1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
279 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
281 latest_features: InitFeatures,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
288 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
289 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
290 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
291 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
292 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>>>;
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
295 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
296 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
297 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
298 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
299 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
300 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, M> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M>;
302 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
303 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
305 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
306 /// to individual Channels.
308 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
309 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
310 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
311 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
313 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
314 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
315 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
316 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
317 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
318 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
319 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
321 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
322 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
323 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
324 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
327 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
328 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
329 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
330 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
331 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
333 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
334 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
335 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
336 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
337 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
338 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
339 default_configuration: UserConfig,
340 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
341 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
343 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
346 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
348 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
349 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
350 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
353 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
355 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
356 our_network_key: SecretKey,
358 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
360 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
361 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
362 /// are currently open with that peer.
363 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
364 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
366 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
368 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
369 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
370 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
371 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
372 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
374 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
379 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
380 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
381 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
382 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
383 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
385 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
386 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
387 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
388 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
389 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
390 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
391 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
393 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
394 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
395 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
396 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
397 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
398 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
401 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
403 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
404 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
407 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
409 macro_rules! secp_call {
410 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
413 Err(_) => return Err($err),
418 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
419 pub struct ChannelDetails {
420 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
421 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
422 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
423 /// lifetime of the channel.
424 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
425 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
426 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
427 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
428 /// The node_id of our counterparty
429 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
430 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
431 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
432 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
433 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
434 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
435 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
436 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
438 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
439 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
440 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
441 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
442 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
443 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
444 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
445 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
446 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
447 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
448 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
449 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
450 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
454 macro_rules! handle_error {
455 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
458 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
459 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
460 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
461 if let Some(update) = update_option {
462 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
467 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
468 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
469 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
470 // Return error in case higher-API need one
477 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
478 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
481 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
482 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
484 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
485 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
486 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
487 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
488 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
490 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
492 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
497 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
498 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
501 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
502 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
504 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
505 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
506 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
507 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
508 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
510 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
512 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
513 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
514 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
515 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
516 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
518 if let Some(update) = update {
519 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
521 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
522 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
523 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
524 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
525 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
526 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
530 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
531 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
532 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
534 shutdown_res.0.clear();
535 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
541 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
542 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
543 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
545 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
547 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
548 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
549 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
550 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
551 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
553 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
554 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
555 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
556 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
557 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
558 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
559 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
560 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
561 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
562 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
565 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
566 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
567 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
568 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
570 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
571 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
573 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
574 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
576 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
577 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
578 if !$resend_commitment {
579 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
582 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
584 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
585 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
591 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
592 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
593 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
595 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
596 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
600 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
601 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
602 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
603 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
604 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
607 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
612 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
613 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
615 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
616 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
618 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
620 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
622 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
623 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
625 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
626 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
627 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
628 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
629 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
631 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>, secp256k1::Error> {
632 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
634 let res = ChannelManager {
635 default_configuration: config.clone(),
636 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
637 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
641 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
642 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
645 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
646 by_id: HashMap::new(),
647 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
648 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
649 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
650 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
652 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
654 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
656 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
658 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
659 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
669 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
671 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
672 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
673 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
674 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
676 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
677 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
679 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
680 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
681 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
682 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
683 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
686 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
687 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
689 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
690 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
691 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
693 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
694 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
696 panic!("RNG is bad???");
699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
701 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
702 node_id: their_network_key,
708 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
709 let mut res = Vec::new();
711 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
712 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
713 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
714 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
715 res.push(ChannelDetails {
716 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
717 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
718 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
719 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
720 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
721 inbound_capacity_msat,
722 outbound_capacity_msat,
723 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
724 is_live: channel.is_live(),
728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
729 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
730 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
731 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
737 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
738 /// more information.
739 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
740 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
743 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
744 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
746 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
747 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
748 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
749 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
750 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
751 // really wanted anyway.
752 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
755 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
756 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
757 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
759 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
760 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
761 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
763 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
764 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
765 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
766 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
768 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
769 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
770 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
773 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
774 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
775 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
777 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
778 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
780 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
783 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
784 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
786 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
787 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
792 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
793 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
794 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
803 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
804 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
805 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
806 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
807 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
809 for tx in local_txn {
810 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
811 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
815 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
816 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
817 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
818 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
821 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
822 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
823 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
824 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
825 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
832 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
833 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
834 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
835 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
836 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
842 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
843 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
844 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
845 for chan in self.list_channels() {
846 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
850 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
851 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
852 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
854 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
855 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
856 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
858 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
859 failure_code: $err_code,
860 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
865 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
866 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
869 let shared_secret = {
870 let mut arr = [0; 32];
871 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
874 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
876 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
877 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
878 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
879 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
880 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
881 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
882 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
883 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
886 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
887 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
888 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
889 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
890 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
893 let mut channel_state = None;
894 macro_rules! return_err {
895 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
897 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
898 if channel_state.is_none() {
899 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
901 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
902 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
903 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
904 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
905 })), channel_state.unwrap());
910 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
911 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
912 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
913 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
915 let error_code = match err {
916 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
917 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
918 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
919 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
920 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
922 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
925 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
926 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
927 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
934 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
937 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
938 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
939 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
940 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
941 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
942 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
943 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
944 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
945 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
946 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
947 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
948 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
952 // final_expiry_too_soon
953 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
954 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
956 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
957 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
958 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
960 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
961 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
962 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
965 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
966 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
967 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
968 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
970 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
972 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
974 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
975 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
976 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
979 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
980 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
981 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
984 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
985 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
986 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
988 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
990 chacha_stream.chacha.process_inline(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
992 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
994 let blinding_factor = {
995 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
996 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
997 sha.input(&shared_secret);
998 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1001 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1003 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1005 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1008 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1009 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1012 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1013 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1014 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1015 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1016 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1020 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1021 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1022 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1023 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1024 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1025 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1026 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1030 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1031 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1032 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1033 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1034 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1035 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1036 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1038 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1040 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1041 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1043 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1044 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1045 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1046 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1047 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1048 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1049 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1051 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1052 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1054 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1055 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1056 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1058 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1059 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1061 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1062 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1063 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1064 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1066 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1067 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1072 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1073 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1074 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1075 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1077 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1078 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1080 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1081 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1083 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1085 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1090 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1093 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1094 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1095 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1096 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1097 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1101 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1103 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1104 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1105 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1106 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1107 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1108 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1109 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1110 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1111 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1112 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1115 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1116 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1118 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1124 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1126 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1127 /// fields for more info.
1129 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1130 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1131 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1132 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1133 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1134 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1136 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1138 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1139 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1140 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1141 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1142 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1143 /// relevant updates.
1145 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1146 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1147 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1148 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1149 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1150 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1151 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1152 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1154 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1155 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1156 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1157 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1161 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1163 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1165 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1166 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1167 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1168 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1169 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route had too large size once"});
1171 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1173 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1175 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1176 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1178 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1179 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1180 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1183 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1184 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1186 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1187 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1189 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1190 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1192 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1193 route: route.clone(),
1194 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1195 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1196 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1198 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1199 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1200 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1201 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1202 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1203 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1204 // something else in case we will resend later!
1205 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1209 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1210 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1211 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1212 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1213 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1214 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1222 } else { unreachable!(); }
1226 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1227 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1228 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1232 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1234 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1235 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1237 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1239 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1240 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1241 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1242 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1244 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1245 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1246 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1248 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1249 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1250 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1251 } else { unreachable!(); })
1256 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1257 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1258 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1260 Err(_) => { return; }
1263 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1264 // lock before add_update_monitor
1265 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1267 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1269 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1270 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1271 Err(_) => { return; },
1272 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1276 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1277 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1278 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1279 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1281 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1286 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1287 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1288 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1291 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1293 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1301 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1302 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1304 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1306 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1308 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1309 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1311 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1312 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1313 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1314 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1315 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1319 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1320 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event.
1322 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias a printable human-readable string to describe this node to
1323 /// humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1325 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1326 /// incoming connections.
1327 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: msgs::NetAddressSet) {
1328 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1330 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1331 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1332 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1333 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1335 addresses: addresses.to_vec(),
1336 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1337 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1339 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1341 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1342 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1343 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1344 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1345 contents: announcement
1350 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1352 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1353 /// Will likely generate further events.
1354 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1355 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1357 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1358 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1359 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1361 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1362 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1364 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1365 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1366 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1367 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1369 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1370 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1371 match forward_info {
1372 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1373 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1374 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1375 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1376 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1378 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1380 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1381 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1382 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1383 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1384 // problem, not ours.
1391 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1392 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1393 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1394 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1395 match forward_info {
1396 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1397 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1398 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1399 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1400 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1401 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1403 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1405 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1406 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1408 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1410 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1411 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1416 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1418 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1419 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1420 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1421 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1422 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1423 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1424 // this channel currently :/.
1430 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1431 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1432 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1434 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1435 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1437 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1439 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1440 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1441 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1444 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1446 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1447 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1448 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1449 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1450 // messages when we can.
1451 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1452 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1453 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1460 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1461 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1464 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1465 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1466 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1467 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1468 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1469 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1471 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1472 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1473 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1474 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1475 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1477 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1479 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1481 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1482 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1483 Err(_) => { continue; },
1487 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1488 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1491 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1492 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1493 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1494 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1495 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1496 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1497 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1499 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1507 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1508 match forward_info {
1509 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1510 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1511 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1512 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1513 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1515 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1517 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1519 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1520 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1521 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1524 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1525 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1533 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1535 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1536 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1540 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1541 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1542 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1543 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1547 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1548 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1549 events.append(&mut new_events);
1552 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1553 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1554 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1556 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1557 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1558 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1559 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1560 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1561 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1562 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1563 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1564 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1569 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1571 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1572 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1577 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1578 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1579 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1580 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1581 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1582 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1583 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1585 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1586 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1587 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1588 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1589 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1590 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1591 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1592 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1598 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1599 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1600 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1601 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1602 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1603 /// still-available channels.
1604 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1605 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1606 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1607 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1610 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1611 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1612 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1613 match &onion_error {
1614 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1616 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1618 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1619 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1620 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1621 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1622 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1623 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1624 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1629 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1630 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1631 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1632 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1634 error_code: onion_error_code
1638 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1642 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1643 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1644 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1645 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1647 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1648 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1649 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1650 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1651 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1652 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1654 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1660 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1661 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1662 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1663 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1664 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1665 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1667 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1668 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1669 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1673 let mut forward_event = None;
1674 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1675 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1677 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1678 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1679 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1681 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1682 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1685 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1686 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1687 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1688 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1689 time_forwardable: time
1696 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1697 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1698 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1700 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1701 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1702 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1703 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1704 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1705 /// motivated attackers.
1707 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1708 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1709 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1711 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1713 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1714 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1715 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1716 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1717 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1718 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1719 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1720 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1721 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1722 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1723 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1724 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1726 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1732 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1733 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1735 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1736 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1737 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1738 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1742 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1743 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1746 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1747 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1749 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1750 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1751 // why it's missing.
1756 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1757 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1758 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1759 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1760 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1761 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1762 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1763 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1765 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1769 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1771 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1772 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1773 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1774 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1775 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1776 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1784 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1785 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1786 //TODO: Do something with e?
1790 } else { unreachable!(); }
1796 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1799 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1800 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1801 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1804 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1805 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1807 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1808 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1809 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1810 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1811 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1812 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1815 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1816 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1817 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1818 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1819 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1820 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1821 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1822 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1824 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1825 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1826 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1827 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1828 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1829 // on-chain confirmations.
1830 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1831 // should be written.
1832 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1833 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1835 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1836 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1837 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1843 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1846 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1847 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1848 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1850 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1852 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1853 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1854 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1855 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1860 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1861 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1862 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1863 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1864 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1869 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1873 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1878 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1879 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1880 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1881 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1884 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1885 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1886 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1889 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1890 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1891 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1892 msg: announcement_sigs,
1895 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1903 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1905 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1906 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1908 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1910 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1911 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1915 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1916 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1920 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1921 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1922 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1923 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1924 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1925 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1928 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1929 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1931 entry.insert(channel);
1937 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1938 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1939 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1940 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1941 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1943 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1944 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1946 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1947 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1952 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1953 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1954 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1955 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1956 output_script: output_script,
1957 user_channel_id: user_id,
1962 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1963 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1964 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1965 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1966 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1967 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1968 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1969 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1971 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1976 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1977 // lock before add_update_monitor
1978 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1980 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1981 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1982 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1983 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1984 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1985 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1987 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1988 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1989 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1990 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1991 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1992 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1996 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1997 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1998 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2000 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2002 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2004 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2013 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2014 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2015 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2017 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2019 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2020 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2022 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2023 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2024 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2026 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2028 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2031 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2032 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2033 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2034 user_channel_id: user_id,
2039 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2040 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2041 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2042 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2043 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2044 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2045 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2047 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2048 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2049 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2050 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2051 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2052 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2053 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2054 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2055 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2056 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2057 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2059 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2060 msg: announcement_sigs,
2065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2069 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2070 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2074 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2075 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2076 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2077 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2079 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2080 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2081 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2082 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2086 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2088 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2092 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2093 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2094 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2096 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2097 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2102 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2103 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2105 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2116 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2117 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2118 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2119 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2120 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2122 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2125 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2126 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2127 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2128 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2133 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2134 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2135 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2136 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2137 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2138 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2139 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2141 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2142 } else { (tx, None) }
2144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2147 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2148 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2149 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2151 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2152 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2153 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2154 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2162 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2163 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2164 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2165 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2167 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2168 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2169 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2170 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2172 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2173 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2175 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2176 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2177 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2180 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2181 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2182 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2183 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2184 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2185 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2186 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2187 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2188 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2189 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2190 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2191 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2192 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2193 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2195 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2196 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2197 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2198 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2202 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2203 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2204 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2205 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2206 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2207 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2212 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2219 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2220 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2222 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2223 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2225 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2228 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2230 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2233 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2237 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2238 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2239 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2240 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2241 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2242 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2243 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2245 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2252 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2253 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2254 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2255 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2257 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2258 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2260 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2261 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2263 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2266 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2270 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2271 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2273 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2274 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2275 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2276 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2278 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2279 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2280 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2281 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2282 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2284 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2285 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2286 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2288 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2289 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2290 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2291 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2292 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2293 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2295 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2297 commitment_signed: msg,
2301 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2302 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2303 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2309 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2314 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2315 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2316 let mut forward_event = None;
2317 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2318 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2319 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2320 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2322 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2323 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2325 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2327 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2328 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2333 match forward_event {
2335 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2336 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2337 time_forwardable: time
2345 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2346 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2347 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2348 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2349 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2350 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2351 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2352 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2354 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2355 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2356 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2357 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2358 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2359 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2360 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2362 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2365 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2366 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2367 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2371 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2372 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2373 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2377 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2382 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2383 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2385 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2390 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2391 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2393 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2394 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2395 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2396 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2398 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2400 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2405 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2406 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2407 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2409 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2410 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2411 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2414 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2415 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2418 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2419 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2420 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2422 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2423 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2424 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2425 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2426 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2429 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2432 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2433 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2434 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2435 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2436 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2437 contents: announcement,
2439 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2447 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2448 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2449 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2451 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2453 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2456 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2457 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2458 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2459 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2460 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2461 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2462 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2463 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2464 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2466 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2467 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2469 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2470 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2473 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2475 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2479 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2480 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2482 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2487 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2488 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2490 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2496 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2500 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2505 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2507 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2517 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2518 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2519 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2520 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2522 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2523 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2526 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2532 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2535 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2536 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2538 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2539 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2541 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2542 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2543 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2545 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2549 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2550 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2551 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2552 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2553 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2554 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2555 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2565 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2566 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2567 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2572 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2573 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2574 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2575 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2576 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2578 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2579 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2580 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2581 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2582 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2584 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2585 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2590 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2591 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2592 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2597 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2598 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2599 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2600 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2601 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2603 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2604 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2605 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2606 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2607 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2609 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2615 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2616 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2617 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2622 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2623 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2624 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2625 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2626 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2627 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2629 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2630 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2631 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2632 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2633 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2634 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2635 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2636 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2637 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2638 msg: funding_locked,
2640 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2641 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2642 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2643 msg: announcement_sigs,
2646 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2647 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2648 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2649 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2650 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2654 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2655 for tx in txn_matched {
2656 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2657 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2658 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2659 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2660 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2662 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2663 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2664 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2665 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2666 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2667 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2676 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2677 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2678 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2680 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2681 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2682 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2683 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2684 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2685 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2686 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2695 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2696 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2698 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2699 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2702 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2703 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2704 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2705 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2707 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2708 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2709 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2710 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2711 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2712 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2713 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2714 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2716 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2717 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2728 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2729 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2731 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2732 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2736 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
2737 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2738 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2739 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2741 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2746 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2747 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2748 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2750 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2751 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2755 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2756 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2757 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2759 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2764 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2765 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2766 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2768 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2769 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2773 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2774 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2775 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2777 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2778 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2782 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2784 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2786 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2787 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2791 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2793 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2796 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2800 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2801 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2802 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2804 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2805 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2809 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2810 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2811 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2813 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2814 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2818 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2819 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2820 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2822 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2827 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2829 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2832 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2836 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2837 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2838 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2840 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2841 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2845 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2846 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2847 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2850 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2854 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2855 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2856 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2858 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2859 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2863 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2864 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2865 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2867 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2868 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2872 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2873 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2874 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2876 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2877 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2881 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2882 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2883 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2884 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2885 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2887 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2888 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2889 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2890 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2891 if no_connection_possible {
2892 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2893 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2894 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2895 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2896 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2898 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2899 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2900 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2910 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2911 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2912 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2913 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2914 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2915 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2916 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2917 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2919 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2920 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2921 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2925 no_channels_remain = false;
2931 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2939 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2942 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2944 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2945 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2946 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2947 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2948 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2952 if no_channels_remain {
2953 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2956 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2957 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2959 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2960 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2961 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2966 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2967 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2969 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2972 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2973 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2974 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2975 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2976 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2980 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2987 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2988 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2989 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2990 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2991 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2992 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2993 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2998 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2999 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3005 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3008 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3009 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3011 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3012 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3013 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3014 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3018 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3023 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3024 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3026 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3027 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3028 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3029 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3030 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3031 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3032 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3033 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3038 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3039 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3040 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3041 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3042 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3043 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3044 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3045 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3051 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3052 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3054 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3056 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3058 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3060 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3067 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3068 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3069 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3070 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3071 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3072 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3077 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3078 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3080 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3082 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3084 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3086 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3093 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3094 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3095 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3096 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3097 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3098 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3103 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3106 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3109 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3112 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3114 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3116 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3118 route.write(writer)?;
3119 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3120 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3127 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3128 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3129 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3130 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3131 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3132 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3133 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3134 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3136 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3141 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3142 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3144 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3148 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3150 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3151 data.write(writer)?;
3158 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3159 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3160 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3161 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3162 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3163 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3164 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3166 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3171 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3172 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3174 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3176 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3177 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3178 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3180 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3182 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3183 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3190 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3191 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3192 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3193 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3194 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3195 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3196 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3198 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3199 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3200 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3202 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3207 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3208 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3209 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3211 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3212 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3214 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3215 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3216 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3218 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3219 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3220 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3221 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3222 unfunded_channels += 1;
3225 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3226 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3227 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3228 channel.write(writer)?;
3232 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3233 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3234 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3235 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3236 for forward in pending_forwards {
3237 forward.write(writer)?;
3241 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3242 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3243 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3244 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3245 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3246 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3247 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3252 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3253 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3254 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3255 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3256 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3259 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3265 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3267 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3269 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3270 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3271 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3272 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3273 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3274 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3275 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3276 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3277 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3278 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3279 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3280 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref> where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3281 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3282 /// deserialization.
3283 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3285 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3287 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3288 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3289 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3291 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3292 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3293 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3296 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3297 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3298 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3299 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3300 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3301 /// deserialization.
3302 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3303 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3304 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3305 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3307 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3308 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3310 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3311 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3312 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3313 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3315 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3317 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3320 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M>) where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor {
3321 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3322 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3323 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3325 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3328 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3329 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3330 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3332 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3334 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3335 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3336 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3337 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3338 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3339 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3340 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3341 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3344 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3345 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3346 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3347 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3348 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3349 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3350 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3351 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3352 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3354 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3355 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3357 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3360 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3364 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3365 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3366 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3370 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3371 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3372 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3373 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3374 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3375 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3376 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3377 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3379 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3382 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3383 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3384 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3385 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3386 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3388 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3389 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3391 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3394 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3395 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3396 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3397 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3398 let peer_state = PeerState {
3399 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3401 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3404 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3406 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3408 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3409 monitor: args.monitor,
3410 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3412 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3413 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3414 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3416 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3421 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3423 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3425 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3427 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3429 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3430 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3431 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3432 logger: args.logger,
3433 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3436 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3437 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3438 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3439 //connection or two.
3442 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))