1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, RoutePath, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure};
82 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
84 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
85 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
86 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
88 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
89 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
90 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
91 // before we forward it.
93 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
94 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
95 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
96 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
97 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
99 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
100 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
102 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
103 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
104 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
105 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
108 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
109 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
114 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
118 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
119 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
120 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
121 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
122 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
124 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
125 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
126 /// may overshoot this in either case)
127 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
128 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
131 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
132 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
133 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
134 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
137 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
138 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
139 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
140 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
141 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
144 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
145 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
147 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
148 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
149 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
152 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
153 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
155 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
156 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
159 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
160 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
163 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
169 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
170 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
171 short_channel_id: u64,
173 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
174 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
176 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
177 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
182 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
184 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
185 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
186 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
188 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
189 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
192 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
193 struct ClaimableHTLC {
194 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
196 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
198 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
199 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
200 sender_intended_value: u64,
201 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
203 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
204 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
205 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
206 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
210 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
212 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for PaymentId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
229 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
231 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
232 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
233 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
235 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
236 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
241 impl Readable for InterceptId {
242 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
243 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
248 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
249 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
250 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
251 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
252 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
255 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
257 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
258 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
259 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
261 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
262 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
266 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
267 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
268 (0, short_channel_id, required),
269 (2, htlc_id, required),
271 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
272 (0, session_priv, required),
277 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
278 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
279 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
280 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
281 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
284 session_priv: SecretKey,
285 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
286 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
287 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
288 payment_id: PaymentId,
289 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
294 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
296 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
298 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
303 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
304 payment_id.hash(hasher);
305 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
306 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
311 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
314 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
315 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
318 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
319 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
320 payment_secret: None,
325 struct ReceiveError {
331 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
332 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
334 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
335 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
336 pub enum FailureCode {
337 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
338 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
339 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
340 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
341 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
342 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
343 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
344 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
345 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
346 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
347 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
350 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
352 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
353 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
354 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
355 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
356 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
358 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
359 err: msgs::LightningError,
360 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
361 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
363 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
365 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
367 err: LightningError {
369 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
370 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
377 shutdown_finish: None,
381 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
382 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
385 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
387 err: LightningError {
389 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
390 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
397 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
401 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
404 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
407 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
411 log_level: Level::Warn,
414 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
416 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
429 shutdown_finish: None,
434 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
435 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
436 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
437 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
438 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
440 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
441 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
442 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
443 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
444 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
445 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
446 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
448 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
452 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
453 struct ClaimingPayment {
455 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
456 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
458 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
459 (0, amount_msat, required),
460 (2, payment_purpose, required),
461 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
464 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
465 struct ClaimablePayments {
466 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
467 /// failed/claimed by the user.
469 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
470 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
472 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
473 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
474 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
476 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
477 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
478 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
479 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
482 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
483 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
484 /// quite some time lag.
485 enum BackgroundEvent {
486 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
487 /// commitment transaction.
488 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
492 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
493 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
494 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
495 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
496 /// event can be generated.
497 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
498 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
499 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
502 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
503 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
504 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
507 /// State we hold per-peer.
508 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
509 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
511 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
512 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
514 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
515 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
516 latest_features: InitFeatures,
517 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
518 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
519 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
520 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
521 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
523 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
524 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
525 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
526 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
528 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
529 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
530 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
531 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
532 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
533 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
534 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
535 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
536 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
537 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
541 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
542 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
543 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
544 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
545 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
546 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
549 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
553 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
554 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
556 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
559 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
560 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
561 struct PendingInboundPayment {
562 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
563 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
564 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
565 /// this payment being removed.
567 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
568 user_payment_id: u64,
569 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
570 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
571 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
574 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
575 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
576 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
577 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
578 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
579 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
580 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
581 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
583 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
584 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
592 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
594 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
599 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
600 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
601 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
602 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
603 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
604 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
605 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
606 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
607 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
609 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
610 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
612 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
613 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
615 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
616 /// to individual Channels.
618 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
619 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
620 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
621 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
623 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
624 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
625 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
626 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
627 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
628 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
629 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
631 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
632 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
633 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
635 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
636 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
637 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
638 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
639 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
641 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
642 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
643 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
644 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
646 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
647 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
648 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
650 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
651 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
652 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
653 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
654 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
656 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
657 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
658 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
659 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
660 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
661 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
662 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
663 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
666 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
667 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
668 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
669 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
670 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
674 // `total_consistency_lock`
676 // |__`forward_htlcs`
678 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
680 // |__`per_peer_state`
682 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
684 // | |__`claimable_payments`
686 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
692 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
694 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
698 // | |__`pending_events`
700 // | |__`pending_background_events`
702 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
704 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
705 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
707 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
708 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
709 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
713 default_configuration: UserConfig,
714 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
715 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
721 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
723 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
725 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
726 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
728 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
729 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
730 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
731 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
733 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
734 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
736 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
737 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
738 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
739 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
740 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
741 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
742 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
743 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
745 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
747 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
748 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
750 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
752 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
753 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
754 /// and via the classic SCID.
756 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
757 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
759 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
761 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
763 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
764 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
765 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
770 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
771 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
774 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
776 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
777 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
778 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
779 /// active channel list on load.
781 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
782 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
784 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
786 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
787 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
788 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
790 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
791 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
792 /// the handling of the events.
794 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
795 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
798 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
799 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
800 /// would break backwards compatability.
801 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
802 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
803 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
805 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
806 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
808 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
810 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
811 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
812 /// confirmation depth.
814 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
815 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
816 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
822 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
824 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
826 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
828 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
829 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
830 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
832 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
833 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
835 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
836 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
837 /// keeping additional state.
838 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
840 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
841 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
842 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
843 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
845 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
846 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
848 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
849 /// are currently open with that peer.
851 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
852 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
855 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
857 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
858 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
859 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
860 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
861 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
863 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
864 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
865 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
866 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
867 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
868 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
869 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
870 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
871 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
872 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
873 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
875 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
884 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
886 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
887 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
888 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
889 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
890 pub struct ChainParameters {
891 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
892 pub network: Network,
894 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
896 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
897 pub best_block: BestBlock,
900 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
906 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
907 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
908 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
909 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
910 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
911 /// updates are ready for persistence).
913 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
914 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
915 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
916 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
917 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
919 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
920 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
923 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
924 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
925 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
928 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
929 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
931 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
932 persistence_notifier: notifier,
933 should_persist: persist_check,
934 _read_guard: read_guard,
939 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
941 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
942 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
947 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
948 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
950 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
952 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
953 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
954 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
955 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
956 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
958 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
959 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
961 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
963 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
964 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
965 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
966 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
967 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
968 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
969 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
970 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
971 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
972 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
973 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
974 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
975 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
977 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
978 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
980 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
981 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
982 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
983 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
985 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
986 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
987 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
988 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
989 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
990 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
993 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
995 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
996 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
999 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1001 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1002 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1004 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1005 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1006 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1007 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1009 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1010 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1011 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1012 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1014 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1015 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1016 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1018 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1019 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1020 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1022 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1023 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1024 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1025 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1026 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1027 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1028 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1029 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1030 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1031 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1032 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1035 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1036 /// to better separate parameters.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1039 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1040 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1041 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1042 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1043 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1044 pub features: InitFeatures,
1045 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1046 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1047 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1049 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1051 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1052 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1053 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1054 /// payments to us through this channel.
1055 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1056 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1057 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1058 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1059 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1060 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1061 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1064 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1065 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1066 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1067 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1068 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1069 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1070 /// lifetime of the channel.
1071 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1072 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1073 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1074 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1075 /// our counterparty already.
1077 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1078 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1079 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1080 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1082 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1083 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1084 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1085 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1087 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1088 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1090 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1091 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1093 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1094 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1095 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1096 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1097 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1098 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1099 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1100 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1101 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1104 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1106 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1107 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1108 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1109 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1110 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1111 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1112 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1114 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1115 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1117 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1118 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1119 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1120 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1121 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1122 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1123 /// this value on chain.
1125 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1127 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1129 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1130 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1131 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1132 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1134 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1135 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1136 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1138 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1139 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1140 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1141 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1142 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1144 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1145 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1146 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1147 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1149 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1150 pub balance_msat: u64,
1151 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1152 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1153 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1154 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1156 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1158 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1159 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1160 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1161 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1162 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1163 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1164 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1165 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1167 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1168 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1169 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1170 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1171 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1172 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1173 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1175 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1176 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1177 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1178 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1179 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1180 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1181 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1182 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1183 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1185 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1187 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1188 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1189 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1190 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1191 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1193 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1194 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1195 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1196 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1197 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1198 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1199 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1201 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1202 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1203 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1204 pub is_outbound: bool,
1205 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1206 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1207 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1208 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1209 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1211 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1212 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1213 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1214 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1216 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1217 pub is_usable: bool,
1218 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1219 pub is_public: bool,
1220 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1221 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1222 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1223 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1224 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1225 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1227 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1228 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1231 impl ChannelDetails {
1232 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1233 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1234 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1236 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1237 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1238 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1239 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1242 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1243 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1244 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1246 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1247 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1248 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1249 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1252 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1253 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1255 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1256 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1257 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1259 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1260 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1261 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1262 features: latest_features,
1263 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1264 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1265 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1266 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1267 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1268 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1269 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1270 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1271 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1272 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1274 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1275 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1276 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1277 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1278 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1279 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1280 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1281 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1282 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1283 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1284 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1285 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1286 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1287 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1288 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1289 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1290 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1291 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1292 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1293 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1294 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1295 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1296 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1297 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1298 config: Some(channel.config()),
1303 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1304 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1305 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1306 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1307 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1309 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1311 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1312 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1313 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1316 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1317 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1318 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1320 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1321 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1322 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1324 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1325 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1326 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1328 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1329 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1333 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1335 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1337 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1338 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1339 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1340 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1342 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1343 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1344 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1347 macro_rules! handle_error {
1348 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1351 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1352 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1353 // entering the macro.
1354 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1355 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1357 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1359 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1360 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1361 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1362 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1366 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1367 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1368 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1369 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1374 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1375 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1377 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1378 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1379 action: err.action.clone()
1383 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1384 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1385 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1386 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1387 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1391 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1398 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1399 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1400 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1401 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1402 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1403 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1405 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1406 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1407 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1408 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1409 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1411 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1412 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1414 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1418 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1419 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1420 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1422 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1423 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1425 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1426 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1428 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1429 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1430 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1431 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1432 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1433 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1439 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1440 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1444 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1446 $entry.remove_entry();
1454 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1455 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1459 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1461 $entry.remove_entry();
1469 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1470 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1472 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1473 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1479 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1480 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1481 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1482 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1483 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1485 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1486 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1487 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1488 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1489 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1490 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1491 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1492 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1493 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1494 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1499 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1500 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1501 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1502 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelPending {
1503 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1504 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1505 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1506 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1507 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1509 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1514 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1515 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1516 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1517 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1518 $locked_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1519 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1520 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1521 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1522 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1524 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1529 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1530 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1531 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1532 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1533 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1534 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1535 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1536 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1537 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1538 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1539 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1541 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1542 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1543 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1549 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1550 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1552 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1553 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1554 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1555 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1556 updates.announcement_sigs);
1557 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1558 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1561 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1562 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1563 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1565 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1567 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1568 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1570 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1571 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1572 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1573 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1578 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1579 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1580 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1581 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1582 debug_assert!($self.id_to_peer.try_lock().is_ok());
1584 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1585 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1586 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1589 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1590 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1591 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1592 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1593 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1594 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1595 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1596 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1600 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1601 if ($update_id == 0 || $chan.get_next_monitor_update()
1602 .expect("We can't be processing a monitor update if it isn't queued")
1603 .update_id == $update_id) &&
1604 $chan.get_latest_monitor_update_id() == $update_id
1606 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1612 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1613 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1617 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1619 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1621 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1622 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1623 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1628 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1630 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1631 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1633 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1635 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1636 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1637 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1640 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1641 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1642 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1643 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1644 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1645 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1646 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1647 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1649 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1650 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1651 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1656 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1658 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1659 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1660 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1661 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1662 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1663 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1664 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1665 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1667 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1670 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1671 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1673 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1675 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1677 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1679 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1680 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1681 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1682 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1692 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1693 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1694 &self.default_configuration
1697 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1698 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1699 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1702 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1703 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1705 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1707 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1711 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1716 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1718 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1719 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1720 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1721 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1722 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1724 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1725 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1727 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1728 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1729 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1731 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1732 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1733 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1735 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1736 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1739 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1740 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1741 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1742 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1743 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1746 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1747 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1748 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1752 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1753 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1755 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1757 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1758 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1759 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1760 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1761 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1762 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1766 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1771 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1773 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1779 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1785 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1786 node_id: their_network_key,
1789 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1792 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1793 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1794 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1795 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1796 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1797 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1798 // the same channel.
1799 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1801 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1802 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1803 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1804 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1805 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1806 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1807 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1808 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1816 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1817 /// more information.
1818 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1819 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1822 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1823 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1825 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1826 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1828 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1829 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1830 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1831 // really wanted anyway.
1832 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1835 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
1836 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1837 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1838 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1840 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
1841 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1842 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1843 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1844 return peer_state.channel_by_id
1847 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
1853 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
1854 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1856 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
1857 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
1858 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
1860 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1861 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
1862 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
1863 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
1864 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
1865 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1866 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1867 total_msat: *total_msat,
1870 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
1871 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1873 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
1874 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
1876 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
1881 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1882 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1883 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1884 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1885 Some(transaction) => {
1886 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1890 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1891 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1892 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1893 reason: closure_reason
1897 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1900 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1901 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1902 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
1905 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
1907 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1908 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1909 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1911 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
1912 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1913 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
1914 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?;
1915 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1917 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
1918 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
1919 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
1920 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1921 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1925 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1926 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
1927 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1928 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
1929 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
1932 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1933 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1934 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1935 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1949 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1950 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1953 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1957 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1958 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1959 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1961 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1962 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1964 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1965 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1966 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1967 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1969 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1971 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1972 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1973 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1974 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1975 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1976 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1979 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1980 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1981 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1983 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1984 /// the channel being closed or not:
1985 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1986 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1987 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1988 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1989 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1990 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1991 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1993 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
1995 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1996 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1997 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1998 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
1999 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2000 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2004 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2005 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2006 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2007 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2008 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2009 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2010 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2013 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2014 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2015 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2016 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2017 // ignore the result here.
2018 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2022 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2023 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2024 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2025 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2026 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2027 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2028 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2030 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2031 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2032 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2033 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2034 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2036 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2038 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2040 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2043 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2044 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2045 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2046 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2047 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2052 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2055 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2057 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2058 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2060 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2061 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2062 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2063 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2064 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2066 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2077 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2078 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2079 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2081 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2082 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2083 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2086 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2087 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2088 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2090 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2091 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2092 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2093 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2094 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2097 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2098 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2099 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2100 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2101 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2105 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2106 /// local transaction(s).
2107 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2108 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2109 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2113 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2114 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2116 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2117 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2118 return Err(ReceiveError {
2119 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2121 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2124 // final_expiry_too_soon
2125 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2126 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2128 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2129 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2130 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2131 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2132 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2133 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2134 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2135 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2136 return Err(ReceiveError {
2137 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2138 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2141 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2142 return Err(ReceiveError {
2144 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2145 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2149 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2150 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2151 return Err(ReceiveError {
2152 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2153 err_data: Vec::new(),
2154 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2157 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2158 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2159 return Err(ReceiveError {
2160 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2161 err_data: Vec::new(),
2162 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2164 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2165 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2167 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 phantom_shared_secret,
2170 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2171 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2172 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2173 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2174 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2175 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2176 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2177 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2178 return Err(ReceiveError {
2179 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2180 err_data: Vec::new(),
2181 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2185 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2187 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2190 return Err(ReceiveError {
2191 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2192 err_data: Vec::new(),
2193 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2198 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2201 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2202 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2203 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2204 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2208 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2209 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2210 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2212 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2213 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2214 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2215 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2216 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2217 failure_code: $err_code,
2223 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2224 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2227 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2228 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2229 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2231 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2232 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2233 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2234 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2235 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2236 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2237 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2238 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2240 macro_rules! return_err {
2241 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2243 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2244 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2245 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2246 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2247 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2248 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2254 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2256 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2257 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2259 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2260 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2264 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2265 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2267 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2269 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2270 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2271 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2272 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2273 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2275 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2278 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2279 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2280 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2282 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2283 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2284 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2287 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2288 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2289 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2290 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2294 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2295 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2296 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2299 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2300 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2301 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2302 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2303 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2308 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2309 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2310 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2311 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2312 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2313 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2314 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2315 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2316 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2317 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2318 // phantom or an intercept.
2319 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2320 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2321 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2325 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2328 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2330 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2332 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2333 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2334 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2336 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2337 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2338 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2340 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2341 // have no consistency guarantees.
2342 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2346 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2347 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2348 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2349 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2350 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2352 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2353 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2354 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2355 // we don't have the channel here.
2356 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2358 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2360 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2361 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2362 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2363 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2364 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2365 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2366 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2368 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2369 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2371 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2372 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2376 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2377 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2378 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2379 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2381 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2388 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2389 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2390 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2391 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2392 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2393 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2395 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2396 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2398 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2399 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2400 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2401 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2402 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2403 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2404 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2405 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2406 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2407 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2413 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2414 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2415 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2416 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2418 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2419 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2421 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2422 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2423 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2425 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2426 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2427 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2428 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2429 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2430 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2431 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2435 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2440 pending_forward_info
2443 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2444 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2445 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2447 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2448 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2449 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2451 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2452 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2453 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2454 if !chan.should_announce() {
2455 return Err(LightningError {
2456 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2460 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2461 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2463 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2464 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2467 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2468 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2469 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2470 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2472 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2473 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2474 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2476 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2477 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2478 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2480 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2481 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2485 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2487 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2489 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2491 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2492 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2494 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2495 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2496 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2497 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2498 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2499 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2500 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2501 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2503 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2504 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2505 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2507 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2509 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2516 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2517 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2518 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2521 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2522 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2523 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2526 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2527 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2529 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2530 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2531 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2532 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2533 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()});
2535 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2537 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2538 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2539 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2540 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2543 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2544 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2545 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2548 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2549 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2550 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2552 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2553 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2554 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2556 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2557 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2559 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2560 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2561 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2562 Some(monitor_update) => {
2563 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2564 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2565 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2568 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2569 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2570 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2571 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2572 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2573 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2574 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2575 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2581 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2582 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2583 // `channel_by_id` map.
2584 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2585 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2590 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2591 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2593 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2598 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2600 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2601 /// fields for more info.
2603 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2604 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2606 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2608 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2609 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2610 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2611 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2612 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2614 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2615 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2616 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2617 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2618 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2620 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2621 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2622 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2623 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2625 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2627 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2628 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2629 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2631 /// In general, a path may raise:
2632 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2633 /// node public key) is specified.
2634 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2635 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2637 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2638 /// relevant updates.
2640 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2641 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2642 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2644 /// # A caution on `payment_secret`
2646 /// `payment_secret` is unrelated to `payment_hash` (or [`PaymentPreimage`]) and exists to
2647 /// authenticate the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization)
2648 /// attacks. For newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one,
2649 /// the [`Route`] must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a
2650 /// recipient-provided `payment_secret`.
2652 /// If a `payment_secret` *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret
2653 /// feature bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the
2654 /// [`Route`], we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2656 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2657 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2658 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2659 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2660 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2661 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2663 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2664 self.pending_outbound_payments
2665 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2666 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2667 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2670 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2671 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2672 pub fn send_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2673 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2674 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2675 self.pending_outbound_payments
2676 .send_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2677 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2678 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2679 &self.pending_events,
2680 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2681 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2685 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2686 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2688 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2689 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2690 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2694 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2696 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2700 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2701 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2702 /// retries are exhausted.
2704 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2705 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2707 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2708 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2709 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2711 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2712 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2714 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2715 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2716 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2718 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, &self.pending_events);
2721 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2722 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2723 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2724 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2725 /// never reach the recipient.
2727 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2728 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2730 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2731 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2733 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2735 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2736 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2739 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2740 route, payment_preimage, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
2742 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2743 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2746 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2747 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2749 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2752 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2753 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2754 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2755 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2756 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, payment_id,
2757 retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2758 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2759 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2760 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2761 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2764 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2765 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2766 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2767 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2770 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(hops, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2771 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2772 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2775 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2778 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2779 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2782 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2783 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2784 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2785 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2786 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2789 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2797 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2799 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2800 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2801 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2802 } else { unreachable!(); })
2805 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) }) },
2808 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2809 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2812 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2813 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
2818 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2819 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2822 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2824 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2827 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2828 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2829 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2838 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2839 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2840 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2844 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2846 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2847 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2849 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2850 /// across the p2p network.
2852 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2853 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2855 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2856 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2857 /// keys per-channel).
2859 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2860 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2861 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2863 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2864 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2865 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2867 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2868 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2869 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2870 /// for more details.
2872 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2873 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2874 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2875 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2877 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2878 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2879 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2880 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2885 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2886 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2887 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2888 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2889 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2890 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2891 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
2895 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2896 let mut output_index = None;
2897 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2898 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2899 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2900 if output_index.is_some() {
2901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2902 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2905 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2907 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2910 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2913 if output_index.is_none() {
2914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2915 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2918 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2922 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
2924 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
2925 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
2926 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
2927 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
2929 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
2930 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
2932 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
2933 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
2935 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
2937 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2938 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
2939 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2940 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
2941 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2942 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
2943 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
2944 pub fn update_channel_config(
2945 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
2946 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2947 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
2948 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2949 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
2953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
2954 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
2956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2957 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2958 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2959 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2960 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2961 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2962 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
2963 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2964 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
2968 for channel_id in channel_ids {
2969 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
2970 if !channel.update_config(config) {
2973 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
2974 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
2975 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
2976 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2977 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2985 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
2986 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
2988 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
2989 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
2991 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
2992 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
2993 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
2994 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
2995 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
2997 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
2998 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3000 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3003 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3004 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3005 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3006 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3007 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3010 let next_hop_scid = {
3011 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3012 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3013 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3015 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3016 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3018 if !chan.is_usable() {
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3020 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3023 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3025 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3026 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3031 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3032 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3033 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3036 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3037 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3038 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3040 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3042 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3043 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3046 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3047 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3048 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3049 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3050 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3052 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3056 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3057 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3059 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3062 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3063 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3066 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3067 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3068 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3071 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3072 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3073 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3074 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3075 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3076 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3077 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3080 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3081 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3082 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3083 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3088 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3090 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3091 /// Will likely generate further events.
3092 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3095 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3096 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3097 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3099 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3100 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3102 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3103 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3104 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3106 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3107 match forward_info {
3108 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3109 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3110 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3111 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3112 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3115 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3116 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3117 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3119 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3120 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3121 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3122 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3124 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3127 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3128 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3130 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3133 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3134 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3140 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3141 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3143 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3147 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3148 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3150 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3154 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3155 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3156 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3157 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3158 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3160 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3161 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3162 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3163 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3164 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3166 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3168 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3169 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3173 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3174 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3175 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3176 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3182 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3185 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3188 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3189 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3190 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3191 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3192 // problem, not ours.
3198 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3199 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3201 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3205 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3206 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3207 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3208 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3211 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3212 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3213 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3215 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3219 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3220 match forward_info {
3221 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3222 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3223 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3224 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3225 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3228 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3229 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3230 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3231 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3232 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3233 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3234 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3235 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3237 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3238 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3239 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3241 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3244 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3246 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3247 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3248 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3249 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3254 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3255 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3257 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3258 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3259 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3260 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3262 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3265 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3267 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3268 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3269 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3278 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3279 match forward_info {
3280 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3281 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3282 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3283 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3286 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3287 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3288 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3289 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3291 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3292 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3294 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3297 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3298 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3299 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3300 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3301 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3302 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3303 phantom_shared_secret,
3305 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3306 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3307 // if routing nodes overpay
3308 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3309 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3311 total_value_received: None,
3312 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3317 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3318 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3319 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3320 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3321 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3323 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3324 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3325 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3326 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3327 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3328 phantom_shared_secret,
3330 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3331 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3335 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3336 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3337 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3338 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3339 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3342 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3343 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3344 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3346 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3347 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3348 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3351 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3352 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3353 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3356 let (_, ref mut htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3357 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3358 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3359 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3361 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3365 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3366 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3367 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3368 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3369 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3370 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3371 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3372 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3373 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3375 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3377 _ => unreachable!(),
3380 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3381 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3382 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3383 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3384 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3386 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3387 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3388 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3389 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3390 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3391 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3392 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3393 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3394 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3398 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3399 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3401 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3403 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3404 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3406 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3408 payment_claimable_generated
3412 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3413 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3414 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3415 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3416 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3417 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3418 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3419 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3420 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3421 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3422 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3423 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3424 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3425 Ok(result) => result,
3427 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3428 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3432 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3433 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3434 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3435 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3436 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3437 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3441 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3443 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3444 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3445 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3446 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3449 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3450 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3451 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3452 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3453 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3454 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3455 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3456 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3457 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3461 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3462 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3465 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3466 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3467 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3473 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3474 if payment_data.is_none() {
3475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3479 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3480 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3481 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3482 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3483 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3485 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3486 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3488 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3489 if payment_claimable_generated {
3490 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3496 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3497 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3505 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3506 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3507 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3508 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3509 |path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3510 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3512 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3515 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3517 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3518 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3519 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3521 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3523 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3524 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3525 events.append(&mut new_events);
3528 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3530 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3531 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3533 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3534 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3535 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3536 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3537 if background_events.is_empty() {
3541 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3543 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3544 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3545 // monitor updating completing.
3546 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3553 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3554 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3555 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3556 self.process_background_events();
3559 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3560 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3561 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3562 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3563 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3564 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3565 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3567 if !chan.is_live() {
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3569 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3570 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3573 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3575 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3576 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3580 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3581 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3582 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3583 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3584 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3585 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3586 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3588 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3591 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3592 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3593 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3594 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3595 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3596 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3604 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3606 /// This currently includes:
3607 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3608 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3609 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3611 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3612 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3613 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3615 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3616 /// estimate fetches.
3618 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3619 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3620 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3621 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3622 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3623 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3625 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3627 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3628 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3629 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3631 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3632 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3635 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3636 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3637 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3638 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3639 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3641 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3642 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3643 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3644 if needs_close { return false; }
3647 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3648 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3649 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3650 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3651 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3652 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3658 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3659 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3661 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3662 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3663 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3667 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3668 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3673 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3677 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3678 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3683 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3684 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3685 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3686 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3687 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3688 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3689 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3690 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3691 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3692 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3693 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3695 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3696 // have no channels to the peer.
3697 let remove_entry = {
3698 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3699 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3702 entry.remove_entry();
3705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3710 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3711 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3712 // This should be unreachable
3713 debug_assert!(false);
3716 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3717 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3718 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3719 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3720 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3721 if htlcs[0].total_msat <= htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value) {
3723 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3724 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3725 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3727 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3734 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3735 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3736 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3737 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3738 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3741 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3742 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3745 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3747 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3748 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3749 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3750 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3751 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3758 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3759 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3760 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3762 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3763 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3764 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3765 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3767 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3768 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3769 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3770 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3771 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
3775 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
3776 /// reason for the failure.
3778 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
3779 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
3780 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3782 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3783 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3784 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3785 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
3786 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3787 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3793 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
3794 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
3795 match failure_code {
3796 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3797 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
3798 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
3799 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3800 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3801 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
3806 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3807 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3809 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3811 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3812 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3813 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3814 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3815 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3816 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3817 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3819 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3821 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3822 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3824 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3829 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3830 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3831 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3832 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3833 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3834 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3835 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3836 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3837 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3838 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3840 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3841 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3842 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3843 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3845 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3846 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3847 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3848 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3849 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3853 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3854 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3855 // be surfaced to the user.
3856 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3857 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3858 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3860 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
3861 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3862 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3865 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3867 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3871 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
3874 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3875 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
3876 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3881 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3882 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3883 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
3884 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
3885 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
3886 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
3887 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
3888 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3889 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3892 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3893 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3894 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3897 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3898 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3899 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3901 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
3902 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
3903 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
3904 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
3905 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3907 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
3908 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
3909 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
3911 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
3912 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3913 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3914 push_forward_ev = true;
3916 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
3917 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3918 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
3920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3921 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
3924 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
3925 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
3926 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3927 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
3928 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
3929 failed_next_destination: destination,
3935 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
3936 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3938 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
3939 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
3940 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
3942 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3943 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
3944 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3945 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3947 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
3948 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
3949 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
3950 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3951 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3952 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
3953 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3955 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3958 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3959 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
3960 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3961 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3962 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3963 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3964 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3965 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
3970 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
3971 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
3972 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
3974 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
3975 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
3976 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
3977 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3982 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3984 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
3985 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
3986 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
3987 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
3988 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
3989 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
3990 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
3991 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3992 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3993 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3994 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3995 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
3996 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
3997 debug_assert!(false);
4001 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4003 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4004 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4005 debug_assert!(false);
4009 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4011 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4012 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4013 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4014 if sources.len() != 1 {
4015 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4016 debug_assert!(false);
4022 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4024 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4025 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4026 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4027 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4030 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4031 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4032 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4033 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4037 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4038 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4039 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4040 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4043 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4044 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4045 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4046 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4051 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4052 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4053 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4054 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4055 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4056 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4057 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4059 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4062 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4063 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4064 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4065 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4069 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4070 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4071 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4072 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4075 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4076 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4077 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4081 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4082 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id).map(
4083 |peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap()
4087 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4088 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4089 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4090 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4091 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4092 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4094 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4095 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4097 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4098 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4100 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4101 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4102 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4103 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4104 if let Err(e) = res {
4105 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4106 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4107 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4108 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4109 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4115 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4116 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4117 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4121 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4122 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4123 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4124 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4125 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4126 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4127 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4128 // again on restart.
4129 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4130 payment_preimage, update_res);
4132 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4133 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4134 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4135 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4136 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4137 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4141 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4142 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4145 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4147 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4148 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4150 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4151 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4152 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4153 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4154 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4155 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4156 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4159 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4160 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4162 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4164 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4167 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4171 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4172 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4173 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4179 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4180 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4181 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4184 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4185 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4187 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4188 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4189 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4190 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4191 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4195 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4196 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4202 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4203 /// update completion.
4204 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4205 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4206 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4207 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4208 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4209 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4211 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4212 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4213 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4214 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4215 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4216 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4218 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4220 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4221 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4222 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4223 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4226 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4227 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4229 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4230 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4231 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4236 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4237 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4238 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4239 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4244 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4245 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4246 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4247 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4248 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4253 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4257 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4263 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4264 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4265 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4269 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4270 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4271 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4277 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4278 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4280 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4281 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4283 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4284 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4285 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4286 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4287 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4293 let mut peer_state_lock;
4294 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4295 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4296 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4297 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4299 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4301 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4304 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4305 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4306 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4309 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4312 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4314 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4315 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4318 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4319 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4320 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4322 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4323 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4324 /// used to accept such channels.
4326 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4327 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4328 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4329 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4332 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4333 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4335 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4336 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4337 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4339 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4340 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4342 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4343 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4345 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4346 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4348 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4349 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4350 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4351 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4354 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4357 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4358 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4359 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4360 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4361 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4362 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4363 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4364 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4366 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4370 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4371 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4372 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4373 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4374 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4375 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4378 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4379 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4380 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4382 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4383 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4384 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4385 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4386 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4387 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4388 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4389 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4392 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4393 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4398 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4399 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4400 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4404 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4410 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4411 /// or 0-conf channels.
4413 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4414 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4415 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4416 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4417 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4418 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4420 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4421 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4422 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4423 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4424 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4425 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4426 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4430 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4433 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4434 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4436 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4437 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4438 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4439 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4441 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4444 num_unfunded_channels
4447 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4448 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4449 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4452 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4453 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4456 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4457 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4458 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4459 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4461 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4462 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4463 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4464 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4469 debug_assert!(false);
4470 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4472 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4473 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4475 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4476 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4477 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4478 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4479 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4480 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4482 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4483 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4484 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4487 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4488 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4489 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4490 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4491 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4494 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4495 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4496 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4499 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4500 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4504 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4505 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4506 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4510 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4511 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4514 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4515 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4516 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4519 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4520 pending_events.push(
4521 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4522 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4523 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4524 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4525 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4526 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4531 entry.insert(channel);
4537 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4538 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4539 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4540 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4542 debug_assert!(false);
4543 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4547 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4549 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4550 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4556 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4557 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4558 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4559 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4561 user_channel_id: user_id,
4566 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4567 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4569 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4570 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4572 debug_assert!(false);
4573 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4576 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4577 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4578 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4579 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4580 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4581 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4583 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4586 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4587 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4588 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4591 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4593 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4594 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4595 funding_msg.channel_id))
4597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4598 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4602 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4603 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4604 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4605 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4606 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4608 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4612 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4614 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4615 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4616 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4618 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4619 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4620 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4621 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4622 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4623 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4624 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4625 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4633 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4634 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4635 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4636 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4638 debug_assert!(false);
4639 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4642 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4643 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4644 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4645 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4646 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4647 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4648 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4649 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4650 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4651 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4652 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4653 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4654 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4655 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4660 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4664 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4665 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4666 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4668 debug_assert!(false);
4669 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4671 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4675 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4676 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4677 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4678 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4679 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4680 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4681 msg: announcement_sigs,
4683 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4684 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4685 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4686 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4687 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4688 // announcement_signatures.
4689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4690 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4691 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4692 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4699 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4700 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4705 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4709 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4710 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4711 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4712 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4713 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4715 debug_assert!(false);
4716 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4718 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4719 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4720 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4721 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4723 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4724 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4725 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4726 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4729 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4730 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4731 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4732 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4734 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4735 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4736 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4737 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4738 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4739 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4744 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4745 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4746 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4747 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4748 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
4752 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4755 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4756 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4757 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
4758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4764 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4765 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4766 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4768 debug_assert!(false);
4769 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4771 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4776 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4777 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4779 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4784 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4785 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4786 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4787 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4788 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4789 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4790 } else { (tx, None) }
4792 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4795 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4796 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4797 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4799 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4800 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4803 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4807 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4812 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4813 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4814 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4815 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4817 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4818 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4819 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4820 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4822 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4823 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4824 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4826 debug_assert!(false);
4827 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4834 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4835 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4836 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4837 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4838 match pending_forward_info {
4839 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4840 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4841 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4842 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
4844 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
4845 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
4846 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4847 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4848 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4851 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4853 _ => pending_forward_info
4856 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4863 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4864 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4865 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4866 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4868 debug_assert!(false);
4869 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4871 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4872 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4873 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4875 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4880 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4884 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4885 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4886 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4888 debug_assert!(false);
4889 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4891 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4892 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4893 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4895 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
4897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4902 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4904 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4906 debug_assert!(false);
4907 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4909 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4910 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4911 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4913 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4914 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4915 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
4917 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
4920 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4924 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4926 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4928 debug_assert!(false);
4929 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4933 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4935 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
4936 let monitor_update = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
4937 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4938 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4939 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4940 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
4942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4947 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4948 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4949 let mut push_forward_event = false;
4950 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
4951 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
4952 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4953 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4954 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
4955 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4956 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4957 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4959 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
4960 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
4962 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4963 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
4964 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
4965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4966 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4967 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
4969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4970 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
4971 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
4973 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
4974 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4975 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
4976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4977 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
4978 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
4979 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
4980 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
4981 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
4984 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4985 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
4987 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4988 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
4989 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4990 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4991 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4992 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4993 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4994 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4997 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
4998 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
4999 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5004 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5005 // payments are being processed.
5006 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5007 push_forward_event = true;
5009 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5010 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5017 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5018 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5021 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5022 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5023 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5025 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5029 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5030 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5032 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5033 .find(|ev| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5035 if !forward_ev_exists {
5036 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5038 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5043 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5044 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5045 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5046 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5048 debug_assert!(false);
5049 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5050 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5051 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5052 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5053 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5054 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5055 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5056 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5057 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5058 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5059 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5060 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5062 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5065 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5069 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5071 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5073 debug_assert!(false);
5074 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5078 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5079 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5080 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5087 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5088 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5089 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5091 debug_assert!(false);
5092 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5094 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5095 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5096 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5098 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5099 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5102 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5103 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5104 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5105 msg, &self.default_configuration
5107 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5108 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5109 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5117 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5118 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5119 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5120 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5122 // It's not a local channel
5123 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5126 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5127 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5128 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5129 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5131 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5132 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5133 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5134 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5135 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5136 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5137 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5138 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5139 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5140 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5142 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5144 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5145 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5146 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5147 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5149 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5150 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5153 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5155 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5158 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5160 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5163 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5165 debug_assert!(false);
5166 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5170 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5172 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5173 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5174 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5175 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5176 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5177 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5178 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5179 let mut channel_update = None;
5180 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5181 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5182 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5185 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5186 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5187 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5188 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5189 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5190 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5191 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5196 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5197 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5198 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5199 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5200 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5201 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5209 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5210 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5213 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5214 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5219 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5220 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5221 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5223 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5224 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5225 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5226 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5227 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5228 match monitor_event {
5229 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5230 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5232 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5234 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5235 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5236 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5237 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5240 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5241 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5242 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5243 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5245 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5246 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5247 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5248 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5251 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5252 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5253 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5256 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5257 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5258 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5259 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5260 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5261 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5265 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5266 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5268 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5270 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5271 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5272 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5274 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5281 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5282 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5288 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5289 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5292 has_pending_monitor_events
5295 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5296 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5297 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5299 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5300 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5301 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5302 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5304 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5309 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5310 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5311 /// update was applied.
5312 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5313 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5314 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5315 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5317 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5318 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5319 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5320 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5323 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5325 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5326 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5327 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5328 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5329 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5330 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5331 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5332 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5333 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5335 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5336 has_monitor_update = true;
5338 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5339 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5340 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5341 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5342 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5343 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5344 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5346 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5348 continue 'peer_loop;
5357 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5358 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5359 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5362 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5363 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5369 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5370 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5371 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5372 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5373 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5374 let mut has_update = false;
5376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5378 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5381 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5382 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5383 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5384 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5385 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5387 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5388 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5391 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5392 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5393 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5394 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5395 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5400 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5402 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5403 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5404 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5410 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5411 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5419 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5420 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5426 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5427 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5429 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5430 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5431 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5432 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5433 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5434 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5435 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5436 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5437 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5438 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5439 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5440 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5441 assert!(should_broadcast);
5442 } else { unreachable!(); }
5443 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5445 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5449 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5450 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5452 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5453 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5456 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5459 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5460 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5462 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5463 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5464 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5465 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5466 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5467 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5468 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5469 // never fail a payment too early.
5470 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5472 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5480 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5483 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5484 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5486 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5487 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5488 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5489 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5491 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5493 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5494 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5498 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5499 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5501 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5503 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5504 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5506 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5507 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5508 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5509 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5510 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5511 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5512 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5513 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5514 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5515 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5516 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5519 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5520 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5522 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5525 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5527 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5529 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5530 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5531 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5532 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5533 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5536 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5537 /// stored external to LDK.
5539 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5540 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5541 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5543 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5544 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5547 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5548 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5549 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5550 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5552 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5553 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5554 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5555 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5556 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5558 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5559 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5560 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5561 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5562 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5564 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5565 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5567 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5568 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5572 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5573 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5575 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5577 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5578 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5580 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5581 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5582 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5583 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5584 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5585 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5586 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5589 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5590 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5592 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5595 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5597 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5599 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5600 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5603 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5604 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5606 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5607 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5608 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5611 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5612 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5614 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5615 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5616 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5617 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5619 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5620 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5621 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5622 Some(_) => continue,
5623 None => return scid_candidate
5628 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5630 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5631 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5633 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5634 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5635 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5639 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5640 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5641 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5643 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5644 /// times to get a unique scid.
5645 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5646 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5647 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5649 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5650 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5651 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5652 return scid_candidate
5656 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5657 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5658 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5659 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5661 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5662 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5663 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5664 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5665 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5666 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5667 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5668 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5677 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5678 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5679 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5680 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5681 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5685 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5686 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5687 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5692 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5693 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5694 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5698 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5699 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5703 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5704 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5707 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5708 /// using the given event handler.
5710 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5711 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5714 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5715 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5716 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5718 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5720 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5721 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5722 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5723 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5726 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5727 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5728 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5731 for event in pending_events {
5732 handler(event).await;
5735 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5736 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5741 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5743 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5744 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5745 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5746 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5747 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5748 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5752 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
5753 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
5754 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
5755 /// is always placed next to each other.
5757 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
5758 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
5759 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
5760 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
5762 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
5763 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
5764 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
5765 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5766 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5767 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5768 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5770 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5771 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5772 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5773 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5776 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5779 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5780 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5783 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5784 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5785 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5786 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5787 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5788 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
5789 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
5793 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5794 events.replace(pending_events);
5803 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5805 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5806 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5807 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5808 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5809 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5810 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5814 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5816 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5817 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5818 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5819 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5820 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5822 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5823 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5824 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5825 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5828 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5829 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5830 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5833 for event in pending_events {
5834 handler.handle_event(event);
5842 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5844 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5845 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5846 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5847 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5848 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5849 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5853 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5855 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5856 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5857 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5858 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5859 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5862 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5863 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5866 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5867 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5868 let new_height = height - 1;
5870 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5871 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5872 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5873 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5874 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5875 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5878 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5882 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5884 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5886 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5888 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5893 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5894 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5895 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5896 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5898 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5899 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5902 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
5903 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5905 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5906 if height < last_best_block_height {
5907 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5908 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5912 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5913 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5914 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5915 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5917 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5918 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5920 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5922 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5924 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
5926 macro_rules! max_time {
5927 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5929 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5930 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5931 // having an explicit local time source.
5932 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5933 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5934 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5935 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5936 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5942 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5943 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5944 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5945 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5949 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
5950 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
5951 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5952 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5953 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5954 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5955 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
5956 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
5963 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5965 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5966 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5967 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5968 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5969 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5970 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5975 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
5977 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
5978 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5979 ES::Target: EntropySource,
5980 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5981 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
5982 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5986 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5987 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5989 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5990 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5991 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5992 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5993 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5995 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5996 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5998 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5999 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6000 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6001 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6002 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6003 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6004 let res = f(channel);
6005 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6006 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6007 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6008 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6009 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6011 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6012 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6013 if channel.is_usable() {
6014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6015 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6016 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6017 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6022 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6027 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6028 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6031 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6032 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6034 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6035 msg: announcement_sigs,
6037 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6038 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6039 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6041 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6042 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6043 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6048 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6049 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6050 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6051 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6052 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6053 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6054 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6055 // is always consistent.
6056 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6057 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6058 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6059 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6060 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6063 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6064 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6065 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6066 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6067 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6068 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6069 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6073 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6074 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6075 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6076 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6077 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6078 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6079 data: reason_message,
6089 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6090 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6091 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6092 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6093 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6094 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6095 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6096 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6097 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6098 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6100 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6101 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6102 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6106 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6109 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6110 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6111 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6112 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6113 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6114 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6115 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6116 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6117 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6120 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6121 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6122 _ => unreachable!(),
6124 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6125 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6126 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6133 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6135 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6136 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6140 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6142 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6143 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6145 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6146 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6149 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6150 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6151 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6154 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6155 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6156 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6157 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6160 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6161 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6162 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6163 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6166 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6167 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6169 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6170 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6171 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6172 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6173 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6176 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6177 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6178 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6179 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6182 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6183 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6184 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6185 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6188 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6189 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6190 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6191 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6195 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6196 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6198 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6199 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6200 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6201 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6203 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6207 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6209 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6212 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6213 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6214 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6217 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6218 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6219 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6222 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6224 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6227 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6229 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6232 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6234 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6237 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6239 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6242 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6243 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6244 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6247 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6249 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6252 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6254 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6257 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6259 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6262 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6263 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6264 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6267 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6268 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6269 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6272 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6274 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6277 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6279 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6282 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6283 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6284 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6287 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6292 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6293 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6294 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6297 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6298 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6299 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6300 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6302 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6303 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6304 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6307 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6308 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6309 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6310 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6311 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6312 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6317 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6324 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6325 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6326 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6327 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6328 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6329 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6330 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6331 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6332 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6333 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6334 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6335 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6336 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6337 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6338 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6339 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6342 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6343 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6344 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6345 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6348 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6350 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6352 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6353 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6357 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6358 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6359 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6365 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6366 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6367 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6368 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6369 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6370 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6373 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6374 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6376 if inbound_peer_limited {
6379 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6380 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6381 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6382 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6383 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6387 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6388 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6389 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6391 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6392 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6393 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6394 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6399 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6400 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6405 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6408 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6411 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6412 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6413 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6414 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6415 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6416 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6417 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6421 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6422 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6423 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6428 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6429 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6430 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6431 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6432 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6441 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6445 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6448 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6449 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6451 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6452 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6455 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6457 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6458 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6459 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6463 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6465 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6466 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6469 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6470 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6471 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6472 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6480 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6481 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6485 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6486 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6489 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6490 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6494 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6495 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6496 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6497 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6500 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6503 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6504 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6505 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6506 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6507 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6510 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6511 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6512 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6513 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6516 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6517 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6518 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6519 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6522 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6523 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6524 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6525 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6526 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6527 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6528 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6529 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6530 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6531 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6532 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6533 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6534 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6535 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6536 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6537 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6538 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6539 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6541 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6542 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6543 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6549 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6550 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6552 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6553 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6554 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6555 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6558 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6559 (2, node_id, required),
6560 (4, features, required),
6561 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6562 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6563 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6564 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6567 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6568 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6569 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6570 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6571 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6572 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6573 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6574 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6575 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6576 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6577 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6578 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6579 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6580 (7, self.config, option),
6581 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6582 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6583 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6584 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6585 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6586 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6587 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6588 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6589 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6590 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6591 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6592 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6593 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6594 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6595 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6596 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6597 (32, self.is_public, required),
6598 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6599 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6600 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6601 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6607 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6608 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6609 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6610 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6611 (2, channel_id, required),
6612 (3, channel_type, option),
6613 (4, counterparty, required),
6614 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6615 (6, funding_txo, option),
6616 (7, config, option),
6617 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6618 (9, confirmations, option),
6619 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6620 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6621 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6622 (16, balance_msat, required),
6623 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6624 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6625 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6626 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6627 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6628 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6629 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6630 (26, is_outbound, required),
6631 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6632 (30, is_usable, required),
6633 (32, is_public, required),
6634 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6635 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6636 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6637 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6640 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6641 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6642 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6643 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6644 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6648 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6650 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6651 outbound_scid_alias,
6655 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6656 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6658 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6659 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6660 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6661 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6662 confirmations_required,
6664 force_close_spend_delay,
6665 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6666 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6667 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6668 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6669 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6670 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6671 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
6676 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6677 (2, channels, vec_type),
6678 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6679 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6682 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6684 (0, onion_packet, required),
6685 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6688 (0, payment_data, required),
6689 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6690 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6692 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6693 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6694 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6698 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6699 (0, routing, required),
6700 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6701 (4, payment_hash, required),
6702 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6703 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6704 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6708 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6709 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6711 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6713 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6714 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6715 reason.write(writer)?;
6717 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6718 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6721 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6722 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6723 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6724 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6731 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6732 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6733 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6737 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6738 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6739 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6743 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6744 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6745 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6746 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6747 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6750 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6751 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6752 // messages contained in the variants.
6753 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6754 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6755 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6757 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6759 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6760 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6761 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6764 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6765 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6766 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6767 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6768 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6770 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6775 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6780 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6781 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6782 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6783 (2, outpoint, required),
6784 (4, htlc_id, required),
6785 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6788 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6789 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6790 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6791 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6792 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6794 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6795 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6796 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6797 (2, self.value, required),
6798 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
6799 (4, payment_data, option),
6800 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
6801 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6802 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6808 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6809 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6810 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6812 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
6813 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6814 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6815 let mut total_value_received = None;
6816 let mut total_msat = None;
6817 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6818 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6819 (0, prev_hop, required),
6820 (1, total_msat, option),
6821 (2, value, required),
6822 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
6823 (4, payment_data, option),
6824 (5, total_value_received, option),
6825 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6826 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6828 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6830 if payment_data.is_some() {
6831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6833 if total_msat.is_none() {
6834 total_msat = Some(value);
6836 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6839 if total_msat.is_none() {
6840 if payment_data.is_none() {
6841 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6843 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6845 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6849 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6852 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
6853 total_value_received,
6854 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6861 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6862 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6863 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
6867 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6868 let mut path: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
6869 let mut payment_id = None;
6870 let mut payment_secret = None;
6871 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
6872 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6873 (0, session_priv, required),
6874 (1, payment_id, option),
6875 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6876 (3, payment_secret, option),
6877 (4, path, vec_type),
6878 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
6880 if payment_id.is_none() {
6881 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6883 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6885 if path.is_none() || path.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
6886 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6888 let path = path.unwrap();
6889 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
6890 if params.final_cltv_expiry_delta == 0 {
6891 params.final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta;
6894 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6895 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6896 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6898 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6902 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6903 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6908 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6909 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6911 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret } => {
6913 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6914 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6915 (0, session_priv, required),
6916 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6917 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6918 (3, payment_secret, option),
6919 (4, *path, vec_type),
6920 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
6923 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6925 field.write(writer)?;
6932 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
6933 (0, forward_info, required),
6934 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
6935 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6936 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6937 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6940 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6942 (0, htlc_id, required),
6943 (2, err_packet, required),
6948 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6949 (0, payment_secret, required),
6950 (2, expiry_time, required),
6951 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6952 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6953 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6956 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6958 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6960 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6961 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6962 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6963 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6967 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6968 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6970 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6972 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6974 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6975 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6976 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6979 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
6981 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6982 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6983 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
6984 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6985 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6986 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6987 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
6988 serializable_peer_count += 1;
6990 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
6991 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
6992 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6993 unfunded_channels += 1;
6998 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7000 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7003 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7004 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7005 channel.write(writer)?;
7012 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7013 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7014 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7015 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7016 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7017 for forward in pending_forwards {
7018 forward.write(writer)?;
7023 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7025 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7026 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7027 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7029 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7030 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7031 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7032 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7033 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7034 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7035 htlc.write(writer)?;
7037 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7040 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7041 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7042 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7043 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7044 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7045 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7046 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7049 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7050 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7051 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7052 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7053 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7055 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7056 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7057 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7058 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7059 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7060 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7061 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7066 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7067 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7068 for event in events.iter() {
7069 event.write(writer)?;
7072 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7073 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7074 for event in background_events.iter() {
7076 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7078 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7079 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7084 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7085 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7086 // likely to be identical.
7087 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7088 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7090 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7091 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7092 hash.write(writer)?;
7093 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7096 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7097 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7098 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7099 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7100 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7103 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7104 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7106 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7107 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7108 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7109 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7112 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7113 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7117 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7118 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7119 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7121 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7122 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7123 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7129 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7130 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7131 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7132 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7135 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7136 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7137 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7138 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7139 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7142 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7143 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7144 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7145 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7146 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7147 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7148 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7149 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7150 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7151 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7158 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7160 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7162 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7163 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7164 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7165 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7166 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7167 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7168 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7169 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7170 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7171 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7172 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7173 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7174 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7176 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7177 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7179 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7180 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7182 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7183 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7184 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7185 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7186 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7187 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7189 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7190 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7192 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7193 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7194 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7195 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7196 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7197 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7201 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7202 pub entropy_source: ES,
7204 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7205 pub node_signer: NS,
7207 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7208 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7210 pub signer_provider: SP,
7212 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7214 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7215 pub fee_estimator: F,
7216 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7218 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7219 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7220 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7221 pub chain_monitor: M,
7223 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7224 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7225 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7226 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7227 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7228 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7230 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7232 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7233 /// deserialization.
7235 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7236 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7237 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7239 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7240 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7242 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7243 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7244 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7245 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7247 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7250 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7251 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7254 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7255 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7257 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7258 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7259 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7261 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7262 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7266 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7267 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7268 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7269 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7270 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7272 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7273 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7278 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7279 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7280 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7281 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7283 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7284 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7285 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7286 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7287 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7288 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7292 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7293 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7294 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7298 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7299 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7301 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7302 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7303 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7304 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7305 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7310 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7311 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7313 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7319 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7321 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7322 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7323 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7324 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7325 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7326 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7327 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7328 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7330 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7331 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7332 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7333 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7334 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7335 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7336 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7337 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7338 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7339 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7340 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7341 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7342 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7343 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7344 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7345 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7346 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7347 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7348 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7349 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7350 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7351 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7352 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7353 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7354 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7355 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7356 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7357 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7359 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7360 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7361 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7362 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7363 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7365 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7366 let mut found_htlc = false;
7367 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7368 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7371 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7372 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7373 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7374 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7375 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7376 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7377 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7378 log_info!(args.logger,
7379 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7380 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7381 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7385 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7386 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7387 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7389 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7390 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7392 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7394 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7395 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7398 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7399 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7400 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7404 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7405 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7406 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7407 // safely discard the channel.
7408 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7409 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7410 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7411 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7412 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7415 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7416 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7417 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7418 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7419 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7424 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7425 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7426 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7427 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7428 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7430 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7434 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7435 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7437 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7438 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7439 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7441 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7442 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7444 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7447 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7449 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7450 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7453 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7454 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7456 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7459 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7460 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7461 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7462 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let peer_state = PeerState {
7464 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7465 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7466 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7467 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7468 is_connected: false,
7470 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7473 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7475 for _ in 0..event_count {
7476 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7477 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7482 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7484 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7486 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7487 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7488 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7489 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7491 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7498 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7499 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7501 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7503 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7504 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7505 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7509 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7511 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7512 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7513 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7514 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7515 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7517 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7518 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7522 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7523 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7524 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7525 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7526 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7527 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7528 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7529 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7530 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7531 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7532 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7533 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7534 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7535 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7536 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7537 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7538 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7539 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7540 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7541 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7543 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7544 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7547 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7548 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7551 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7552 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7555 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7556 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7557 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7558 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7559 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7560 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7562 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7564 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7565 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7566 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7570 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7571 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7572 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7573 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7574 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7575 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7576 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7578 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7579 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7580 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
7581 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7582 if path.is_empty() {
7583 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7584 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7587 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7588 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7589 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7590 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7591 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7592 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7593 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7594 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7597 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7598 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7599 retry_strategy: None,
7600 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
7601 payment_params: None,
7602 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7603 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7605 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
7606 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7607 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7608 total_msat: path_amt,
7609 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7611 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7612 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7617 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7619 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
7620 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
7621 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
7622 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7624 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7625 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7626 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
7627 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
7628 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
7629 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7630 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7631 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7632 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7633 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7634 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7639 !forwards.is_empty()
7641 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
7642 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
7643 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7644 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7645 pending_events_read.retain(|event| {
7646 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
7647 intercepted_id != ev_id
7654 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
7655 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
7656 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
7657 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
7658 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
7659 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
7660 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
7661 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
7662 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
7663 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
7664 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
7665 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
7666 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
7675 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
7676 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7677 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7678 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7679 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7680 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7681 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7682 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7686 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7687 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7689 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7690 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7691 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7692 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7694 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7695 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7698 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7699 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7700 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7701 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7704 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7705 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7706 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7707 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7708 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7709 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7710 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7711 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
7713 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7714 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7718 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7720 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7722 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7723 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7725 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7729 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7730 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7732 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
7734 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7736 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7737 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7738 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7739 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7743 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7744 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
7745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7747 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7748 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7749 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7751 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7752 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
7753 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7755 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7756 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7757 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7758 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7759 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7760 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7762 if chan.is_usable() {
7763 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7764 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7765 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7766 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7767 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7773 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7775 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7776 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7777 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7778 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7779 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7780 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7781 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7782 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7783 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7784 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7785 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7787 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7788 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7790 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7791 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7792 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7793 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7795 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7796 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7797 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7798 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7800 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7801 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7802 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7803 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7805 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7806 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
7807 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
7808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7810 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7811 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7814 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7815 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7818 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7821 purpose: payment_purpose,
7822 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7828 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
7829 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
7830 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
7832 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
7833 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7837 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7839 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7840 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7841 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7842 router: args.router,
7844 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7846 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7847 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7848 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
7849 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7851 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7852 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7853 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7854 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7855 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7856 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7858 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7863 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7865 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7867 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7868 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
7869 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7870 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7872 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
7873 node_signer: args.node_signer,
7874 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
7876 logger: args.logger,
7877 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7880 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7881 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7882 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7883 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7884 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7887 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7888 //connection or two.
7890 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7896 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7897 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7898 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
7899 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7900 use core::time::Duration;
7901 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7902 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7903 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7904 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, InterceptId};
7905 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7906 use crate::ln::msgs;
7907 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7908 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7909 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7910 use crate::util::test_utils;
7911 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
7912 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EntropySource;
7915 fn test_notify_limits() {
7916 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7917 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7918 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7919 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7920 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7921 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7923 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7924 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7926 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7927 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7929 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7931 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7932 // to connect messages with new values
7933 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7934 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7935 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7936 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7937 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
7938 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
7940 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7941 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7942 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7943 // ... but the last node should not.
7944 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7945 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7946 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7947 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7949 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7950 // about the channel.
7951 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7952 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7953 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7955 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7957 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7958 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7959 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7960 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7961 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7962 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7964 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7965 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7966 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7968 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7969 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7970 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7971 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7972 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7973 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7975 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7976 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7977 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7978 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7979 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7980 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7981 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7982 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7984 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7985 // the channel info has updated.
7986 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7987 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7988 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7989 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
7990 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7991 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7995 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7996 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8002 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8004 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8005 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8006 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8007 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8009 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8010 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8011 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8012 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8013 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8014 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8018 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8020 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8021 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8023 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8025 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8026 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8027 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8029 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8030 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8031 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8033 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8035 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8036 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8037 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8038 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8039 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8040 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8041 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8043 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8044 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8046 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8048 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8050 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8051 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8052 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8053 // lightning messages manually.
8054 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8055 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8058 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8060 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8062 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8063 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8065 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8068 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8070 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8072 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8073 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8074 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8076 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8078 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8080 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8081 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8085 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8086 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8089 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8090 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8091 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8092 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8094 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8097 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8098 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8099 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8100 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8102 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8105 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8106 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8107 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8108 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8115 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8116 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8117 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8118 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8119 // fails as expected.
8120 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8121 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8122 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8123 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8124 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8125 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8126 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8128 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8129 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8130 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8132 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8133 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8134 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8135 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8137 let route = find_route(
8138 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8139 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8141 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8143 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8144 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8145 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8146 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8149 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8150 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8151 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8155 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8156 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8157 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8158 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8159 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8160 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8161 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8163 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8165 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8168 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8169 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8170 let route = find_route(
8171 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8172 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8174 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8176 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8178 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8179 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8180 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8182 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8183 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8184 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8187 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8188 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8189 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8190 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8193 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8196 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8197 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8198 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8199 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8200 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8201 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8202 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8203 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8204 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8206 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8207 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8211 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8212 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8213 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8217 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8219 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8220 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8222 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8223 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8224 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8225 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8227 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8228 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8229 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8230 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8231 let route = find_route(
8232 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8233 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8236 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8237 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8238 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8239 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8242 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8243 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8244 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8245 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8246 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8247 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8248 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8250 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8254 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8255 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8256 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8257 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8259 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8261 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8262 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8264 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8265 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8266 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8267 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8269 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8270 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8271 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8272 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8273 let route = find_route(
8274 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8275 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8278 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8279 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8280 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8281 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8282 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8285 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8286 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8287 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8288 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8289 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8290 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8291 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8293 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8297 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8298 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8299 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8300 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8301 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8303 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8304 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8305 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8306 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8308 // Marshall an MPP route.
8309 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8310 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8311 route.paths.push(path);
8312 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8313 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8314 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8315 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8316 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8317 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8319 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8320 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8321 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8323 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8328 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8329 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8330 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8331 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8332 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8334 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8336 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8339 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8340 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8342 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8345 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8346 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8347 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8348 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8349 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8350 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8353 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8356 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8357 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8362 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8363 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8364 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8365 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8366 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8367 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8369 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8370 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8372 total_msat: 100_000,
8375 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8376 // payment verification fails as expected.
8377 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8378 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8379 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8380 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8382 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8386 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8387 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8391 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8392 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8393 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8394 // the channel is successfully closed.
8395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8400 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8401 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8402 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8403 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8404 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8406 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8407 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8409 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8410 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8411 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8412 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8415 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8417 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8418 // as it has the funding transaction.
8419 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8420 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8421 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8424 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8426 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8428 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8430 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8431 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8432 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8434 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8437 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8438 // as it has the funding transaction.
8439 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8440 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8441 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8444 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8445 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8446 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8447 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8448 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8449 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8450 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8452 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8453 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8454 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8455 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8457 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8458 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8460 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8461 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8462 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8463 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8464 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8465 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8466 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8470 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8471 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8472 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8473 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8474 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8475 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8476 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8479 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8481 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8482 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8483 // closing transaction).
8484 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8485 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8486 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8488 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8489 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8490 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8491 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8492 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8495 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8497 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8499 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8500 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8501 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8503 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8505 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8506 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8509 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8510 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8511 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8514 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8515 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8516 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8519 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8521 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8522 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8524 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8525 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8527 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8528 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8533 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8534 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8535 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8536 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8537 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8538 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8539 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8543 let channel_id = [4; 32];
8544 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8545 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
8547 // Test the API functions.
8548 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
8550 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
8552 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8554 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8556 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
8558 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
8560 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
8564 fn test_connection_limiting() {
8565 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
8566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8571 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8573 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8574 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8576 let mut funding_tx = None;
8577 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8578 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8579 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8582 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8583 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8584 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
8585 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
8586 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8588 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8590 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8592 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8594 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8596 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8598 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8601 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
8602 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8603 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8604 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8605 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8607 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
8608 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
8610 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
8611 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
8612 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8613 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8614 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
8615 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8616 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8618 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8619 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8620 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8621 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8623 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
8624 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
8625 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8626 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8627 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
8628 for ev in chan_closed_events {
8629 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
8631 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8632 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8633 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8634 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
8636 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
8637 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8638 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8639 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8641 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
8642 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
8644 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
8645 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8646 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
8647 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
8648 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8650 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8651 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8652 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8654 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
8655 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8656 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
8658 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
8659 // "protected" and can connect again.
8660 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
8661 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
8662 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8663 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8665 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
8667 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8668 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8672 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
8673 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
8674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8677 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8679 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8681 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8682 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8684 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
8685 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8686 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8687 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8690 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
8692 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8693 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8694 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8696 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
8697 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8698 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8700 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
8701 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8702 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
8703 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8707 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
8708 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
8709 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
8710 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8712 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
8713 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
8715 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
8719 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8720 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8722 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
8723 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
8724 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8725 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8726 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8727 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8732 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8733 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8737 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
8738 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8741 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
8742 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
8743 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
8744 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
8745 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8746 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8747 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8749 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8750 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
8751 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
8752 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
8756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8758 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
8759 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8761 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
8762 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
8763 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8765 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8766 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
8768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8770 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
8775 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
8776 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
8777 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
8778 // the channel without the anchors feature.
8779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8781 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
8782 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8783 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8784 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
8785 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8787 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
8788 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8789 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8791 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
8792 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8794 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8795 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8800 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8801 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
8803 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8804 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8806 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8810 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8812 use crate::chain::Listen;
8813 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8814 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{EntropySource, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
8815 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8816 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8817 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8818 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8819 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8820 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8821 use crate::util::test_utils;
8822 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8824 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8825 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8826 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8828 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8832 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8833 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8834 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8835 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8836 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8837 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
8838 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
8839 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8844 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8845 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8848 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8849 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8850 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8852 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8854 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8855 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8856 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8857 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
8858 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
8860 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8861 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8863 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8864 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8865 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8866 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8868 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8870 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8872 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8873 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8874 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8875 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8876 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8878 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
8880 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8882 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
8883 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
8884 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8885 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8886 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8889 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8890 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8891 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8893 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8894 } else { panic!(); }
8896 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8897 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8898 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8900 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8901 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8903 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8906 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8907 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8908 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8910 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8911 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8916 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8919 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8922 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8923 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8925 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8926 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8927 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8928 match msg_events[0] {
8929 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8930 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8931 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8935 match msg_events[1] {
8936 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8940 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8941 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8943 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8944 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8949 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8950 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8952 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8953 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8955 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8958 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a);
8960 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8961 macro_rules! send_payment {
8962 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8963 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8964 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
8965 .with_features($node_b.invoice_features());
8966 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8967 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8968 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8969 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8970 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8971 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8973 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8974 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8976 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8977 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
8979 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8980 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8981 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8982 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8983 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
8984 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8985 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8986 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8989 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8990 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8991 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8993 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8994 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8995 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8996 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8997 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8999 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9002 let (raa, cs) = do_get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9003 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9004 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9005 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9007 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9012 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9013 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);