2575 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2577 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2578 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2579 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2580 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2581 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2583 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2584 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2585 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2586 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2587 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2589 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2590 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2591 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2592 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2594 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2596 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2597 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2598 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2600 /// In general, a path may raise:
2601 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2602 /// node public key) is specified.
2603 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2604 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2606 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2607 /// relevant updates.
2609 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2610 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2611 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2613 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2615 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2616 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2617 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2618 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2619 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2621 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2622 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2623 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2625 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2626 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2627 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2628 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2629 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2630 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2631 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2632 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2633 self.pending_outbound_payments
2634 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2635 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2636 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2639 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2640 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2641 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2644 self.pending_outbound_payments
2645 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2646 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2647 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2648 &self.pending_events,
2649 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2650 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2654 fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2655 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2657 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2658 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2659 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2663 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2664 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2665 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2669 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2670 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2671 /// retries are exhausted.
2673 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2674 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2676 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2677 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2678 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2680 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2681 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2683 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2684 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2685 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2686 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2687 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2690 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2691 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2692 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2693 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2694 /// never reach the recipient.
2696 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2697 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2699 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2700 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2702 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2704 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2705 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2706 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2708 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2709 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2711 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2712 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2715 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2716 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2718 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2721 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2722 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2723 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2724 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2725 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2726 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2727 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2728 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2729 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2730 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2733 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2734 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2735 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2736 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2739 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2740 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2741 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2744 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2747 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2748 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2751 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2752 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2753 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2754 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2755 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2758 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2764 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2766 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2768 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2769 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2770 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2771 } else { unreachable!(); })
2774 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2777 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2778 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2781 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2782 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2787 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2788 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2791 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2793 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2796 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2797 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2798 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2807 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2808 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2809 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2813 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2815 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2816 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2818 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2819 /// across the p2p network.
2821 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2822 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2824 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2825 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2826 /// keys per-channel).
2828 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2829 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2830 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2832 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2833 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2834 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2836 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2837 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2838 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2839 /// for more details.
2841 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2842 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2843 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2846 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2847 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2848 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2849 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2854 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2855 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2856 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2857 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2858 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2859 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2860 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2864 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2865 let mut output_index = None;
2866 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2867 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2868 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2869 if output_index.is_some() {
2870 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2871 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2874 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2875 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2876 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2879 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2882 if output_index.is_none() {
2883 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2884 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2887 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2891 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2893 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2894 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2895 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2896 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2898 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2899 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2901 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2902 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2904 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2906 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2907 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2908 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2909 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2910 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2911 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2912 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2913 pub fn update_channel_config(
2914 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2915 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2916 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2918 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2922 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2923 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2926 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2927 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2930 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2931 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2932 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2933 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2937 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2938 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2939 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2942 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2943 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2944 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2945 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2946 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2954 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2955 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2957 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2958 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2960 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2961 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2962 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2963 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2964 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2966 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2967 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
2969 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
2972 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
2973 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
2974 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
2975 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
2976 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2979 let next_hop_scid = {
2980 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2981 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
2982 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
2983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2985 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
2987 if !chan.is_usable() {
2988 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2989 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
2992 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
2994 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2995 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3000 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3001 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3002 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3005 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3006 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3007 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3009 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3011 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3012 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3015 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3016 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3017 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3018 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3019 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3021 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3025 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3026 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3028 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3031 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3032 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3033 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3035 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3036 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3037 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3040 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3041 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3042 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3043 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3044 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3045 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3046 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3049 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3050 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3052 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3057 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3059 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3060 /// Will likely generate further events.
3061 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3064 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3065 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3066 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3068 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3069 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3071 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3072 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3073 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3075 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3076 match forward_info {
3077 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3078 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3079 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3080 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3081 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3084 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3085 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3086 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3088 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3089 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3090 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3091 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3092 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3093 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3096 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3097 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3099 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3102 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3103 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3109 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3110 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3112 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3116 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3119 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3123 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3124 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3125 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3126 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3127 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3129 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3130 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3131 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3132 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3133 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3135 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3137 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3138 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3142 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3143 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3144 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3145 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3151 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3154 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3157 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3158 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3159 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3160 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3161 // problem, not ours.
3167 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3168 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3170 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3175 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3176 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3177 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3182 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3184 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3187 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3188 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3189 match forward_info {
3190 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3191 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3192 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3193 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3194 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3197 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3198 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3199 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3200 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3201 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3202 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3203 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3204 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3206 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3207 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3208 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3210 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3211 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3213 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3215 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3216 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3217 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3218 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3223 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3224 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3226 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3227 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3228 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3229 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3231 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3234 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3236 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3237 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3238 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3247 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3248 match forward_info {
3249 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3250 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3251 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3252 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3255 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3256 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3257 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3258 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3260 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3261 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3263 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3266 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3267 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3268 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3269 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3270 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3271 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3272 phantom_shared_secret,
3274 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3276 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3281 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3282 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3283 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3284 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3285 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3287 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3288 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3289 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3290 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3291 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3292 phantom_shared_secret,
3294 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3295 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3299 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3300 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3301 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3302 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3303 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3306 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3307 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3308 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3310 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3311 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3312 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3315 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3316 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3317 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3320 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3321 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3322 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3323 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3325 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3329 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3330 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3331 total_value += htlc.value;
3332 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3333 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3334 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3336 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3337 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3339 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3341 _ => unreachable!(),
3344 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3346 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3347 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3348 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3349 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3350 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3351 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3352 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3355 amount_msat: total_value,
3356 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3357 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3359 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3361 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3362 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3364 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3366 payment_claimable_generated
3370 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3371 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3372 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3373 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3374 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3375 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3376 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3377 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3379 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3380 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3381 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3382 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3383 Ok(result) => result,
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3386 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3390 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3391 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3392 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3393 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3394 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3395 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3399 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3401 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3402 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3403 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3404 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3407 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3409 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3410 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3411 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3412 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3413 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3415 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3417 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3418 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3422 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3423 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3429 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3430 if payment_data.is_none() {
3431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3432 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3435 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3436 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3438 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3439 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3440 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3441 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3442 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3444 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3445 if payment_claimable_generated {
3446 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3452 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3453 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3461 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3462 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3463 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3464 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3465 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3466 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3468 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3469 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3471 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3473 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3474 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3475 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3477 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3479 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3480 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3481 events.append(&mut new_events);
3484 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3486 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3487 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3489 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3490 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3491 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3492 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3493 if background_events.is_empty() {
3497 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3499 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3500 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3501 // monitor updating completing.
3502 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3509 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3510 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3511 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3512 self.process_background_events();
3515 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3516 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3517 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3518 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3519 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3520 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3521 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3523 if !chan.is_live() {
3524 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3525 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3526 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3529 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3531 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3532 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3536 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3537 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3538 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3539 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3540 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3541 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3542 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3544 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3546 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3547 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3548 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3549 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3550 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3551 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3552 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3560 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3562 /// This currently includes:
3563 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3564 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3565 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3567 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3568 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3569 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3571 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3572 /// estimate fetches.
3574 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3575 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3576 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3577 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3578 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3579 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3581 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3583 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3584 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3585 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3587 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3588 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3589 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3590 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3591 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3592 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3593 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3594 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3595 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3597 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3598 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3599 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3600 if needs_close { return false; }
3603 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3604 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3605 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3606 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3607 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3608 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3609 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3610 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3614 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3615 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3617 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3618 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3619 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3623 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3624 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3629 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3633 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3634 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3639 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3640 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3641 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3642 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3643 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3644 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3645 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3646 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3647 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3648 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3649 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3650 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3651 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3652 // have no channels to the peer.
3653 let remove_entry = {
3654 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3655 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3658 entry.remove_entry();
3661 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3666 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3667 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3668 // This should be unreachable
3669 debug_assert!(false);
3672 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3673 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3674 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3675 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3677 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3678 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3679 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3681 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3688 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3689 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3690 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3691 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3692 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3695 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3696 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3699 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3701 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3702 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3703 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3704 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3705 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3712 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3713 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3714 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3716 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3717 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3718 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3719 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3721 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3722 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3723 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3724 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3725 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3726 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3729 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3730 /// reason for the failure.
3732 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3733 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3734 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3736 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3737 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3738 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3739 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3740 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3741 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3742 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3747 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3748 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3749 match failure_code {
3750 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3751 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3752 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3753 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3754 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3755 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3760 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3761 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3763 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3765 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3766 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3767 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3768 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3769 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3770 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3771 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3773 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3775 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3776 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3778 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3783 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3784 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3785 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3786 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3787 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3788 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3789 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3790 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3791 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3792 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3794 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3795 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3796 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3797 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3799 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3800 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3801 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3802 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3803 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3807 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3808 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3809 // be surfaced to the user.
3810 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3811 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3812 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3814 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3816 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3817 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3819 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3821 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3823 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3825 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3828 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3829 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3830 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3835 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3836 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3837 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3838 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3839 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3840 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3841 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3842 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3843 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3846 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3847 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3848 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3851 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3852 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3853 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3855 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3856 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3857 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3858 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3859 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3861 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3862 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3863 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3865 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3866 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3867 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3868 push_forward_ev = true;
3870 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3872 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3875 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3878 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3879 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3880 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3881 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3882 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3883 failed_next_destination: destination,
3889 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3890 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3892 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3893 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3894 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3896 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3897 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3898 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3899 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3901 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3902 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3903 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3904 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3905 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3906 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3907 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3912 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3913 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3914 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3915 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3916 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3917 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3918 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3919 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3924 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3925 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3926 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3928 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3929 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3930 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3931 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3936 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3938 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
3939 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
3940 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
3941 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
3942 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
3944 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
3945 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
3947 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3948 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3949 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3950 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3951 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3953 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3954 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3955 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3956 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3957 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3958 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3959 let (counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3960 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3967 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3968 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3976 if peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&chan_id).is_none() {
3981 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3982 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3983 debug_assert!(false);
3988 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
3989 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
3990 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
3991 // that there's one payment here and move on.
3992 if sources.len() != 1 {
3993 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
3994 debug_assert!(false);
4000 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4002 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4003 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4004 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4005 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4008 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4009 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4010 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4011 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4015 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4016 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4017 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4018 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4020 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4021 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4022 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4023 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4024 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4029 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4030 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4031 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4032 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4033 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4034 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4037 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4040 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4041 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4042 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4043 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4047 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4048 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4049 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4050 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4053 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4054 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4055 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4059 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4060 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4061 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4065 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4068 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4069 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4070 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4072 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4073 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4075 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4076 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4078 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4079 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4080 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4081 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4082 if let Err(e) = res {
4083 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4084 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4085 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4086 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4087 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4093 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4094 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4095 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4099 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4100 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4101 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4102 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4103 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4104 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4105 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4106 // again on restart.
4107 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4108 payment_preimage, update_res);
4110 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4111 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4112 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4113 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4114 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4115 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4119 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4120 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4123 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4125 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4126 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4128 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4129 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4130 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4131 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4132 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4133 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4134 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4137 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4138 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4140 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4142 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4148 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4149 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4150 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4156 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4157 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4158 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4161 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4162 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4164 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4165 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4166 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4167 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4168 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4172 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4173 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4179 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4180 /// update completion.
4181 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4182 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4183 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4184 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4185 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4186 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4187 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4188 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4189 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4190 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4191 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4192 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4193 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4195 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4197 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4198 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4199 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4200 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4203 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4204 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4206 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4207 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4208 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4213 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4215 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4216 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4217 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4218 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4223 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4224 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4226 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4227 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4232 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4236 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4242 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4243 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4244 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4250 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4251 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4253 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4254 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4256 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4257 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4258 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4259 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4260 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4265 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4266 let mut peer_state_lock;
4267 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4268 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4269 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4270 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4272 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4277 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4278 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4279 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4282 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4285 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4287 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4288 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4291 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4292 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4293 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4295 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4296 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4297 /// used to accept such channels.
4299 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4300 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4301 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4302 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4305 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4306 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4308 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4309 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4310 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4312 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4313 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4315 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4316 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4318 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4319 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4321 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4322 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4323 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4324 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4327 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4330 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4333 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4336 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4337 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4338 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4339 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4340 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4343 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4344 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4345 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4346 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4347 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4348 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4351 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4352 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4353 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4355 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4356 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4357 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4358 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4359 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4360 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4361 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4362 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4365 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4366 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4371 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4372 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4373 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4377 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4383 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4384 /// or 0-conf channels.
4386 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4387 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4388 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4389 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4390 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4393 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4394 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4395 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4396 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4397 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4398 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4399 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4403 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4406 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4407 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4409 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4410 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4411 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4412 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4414 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4417 num_unfunded_channels
4420 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4421 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4425 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4429 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4430 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4431 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4432 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4434 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4435 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4436 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4437 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4440 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4442 debug_assert!(false);
4443 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4445 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4446 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4448 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4449 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4450 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4451 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4452 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4453 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4455 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4456 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4457 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4460 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4461 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4462 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4463 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4464 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4467 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4468 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4469 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4472 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4473 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4477 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4478 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4479 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4480 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4483 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4484 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4487 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4488 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4489 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4492 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4493 pending_events.push(
4494 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4495 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4496 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4497 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4498 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4499 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4504 entry.insert(channel);
4510 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4511 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4515 debug_assert!(false);
4516 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4522 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4523 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4525 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4529 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4530 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4531 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4532 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4534 user_channel_id: user_id,
4539 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4540 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4543 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4545 debug_assert!(false);
4546 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4549 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4550 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4551 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4552 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4553 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4554 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4559 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4561 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4564 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4566 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4567 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4568 funding_msg.channel_id))
4570 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4571 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4575 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4576 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4577 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4578 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4579 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4580 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4581 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4585 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4587 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4588 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4589 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4591 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4592 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4593 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4594 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4595 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4596 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4597 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4598 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4606 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4607 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4611 debug_assert!(false);
4612 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4615 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4616 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4617 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4618 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4619 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4620 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4621 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4622 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4623 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4624 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4625 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4626 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4627 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4628 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4637 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4638 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4639 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4641 debug_assert!(false);
4642 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4644 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4645 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4646 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4648 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4649 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4650 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4651 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4653 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4654 msg: announcement_sigs,
4656 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4657 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4658 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4659 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4660 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4661 // announcement_signatures.
4662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4663 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4665 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4671 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4679 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4680 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4681 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4682 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4683 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4685 debug_assert!(false);
4686 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4688 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4689 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4690 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4693 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4694 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4695 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4696 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4699 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4700 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4701 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4702 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4704 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4705 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4706 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4707 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4708 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4709 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4714 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4715 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4716 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4717 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4718 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4725 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4726 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4727 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4728 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4734 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4735 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4736 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4738 debug_assert!(false);
4739 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4741 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4746 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4747 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4749 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4754 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4755 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4756 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4757 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4758 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4759 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4760 } else { (tx, None) }
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4765 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4766 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4767 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4769 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4777 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4782 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4783 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4784 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4785 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4787 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4788 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4789 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4790 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4792 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4793 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4796 debug_assert!(false);
4797 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4799 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4800 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4801 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4802 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4804 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4805 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4806 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4807 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4808 match pending_forward_info {
4809 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4810 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4811 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4812 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4814 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4815 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4816 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4817 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4818 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4821 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4823 _ => pending_forward_info
4826 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4833 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4834 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4836 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4838 debug_assert!(false);
4839 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4843 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4844 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4845 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4850 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4854 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4858 debug_assert!(false);
4859 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4861 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4862 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4863 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4865 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4872 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4873 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4874 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4876 debug_assert!(false);
4877 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4881 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4883 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4884 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4885 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4887 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4890 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4894 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4896 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4898 debug_assert!(false);
4899 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4903 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4905 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4906 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4907 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4908 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4909 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4910 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4912 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4917 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4918 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4919 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4920 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4921 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4922 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4923 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4924 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4925 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4926 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4927 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4929 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4930 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4932 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4933 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4934 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4935 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4936 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4937 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4940 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4941 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4943 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4944 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4945 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4947 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4948 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4949 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4950 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4951 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4954 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4955 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4958 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4959 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4960 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4961 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4962 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4963 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4964 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4967 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4968 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4969 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
4974 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
4975 // payments are being processed.
4976 if forward_htlcs_empty {
4977 push_forward_event = true;
4979 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4980 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
4987 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
4988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4991 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
4992 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4993 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
4995 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
4999 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5000 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5001 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5002 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5003 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5005 if !forward_ev_exists {
5006 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5008 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5013 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5014 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5016 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5018 debug_assert!(false);
5019 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5020 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5024 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5025 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5026 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5027 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5028 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5029 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5030 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5032 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5035 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5039 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5040 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5041 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5043 debug_assert!(false);
5044 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5046 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5047 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5048 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5050 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5057 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5058 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5059 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5061 debug_assert!(false);
5062 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5066 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5068 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5069 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5072 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5073 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5074 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5075 msg, &self.default_configuration
5077 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5078 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5079 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5087 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5088 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5089 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5090 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5092 // It's not a local channel
5093 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5096 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5097 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5098 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5099 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5101 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5102 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5103 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5104 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5105 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5106 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5107 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5108 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5109 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5110 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5114 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5115 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5116 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5117 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5119 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5120 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5125 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5128 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5130 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5131 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5133 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5135 debug_assert!(false);
5136 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5140 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5142 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5143 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5144 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5145 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5146 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5147 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5148 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5149 let mut channel_update = None;
5150 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5155 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5156 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5157 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5158 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5159 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5160 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5161 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5166 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5167 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5168 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5169 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5170 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5179 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5180 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5183 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5184 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5189 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5190 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5191 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5193 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5194 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5195 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5196 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5197 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5198 match monitor_event {
5199 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5200 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5202 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5205 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5206 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5207 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5210 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5211 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5212 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5213 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5215 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5216 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5217 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5218 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5221 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5223 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5224 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5225 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5226 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5227 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5228 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5229 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5230 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5231 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5235 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5236 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5238 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5240 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5242 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5243 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5244 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5251 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5252 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5258 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5259 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5262 has_pending_monitor_events
5265 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5266 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5267 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5269 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5270 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5271 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5272 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5274 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5279 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5280 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5281 /// update was applied.
5282 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5283 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5284 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5285 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5287 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5288 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5289 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5290 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5293 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5296 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5297 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5298 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5299 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5300 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5301 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5302 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5303 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5305 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5306 has_monitor_update = true;
5308 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5309 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5310 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5311 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5312 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5313 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5314 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5316 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5318 continue 'peer_loop;
5327 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5328 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5329 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5332 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5333 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5339 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5340 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5341 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5342 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5343 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5344 let mut has_update = false;
5346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5348 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5351 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5352 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5353 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5354 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5355 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5358 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5361 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5362 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5363 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5364 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5365 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5370 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5372 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5373 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5374 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5380 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5381 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5389 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5390 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5396 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5397 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5399 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5400 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5401 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5402 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5403 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5404 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5405 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5406 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5407 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5408 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5409 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5410 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5411 assert!(should_broadcast);
5412 } else { unreachable!(); }
5413 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5415 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5419 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5420 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5422 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5423 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5426 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5429 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5430 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5432 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5433 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5434 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5435 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5436 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5437 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5438 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5439 // never fail a payment too early.
5440 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5442 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5450 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5453 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5454 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5456 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5457 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5458 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5459 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5461 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5463 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5464 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5468 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5469 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5471 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5473 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5474 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5476 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5477 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5478 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5479 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5480 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5481 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5482 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5483 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5484 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5485 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5486 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5489 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5490 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5492 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5495 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5497 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5499 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5500 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5501 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5502 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5503 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5506 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5507 /// stored external to LDK.
5509 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5510 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5511 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5513 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5514 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5517 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5518 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5519 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5520 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5522 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5523 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5524 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5525 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5526 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5528 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5529 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5530 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5531 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5532 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5534 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5535 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5537 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5538 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5542 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5543 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5545 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5547 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5548 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5550 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5551 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5552 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5553 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5554 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5555 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5556 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5559 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5560 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5562 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5565 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5567 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5569 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5570 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5573 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5574 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5576 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5577 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5578 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5581 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5582 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5584 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5585 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5586 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5587 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5589 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5590 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5591 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5592 Some(_) => continue,
5593 None => return scid_candidate
5598 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5600 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5601 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5603 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5604 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5605 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5609 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5610 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5611 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5613 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5614 /// times to get a unique scid.
5615 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5617 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5619 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5620 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5621 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5622 return scid_candidate
5626 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5627 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5628 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5629 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5632 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5635 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5636 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5637 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5638 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5647 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5648 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5649 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5650 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5651 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5655 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5656 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5657 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5662 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5663 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5664 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5668 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5669 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5673 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5674 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5677 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5678 /// using the given event handler.
5680 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5681 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5684 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5685 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5686 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5688 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5690 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5691 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5692 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5693 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5696 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5697 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5698 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5701 for event in pending_events {
5702 handler(event).await;
5705 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5706 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5722 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5723 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5724 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5725 /// is always placed next to each other.
5727 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5728 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5729 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5730 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5732 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5733 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5734 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5735 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5736 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5737 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5738 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5740 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5741 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5742 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5743 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5746 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5747 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5749 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5750 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5753 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5755 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5758 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5759 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5763 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5764 events.replace(pending_events);
5773 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5775 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5776 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5777 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5778 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5779 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5780 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5784 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5786 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5787 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5788 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5789 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5790 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5792 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5793 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5794 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5795 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5798 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5799 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5800 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5803 for event in pending_events {
5804 handler.handle_event(event);
5812 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5823 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5825 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5826 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5827 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5828 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5829 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5832 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5833 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5836 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5837 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5838 let new_height = height - 1;
5840 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5841 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5842 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5843 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5844 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5845 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5848 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5852 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5854 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5855 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5856 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5857 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5858 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5859 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5863 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5864 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5865 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5866 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5868 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5869 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5871 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5872 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5873 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5875 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5876 if height < last_best_block_height {
5877 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5878 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5882 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5883 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5884 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5885 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5887 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5888 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5892 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5894 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5896 macro_rules! max_time {
5897 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5899 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5900 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5901 // having an explicit local time source.
5902 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5903 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5904 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5905 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5906 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5912 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5913 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5914 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5915 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5919 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5920 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5921 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5922 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5923 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5924 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5925 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5926 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5933 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5935 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5936 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5937 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5938 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5939 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5940 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5945 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5947 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5948 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5949 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5950 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5951 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5952 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5956 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5957 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5959 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5960 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5961 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5962 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5963 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5965 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5966 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5969 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5972 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5973 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5974 let res = f(channel);
5975 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5976 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5977 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5978 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5979 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5981 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5982 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5983 if channel.is_usable() {
5984 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5985 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5987 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5996 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5998 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6000 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6001 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6002 msg: announcement_sigs,
6004 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6005 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6006 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6008 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6009 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6010 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6015 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6016 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6017 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6018 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6019 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6020 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6021 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6022 // is always consistent.
6023 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6024 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6025 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6026 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6027 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6030 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6031 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6032 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6033 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6034 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6035 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6040 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6041 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6043 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6044 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6045 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6046 data: reason_message,
6056 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6057 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6058 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6059 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6060 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6061 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6062 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6063 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6064 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6065 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6067 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6068 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6069 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6073 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6076 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6077 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6078 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6079 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6080 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6081 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6082 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6083 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6084 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6087 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6088 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6089 _ => unreachable!(),
6091 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6092 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6093 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6100 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6102 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6103 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6107 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6108 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6109 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6110 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6112 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6114 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6115 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6116 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6117 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6118 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6119 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6122 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6123 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6124 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6126 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6127 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6128 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6129 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6132 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6133 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6134 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6135 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6136 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6139 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6140 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6141 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6144 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6145 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6146 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6147 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6150 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6151 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6152 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6153 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6156 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6157 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6159 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6160 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6161 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6162 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6163 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6166 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6168 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6169 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6172 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6173 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6174 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6175 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6178 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6179 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6180 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6181 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6185 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6186 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6188 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6189 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6190 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6191 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6192 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6197 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6199 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6202 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6203 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6204 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6207 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6217 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6219 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6222 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6224 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6227 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6229 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6232 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6234 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6237 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6239 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6242 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6244 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6247 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6249 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6252 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6254 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6257 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6259 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6262 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6264 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6267 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6269 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6272 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6273 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6274 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6277 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6282 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6283 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6284 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6287 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6288 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6289 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6290 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6292 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6293 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6294 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6295 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6296 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6297 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6298 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6299 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6300 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6301 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6302 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6307 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6313 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6314 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6315 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6316 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6317 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6318 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6332 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6333 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6334 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6335 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6338 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6340 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6342 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6343 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6347 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6348 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6349 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6353 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6355 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6356 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6357 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6358 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6359 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6360 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6363 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6364 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6365 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6366 if inbound_peer_limited {
6369 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6370 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6371 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6372 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6373 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6377 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6378 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6379 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6381 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6382 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6383 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6384 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6389 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6390 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6395 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6398 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6401 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6402 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6403 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6404 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6405 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6406 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6407 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6412 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6413 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6418 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6419 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6420 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6421 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6422 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6431 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6435 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6436 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6438 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6439 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6441 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6442 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6443 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6445 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6447 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6448 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6449 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6453 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6455 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6456 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6459 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6460 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6461 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6462 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6470 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6471 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6475 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6476 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6479 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6480 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6484 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6485 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6486 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6487 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6490 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6491 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6493 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6494 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6495 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6496 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6497 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6500 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6502 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6503 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6506 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6508 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6509 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6512 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6513 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6514 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6515 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6516 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6517 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6518 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6519 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6520 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6521 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6522 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6523 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6524 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6525 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6526 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6527 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6528 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6529 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6531 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6532 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6533 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6539 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6540 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6542 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6543 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6544 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6545 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6548 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6549 (2, node_id, required),
6550 (4, features, required),
6551 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6552 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6553 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6554 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6557 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6558 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6559 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6560 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6561 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6562 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6563 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6564 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6565 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6566 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6567 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6568 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6569 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6570 (7, self.config, option),
6571 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6572 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6573 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6574 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6575 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6576 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6577 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6578 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6579 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6580 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6581 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6582 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6583 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6584 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6585 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6586 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6587 (32, self.is_public, required),
6588 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6589 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6590 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6596 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6597 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6598 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6599 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6600 (2, channel_id, required),
6601 (3, channel_type, option),
6602 (4, counterparty, required),
6603 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6604 (6, funding_txo, option),
6605 (7, config, option),
6606 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6607 (9, confirmations, option),
6608 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6609 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6610 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6611 (16, balance_msat, required),
6612 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6613 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6614 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6615 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6616 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6617 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6618 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6619 (26, is_outbound, required),
6620 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6621 (30, is_usable, required),
6622 (32, is_public, required),
6623 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6624 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6625 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6628 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6629 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6630 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6631 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6632 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6636 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6638 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6639 outbound_scid_alias,
6643 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6644 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6646 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6647 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6648 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6649 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6650 confirmations_required,
6652 force_close_spend_delay,
6653 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6654 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6655 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6656 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6657 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6658 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6663 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6664 (2, channels, vec_type),
6665 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6666 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6669 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6671 (0, onion_packet, required),
6672 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6675 (0, payment_data, required),
6676 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6677 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6679 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6680 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6681 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6685 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6686 (0, routing, required),
6687 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6688 (4, payment_hash, required),
6689 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6690 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6691 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6695 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6696 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6698 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6700 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6701 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6702 reason.write(writer)?;
6704 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6705 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6708 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6709 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6710 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6711 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6718 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6719 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6720 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6723 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6724 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6725 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6726 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6730 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6731 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6732 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6733 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6734 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6737 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6738 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6739 // messages contained in the variants.
6740 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6741 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6742 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6744 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6746 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6747 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6748 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6751 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6753 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6754 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6755 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6757 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6762 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6767 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6768 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6769 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6770 (2, outpoint, required),
6771 (4, htlc_id, required),
6772 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6775 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6776 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6777 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6778 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6779 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6781 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6782 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6783 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6784 (2, self.value, required),
6785 (4, payment_data, option),
6786 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6787 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6793 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6794 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6795 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6797 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6798 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6799 let mut total_msat = None;
6800 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6801 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6802 (0, prev_hop, required),
6803 (1, total_msat, option),
6804 (2, value, required),
6805 (4, payment_data, option),
6806 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6807 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6809 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6811 if payment_data.is_some() {
6812 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6814 if total_msat.is_none() {
6815 total_msat = Some(value);
6817 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6820 if total_msat.is_none() {
6821 if payment_data.is_none() {
6822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6824 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6826 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6830 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6833 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6840 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6841 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6842 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6846 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6847 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6848 let mut payment_id = None;
6849 let mut payment_secret = None;
6850 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6851 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6852 (0, session_priv, required),
6853 (1, payment_id, option),
6854 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6855 (3, payment_secret, option),
6856 (4, path, vec_type),
6857 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6859 if payment_id.is_none() {
6860 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6862 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6864 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6865 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6867 let path = path.unwrap();
6868 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6869 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6870 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6873 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6874 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6875 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6877 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6881 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6882 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6887 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6888 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6890 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6892 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6893 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6894 (0, session_priv, required),
6895 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6896 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6897 (3, payment_secret, option),
6898 (4, *path, vec_type),
6899 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6902 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6904 field.write(writer)?;
6911 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6912 (0, forward_info, required),
6913 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6914 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6915 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6916 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6919 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6921 (0, htlc_id, required),
6922 (2, err_packet, required),
6927 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6928 (0, payment_secret, required),
6929 (2, expiry_time, required),
6930 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6931 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6932 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6935 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6937 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6938 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6939 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6940 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6941 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6942 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6947 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6949 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6951 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6953 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6954 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6955 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6958 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6961 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6962 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6963 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6964 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6966 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6967 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6969 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6970 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6971 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6972 unfunded_channels += 1;
6977 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6979 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6980 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6981 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6982 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6983 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6984 channel.write(writer)?;
6991 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6992 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6993 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6994 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6995 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6996 for forward in pending_forwards {
6997 forward.write(writer)?;
7002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7004 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7005 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7006 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7008 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7009 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7010 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7011 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7012 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7013 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7014 htlc.write(writer)?;
7016 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7019 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7020 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7021 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7022 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7023 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7024 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7025 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7028 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7029 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7030 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7031 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7032 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7034 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7035 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7036 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7037 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7038 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7039 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7040 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7045 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7046 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7047 for event in events.iter() {
7048 event.write(writer)?;
7051 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7052 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7053 for event in background_events.iter() {
7055 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7057 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7058 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7063 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7064 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7065 // likely to be identical.
7066 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7067 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7069 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7070 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7071 hash.write(writer)?;
7072 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7075 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7076 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7077 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7078 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7079 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7082 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7083 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7085 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7086 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7087 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7088 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7091 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7092 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7096 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7097 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7098 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7100 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7101 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7102 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7108 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7109 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7110 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7111 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7114 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7115 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7116 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7117 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7118 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7121 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7122 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7123 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7124 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7125 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7126 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7127 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7128 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7129 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7130 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7137 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7139 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7141 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7142 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7143 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7144 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7145 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7146 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7147 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7148 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7149 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7150 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7151 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7152 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7153 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7155 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7156 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7158 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7159 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7161 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7162 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7163 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7164 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7165 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7166 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7168 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7169 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7171 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7172 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7173 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7174 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7175 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7176 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7180 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7181 pub entropy_source: ES,
7183 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7184 pub node_signer: NS,
7186 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7187 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7189 pub signer_provider: SP,
7191 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7193 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7194 pub fee_estimator: F,
7195 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7197 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7198 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7199 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7200 pub chain_monitor: M,
7202 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7203 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7204 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7205 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7206 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7207 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7209 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7211 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7212 /// deserialization.
7214 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7215 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7216 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7218 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7219 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7221 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7222 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7223 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7224 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7226 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7229 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7230 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7233 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7234 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7236 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7237 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7238 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7239 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7240 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7241 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7245 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7246 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7247 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7248 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7249 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7251 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7252 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7257 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7258 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7259 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7260 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7262 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7263 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7264 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7265 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7266 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7267 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7271 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7272 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7273 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7277 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7278 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7280 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7282 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7283 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7284 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7289 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7290 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7292 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7293 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7298 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7300 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7301 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7302 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7303 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7304 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7305 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7306 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7308 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7309 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7310 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7311 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7312 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7313 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7314 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7315 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7316 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7317 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7318 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7319 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7320 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7321 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7322 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7324 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7325 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7326 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7327 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7328 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7329 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7330 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7331 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7332 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7333 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7334 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7335 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7336 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7337 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7338 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7339 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7341 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7342 let mut found_htlc = false;
7343 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7344 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7347 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7348 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7349 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7350 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7351 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7352 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7353 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7354 log_info!(args.logger,
7355 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7356 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7357 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7361 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7362 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7363 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7365 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7366 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7368 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7369 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7370 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7371 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7374 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7375 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7376 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7380 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7381 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7382 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7383 // safely discard the channel.
7384 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7385 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7386 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7387 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7388 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7391 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7392 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7393 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7394 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7395 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7400 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7401 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7402 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7403 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7407 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7408 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7409 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7410 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7411 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7412 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7413 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7414 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7415 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7417 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7420 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7421 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7422 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7423 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7424 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7426 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7427 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7429 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7432 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7434 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7435 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let peer_state = PeerState {
7437 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7438 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7439 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7440 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7441 is_connected: false,
7443 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7446 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7448 for _ in 0..event_count {
7449 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7450 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7455 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7457 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7458 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7459 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7460 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7464 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7465 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7469 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7470 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7471 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7475 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7477 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7478 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7479 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7481 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7483 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7484 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7488 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7489 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7490 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7491 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7492 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7493 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7494 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7495 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7496 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7497 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7498 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7499 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7500 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7501 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7502 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7503 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7504 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7505 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7506 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7507 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7509 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7510 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7513 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7514 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7517 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7518 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7521 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7522 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7523 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7524 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7525 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7526 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7528 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7530 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7531 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7532 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7536 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7537 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7538 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7539 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7540 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7541 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7542 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7544 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7545 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7546 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7547 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7548 if path.is_empty() {
7549 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7553 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7554 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7555 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7556 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7558 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7559 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7560 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7563 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7564 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7565 retry_strategy: None,
7566 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7567 payment_params: None,
7568 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7569 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7571 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7572 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7573 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7574 total_msat: path_amt,
7575 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7577 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7578 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7583 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7585 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7586 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7587 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7588 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7590 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7591 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7592 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7593 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7594 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7595 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7596 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7597 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7598 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7599 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7600 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7605 !forwards.is_empty()
7607 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7608 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7609 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7610 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7611 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7612 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7613 intercepted_id != ev_id
7620 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7621 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7622 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7623 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7624 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7625 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7626 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7627 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7628 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7629 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7630 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7631 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7632 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7641 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7642 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7643 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7644 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7645 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7646 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7647 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7648 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7652 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7653 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7655 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7656 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7657 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7658 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7660 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7661 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7664 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7665 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7666 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7667 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7668 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7670 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7671 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7672 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7673 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7674 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7675 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7676 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7677 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7679 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7680 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7684 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7686 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7688 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7689 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7691 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7695 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7696 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7698 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7700 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7702 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7703 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7704 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7705 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7709 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7710 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7713 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7714 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7715 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7717 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7718 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7719 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7721 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7722 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7723 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7724 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7725 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7728 if chan.is_usable() {
7729 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7730 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7731 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7732 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7733 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7739 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7741 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7742 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7743 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7744 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7745 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7746 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7747 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7748 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7749 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7750 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7751 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7753 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7754 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7756 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7757 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7758 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7759 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7761 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7762 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7763 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7764 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7766 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7767 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7768 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7769 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7771 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7772 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7773 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7776 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7777 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7780 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7781 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7784 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7787 purpose: payment_purpose,
7788 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7794 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7795 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7796 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7798 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7799 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7803 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7805 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7806 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7807 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7808 router: args.router,
7810 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7812 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7813 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7814 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7815 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7817 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7818 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7819 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7820 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7821 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7822 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7824 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7829 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7831 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7833 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7834 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7835 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7836 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7838 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7839 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7840 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7842 logger: args.logger,
7843 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7846 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7847 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7848 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7849 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7850 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7853 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7854 //connection or two.
7856 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7862 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7863 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7864 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7865 use core::time::Duration;
7866 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7867 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7868 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7869 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7870 use crate::ln::msgs;
7871 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7872 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7873 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7874 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7875 use crate::util::test_utils;
7876 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7877 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7880 fn test_notify_limits() {
7881 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7882 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7886 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7888 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7889 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7890 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7891 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7892 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7894 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7896 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7897 // to connect messages with new values
7898 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7899 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7900 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7901 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7902 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7903 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7905 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7906 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7907 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7908 // ... but the last node should not.
7909 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7910 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7911 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7912 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7914 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7915 // about the channel.
7916 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7917 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7918 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7922 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7923 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7924 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7925 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7926 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7927 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7930 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7931 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7933 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7934 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7935 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7936 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7937 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7938 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7940 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7941 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7942 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7943 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7944 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7945 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7947 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7949 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7950 // the channel info has updated.
7951 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7952 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7953 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7954 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7955 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7956 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7960 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7961 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7967 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7969 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7970 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7971 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7972 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7974 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7975 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7976 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7977 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7978 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7979 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7981 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7982 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7983 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7985 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7986 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7988 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7989 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7990 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7991 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7992 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7994 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7998 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8000 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8001 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8002 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8003 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8004 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8005 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8006 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8008 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8009 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8010 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8011 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8012 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8013 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8015 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8016 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8017 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8018 // lightning messages manually.
8019 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8020 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8023 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8024 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8025 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8027 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8028 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8030 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8031 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8033 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8035 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8037 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8038 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8039 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8041 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8043 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8045 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8046 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8049 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8050 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8051 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8054 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8055 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8056 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8057 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8062 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8063 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8064 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8065 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8070 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8071 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8072 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8073 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8080 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8081 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8082 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8083 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8084 // fails as expected.
8085 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8086 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8087 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8088 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8089 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8090 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8091 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8093 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8094 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8095 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8097 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8098 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8099 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8100 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8102 let route = find_route(
8103 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8104 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8106 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8108 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8110 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8111 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8112 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8114 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8115 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8116 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8120 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8121 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8123 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8126 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8127 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8128 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8130 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8133 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8134 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8135 let route = find_route(
8136 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8137 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8139 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8140 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8141 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8142 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8143 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8144 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8145 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8147 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8148 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8149 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8153 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8154 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8155 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8157 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8158 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8161 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8162 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8163 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8164 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8165 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8166 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8167 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8168 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8169 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8171 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8176 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8177 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8178 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8184 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8185 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8187 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8188 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8189 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8190 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8192 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8193 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8194 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8195 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8196 let route = find_route(
8197 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8198 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8201 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8202 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8203 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8204 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8207 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8208 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8209 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8210 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8211 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8212 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8215 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8219 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8220 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8224 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8226 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8227 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8229 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8230 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8231 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8232 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8234 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8235 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8236 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8237 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8238 let route = find_route(
8239 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8240 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8243 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8244 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8245 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8246 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8247 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8250 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8251 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8252 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8253 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8254 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8255 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8258 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8262 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8266 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8268 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8269 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8270 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8271 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8273 // Marshall an MPP route.
8274 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8275 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8276 route.paths.push(path);
8277 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8278 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8279 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8280 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8281 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8282 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8284 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8285 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8286 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8287 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8292 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8298 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8300 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8301 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8303 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8306 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8309 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8310 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8311 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8312 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8313 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8314 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8317 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8320 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8326 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8327 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8331 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8333 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8334 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8336 total_msat: 100_000,
8339 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8340 // payment verification fails as expected.
8341 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8342 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8343 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8344 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8350 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8351 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8355 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8356 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8357 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8358 // the channel is successfully closed.
8359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8362 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8364 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8365 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8366 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8367 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8368 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8370 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8371 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8373 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8374 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8375 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8376 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8379 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8381 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8382 // as it has the funding transaction.
8383 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8384 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8385 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8390 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8392 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8394 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8395 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8396 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8400 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8401 // as it has the funding transaction.
8402 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8403 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8404 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8407 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8408 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8410 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8411 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8412 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8414 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8415 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8416 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8417 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8419 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8420 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8422 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8423 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8424 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8425 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8426 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8427 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8428 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8432 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8433 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8434 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8435 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8436 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8437 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8438 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8441 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8443 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8444 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8445 // closing transaction).
8446 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8447 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8448 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8450 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8451 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8452 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8453 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8454 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8457 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8461 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8462 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8463 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8465 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8468 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8471 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8472 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8473 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8476 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8477 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8478 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8481 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8483 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8484 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8486 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8487 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8489 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8490 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8495 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8496 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8497 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8498 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8499 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8500 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8501 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8505 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8506 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8507 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8509 // Test the API functions.
8510 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8512 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8514 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8516 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8518 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8520 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8522 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8526 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8527 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8533 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8535 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8536 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8538 let mut funding_tx = None;
8539 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8540 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8541 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8544 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8545 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8546 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8547 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8548 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8550 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8552 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8554 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8557 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8560 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8561 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8562 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8563 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8564 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8566 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8567 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8569 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8570 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8571 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8572 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8573 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8575 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8577 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8578 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8579 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8580 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8582 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8583 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8585 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8586 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8587 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8588 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8593 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8595 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8596 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8597 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8598 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8600 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8601 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8603 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8604 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8605 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8606 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8607 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8609 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8610 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8611 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8613 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8614 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8615 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8617 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8618 // "protected" and can connect again.
8619 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8620 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8621 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8622 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8624 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8626 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8627 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8631 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8632 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8633 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8636 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8638 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8640 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8641 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8643 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8644 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8645 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8646 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8649 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8651 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8652 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8653 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8655 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8656 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8657 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8659 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8660 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8661 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8662 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8666 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8667 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8668 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8671 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8672 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8676 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8678 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8679 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8681 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8682 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8683 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8684 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8685 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8686 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8688 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8689 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8691 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8692 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8696 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8697 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8700 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8701 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8702 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8703 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8704 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8705 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8706 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8708 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8709 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8710 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8711 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8715 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8717 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8718 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8720 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8721 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8722 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8724 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8725 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8729 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8734 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8735 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8736 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8737 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8740 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8741 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8742 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8746 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8747 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8748 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8751 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8753 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8754 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8759 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8760 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8762 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8763 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8765 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8769 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8771 use crate::chain::Listen;
8772 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8773 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8774 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8775 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8776 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8777 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8778 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8779 use crate::util::test_utils;
8780 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8781 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8783 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8784 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8785 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8787 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8791 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8792 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8793 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8794 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8795 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8796 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8797 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8798 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8803 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8804 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8807 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8808 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8809 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8811 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8813 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8814 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8815 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8816 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8817 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8819 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8820 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8822 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8823 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8824 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8825 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8827 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8829 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8831 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8832 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8833 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8834 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8835 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8837 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8839 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8841 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8842 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8843 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8844 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8845 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8848 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8849 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8850 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8852 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8853 } else { panic!(); }
8855 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8856 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8858 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8861 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8864 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8865 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8867 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8868 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8869 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8870 match msg_events[0] {
8871 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8872 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8873 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8877 match msg_events[1] {
8878 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8882 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8883 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8885 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8886 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8891 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8892 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8894 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8895 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8900 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8902 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8903 macro_rules! send_payment {
8904 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8905 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8906 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8907 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8908 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8909 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8910 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8911 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8912 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8913 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8915 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8916 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8918 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8919 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8921 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8922 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8923 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8924 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8925 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8926 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8927 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8928 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8930 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8931 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8932 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8933 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8935 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8936 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8937 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8938 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8939 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8941 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8944 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
8945 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8946 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8947 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8949 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8954 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8955 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);