1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
243 /// Number of bytes in the id.
244 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
247 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
253 impl Readable for PaymentId {
254 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
255 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
260 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
261 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
262 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
266 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
269 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
270 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278 impl Readable for InterceptId {
279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
286 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
287 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
288 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
289 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
292 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
295 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
296 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
299 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
303 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
304 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
305 (0, short_channel_id, required),
306 (2, htlc_id, required),
308 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
309 (0, session_priv, required),
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
318 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
321 session_priv: SecretKey,
322 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
323 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
325 payment_id: PaymentId,
328 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
329 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
330 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
339 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
340 payment_id.hash(hasher);
341 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
347 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
350 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
351 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
352 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
353 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
354 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
359 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
360 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
361 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
362 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
363 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
371 struct InboundOnionErr {
377 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
378 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
381 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
382 pub enum FailureCode {
383 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
384 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
385 TemporaryNodeFailure,
386 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
387 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
388 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
389 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
390 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
391 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
392 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
393 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
394 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
395 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
398 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
399 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
402 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
403 fn into(self) -> u16 {
405 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
406 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
407 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
413 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
414 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
415 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
416 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
417 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
420 err: msgs::LightningError,
421 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
422 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
423 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429 err: LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
440 channel_capacity: None,
444 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
445 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
448 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 err: LightningError {
452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
459 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
460 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
461 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
465 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
468 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
470 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
471 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
475 log_level: Level::Warn,
478 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
493 shutdown_finish: None,
494 channel_capacity: None,
499 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
500 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
501 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
502 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
503 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
505 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
506 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
507 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
508 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
509 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
510 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
511 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
513 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
517 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
518 struct ClaimingPayment {
520 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
521 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
522 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
523 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
526 (0, amount_msat, required),
527 (2, payment_purpose, required),
528 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
529 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
530 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
533 struct ClaimablePayment {
534 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
535 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
536 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
539 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
540 struct ClaimablePayments {
541 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
542 /// failed/claimed by the user.
544 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
545 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
547 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
548 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
549 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
552 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
553 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
554 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
557 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
558 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
559 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
560 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
561 enum BackgroundEvent {
562 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
563 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
564 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
565 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
570 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
571 /// channel to continue normal operation.
573 /// In general this should be used rather than
574 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
575 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
576 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
578 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
579 /// are regenerated on startup.
580 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
581 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
582 funding_txo: OutPoint,
583 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
585 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
586 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
588 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
589 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
590 channel_id: ChannelId,
595 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
596 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
597 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
598 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
599 /// event can be generated.
600 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
601 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
602 /// operation of another channel.
604 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
605 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
606 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
607 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
609 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
610 event: events::Event,
611 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
616 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
617 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
618 (0, event, upgradable_required),
619 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
620 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
621 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
622 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
623 // downgrades to prior versions.
624 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
629 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
630 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
632 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
635 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
636 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
637 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
638 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
642 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
643 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
644 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
645 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
646 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
647 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
649 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
651 channel_id: ChannelId,
652 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
657 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
676 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
680 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
681 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
683 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
684 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
686 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
687 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
689 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
690 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
692 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
693 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
694 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
695 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
696 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
697 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
698 latest_features: InitFeatures,
699 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
700 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
701 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
702 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
703 /// user but which have not yet completed.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel.
708 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
709 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
710 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
712 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
713 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
714 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
715 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
717 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
718 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
719 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
720 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
721 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
722 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
723 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
724 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
725 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
726 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
727 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
728 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
729 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
730 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
731 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
735 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
736 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
737 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
738 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
739 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
740 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
743 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
744 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
747 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
748 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
749 self.channel_by_id.len() +
750 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
751 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
752 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
755 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
756 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
757 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
758 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
759 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
760 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id)
764 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
765 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
766 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
767 /// The original OpenChannel message.
768 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
769 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
770 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
773 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
774 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
775 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
777 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
778 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
780 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
783 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
784 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
785 struct PendingInboundPayment {
786 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
787 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
788 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
789 /// this payment being removed.
791 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
792 user_payment_id: u64,
793 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
794 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
795 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
798 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
799 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
800 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
801 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
802 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
803 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
804 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
805 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
807 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
808 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
816 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
818 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
819 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
820 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
826 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
827 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
828 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
829 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
830 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
831 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
832 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
833 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
835 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
836 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
845 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
847 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
848 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
849 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
854 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
855 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
856 $vis trait AChannelManager {
857 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
858 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
859 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
860 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
861 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
862 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
863 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
864 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
865 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
866 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
867 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
868 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
869 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
871 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
872 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
873 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
874 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
879 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
880 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
881 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
882 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
884 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
886 ES::Target: EntropySource,
887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
888 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
893 type Watch = M::Target;
895 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
897 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
899 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
901 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
902 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
904 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
906 type Router = R::Target;
908 type Logger = L::Target;
910 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
913 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
914 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
916 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
917 /// to individual Channels.
919 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
920 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
921 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
922 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
924 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
925 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
926 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
927 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
928 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
929 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
930 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
932 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
933 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
934 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
936 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
938 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
939 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
940 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
942 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
943 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
944 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
945 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
947 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
948 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
949 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
951 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
952 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
953 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
954 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
955 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
957 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
958 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
959 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
960 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
961 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
962 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
963 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
964 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
967 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
968 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
969 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
970 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
971 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
975 // `total_consistency_lock`
977 // |__`forward_htlcs`
979 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
981 // |__`per_peer_state`
983 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
985 // | |__`claimable_payments`
987 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
993 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
995 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
999 // | |__`pending_events`
1001 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1003 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1014 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1015 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1016 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1026 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1027 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1029 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1030 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1031 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1032 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1034 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1037 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1038 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1039 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1040 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1041 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1042 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1043 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1044 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1046 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1051 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1053 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1054 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1055 /// and via the classic SCID.
1057 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1058 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1060 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1062 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1064 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1065 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1066 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1071 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1072 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1074 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1075 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1077 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1078 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1079 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1080 /// active channel list on load.
1082 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1083 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1085 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1087 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1088 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1089 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1091 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1092 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1093 /// the handling of the events.
1095 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1096 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1099 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1100 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1101 /// would break backwards compatability.
1102 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1103 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1104 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1106 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1109 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1111 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1112 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1113 /// confirmation depth.
1115 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1116 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1117 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1119 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1123 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1125 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1127 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1129 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1130 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1131 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1133 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1134 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1136 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1137 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1138 /// keeping additional state.
1139 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1141 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1142 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1143 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1144 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1146 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1147 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1149 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1150 /// are currently open with that peer.
1152 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1153 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1156 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1158 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1159 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1160 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1162 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1165 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1166 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1167 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1168 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1170 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1171 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1173 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1174 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1175 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1177 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1180 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1182 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1183 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1184 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1185 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1186 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1188 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1190 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1192 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1193 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1194 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1195 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1196 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1197 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1198 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1199 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1200 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1202 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1204 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1208 signer_provider: SP,
1213 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1215 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1216 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1217 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1218 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1219 pub struct ChainParameters {
1220 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1221 pub network: Network,
1223 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1225 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1226 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1229 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1236 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1237 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1238 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1239 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1240 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1241 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1243 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1244 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1245 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1246 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1247 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1249 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1250 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1253 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1254 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1255 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1256 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1258 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1259 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1260 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1261 _read_guard: read_guard,
1266 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1267 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1268 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1269 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1271 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1272 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1273 should_persist: persist_check,
1274 _read_guard: read_guard,
1279 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1280 fn drop(&mut self) {
1281 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1282 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1287 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1288 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1290 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1292 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1293 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1294 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1295 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1296 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1298 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1299 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1301 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1303 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1304 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1305 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1306 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1307 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1308 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1309 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1310 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1311 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1312 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1313 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1314 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1315 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1317 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1318 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1320 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1321 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1322 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1323 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1325 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1326 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1327 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1328 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1329 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1330 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1333 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1335 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1336 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1339 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1341 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1342 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1344 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1345 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1346 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_payments`].
1347 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1349 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1350 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1351 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1353 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1354 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1355 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1357 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1358 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1359 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1360 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1362 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1363 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1364 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1366 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1367 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1368 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1370 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1371 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1372 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1373 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1374 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1375 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1376 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1377 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1378 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1379 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1380 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1383 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1384 /// to better separate parameters.
1385 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1386 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1387 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1388 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1389 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1390 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1391 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1392 pub features: InitFeatures,
1393 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1394 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1395 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1397 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1399 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1400 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1401 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1402 /// payments to us through this channel.
1403 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1404 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1405 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1406 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1407 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1408 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1409 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1412 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1414 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1415 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1418 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1419 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1420 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1421 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1422 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1423 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1424 /// lifetime of the channel.
1425 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1426 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1427 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1428 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1429 /// our counterparty already.
1431 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1432 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1433 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1434 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1436 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1437 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1438 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1439 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1441 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1442 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1444 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1445 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1447 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1448 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1449 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1450 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1451 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1452 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1453 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1454 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1455 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1458 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1460 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1461 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1462 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1463 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1464 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1465 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1466 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1468 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1469 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1471 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1472 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1473 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1474 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1475 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1476 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1477 /// this value on chain.
1479 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1481 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1483 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1484 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1485 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1486 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1487 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1488 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1489 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1491 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1492 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1493 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1494 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1495 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1496 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1498 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1499 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1500 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1501 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1502 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1503 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1505 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1506 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1507 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1508 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1509 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1510 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1511 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1512 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1514 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1515 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1516 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1517 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1518 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1519 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1520 /// route which is valid.
1521 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1522 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1523 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1524 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1525 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1526 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1528 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1529 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1530 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1531 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1532 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1533 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1534 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1535 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1538 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1540 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1541 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1542 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1543 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1544 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1546 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1547 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1548 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1549 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1550 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1551 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1552 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1554 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1555 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1556 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1557 pub is_outbound: bool,
1558 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1559 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1560 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1561 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1562 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1564 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1565 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1566 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1567 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1568 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1569 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1570 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1572 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1573 pub is_usable: bool,
1574 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1575 pub is_public: bool,
1576 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1577 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1578 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1579 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1580 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1581 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1583 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1584 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1587 impl ChannelDetails {
1588 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1589 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1590 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1592 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1593 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1594 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1595 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1598 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1599 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1600 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1602 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1603 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1604 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1605 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1608 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1609 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1610 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1613 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1614 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1616 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1617 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1618 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1620 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1621 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1622 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1623 features: latest_features,
1624 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1625 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1626 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1627 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1628 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1629 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1630 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1631 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1632 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1633 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1635 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1636 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1637 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1638 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1639 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1640 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1641 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1642 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1643 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1644 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1645 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1646 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1647 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1648 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1649 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1650 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1651 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1652 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1653 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1654 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1655 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1656 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1657 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1658 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1659 config: Some(context.config()),
1660 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1665 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1666 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1667 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1668 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1669 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1670 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1671 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1672 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1673 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1675 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1677 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1678 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1680 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1681 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1682 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1683 /// to drop the channel.
1687 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1688 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1689 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1690 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1691 /// When an invoice was requested but not yet received, and thus a payment has not been sent.
1693 /// Identifier for the payment to ensure idempotency.
1694 payment_id: PaymentId,
1696 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1698 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1700 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1701 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1702 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1705 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1706 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1707 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1709 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1710 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1711 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1713 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1714 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1715 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1717 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1718 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1722 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1724 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1726 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1727 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1728 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1729 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1731 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1732 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1733 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1736 macro_rules! handle_error {
1737 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1738 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1739 // entering the macro.
1740 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1741 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1745 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1746 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1748 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1749 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1750 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1751 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1755 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1756 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1757 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1758 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1759 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1760 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1765 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1766 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1768 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1769 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1770 action: err.action.clone()
1774 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1775 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1776 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1777 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1782 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1787 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1790 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1791 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1792 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1798 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1799 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1800 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1801 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1802 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1803 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1805 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1806 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1807 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1808 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1809 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1811 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1812 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1814 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1818 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1819 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1820 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1822 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1823 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1825 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1826 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1828 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1829 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
1830 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1831 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1832 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1833 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1837 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1839 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1840 // In any case, just close the channel.
1841 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1842 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
1843 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1844 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1845 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1846 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1852 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1853 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1857 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1859 $entry.remove_entry();
1867 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1868 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1872 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1874 $entry.remove_entry();
1882 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1883 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1887 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1889 $entry.remove_entry();
1897 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1898 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1900 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1901 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1907 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1908 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1909 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1910 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1911 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1913 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1914 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1915 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1916 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1917 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1918 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1919 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1920 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1921 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1922 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1927 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1928 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1929 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1930 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1931 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1932 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1933 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1934 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1935 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1937 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1942 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1943 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1944 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1945 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1946 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1947 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1948 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1949 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1950 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1952 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1957 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1958 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1959 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1960 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1961 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1962 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1963 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1964 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1965 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1966 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1967 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1969 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1970 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1971 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1977 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1978 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1980 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1981 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1982 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1983 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1984 updates.announcement_sigs);
1985 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1986 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1989 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1990 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1991 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1993 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1995 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1996 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1998 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1999 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2000 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2001 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2006 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2007 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2008 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2009 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2010 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2011 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2013 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2014 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2015 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2018 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2019 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2020 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2021 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2022 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2023 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2024 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2025 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2029 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2035 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2036 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2037 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2038 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2040 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2041 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2043 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2044 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2045 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2046 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2047 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2048 // filter for uniqueness here.
2049 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2050 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2051 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2052 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2054 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2055 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2056 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2058 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2059 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2060 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2064 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2065 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2069 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2070 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2071 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2072 while !processed_all_events {
2073 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2077 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2080 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2081 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2082 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2084 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2085 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2086 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2088 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2089 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2090 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2091 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2095 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2096 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2097 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2098 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2101 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2103 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2104 $event_to_handle = event;
2106 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2107 post_event_actions.push(action);
2112 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2113 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2114 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2115 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2116 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2117 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2120 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2121 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2122 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2123 processed_all_events = false;
2126 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2127 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2133 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2135 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2137 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2138 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2139 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2140 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2144 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2146 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2148 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2149 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2151 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2153 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2154 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2155 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2158 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2159 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2160 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2162 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2163 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2164 current_timestamp: u32,
2166 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2167 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2168 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2169 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2171 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2172 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2173 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2178 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2180 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2181 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2182 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2183 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2184 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2185 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2186 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2187 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2189 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2192 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2193 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2195 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2197 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2199 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2201 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2202 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2203 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2204 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2205 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2206 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2216 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2217 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2218 &self.default_configuration
2221 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2222 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2223 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2226 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2227 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2229 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2231 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2235 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2240 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2242 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2243 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2244 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2245 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2246 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2248 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2249 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2251 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2252 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2253 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2255 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2256 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2257 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2259 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2260 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2261 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2262 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2263 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2264 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2266 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2267 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2268 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2269 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2270 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2271 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2275 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2276 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2280 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2281 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2283 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2285 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2286 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2287 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2288 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2289 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2290 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2294 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2299 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2301 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2302 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2305 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2307 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2310 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2313 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2314 node_id: their_network_key,
2317 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2320 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2321 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2322 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2323 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2324 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2325 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2326 // the same channel.
2327 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2329 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2330 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2331 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2334 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2335 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2336 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2337 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2345 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2346 /// more information.
2347 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2348 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2349 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2350 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2351 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2352 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2353 // the same channel.
2354 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2356 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2357 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2358 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2359 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2360 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2361 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2362 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2363 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2366 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2367 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2368 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2371 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2372 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2373 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2381 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2382 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2384 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2385 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2387 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2388 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2389 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2390 // really wanted anyway.
2391 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2394 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2395 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2396 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2399 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2402 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2403 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2404 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2406 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2408 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2409 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2410 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2411 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2417 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2418 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2420 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2421 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2422 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2424 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2425 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2426 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2427 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2428 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2429 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2431 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2432 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2433 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2434 total_msat: *total_msat,
2437 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2438 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2440 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2441 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2443 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2448 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2449 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2450 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2451 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2452 Some(transaction) => {
2453 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2454 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2459 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2460 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2461 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2462 reason: closure_reason,
2463 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2464 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2468 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2471 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2472 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2474 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2477 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2479 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2480 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2482 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2483 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2484 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2485 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2486 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2487 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2488 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2490 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2491 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2492 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2494 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2498 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2499 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2500 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2501 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2504 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2505 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2506 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2507 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2511 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2518 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2519 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2521 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2522 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2523 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2524 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2527 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2528 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2529 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2530 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2533 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2537 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2538 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2539 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2541 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2542 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2544 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2545 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2546 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2547 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2549 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2551 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2552 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2553 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2556 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2557 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2558 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2559 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2560 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2561 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2564 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2565 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2566 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2568 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2569 /// the channel being closed or not:
2570 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2571 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2572 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2573 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2574 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2575 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2576 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2578 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2579 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2580 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2581 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2583 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2585 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2586 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2587 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2590 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2591 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2592 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2593 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2594 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2595 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2599 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2600 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2601 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2602 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2603 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2604 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2605 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2606 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2608 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2609 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2610 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2611 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2612 // ignore the result here.
2613 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2617 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2618 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2619 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2620 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2622 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2623 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2624 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2625 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2626 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2627 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2628 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2630 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2632 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2633 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2634 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2635 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2636 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2637 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2638 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2639 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2640 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2641 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2642 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2643 // Unfunded channel has no update
2644 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2645 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2646 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2647 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2648 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2649 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2650 // Unfunded channel has no update
2651 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2652 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2653 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2654 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2655 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2657 (None, *peer_node_id)
2659 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2662 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2663 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2664 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2669 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2672 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2674 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2675 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2677 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2678 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2679 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2680 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2681 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2682 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2683 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2694 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2695 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2696 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2698 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2699 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2700 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2703 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2704 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2705 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2707 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2708 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2709 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2710 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2711 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2714 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2715 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2716 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2717 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2718 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2722 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2723 /// local transaction(s).
2724 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2725 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2726 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2730 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2731 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2732 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2733 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2734 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2735 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2736 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2738 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2739 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2743 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2744 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2745 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2746 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2747 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2748 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2749 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2750 err_data: Vec::new(),
2754 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2755 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2756 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2759 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2760 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2761 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2762 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2763 outgoing_cltv_value,
2764 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2768 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2769 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2770 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2771 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2772 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2773 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2774 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2775 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2777 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2779 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2780 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2781 err_data: Vec::new(),
2782 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2785 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2786 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2787 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2788 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2790 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2793 // final_expiry_too_soon
2794 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2795 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2797 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2798 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2799 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2800 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2801 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2802 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2803 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2804 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2805 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2806 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2807 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2810 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2811 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2812 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2814 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2816 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2817 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2821 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2822 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2823 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2824 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2825 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2826 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2827 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2828 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2829 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2830 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2831 err_data: Vec::new(),
2832 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2835 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2836 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2837 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2838 err_data: Vec::new(),
2839 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2842 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2846 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2849 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2850 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2853 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2854 phantom_shared_secret,
2858 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2859 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2860 err_data: Vec::new(),
2861 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2864 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2867 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2868 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2869 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2870 outgoing_cltv_value,
2871 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2875 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2876 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2877 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2878 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2879 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2881 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2882 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2883 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2884 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2885 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2886 failure_code: $err_code,
2892 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2893 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2896 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2897 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2898 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2900 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2901 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2902 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2903 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2904 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2905 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2906 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2907 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2909 macro_rules! return_err {
2910 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2912 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2913 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2914 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2915 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2916 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2917 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2923 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2925 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2926 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2928 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2929 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2932 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2933 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2934 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2935 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2938 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2939 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2940 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2942 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2943 // inbound channel's state.
2944 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2945 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2946 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2950 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2951 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2952 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2953 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2954 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2955 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2956 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2957 // phantom or an intercept.
2958 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2959 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2960 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2964 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2967 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2969 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2970 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2971 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2972 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2973 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2977 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2979 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2980 // have no consistency guarantees.
2981 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2985 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2986 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2987 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2988 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2989 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2991 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2992 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2993 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2994 // we don't have the channel here.
2995 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2997 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2999 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3000 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3001 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3002 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3003 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3004 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3005 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3006 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3007 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3008 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3009 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3011 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3014 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3015 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3017 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3018 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3022 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3023 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3024 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3025 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3027 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3034 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3035 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3036 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3037 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3038 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3039 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3041 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3042 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3044 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3045 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3046 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3047 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3048 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3049 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3050 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3051 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3052 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3053 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3059 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3060 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3061 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3062 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3064 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3065 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3067 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3068 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3069 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3071 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3072 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3073 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3074 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3075 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3076 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3077 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3081 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3083 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3086 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3087 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3088 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3089 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3090 macro_rules! return_err {
3091 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3093 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3094 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3096 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3097 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3098 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3104 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3106 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3107 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3110 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3111 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3112 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3113 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3114 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3116 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3120 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3121 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3122 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3123 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3129 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3130 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3131 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3133 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3134 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3135 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3137 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3138 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3139 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3140 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3141 return Err(LightningError {
3142 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3143 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3146 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3147 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3149 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3150 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3153 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3154 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3155 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3156 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3158 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3159 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3160 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3162 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3163 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3164 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3166 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3167 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3171 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3174 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3176 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3178 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3179 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3180 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3181 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3182 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3185 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3186 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3188 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3189 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3190 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3191 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3192 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3193 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3194 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3195 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3197 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3198 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3199 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3201 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3203 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3210 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3211 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3212 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3213 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3218 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3219 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3220 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3223 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3224 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3226 log_trace!(self.logger,
3227 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3228 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3229 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3230 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3232 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3233 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3234 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3236 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3237 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3239 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3240 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3241 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3242 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3245 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3246 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3247 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3250 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3251 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3252 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3254 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3255 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3256 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3258 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3259 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3261 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3262 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3263 Some(monitor_update) => {
3264 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3265 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3267 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3268 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3269 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3270 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3271 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3272 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3273 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3281 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3282 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3283 // `channel_by_id` map.
3284 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3285 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3290 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3291 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3293 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3298 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3300 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3301 /// fields for more info.
3303 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3304 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3306 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3308 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3309 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3310 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3311 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3312 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3314 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3315 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3316 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3317 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3318 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3320 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3321 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3322 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3323 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3325 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3327 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3328 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3329 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3331 /// In general, a path may raise:
3332 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3333 /// node public key) is specified.
3334 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3335 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3337 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3338 /// relevant updates.
3340 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3341 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3342 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3344 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3345 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3346 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3347 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3348 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3349 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3350 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3351 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3353 self.pending_outbound_payments
3354 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3355 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3356 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3359 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3360 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3361 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3362 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3363 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3364 self.pending_outbound_payments
3365 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3366 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3367 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3368 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3372 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3373 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3374 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3375 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3376 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3377 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3381 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3382 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3383 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3387 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3388 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3392 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3393 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3394 /// retries are exhausted.
3396 /// # Event Generation
3398 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3399 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3401 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3402 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3403 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3405 /// # Requested Invoices
3407 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3408 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3409 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3411 /// # Restart Behavior
3413 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3414 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3415 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3417 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3418 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3419 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3420 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3423 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3424 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3425 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3426 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3427 /// never reach the recipient.
3429 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3430 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3432 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3433 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3435 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3436 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3437 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3439 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3440 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3441 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3444 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3445 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3447 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3450 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3451 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3452 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3454 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3455 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3456 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3457 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3460 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3461 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3462 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3463 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3464 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3466 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3467 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3468 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3471 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3474 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3475 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3478 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3479 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3480 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3481 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3482 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3484 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3485 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3489 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
3491 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3493 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3494 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3495 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3496 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3497 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3498 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3499 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3500 } else { unreachable!(); });
3502 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3503 Err((chan, err)) => {
3504 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3505 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3507 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3508 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3509 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3515 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3517 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3518 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3523 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3524 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3527 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3528 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3529 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3532 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3533 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3534 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3543 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3544 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3545 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3549 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3551 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3552 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3554 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3555 /// across the p2p network.
3557 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3558 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3560 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3561 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3562 /// keys per-channel).
3564 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3565 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3566 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3568 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3569 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3570 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3572 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3573 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3574 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3575 /// for more details.
3577 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3578 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3579 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3582 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3583 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3584 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3585 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3586 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3592 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3593 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3594 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3595 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3596 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3597 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3598 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3599 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3603 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3604 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3605 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3606 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3610 let mut output_index = None;
3611 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3612 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3613 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3614 if output_index.is_some() {
3615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3616 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3619 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3622 if output_index.is_none() {
3623 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3624 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3627 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3631 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3633 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3634 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3635 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3636 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3638 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3639 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3641 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3642 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3644 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3646 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3647 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3648 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3649 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3650 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3651 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3652 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3653 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3654 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3655 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3656 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3657 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3658 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3663 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3664 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3665 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3668 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3669 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3670 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3671 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3675 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3676 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3677 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3678 config.apply(config_update);
3679 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3682 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3683 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3684 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3685 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3686 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3693 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3694 &mut channel.context
3695 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3696 &mut channel.context
3698 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3699 debug_assert!(false);
3700 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3702 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3703 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3706 let mut config = context.config();
3707 config.apply(config_update);
3708 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3709 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3710 context.update_config(&config);
3715 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3717 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3718 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3719 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3720 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3722 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3723 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3725 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3726 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3728 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3730 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3731 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3732 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3733 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3734 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3735 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3736 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3737 pub fn update_channel_config(
3738 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3739 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3740 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3743 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3744 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3746 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3747 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3749 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3750 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3751 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3752 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3753 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3755 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3756 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3757 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3760 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3763 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3764 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3765 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3766 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3767 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3768 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3771 let next_hop_scid = {
3772 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3773 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3774 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3777 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&next_hop_channel_id) {
3779 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3780 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3781 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3784 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3786 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3787 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3788 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3793 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3794 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3795 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3798 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3799 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3800 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3802 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3804 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3805 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3806 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3807 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3808 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3811 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3812 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3813 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3814 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3815 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3817 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3821 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3822 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3824 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3827 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3828 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3831 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3832 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3833 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3836 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3837 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3838 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3839 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3840 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3841 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3842 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3843 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3846 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3847 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3848 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3849 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3854 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3856 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3857 /// Will likely generate further events.
3858 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3861 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3862 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3863 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3865 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3866 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3868 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3869 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3870 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3872 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3873 match forward_info {
3874 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3875 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3876 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3877 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3878 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3881 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3882 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3883 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3885 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3886 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3887 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3888 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3889 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3890 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3891 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3894 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3895 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3897 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3900 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3901 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3907 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3908 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3910 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3914 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3915 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3917 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3921 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3922 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3923 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3924 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3925 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3927 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3928 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3929 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3930 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3931 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3933 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3935 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3936 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3940 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3941 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3942 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3943 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3945 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3946 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3952 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3955 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3958 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3959 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3960 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3961 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3962 // problem, not ours.
3968 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3969 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3971 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3976 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3977 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3978 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3983 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3984 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3985 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3989 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3990 match forward_info {
3991 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3992 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3993 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3994 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3995 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3998 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
3999 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4000 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4001 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4002 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4003 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4004 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4005 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4006 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4008 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4009 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4010 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4013 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4014 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4016 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4018 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
4019 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4020 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4021 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4026 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4027 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4029 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4031 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
4032 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4034 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4037 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4039 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4040 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4041 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4050 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4051 match forward_info {
4052 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4053 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4054 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4055 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4056 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4059 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4060 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4061 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4062 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4063 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4064 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4065 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4067 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4068 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4069 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4073 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4074 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4077 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4080 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4081 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4082 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4083 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4084 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4085 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4086 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4087 phantom_shared_secret,
4089 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4090 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4091 // if routing nodes overpay
4092 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4093 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4095 total_value_received: None,
4096 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4099 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4102 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4104 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4105 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4106 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4107 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4108 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4109 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4111 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4112 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4113 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4114 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4115 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4116 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4117 phantom_shared_secret,
4119 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4120 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4122 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4125 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4126 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4127 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4128 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4129 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4132 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4133 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4134 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4135 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4136 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4137 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4139 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4140 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4141 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4143 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4144 .entry(payment_hash)
4145 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4146 .or_insert_with(|| {
4147 committed_to_claimable = true;
4149 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4152 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4153 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4155 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4157 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4158 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4159 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4161 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4162 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4163 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4166 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4168 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4169 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4170 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4171 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4172 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4173 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4174 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4176 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4177 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4179 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4181 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4182 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4183 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4184 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4185 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4188 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4189 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4190 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4191 committed_to_claimable = true;
4193 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4194 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4195 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4196 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4197 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4198 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4199 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4200 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4201 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4202 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4206 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4207 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4208 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4209 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4210 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4212 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4214 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4215 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4217 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4218 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4219 committed_to_claimable = true;
4222 payment_claimable_generated
4226 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4227 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4228 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4229 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4230 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4231 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4232 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4233 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4235 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4236 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4237 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4238 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4239 Ok(result) => result,
4241 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4242 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4245 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4246 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4247 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4249 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4250 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4253 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4254 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4255 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4257 check_total_value!(purpose);
4259 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4260 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4261 check_total_value!(purpose);
4265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4266 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4268 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4270 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4271 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4273 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4274 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4275 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4276 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4277 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4279 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4280 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4281 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4283 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4284 if payment_claimable_generated {
4285 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4291 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4292 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4300 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4301 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4302 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4303 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4305 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4308 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4310 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4311 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4312 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4314 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4316 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4317 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4318 events.append(&mut new_events);
4321 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4323 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4324 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4325 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4327 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4329 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4330 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4331 if background_events.is_empty() {
4332 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4335 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4337 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4338 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4339 // monitor updating completing.
4340 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4342 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4343 let mut updated_chan = false;
4345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4346 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4349 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4351 updated_chan = true;
4352 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4353 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4360 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4361 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4363 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4364 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4365 // however, ensure that.
4367 log_error!(self.logger,
4368 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4370 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4372 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4374 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4375 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4376 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4377 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4378 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4380 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4381 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4382 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4383 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4384 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4390 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4393 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4394 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4395 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4396 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4397 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4400 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4401 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4402 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4403 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4404 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4405 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4406 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4408 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4410 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4411 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4414 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4416 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4417 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4421 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4422 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4423 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4424 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4425 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4426 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4427 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4429 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4430 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4433 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4437 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4442 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4443 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4451 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4453 /// This currently includes:
4454 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4455 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4456 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4458 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4459 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4460 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4461 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4463 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4464 /// estimate fetches.
4466 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4467 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4468 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4469 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4470 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4472 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4473 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4475 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4476 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4477 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4479 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4480 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4483 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4484 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4485 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4486 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4491 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4492 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4494 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4495 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4496 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4497 if needs_close { return false; }
4500 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4501 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4502 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4503 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4504 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4505 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4506 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4507 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4509 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4510 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4511 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4512 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4516 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4518 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4521 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4523 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4524 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4525 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4530 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4532 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4538 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4540 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4541 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4542 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4543 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4544 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4545 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4546 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4547 channel_id: *chan_id,
4548 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4557 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4558 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4559 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4560 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4561 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4563 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4564 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4565 log_error!(self.logger,
4566 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4568 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4569 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4570 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4571 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4572 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4573 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4574 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4575 channel_id: *chan_id,
4576 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4585 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4586 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4587 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4588 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4590 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4591 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4592 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4593 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4594 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4595 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4596 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4597 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4603 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4605 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4606 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4611 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4612 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4613 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4614 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4615 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4616 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4617 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4618 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4619 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4620 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4621 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4622 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4623 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4624 // have no channels to the peer.
4625 let remove_entry = {
4626 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4627 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4630 entry.remove_entry();
4633 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4638 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4639 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4640 // This should be unreachable
4641 debug_assert!(false);
4644 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4645 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4646 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4647 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4648 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4649 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4650 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4653 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4654 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4655 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4657 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4658 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4665 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4666 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4667 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4668 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4669 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4672 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4673 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4676 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4678 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4679 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4680 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4681 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4682 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4689 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4690 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4691 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4693 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4694 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4695 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4696 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4698 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4699 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4700 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4701 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4702 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4703 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4706 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4707 /// reason for the failure.
4709 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4710 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4713 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4714 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4715 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4716 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4717 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4718 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4719 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4724 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4725 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4726 match failure_code {
4727 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4728 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4729 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4730 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4731 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4732 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4734 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4735 let fail_data = match data {
4736 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4739 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4744 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4745 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4747 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4749 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4750 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4751 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4752 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4753 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4754 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4755 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4757 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4759 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4760 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4762 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4767 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4768 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4769 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4770 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4771 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4772 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4773 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4774 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4775 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4776 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4778 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4779 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4780 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4781 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4783 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4784 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4785 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4786 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4787 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4791 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4792 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4793 // be surfaced to the user.
4794 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4795 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4796 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4798 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4800 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4805 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4809 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4812 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4813 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4814 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4819 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4820 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4821 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4822 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4823 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4824 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4825 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4826 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4827 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4830 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4831 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4832 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4835 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4836 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4837 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4839 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4840 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4841 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4842 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4843 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4845 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4846 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4847 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4849 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4850 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4851 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4852 push_forward_ev = true;
4854 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4856 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4858 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4859 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4862 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4863 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4864 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4865 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4866 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4867 failed_next_destination: destination,
4873 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4874 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4876 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4877 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4878 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4879 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4881 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4882 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4883 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4884 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4886 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4887 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4888 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4890 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4891 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4892 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4893 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4894 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4895 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4896 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4897 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4898 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4901 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4902 /// even type numbers.
4906 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4907 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4909 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4910 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4911 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4914 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4915 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4920 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4921 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4922 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4923 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4924 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4925 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4926 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4927 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4932 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
4933 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
4934 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4935 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4936 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
4938 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4939 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4940 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4944 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4945 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4946 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4947 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4948 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4949 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4950 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4951 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4952 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4953 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4954 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4963 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4965 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4966 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4967 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4968 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4969 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4970 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4971 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4972 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4973 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4974 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4975 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4976 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4977 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4978 debug_assert!(false);
4982 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4984 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4985 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4986 debug_assert!(false);
4990 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4991 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4994 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4995 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4996 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4999 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5000 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5001 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5002 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5006 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5007 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5008 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5009 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5011 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5012 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5013 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5014 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5015 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5020 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5021 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5022 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5023 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5024 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5025 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5026 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5028 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5031 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5032 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5033 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5034 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5038 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5039 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5040 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5041 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5043 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5044 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5045 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5046 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5050 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5051 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5052 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5056 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5057 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5058 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5061 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5062 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5063 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5064 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5065 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5066 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5068 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5069 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5072 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5075 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5076 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5077 if let Err(e) = res {
5078 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5079 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5080 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5081 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5082 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5085 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5086 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5087 // monitor update as a background event.
5088 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5089 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5090 counterparty_node_id,
5091 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5092 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5100 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5101 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5102 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5108 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5109 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5110 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5111 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5112 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5113 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5114 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5115 // again on restart.
5116 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5117 payment_preimage, update_res);
5120 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5121 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5123 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5124 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5125 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5126 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5127 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5128 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5129 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5130 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5131 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5132 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5135 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5136 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5137 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5138 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5139 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5140 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5144 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5145 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5148 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5150 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5151 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5152 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5153 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5154 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5155 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5157 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5158 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5161 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5162 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5163 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5164 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5165 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5166 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5167 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5170 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5171 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5173 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5174 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5175 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5176 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5178 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5182 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5183 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5184 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5190 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5191 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5192 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5195 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5196 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5198 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5199 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5200 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5202 payment_purpose: purpose,
5205 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5207 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5211 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5213 sender_intended_total_msat,
5217 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5218 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5220 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5221 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5222 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5229 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5230 /// update completion.
5231 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5232 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5233 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5234 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5235 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5236 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5237 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5238 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5239 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5240 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5241 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5242 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5243 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5245 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5247 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5248 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5249 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5250 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5253 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5254 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5256 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5257 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5258 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5263 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5264 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5266 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5271 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5272 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5274 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5275 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5280 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5284 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5290 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5291 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5292 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5296 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5297 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5298 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5304 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5305 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5307 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5308 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5310 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5311 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5312 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5313 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5314 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5319 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5320 let mut peer_state_lock;
5321 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5322 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5323 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5326 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5329 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5330 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5331 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5332 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5333 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5336 let remaining_in_flight =
5337 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5338 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5341 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5342 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5343 remaining_in_flight);
5344 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5347 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5350 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5352 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5353 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5356 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5357 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5358 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5360 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5361 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5362 /// used to accept such channels.
5364 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5365 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5366 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5367 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5370 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5371 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5373 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5374 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5375 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5377 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5378 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5380 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5381 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5383 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5384 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5386 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5387 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5388 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5389 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5392 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5395 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5396 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5397 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5398 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5399 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5402 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5404 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5405 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5406 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5408 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5409 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5410 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5411 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5412 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5413 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5414 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5416 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5420 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5421 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5422 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5423 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5424 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5426 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5429 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5432 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5433 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5434 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5435 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5436 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5437 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5438 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5439 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5442 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5447 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5448 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5449 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5451 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5452 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5453 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5456 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5461 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5462 /// or 0-conf channels.
5464 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5465 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5466 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5467 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5468 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5469 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5471 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5472 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5473 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5474 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5475 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5476 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5477 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5481 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5484 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5485 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5487 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5488 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5489 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5490 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5491 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5492 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5494 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5497 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5498 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5499 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5502 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5505 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5506 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5507 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5510 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5514 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5515 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5516 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5517 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5518 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5520 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5521 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5523 debug_assert!(false);
5524 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5526 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5527 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5529 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5530 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5531 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5532 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5533 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5534 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5537 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5538 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5541 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5542 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5543 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5544 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5545 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5548 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5549 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5551 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5554 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5555 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5556 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5557 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5558 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5559 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5560 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5561 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5562 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5564 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5565 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5566 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5571 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5572 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5573 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5574 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5575 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5576 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5577 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5580 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5585 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5586 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5589 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5593 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5594 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5597 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5598 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5600 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5604 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5605 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5606 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5607 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5609 debug_assert!(false);
5610 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5614 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5616 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5617 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5619 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5622 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5623 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5624 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5625 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5626 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5628 user_channel_id: user_id,
5633 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5634 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5636 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5637 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5639 debug_assert!(false);
5640 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5643 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5644 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5645 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5646 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5647 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5648 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5650 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5651 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5652 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5653 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5654 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5655 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5656 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5657 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5658 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5662 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5665 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5667 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5669 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5670 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5672 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5673 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5674 funding_msg.channel_id))
5676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5677 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5681 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5682 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5683 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5684 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5685 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5686 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5687 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5691 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5693 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5694 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5695 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5696 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5698 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5699 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5700 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5701 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5702 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5703 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5704 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5705 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5713 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5714 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5715 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5716 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5718 debug_assert!(false);
5719 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5724 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5725 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5726 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5727 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5728 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5729 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5730 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5731 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5732 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5733 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5734 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5735 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5740 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5744 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5745 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5746 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5748 debug_assert!(false);
5749 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5751 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5752 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5753 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5754 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5755 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5756 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5757 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
5759 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5760 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5761 msg: announcement_sigs,
5763 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5764 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5765 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5766 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5767 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5768 // announcement_signatures.
5769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &chan.get().context.channel_id());
5770 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5771 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5772 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5779 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5780 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5789 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5790 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5791 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5792 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5793 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5795 debug_assert!(false);
5796 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5798 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5799 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5800 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5801 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5802 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5803 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5804 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5805 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5806 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5808 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5809 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5810 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5811 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5812 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5814 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5815 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5816 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5818 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5821 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5822 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5823 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5824 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5826 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5827 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5828 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5829 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5830 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5831 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5836 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5837 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5838 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5839 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5843 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5846 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5847 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5848 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5849 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5855 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5856 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5857 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5859 debug_assert!(false);
5860 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5862 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5865 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5867 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5868 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5869 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5870 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5875 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5876 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5877 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5878 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5879 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5880 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5881 } else { (tx, None) }
5883 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5886 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5887 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5888 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5890 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5891 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5894 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5898 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5903 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5904 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5905 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5906 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5908 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5909 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5910 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5911 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5913 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5914 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5915 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5917 debug_assert!(false);
5918 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5920 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5921 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5922 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5925 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5926 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5927 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5928 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5929 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5931 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5932 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5933 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5934 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5935 match pending_forward_info {
5936 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5937 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5938 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5939 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5941 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5942 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5943 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5944 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5945 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5948 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5950 _ => pending_forward_info
5953 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5955 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5960 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5962 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5964 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5966 debug_assert!(false);
5967 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5969 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5970 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5971 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5973 let res = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan);
5974 funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
5977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5980 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
5984 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5985 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5986 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5988 debug_assert!(false);
5989 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5993 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5995 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5997 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6002 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6003 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6004 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6006 debug_assert!(false);
6007 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6009 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6010 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6011 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6012 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6013 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6014 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6015 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
6017 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
6020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6024 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6026 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6028 debug_assert!(false);
6029 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6033 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6034 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6035 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6036 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
6037 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6038 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6039 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6047 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6048 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6049 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6050 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6051 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6052 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6053 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6054 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6055 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6056 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6057 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6059 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6060 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6062 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6063 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6064 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6066 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6067 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6070 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6071 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6073 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6074 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6075 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6077 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6078 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6079 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6080 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6081 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6084 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6085 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6088 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6089 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6090 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6091 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6092 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6093 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6094 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6095 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6098 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6099 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6100 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6105 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6106 // payments are being processed.
6107 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6108 push_forward_event = true;
6110 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6111 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6118 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6119 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6122 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6123 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6124 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6126 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6130 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6132 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6133 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6134 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6136 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6137 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6138 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6139 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6140 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6141 // real by taking more time.
6142 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6143 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6144 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6149 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6150 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6151 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6152 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6153 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6154 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6155 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6157 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6158 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6159 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6160 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6161 channel_funding_outpoint,
6162 counterparty_node_id,
6167 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6168 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6169 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6170 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6172 debug_assert!(false);
6173 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6174 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6176 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6178 let funding_txo_opt = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6179 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6180 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6181 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6182 *counterparty_node_id)
6184 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self,
6185 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan);
6186 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6187 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6188 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6189 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6190 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6192 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6197 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6201 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6202 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6203 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6205 debug_assert!(false);
6206 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6208 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6209 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6210 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6211 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6212 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6219 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6220 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6221 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6223 debug_assert!(false);
6224 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6228 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6229 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6230 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6231 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6234 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6235 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6236 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6237 msg, &self.default_configuration
6239 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6240 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6241 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6249 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6250 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6251 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6252 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6254 // It's not a local channel
6255 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6259 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6260 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6261 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6267 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6268 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6269 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6270 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6271 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6272 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6276 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6277 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6278 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6279 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6281 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", &chan_id);
6282 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6287 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6290 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6292 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6293 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6295 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6297 debug_assert!(false);
6298 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6300 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6304 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6305 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6306 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6307 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6308 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6309 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6310 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6311 let mut channel_update = None;
6312 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6313 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6314 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6317 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6318 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6319 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6320 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6321 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6322 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6323 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6328 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6329 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6330 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6331 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6332 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6333 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6341 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6342 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6345 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6346 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6351 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6352 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6353 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6355 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6356 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6357 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6358 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6359 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6360 match monitor_event {
6361 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6362 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6363 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6364 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6367 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6368 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6369 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6372 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6373 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6374 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6375 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6377 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6378 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6379 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6380 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6383 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6384 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6385 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6386 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6387 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6388 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6389 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6390 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6391 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6392 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6397 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6398 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6400 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6402 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6403 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6404 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6405 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6406 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6413 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6414 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6420 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6421 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6424 has_pending_monitor_events
6427 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6428 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6429 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6431 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6432 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6433 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6436 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6437 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6438 /// update was applied.
6439 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6440 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6441 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6442 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6444 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6445 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6446 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6447 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6449 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6450 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6452 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6453 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6454 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6455 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6456 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6457 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6458 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6459 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6460 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6462 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6463 has_monitor_update = true;
6465 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6466 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6467 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6468 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6470 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6472 continue 'peer_loop;
6481 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6482 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6483 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6486 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6487 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6493 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6494 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6495 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6496 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6497 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6498 let mut has_update = false;
6500 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6502 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6505 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6506 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6507 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6508 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6509 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6511 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6512 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6515 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6516 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6517 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6518 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6519 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6524 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6526 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6527 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6528 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6534 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6535 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6543 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6544 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6550 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6551 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6553 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6554 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6555 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6556 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6557 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6558 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6559 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6560 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6561 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6562 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6563 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6564 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6565 assert!(should_broadcast);
6566 } else { unreachable!(); }
6567 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6568 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6569 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6572 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6576 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6579 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6580 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6582 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6583 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6584 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6585 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6587 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6589 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6590 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6594 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6595 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6597 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6599 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6600 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6602 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6603 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6604 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6605 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6606 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6607 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6608 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6609 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6610 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6611 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6612 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6615 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6616 /// stored external to LDK.
6618 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6619 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6620 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6622 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6623 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6626 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6627 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6628 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6629 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6631 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6632 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6633 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6634 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6635 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6637 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6638 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6639 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6640 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6641 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6643 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6644 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6646 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6647 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6651 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6652 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6654 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6656 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6657 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6659 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6660 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6661 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6662 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6663 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6664 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6665 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6668 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6669 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6671 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6672 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6673 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6676 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6677 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6679 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6680 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6681 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6682 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6684 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6685 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6686 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6687 Some(_) => continue,
6688 None => return scid_candidate
6693 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6695 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6696 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6698 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6699 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6700 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6704 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6705 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6706 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6708 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6709 /// times to get a unique scid.
6710 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6711 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6712 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6714 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6715 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6716 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6717 return scid_candidate
6721 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6722 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6723 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6724 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6726 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6727 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6730 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6731 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6732 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6733 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6742 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6743 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6744 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6745 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6746 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6750 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6751 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6752 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6753 events.push_back((event, None));
6757 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6758 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6759 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6763 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6764 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6768 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6769 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6772 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6773 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6774 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6775 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6776 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6777 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6779 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6780 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6781 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6782 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6784 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6785 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6786 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6787 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6789 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6793 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6794 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6795 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6796 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6797 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6798 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6799 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6803 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6804 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6805 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6806 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6807 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6808 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6809 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6811 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6813 if further_update_exists {
6814 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6819 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6820 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6824 log_debug!(self.logger,
6825 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6826 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6830 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6831 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6832 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6836 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6837 for action in actions {
6839 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6840 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6842 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6848 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6849 /// using the given event handler.
6851 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6852 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6856 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6860 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6862 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6863 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6864 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6865 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6866 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6867 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6871 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6872 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6873 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6874 /// is always placed next to each other.
6876 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6877 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6878 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6879 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6881 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6882 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6883 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6884 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6885 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6886 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6887 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6889 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6890 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6891 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6892 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6895 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6896 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6898 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6899 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6902 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6903 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6904 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6905 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6906 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6907 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6908 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6912 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6913 events.replace(pending_events);
6922 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6924 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6926 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6927 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6928 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6933 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6935 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6936 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6937 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6939 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6943 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6945 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6946 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6947 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6948 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6949 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6950 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6954 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6956 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6957 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6958 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6959 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6960 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6963 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6964 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6967 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6969 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6970 let new_height = height - 1;
6972 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6973 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6974 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6975 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6976 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6977 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6980 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6984 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6986 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6987 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6988 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6989 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6990 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6991 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6995 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6996 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6997 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6998 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7000 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7001 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7004 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7005 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7006 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7008 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7009 if height < last_best_block_height {
7010 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7011 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7015 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7016 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7017 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7018 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7020 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7021 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7024 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7025 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7027 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7029 macro_rules! max_time {
7030 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7032 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7033 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7034 // having an explicit local time source.
7035 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7036 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7037 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7038 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7039 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7045 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7046 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7047 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7048 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7052 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7053 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7054 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7055 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7056 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7057 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
7058 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7059 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7066 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7067 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7068 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7069 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7070 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7071 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7072 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7073 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7074 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7079 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7081 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7082 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7083 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7084 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7085 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7086 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7090 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7091 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7093 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7094 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7095 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7096 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7097 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7099 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7100 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7102 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7103 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7104 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7105 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7106 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7107 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
7108 let res = f(channel);
7109 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7110 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7111 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7112 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7113 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7115 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7116 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7117 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
7119 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7120 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7121 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7126 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
7131 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7132 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7135 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7136 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", &channel.context.channel_id());
7137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7138 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7139 msg: announcement_sigs,
7141 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7142 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7145 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7146 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7147 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7152 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7153 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7154 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7155 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7156 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7157 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7158 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7159 // is always consistent.
7160 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7161 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7162 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7163 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7164 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7167 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7168 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7169 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7170 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7171 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7172 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7173 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7177 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7178 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7179 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7180 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7181 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7182 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7183 data: reason_message,
7193 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7194 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7195 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7196 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7197 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7198 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7199 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7200 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7201 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7202 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7204 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7205 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7206 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7210 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7213 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7214 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7215 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7216 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7217 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7218 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7219 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7220 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7221 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7222 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7225 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7226 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7227 _ => unreachable!(),
7229 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7230 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7231 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7238 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7240 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7245 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7247 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7248 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7250 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7251 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7255 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7256 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7259 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7260 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7261 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7262 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7265 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7266 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7267 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7268 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7271 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7272 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7274 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7275 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7276 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7277 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7278 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7281 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7282 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7283 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7284 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7287 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7288 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7289 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7290 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7293 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7294 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7295 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7296 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7300 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7301 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7303 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7305 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7306 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7307 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7308 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7312 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7313 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7314 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7317 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7318 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7319 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7320 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7323 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7324 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7325 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7328 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7329 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7330 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7331 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7334 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7335 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7336 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7339 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7341 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7344 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7345 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7346 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7349 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7350 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7351 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7354 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7356 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7359 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7361 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7364 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7365 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7366 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7369 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7370 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7371 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7374 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7375 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7376 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7379 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7380 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7381 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7384 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7386 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7389 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7391 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7394 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7396 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7399 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7400 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7401 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7402 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7403 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7405 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7410 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7415 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7416 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7417 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7418 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7420 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7421 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7422 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7423 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7424 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7425 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7426 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7427 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7428 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7429 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7430 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7435 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7436 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7437 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7440 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7441 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7442 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7445 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7446 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7447 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7448 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7450 // V1 Channel Establishment
7451 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7453 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7454 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7455 // V2 Channel Establishment
7456 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7457 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7458 // Common Channel Establishment
7459 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7460 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7461 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7462 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7463 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7464 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7465 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7466 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7467 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7468 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7469 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7470 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7471 // Channel Operations
7472 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7473 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7474 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7475 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7476 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7477 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7479 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7480 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7481 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7482 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7483 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7484 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7485 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7486 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7487 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7490 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7491 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7492 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7493 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7496 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7498 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7500 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7501 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7505 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7506 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7507 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7513 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7514 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7515 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7516 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7517 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7518 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7521 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7522 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7524 if inbound_peer_limited {
7527 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7528 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7529 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7530 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7531 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7532 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7533 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7534 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7535 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7536 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7540 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7541 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7542 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7545 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7546 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7547 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7552 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7553 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7558 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7560 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7561 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7562 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7563 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7564 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7566 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7567 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7568 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7569 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7570 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7571 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7572 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7573 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7577 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7581 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7584 match &msg.data as &str {
7585 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7586 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7588 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7589 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7590 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7591 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7592 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7593 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7594 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7595 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7597 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7598 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7599 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7600 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7601 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7602 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7603 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7607 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7608 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7610 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7611 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7612 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7614 log_level: Level::Trace,
7624 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7625 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7626 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7627 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7628 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7631 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7632 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7633 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7634 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7635 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7636 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7638 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7639 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7640 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7644 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7646 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7647 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7650 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7651 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7652 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7653 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7661 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7662 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7666 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7667 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7670 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7671 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7674 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7675 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7678 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7679 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7680 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7681 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7684 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7685 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7686 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7687 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7690 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7691 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7692 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7693 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7696 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7697 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7698 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7699 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7702 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7703 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7704 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7705 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7708 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7709 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7710 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7711 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7714 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7715 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7716 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7717 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7720 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7721 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7722 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7723 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7726 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7727 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7728 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7729 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7733 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7734 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7735 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7736 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7737 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7741 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7742 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7744 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7745 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7746 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7747 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7748 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7751 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7752 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7753 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7754 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7757 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7758 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7759 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7760 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7763 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7764 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7765 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7766 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7767 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7768 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7769 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7770 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7771 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7772 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7773 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7774 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7775 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7776 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7777 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7778 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7779 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7780 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7781 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7782 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7787 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7788 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7790 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7791 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7792 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7793 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7796 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7797 (2, node_id, required),
7798 (4, features, required),
7799 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7800 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7801 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7802 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7805 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7806 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7807 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7808 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7809 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7810 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7811 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7812 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7813 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7814 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7815 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7816 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7817 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7818 (7, self.config, option),
7819 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7820 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7821 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7822 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7823 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7824 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7825 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7826 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7827 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7828 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7829 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7830 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7831 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7832 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7833 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7834 (32, self.is_public, required),
7835 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7836 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7837 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7838 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7839 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7845 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7846 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7847 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7848 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7849 (2, channel_id, required),
7850 (3, channel_type, option),
7851 (4, counterparty, required),
7852 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7853 (6, funding_txo, option),
7854 (7, config, option),
7855 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7856 (9, confirmations, option),
7857 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7858 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7859 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7860 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7861 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7862 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7863 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7864 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7865 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7866 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7867 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7868 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7869 (26, is_outbound, required),
7870 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7871 (30, is_usable, required),
7872 (32, is_public, required),
7873 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7874 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7875 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7876 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7877 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7880 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7881 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7882 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7883 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7884 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7886 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7890 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7892 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7893 outbound_scid_alias,
7897 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7898 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7900 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7901 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7902 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7903 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7904 confirmations_required,
7906 force_close_spend_delay,
7907 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7908 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7909 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7910 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7911 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7912 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7913 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7914 channel_shutdown_state,
7919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7920 (2, channels, required_vec),
7921 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7922 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7925 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7927 (0, onion_packet, required),
7928 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7931 (0, payment_data, required),
7932 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7933 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7934 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7935 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7937 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7938 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7939 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7940 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7941 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7942 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7946 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7947 (0, routing, required),
7948 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7949 (4, payment_hash, required),
7950 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7951 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7952 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7953 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7957 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7958 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7960 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7962 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7963 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7964 reason.write(writer)?;
7966 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7967 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7970 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7971 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7972 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7973 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7980 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7981 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7982 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7986 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7987 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7988 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7992 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7993 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7994 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7995 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7996 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7999 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8000 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8001 // messages contained in the variants.
8002 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8003 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8004 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8006 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8007 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8008 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8009 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8010 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8013 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8014 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8015 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8016 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8017 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8019 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8024 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8029 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8030 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8031 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8032 (2, outpoint, required),
8033 (4, htlc_id, required),
8034 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8035 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8038 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8039 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8040 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8041 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8042 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8044 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8045 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8046 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8047 (2, self.value, required),
8048 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8049 (4, payment_data, option),
8050 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8051 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8052 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8053 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8059 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8060 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8061 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8062 (0, prev_hop, required),
8063 (1, total_msat, option),
8064 (2, value_ser, required),
8065 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8066 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8067 (5, total_value_received, option),
8068 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8069 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8070 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8072 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8073 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8074 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8076 if payment_data.is_some() {
8077 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8079 if total_msat.is_none() {
8080 total_msat = Some(value);
8082 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8085 if total_msat.is_none() {
8086 if payment_data.is_none() {
8087 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8089 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8091 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8095 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8098 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8099 total_value_received,
8100 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8102 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8103 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8108 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8109 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8110 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8113 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8114 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8115 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8116 let mut payment_id = None;
8117 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8118 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8119 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8120 (0, session_priv, required),
8121 (1, payment_id, option),
8122 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8123 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8124 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8125 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8127 if payment_id.is_none() {
8128 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8130 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8132 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8133 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8134 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8136 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8137 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8138 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8139 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8143 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8144 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8145 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8147 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8150 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8151 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8156 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8157 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8159 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8161 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8162 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8163 (0, session_priv, required),
8164 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8165 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8166 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8167 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8168 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8169 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8172 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8174 field.write(writer)?;
8181 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8182 (0, forward_info, required),
8183 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8184 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8185 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8186 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8189 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8191 (0, htlc_id, required),
8192 (2, err_packet, required),
8197 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8198 (0, payment_secret, required),
8199 (2, expiry_time, required),
8200 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8201 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8202 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8205 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8207 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8208 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8209 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8210 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8211 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8212 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8216 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8217 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8219 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8221 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8223 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8224 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8225 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8228 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8230 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8231 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8232 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8233 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8236 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8237 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8239 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8240 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8241 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8242 unfunded_channels += 1;
8247 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8249 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8250 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8251 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8252 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8253 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8254 channel.write(writer)?;
8261 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8262 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8263 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8264 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8265 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8266 for forward in pending_forwards {
8267 forward.write(writer)?;
8272 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8274 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8275 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8276 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8278 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8279 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8280 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8281 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8282 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8283 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8284 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8285 htlc.write(writer)?;
8287 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8288 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8291 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8292 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8293 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8294 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8295 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8296 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8297 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8300 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8301 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8302 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8303 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8304 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8306 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8307 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8308 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8309 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8310 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8311 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8312 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8317 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8318 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8319 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8320 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8321 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8322 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8323 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8324 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8325 0u64.write(writer)?;
8327 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8328 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8329 event.write(writer)?;
8333 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8334 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8335 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8336 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8337 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8338 0u64.write(writer)?;
8340 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8341 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8342 // likely to be identical.
8343 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8344 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8346 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8347 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8348 hash.write(writer)?;
8349 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8352 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8353 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8354 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8355 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8356 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8359 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8360 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8362 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8363 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8364 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8365 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8368 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8369 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8370 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8374 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8375 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8376 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8378 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8379 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8380 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8386 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8387 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8388 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8389 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8392 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8393 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8394 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8395 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8396 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8399 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8400 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8401 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8402 if !updates.is_empty() {
8403 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8404 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8409 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8410 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8411 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8412 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8413 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8414 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8415 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8416 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8417 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8418 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8419 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8420 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8421 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8428 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8429 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8430 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8431 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8435 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8436 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8437 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8438 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8439 // check that the event is sane here.
8440 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8441 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8442 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8443 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8449 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8450 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8451 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8452 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8453 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8454 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8457 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8458 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8459 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8460 events.push_back((ev, action));
8461 } else if action.is_some() {
8462 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8470 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8471 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8472 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8473 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8474 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8477 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8479 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8481 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8482 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8483 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8484 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8485 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8486 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8487 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8488 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8489 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8490 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8491 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8492 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8493 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8495 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8496 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8498 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8499 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8501 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8502 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8503 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8504 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8505 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8506 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8508 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8509 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8511 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8512 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8513 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8514 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8515 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8516 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8520 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8521 pub entropy_source: ES,
8523 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8524 pub node_signer: NS,
8526 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8527 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8529 pub signer_provider: SP,
8531 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8533 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8534 pub fee_estimator: F,
8535 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8537 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8538 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8539 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8540 pub chain_monitor: M,
8542 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8543 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8544 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8545 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8546 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8547 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8549 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8551 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8552 /// deserialization.
8554 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8555 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8556 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8558 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8559 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8561 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8562 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8563 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8564 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8566 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8569 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8570 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8573 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8574 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8576 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8577 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8578 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8579 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8580 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8581 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8585 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8586 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8587 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8588 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8589 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8591 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8592 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8597 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8598 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8599 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8600 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8602 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8603 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8604 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8605 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8606 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8607 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8611 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8612 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8613 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8617 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8618 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8620 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8621 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8622 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8623 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8624 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8625 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8629 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8630 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8632 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8633 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8634 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8636 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8638 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8639 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8640 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, Channel<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8641 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8642 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8643 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8644 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8645 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8646 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8647 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8649 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8650 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8651 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8652 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8653 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8654 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8655 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8656 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8657 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8658 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8659 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8660 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8661 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8662 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8663 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8664 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8667 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8668 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8669 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8670 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8671 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8672 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8673 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8675 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8676 let mut found_htlc = false;
8677 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8678 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8681 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8682 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8683 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8684 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8685 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8686 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8687 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8688 log_info!(args.logger,
8689 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8690 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8691 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8695 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8696 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8697 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8698 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8699 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8701 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8702 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8704 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8706 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8707 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8710 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8711 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8712 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8716 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8717 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8718 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8719 // safely discard the channel.
8720 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8721 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8722 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8723 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8724 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8725 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8726 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8729 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
8730 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8731 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8732 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8733 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8734 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8738 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8739 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8740 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8741 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8742 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8743 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8744 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8746 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8750 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8751 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8752 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8753 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8754 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8755 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8756 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8757 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8758 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8760 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8763 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8765 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8766 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8767 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8768 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8769 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8770 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8772 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8775 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8778 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8779 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8780 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8781 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8782 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8783 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8784 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8785 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8786 is_connected: false,
8790 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8791 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
8792 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8793 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8794 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8795 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8796 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8800 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8801 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8802 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8803 for _ in 0..event_count {
8804 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8805 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8810 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8811 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8812 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8814 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8815 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8816 // on-startup monitor updates.
8817 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8818 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8824 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8825 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8827 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8828 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8829 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8830 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8831 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8835 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8837 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8838 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8839 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8840 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8841 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8843 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8844 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8848 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8849 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8850 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8851 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8852 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8853 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8854 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8855 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8856 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8857 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8858 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8859 let mut events_override = None;
8860 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8861 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8862 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8863 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8864 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8865 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8866 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8867 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8868 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8869 (8, events_override, option),
8870 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8871 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8872 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8873 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8875 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8876 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8879 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8880 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8883 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8884 pending_events_read = events;
8887 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8888 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8891 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8892 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8893 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8894 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8895 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8896 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8898 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8900 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8901 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8902 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8905 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8906 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8907 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8908 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8909 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8911 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8912 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8913 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8915 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8916 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8917 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8918 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8919 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8921 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8922 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8923 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8924 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8925 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8926 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8927 pending_background_events.push(
8928 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8929 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8930 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8931 update: update.clone(),
8934 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8935 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8936 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8937 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8938 pending_background_events.push(
8939 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8940 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8941 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8944 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8945 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8946 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8948 max_in_flight_update_id
8952 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8953 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8954 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8955 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8956 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8958 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8959 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8960 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8961 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8962 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8963 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8964 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8965 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8966 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8969 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8970 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8971 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8972 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8973 &chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8974 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8975 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8976 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8977 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8978 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8984 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8985 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8986 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8987 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8988 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8989 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8990 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8991 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8993 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8994 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8995 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8997 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8998 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8999 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9000 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9001 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9002 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9003 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9004 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9009 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9010 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9012 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9013 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9014 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9015 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9018 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9019 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9020 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9021 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9022 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9023 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9024 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9026 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9027 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9028 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9029 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9030 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9031 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9032 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9036 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9037 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9038 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9039 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9041 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9042 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9043 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9046 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9047 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9048 retry_strategy: None,
9049 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9050 payment_params: None,
9051 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9052 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9053 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9054 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9055 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9056 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9057 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9058 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9059 total_msat: path_amt,
9060 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9062 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9063 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9068 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9070 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9071 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9072 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9073 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9075 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9076 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9077 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9078 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9079 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9080 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9081 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9082 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9083 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9084 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9085 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9090 !forwards.is_empty()
9092 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9093 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9094 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9095 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9096 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9097 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9098 intercepted_id != ev_id
9105 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9106 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9107 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9108 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9109 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9110 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9111 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9112 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9113 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9114 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9115 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9117 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9118 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9119 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9121 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9122 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9123 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9130 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9131 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9133 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9135 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9136 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9137 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9138 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9139 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9140 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9141 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9142 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9143 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9146 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9147 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9148 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9149 // channel still live case here.
9153 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9154 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9159 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9160 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9161 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9162 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9163 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9164 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9165 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9166 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9170 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9171 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9173 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9174 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9175 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9176 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9178 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9179 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9180 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9182 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9183 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9185 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9186 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9188 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9191 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9192 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9193 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9195 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9199 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9200 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9201 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9202 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9203 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9205 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9206 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9207 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9208 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9209 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9210 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9211 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9212 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9214 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9215 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9219 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9221 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9223 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9224 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9226 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9227 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9232 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9233 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9235 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9237 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9239 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9240 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9241 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9242 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9246 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9247 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9250 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9251 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9252 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9254 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9255 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9256 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9258 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9259 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9260 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9261 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9262 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9263 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9265 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9266 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9267 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9268 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9269 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9270 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9276 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9278 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9279 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9280 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9281 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9282 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9283 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9284 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9285 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9286 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9287 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9288 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9290 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9291 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9293 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9294 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9295 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9296 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9298 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9299 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9300 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9301 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9303 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9304 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9305 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9306 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9308 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9309 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9310 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9313 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9314 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9317 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9318 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9321 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9324 purpose: payment.purpose,
9325 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9326 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9327 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9333 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9334 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9335 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9336 for action in actions.iter() {
9337 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9338 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9339 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9341 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9342 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9343 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9344 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9346 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9347 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9348 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9349 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9355 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9357 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9362 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9364 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9365 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9366 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9367 router: args.router,
9369 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9371 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9372 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9373 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9374 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9376 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9377 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9378 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9379 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9380 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9381 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9383 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9388 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9390 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9392 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9393 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9394 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9395 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9396 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9397 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9399 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9400 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9401 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9403 logger: args.logger,
9404 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9407 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9408 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9409 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9410 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9411 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9414 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9415 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9416 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9417 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9418 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9419 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9422 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9423 //connection or two.
9425 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9431 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9432 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9433 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9434 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9435 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9436 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9437 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9438 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9439 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9440 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9441 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9442 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9443 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9444 use crate::util::test_utils;
9445 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9446 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9449 fn test_notify_limits() {
9450 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9451 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9452 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9455 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9457 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9458 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9459 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9460 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9461 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9463 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9465 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9466 // to connect messages with new values
9467 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9468 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9469 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9470 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9471 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9472 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9474 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9475 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9476 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9477 // ... but the last node should not.
9478 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9479 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9480 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9481 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9483 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9484 // about the channel.
9485 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9486 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9487 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9489 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9491 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9492 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9493 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9494 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9495 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9496 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9498 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9499 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9500 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9502 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9503 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9504 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9505 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9506 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9507 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9509 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9510 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9511 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9512 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9513 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9514 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9516 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9518 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9519 // the channel info has updated.
9520 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9521 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9522 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9523 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9524 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9525 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9529 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9530 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9536 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9538 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9539 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9540 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9541 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9543 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9544 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9545 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9546 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9547 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9548 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9549 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9550 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9552 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9553 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9554 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9556 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9557 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9558 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9560 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9562 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9563 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9566 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9567 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9568 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9570 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9571 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9572 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9573 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9574 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9575 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9576 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9577 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9578 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9580 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9581 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9582 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9584 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9585 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9586 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9588 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9589 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9590 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9591 // lightning messages manually.
9592 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9593 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9596 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9597 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9598 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9599 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9601 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9602 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9604 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9605 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9607 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9608 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9609 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9611 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9612 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9613 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9615 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9617 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9619 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9620 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9623 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9624 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9628 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9629 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9630 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9631 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9636 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9637 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9638 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9639 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9646 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9647 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9648 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9651 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9652 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9653 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9654 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9655 // fails as expected.
9656 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9657 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9658 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9659 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9660 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9661 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9664 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9665 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9666 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9667 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9668 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9669 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9670 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9672 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9673 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9674 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9676 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9677 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9678 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9679 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9680 let route = find_route(
9681 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9682 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9684 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9685 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9687 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9689 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9690 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9691 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9693 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9694 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9695 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9696 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9699 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9700 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9701 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9702 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9703 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9704 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9706 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9707 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9709 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9710 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9712 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9713 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9714 let route = find_route(
9715 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9716 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9718 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9719 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9723 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9724 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9725 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9727 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9728 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9729 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9730 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9732 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9734 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9735 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9738 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9739 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9740 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9742 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9743 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9744 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9745 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9746 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9747 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9748 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9749 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9750 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9752 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9753 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9755 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9756 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9757 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9758 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9760 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9762 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9763 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9764 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9766 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9767 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9768 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9771 let route = find_route(
9772 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9773 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9775 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9776 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9777 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9779 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9781 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9782 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9785 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9786 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9787 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9789 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9790 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9791 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9792 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9793 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9794 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9795 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9796 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9797 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9799 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9800 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9804 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9805 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9806 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9812 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9813 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9815 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9816 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9817 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
9818 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9819 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9820 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9821 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9822 let route = find_route(
9823 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9824 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9827 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9828 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9829 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9830 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9831 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9832 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9835 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9836 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9837 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9838 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9839 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9840 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9841 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9843 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9847 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9848 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9849 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9850 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9851 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9857 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9858 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9860 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9861 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9862 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
9863 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9864 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9865 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9866 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9867 let route = find_route(
9868 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9869 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9872 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9873 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9874 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9875 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9876 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9877 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9878 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9879 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9882 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9883 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9884 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9885 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9886 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9887 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9888 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9890 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9894 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9895 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9898 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9900 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9901 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9902 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9903 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9905 // Marshall an MPP route.
9906 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9907 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9908 route.paths.push(path);
9909 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9910 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9911 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9912 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9913 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9914 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9916 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9917 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9919 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9920 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9922 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9927 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9928 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9929 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9930 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9933 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9935 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9936 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9938 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9939 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9941 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9944 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9945 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9946 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9947 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9948 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9949 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9952 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9955 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9961 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9962 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9963 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9964 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9965 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9966 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9968 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9969 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9971 total_msat: 100_000,
9974 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9975 // payment verification fails as expected.
9976 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9977 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9978 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9979 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9981 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9985 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9986 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9990 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9991 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9992 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9993 // the channel is successfully closed.
9994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9999 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10000 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10002 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10003 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10005 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10006 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10008 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10009 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10010 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10011 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10014 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10016 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10017 // as it has the funding transaction.
10018 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10019 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10020 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10023 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10025 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10027 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10029 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10030 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10031 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10033 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10036 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10037 // as it has the funding transaction.
10038 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10039 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10040 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10043 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10044 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10045 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10046 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10047 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10048 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10049 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10051 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10052 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10053 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10054 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10056 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10057 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10059 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10060 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10061 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10062 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10063 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10064 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10065 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10069 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10070 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10071 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10072 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10073 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10074 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10075 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10078 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10080 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10081 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10082 // closing transaction).
10083 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10084 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10085 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10087 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10088 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10089 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10090 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10091 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10094 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10096 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10098 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10099 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10100 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10102 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10104 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10105 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10108 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10109 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10110 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10113 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10114 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10115 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10118 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10120 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10121 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10123 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10124 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10126 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10127 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10132 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10133 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10134 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10135 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10136 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10137 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10138 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10139 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10142 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10143 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10144 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10146 // Test the API functions.
10147 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10149 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10151 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10153 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10155 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10157 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10159 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10163 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10164 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10165 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10166 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10167 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10168 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10170 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10172 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10173 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10175 let mut funding_tx = None;
10176 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10177 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10178 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10181 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10182 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10183 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10184 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10185 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10187 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10189 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10191 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10193 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10195 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10197 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10200 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10201 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10202 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10203 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10204 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10206 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10207 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10209 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10210 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10211 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10212 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10213 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10214 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10215 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10218 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10219 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10220 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10221 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10222 }, true).unwrap_err();
10224 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10225 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10226 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10227 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10228 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10229 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10230 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10232 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10233 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10235 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10236 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10237 }, true).unwrap_err();
10239 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10240 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10241 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10242 }, false).unwrap();
10243 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10245 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10246 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10248 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10249 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10250 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10251 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10252 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10254 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10255 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10256 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10258 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10259 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10260 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10262 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10263 // "protected" and can connect again.
10264 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10265 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10266 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10268 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10270 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10272 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10273 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10277 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10278 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10282 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10284 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10286 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10287 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10289 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10290 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10291 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10292 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10295 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10297 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10298 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10299 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10301 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10302 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10303 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10305 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10306 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10307 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10308 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10312 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10313 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10314 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10317 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10318 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10322 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10324 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10325 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10327 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10328 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10329 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10330 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10331 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10332 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10338 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10339 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10343 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10344 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10347 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10348 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10349 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10350 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10351 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10353 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10354 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10356 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10357 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10358 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10359 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10365 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10366 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10368 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10369 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10370 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10372 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10373 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10375 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10377 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10381 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10382 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10383 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10384 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10385 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10386 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10387 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10388 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10390 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10391 payment_metadata: None,
10392 keysend_preimage: None,
10393 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10394 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10396 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10398 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10399 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10400 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10401 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10402 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10404 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10405 } else { panic!(); }
10407 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10408 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10410 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10411 payment_metadata: None,
10412 keysend_preimage: None,
10413 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10414 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10416 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10418 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10419 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10423 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10424 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10425 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10426 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10427 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10429 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10430 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10432 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10433 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10434 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10435 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10436 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10438 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10439 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10441 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10443 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10444 match &msg_events[0] {
10445 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10446 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10448 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10449 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10450 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10456 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10457 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10459 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10460 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10461 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10463 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10467 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10468 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10469 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10470 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10473 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10474 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10475 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10479 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10480 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10481 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10483 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10484 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10486 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10487 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10492 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10493 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10495 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10496 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10498 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10499 // not have generated any events.
10500 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10504 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10505 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10506 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10507 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10508 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10510 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10511 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10513 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10514 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10517 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10518 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10519 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10520 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10523 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10524 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10527 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10528 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10531 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10532 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10533 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10534 ..Default::default()
10536 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10537 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10538 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10540 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10541 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10544 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10545 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10546 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10547 ..Default::default()
10549 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10550 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10551 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10552 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10554 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10555 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10558 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10559 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10560 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10561 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10562 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10565 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10566 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10567 ..Default::default()
10569 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10572 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10573 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10574 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10575 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10579 fn test_payment_display() {
10580 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10581 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10582 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10583 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10584 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10585 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10591 use crate::chain::Listen;
10592 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10593 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10594 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10595 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10596 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10597 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10598 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10599 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10600 use crate::util::test_utils;
10601 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10603 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10604 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10605 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10607 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10609 use criterion::Criterion;
10611 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10612 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10613 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10614 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10615 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10616 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10617 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10619 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10620 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10622 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10623 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10625 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10627 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10630 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10631 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10634 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10635 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10636 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10638 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10639 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10641 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10642 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10643 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10644 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10645 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10647 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10648 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10649 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10651 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10652 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10653 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10654 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10656 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10657 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10658 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10660 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10661 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10662 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10663 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10664 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10666 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10667 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10668 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10670 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10671 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10673 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10674 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10675 }, false).unwrap();
10676 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10677 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10678 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10681 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10682 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10683 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10685 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10686 } else { panic!(); }
10688 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10689 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10690 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10691 match events_b[0] {
10692 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10693 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10698 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10699 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10700 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10701 match events_a[0] {
10702 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10703 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10708 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10710 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10711 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10712 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10714 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10715 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10716 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10717 match msg_events[0] {
10718 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10719 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10720 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10724 match msg_events[1] {
10725 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10729 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10730 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10731 match events_a[0] {
10732 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10733 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10738 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10739 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10740 match events_b[0] {
10741 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10742 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10747 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10748 macro_rules! send_payment {
10749 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10750 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10751 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10752 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10753 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10754 payment_count += 1;
10755 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10756 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10758 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10759 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
10760 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
10761 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10762 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10763 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10764 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10765 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10766 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10767 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10768 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10770 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10771 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10772 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10773 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10775 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10776 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10777 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10778 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10779 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10781 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10784 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10785 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10786 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10787 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10789 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10793 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10794 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10795 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);