1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
202 payment_id: PaymentId,
203 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
204 payee: Option<Payee>,
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
209 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
211 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
213 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
215 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
218 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
219 payment_id.hash(hasher);
220 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
221 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
229 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
232 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
233 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
234 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
235 payment_secret: None,
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
244 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
253 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
255 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
260 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
262 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
263 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
264 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
265 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
266 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
268 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
269 err: msgs::LightningError,
270 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
271 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
273 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
275 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
277 err: LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 shutdown_finish: None,
291 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
293 err: LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
298 shutdown_finish: None,
302 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
303 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
306 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
308 err: LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
318 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
322 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
325 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
329 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
333 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
353 shutdown_finish: None,
358 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
359 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
360 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
361 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
362 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
364 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
365 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
366 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
367 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
368 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
369 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
370 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
372 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
376 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
377 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
378 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
379 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
380 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
381 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
382 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
383 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
384 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
385 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
386 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
387 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
389 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
390 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
391 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
392 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
395 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
396 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
397 /// quite some time lag.
398 enum BackgroundEvent {
399 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
400 /// commitment transaction.
401 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
404 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
405 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
407 latest_features: InitFeatures,
410 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
411 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
413 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
415 struct PendingInboundPayment {
416 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
417 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
418 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
419 /// this payment being removed.
421 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
422 user_payment_id: u64,
423 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
424 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
425 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
428 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
429 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
430 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
432 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
435 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
436 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
437 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
438 pending_amt_msat: u64,
439 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
441 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
442 starting_block_height: u32,
444 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
445 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
446 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
448 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
452 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
453 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
455 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
459 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
461 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
466 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
467 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
468 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
469 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
470 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
471 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
474 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
477 /// panics if part_amt_msat is None and !self.is_fulfilled
478 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: Option<u64>) -> bool {
479 let remove_res = match self {
480 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
482 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
483 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
487 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
488 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat.expect("We must only not provide an amount if the payment was already fulfilled");
494 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
495 let insert_res = match self {
496 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
497 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
498 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
503 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
504 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
510 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
512 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
513 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
514 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
521 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
522 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
523 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
524 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
525 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
526 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
527 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
528 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
530 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
531 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
532 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
533 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
534 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
535 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
536 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
537 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
538 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
540 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
541 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
543 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
544 /// to individual Channels.
546 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
547 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
548 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
549 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
551 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
552 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
553 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
554 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
555 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
556 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
557 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
559 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
560 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
561 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
562 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
565 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
566 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
567 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
568 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
569 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
571 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
572 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
573 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
574 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
575 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
576 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
577 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
578 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
579 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
580 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
583 default_configuration: UserConfig,
584 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
590 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
592 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
593 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
595 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
596 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
597 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
598 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
600 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
601 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
602 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
603 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
604 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
605 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
607 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
608 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
609 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
610 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
611 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
612 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
613 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
614 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
616 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
618 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
619 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
621 our_network_key: SecretKey,
622 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
624 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
625 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
626 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
628 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
629 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
630 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
631 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
633 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
634 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
635 /// are currently open with that peer.
636 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
637 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
640 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
641 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
643 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
644 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
645 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
646 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
647 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
648 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
649 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
650 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
651 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
653 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
660 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
662 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
663 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
664 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
665 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
666 pub struct ChainParameters {
667 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
668 pub network: Network,
670 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
672 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
673 pub best_block: BestBlock,
676 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
682 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
683 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
684 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
685 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
686 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
687 /// updates are ready for persistence).
689 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
690 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
691 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
692 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
693 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
695 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
696 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
699 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
700 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
701 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
704 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
705 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
707 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
708 persistence_notifier: notifier,
709 should_persist: persist_check,
710 _read_guard: read_guard,
715 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
717 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
718 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
723 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
724 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
726 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
728 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
729 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
730 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
731 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
732 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
734 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
735 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
737 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
739 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
740 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
741 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
742 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
743 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
744 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
745 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
747 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
748 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
750 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
751 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
752 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
753 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
755 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
756 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
757 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
758 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
759 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
760 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
763 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
765 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
766 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
769 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
771 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
772 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
773 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
774 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
775 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
776 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
777 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
778 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
779 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
780 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
781 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
784 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
785 /// to better separate parameters.
786 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
787 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
788 /// The node_id of our counterparty
789 pub node_id: PublicKey,
790 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
791 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
792 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
793 pub features: InitFeatures,
794 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
795 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
796 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
798 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
800 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
801 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
802 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
803 /// payments to us through this channel.
804 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
807 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
808 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
809 pub struct ChannelDetails {
810 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
811 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
812 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
813 /// lifetime of the channel.
814 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
815 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
816 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
817 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
818 /// our counterparty already.
820 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
821 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
822 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
823 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
824 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
825 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
826 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
827 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
828 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
829 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
830 /// this value on chain.
832 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
834 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
836 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
837 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
838 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
839 pub user_channel_id: u64,
840 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
841 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
842 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
843 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
845 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
846 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
847 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
848 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
849 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
850 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
851 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
852 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
853 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
855 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
856 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
857 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
858 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
859 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
860 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
861 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
863 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
865 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
867 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
868 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
869 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
870 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
871 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
872 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
873 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
874 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
875 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
877 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
878 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
879 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
880 pub is_outbound: bool,
881 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
882 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
883 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
884 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
885 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
887 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
888 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
889 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
890 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
892 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
894 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
898 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
899 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
901 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
902 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
903 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
904 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
905 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
906 ParameterError(APIError),
907 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
908 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
909 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
912 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
914 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
915 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
916 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
917 /// paths than the ones selected).
918 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
919 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
920 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
921 /// in over-/re-payment.
923 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
924 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
925 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
927 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
928 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
929 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
930 /// with the latest update_id.
931 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
934 macro_rules! handle_error {
935 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
938 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
939 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
941 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
942 // entering the macro.
943 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
944 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
947 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
949 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
950 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
951 if let Some(update) = update_option {
952 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
956 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
957 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
958 channel_id, user_channel_id,
959 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
964 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
965 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
967 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
968 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
969 action: err.action.clone()
973 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
974 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
977 // Return error in case higher-API need one
984 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
985 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
986 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
988 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
989 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
991 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
993 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
994 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
996 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
997 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
998 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
999 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1001 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1002 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1003 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1005 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1006 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1007 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1008 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1010 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1011 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1012 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1018 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1019 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1023 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1025 $entry.remove_entry();
1033 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1034 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1038 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1040 $entry.remove_entry();
1048 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1049 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1051 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1052 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1053 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1060 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1061 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1062 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1064 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1066 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1067 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1068 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1069 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1071 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1072 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1073 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1074 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1075 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1076 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1077 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1078 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1079 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1080 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1081 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1084 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1085 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1086 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1087 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1088 match $action_type {
1089 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1090 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1092 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1093 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1095 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1096 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1097 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1098 if !$resend_commitment {
1099 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1102 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1104 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1105 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1110 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1112 $entry.remove_entry();
1116 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1117 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1121 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1122 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1123 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1125 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1126 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1130 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1131 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1132 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1133 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1134 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1137 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1142 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1143 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1144 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1145 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1146 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1147 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1149 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1150 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1152 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1153 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1154 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1155 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1158 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1159 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1160 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1161 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1162 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1163 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1164 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1165 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1166 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1167 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1168 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1169 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1172 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1173 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1174 // before it should be allowed to.
1175 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1176 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1177 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1180 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1181 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1182 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1183 msg: announcement_sigs,
1186 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1189 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1190 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1191 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1192 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1193 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1194 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1195 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1196 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1197 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1198 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1199 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1200 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1201 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1202 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1203 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1204 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1205 let mut order = $order;
1207 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1209 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1213 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1214 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1215 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1216 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1221 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1222 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1223 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1224 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1225 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1230 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1234 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1239 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1240 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1241 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1246 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1247 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1248 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1249 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1250 assert!(res.is_ok());
1253 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1257 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1258 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1259 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1261 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1263 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1264 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1269 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1270 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1271 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1272 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1273 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1276 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1278 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1279 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1281 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1283 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1285 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1286 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1287 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1288 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1289 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1290 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1293 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1294 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1295 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1299 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1301 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1302 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1303 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1304 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1305 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1306 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1308 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1309 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1311 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1312 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1315 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1316 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1318 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1320 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1321 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1322 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1323 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1331 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1332 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1333 &self.default_configuration
1336 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1338 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1339 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1340 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1341 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1342 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1345 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1346 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1348 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1349 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1350 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1352 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1353 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1354 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1355 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1356 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1357 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1359 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1360 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1361 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1362 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1363 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1364 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1368 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1369 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1370 Some(peer_state) => {
1371 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1372 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1373 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1374 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1376 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1379 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1381 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1382 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1383 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1385 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1386 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1387 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1389 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1390 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1392 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1395 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1397 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1398 node_id: their_network_key,
1401 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1404 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1405 let mut res = Vec::new();
1407 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1408 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1409 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1410 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1411 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1412 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1413 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1414 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1415 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1416 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1417 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1418 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1419 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1421 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1422 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1423 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1424 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1425 inbound_capacity_msat,
1426 outbound_capacity_msat,
1427 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1428 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1429 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1430 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1431 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1432 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1433 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1439 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1440 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1446 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1447 /// more information.
1448 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1449 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1452 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1453 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1455 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1456 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1458 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1459 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1460 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1461 // really wanted anyway.
1462 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1465 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1466 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1467 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1468 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1469 Some(transaction) => {
1470 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1474 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1475 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1476 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1477 reason: closure_reason
1481 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1484 let counterparty_node_id;
1485 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1486 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1487 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1488 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1489 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1490 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1491 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1492 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1493 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1494 Some(peer_state) => {
1495 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1496 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1497 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1499 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1501 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1503 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1504 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1505 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1506 let (result, is_permanent) =
1507 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1509 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1516 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1520 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1521 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1522 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1523 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1527 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1535 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1536 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1539 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1543 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1544 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1545 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1547 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1548 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1550 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1551 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1552 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1553 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1555 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1557 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1558 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1559 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1560 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1561 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1564 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1565 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1566 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1568 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1569 /// the channel being closed or not:
1570 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1571 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1572 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1573 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1574 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1575 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1576 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1578 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1580 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1581 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1582 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1583 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1584 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1588 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1589 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1590 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1591 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1592 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1594 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1595 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1596 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1597 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1598 // ignore the result here.
1599 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1603 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1604 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1605 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1607 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1608 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1609 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1610 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1611 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1612 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1615 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1616 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1618 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1619 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1620 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1623 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1625 chan.remove_entry().1
1627 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1630 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1631 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1632 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1633 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1634 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1639 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1642 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1643 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1644 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1646 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1647 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1648 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1649 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1650 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1651 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1652 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1662 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1663 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1664 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1665 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1666 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1670 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1671 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1672 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1674 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1675 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1676 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1677 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1678 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1679 failure_code: $err_code,
1680 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1685 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1686 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1689 let shared_secret = {
1690 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1691 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1694 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1696 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1697 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1698 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1699 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1700 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1701 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1702 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1703 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1706 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1707 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1708 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1709 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1710 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1713 let mut channel_state = None;
1714 macro_rules! return_err {
1715 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1717 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1718 if channel_state.is_none() {
1719 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1721 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1722 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1723 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1724 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1725 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1730 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1731 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1732 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1733 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1735 let error_code = match err {
1736 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1737 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1738 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1739 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1740 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1742 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1745 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1746 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1747 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1754 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1757 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1758 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1759 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1760 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1761 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1762 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1763 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1764 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1765 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1766 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1767 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1768 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1772 // final_expiry_too_soon
1773 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1774 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1775 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1776 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1777 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1778 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1779 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1781 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1782 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1783 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1785 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1786 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1787 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1790 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1791 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1792 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1793 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1794 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1795 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1796 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1797 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1799 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1801 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1802 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1803 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1804 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1805 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1806 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1807 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1808 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1809 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1812 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1814 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1817 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1822 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1823 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1824 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1825 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1827 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1829 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1830 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1831 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1832 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1835 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1836 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1837 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1839 // Check two things:
1840 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1841 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1842 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1844 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1846 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1847 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1848 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1850 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1852 let blinding_factor = {
1853 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1854 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1855 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1856 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1859 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1861 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1863 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1866 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1867 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1870 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1871 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1872 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1873 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1874 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1878 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1879 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1880 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1883 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1884 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1885 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1886 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1890 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1891 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1892 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1893 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1894 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1895 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1896 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1897 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1898 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1899 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1900 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1902 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1905 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1907 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1908 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1909 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1910 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1911 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1914 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1915 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1916 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1917 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1918 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1919 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1920 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1922 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1923 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1925 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1926 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1927 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1928 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1929 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1931 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1932 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1934 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1935 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1936 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1937 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1938 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1940 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1941 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1943 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1944 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1945 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1946 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1952 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1953 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1954 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1955 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1957 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1958 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1960 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1961 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1962 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1964 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1966 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1971 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1974 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1975 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1976 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1978 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1979 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1980 if !chan.should_announce() {
1981 return Err(LightningError {
1982 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1987 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1990 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1991 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1992 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1993 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1994 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1995 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1997 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1998 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2002 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2004 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2005 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2007 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2008 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2009 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2010 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2011 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2012 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2013 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2014 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2017 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2018 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2020 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2026 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2027 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2028 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2029 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2030 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2031 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2033 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2034 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2035 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2036 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2037 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2039 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2043 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2044 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2046 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2047 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2048 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2049 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2050 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2051 err: "Payment already completed"
2056 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2057 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2058 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2061 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2062 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2064 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2065 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2067 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2068 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2070 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2071 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2073 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2074 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2076 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2077 payee: payee.clone(),
2078 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2079 channel_state, chan);
2081 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2082 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2083 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2084 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2085 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2086 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2087 total_msat: total_value,
2089 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
2093 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2094 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2095 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2096 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2097 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2098 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2099 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2100 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2101 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2104 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2105 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2106 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2107 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2108 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2109 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2110 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2111 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2119 } else { unreachable!(); }
2123 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2124 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2126 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2131 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2133 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2134 /// fields for more info.
2136 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2137 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2138 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2139 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2140 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2141 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2143 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2145 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2146 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2147 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2149 /// In general, a path may raise:
2150 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2151 /// node public key) is specified.
2152 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2153 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2155 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2156 /// relevant updates.
2158 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2159 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2160 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2162 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2163 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2164 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2165 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2167 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2168 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2169 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2170 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2171 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2174 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2175 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2176 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2178 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2179 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2180 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2181 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2182 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2184 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2185 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2187 let mut total_value = 0;
2188 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2189 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2190 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2191 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2192 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2193 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2194 continue 'path_check;
2196 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2197 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2198 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2199 continue 'path_check;
2202 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2203 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2205 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2206 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2208 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2209 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2210 total_value = amt_msat;
2213 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2214 let mut results = Vec::new();
2215 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2216 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2218 let mut has_ok = false;
2219 let mut has_err = false;
2220 for res in results.iter() {
2221 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2222 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2223 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2224 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2231 if has_err && has_ok {
2232 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2234 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2240 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2242 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2243 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2244 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2245 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2247 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2248 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2249 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2250 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2251 if path.len() == 0 {
2252 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2253 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2258 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2259 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2260 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2262 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2263 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2265 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2266 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2267 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2268 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2271 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2273 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2274 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2275 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2278 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2279 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2280 err: "Payment already completed"
2285 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2286 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2290 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2293 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2294 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2295 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2296 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2297 /// never reach the recipient.
2299 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2301 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2302 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2304 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2306 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2307 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2308 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2310 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2313 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2314 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2319 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2320 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2321 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2322 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2324 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2326 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2328 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2329 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2330 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2331 } else { unreachable!(); })
2334 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2336 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2337 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2340 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2341 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2346 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2347 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2348 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2353 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2363 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2364 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2365 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2369 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2371 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2372 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2374 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2376 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2377 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2378 /// keys per-channel).
2380 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2381 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2382 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2384 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2385 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2386 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2388 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2389 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2390 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2392 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2393 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2394 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2395 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2399 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2400 let mut output_index = None;
2401 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2402 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2403 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2404 if output_index.is_some() {
2405 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2406 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2409 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2410 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2411 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2414 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2417 if output_index.is_none() {
2418 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2419 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2422 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2426 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2427 if !chan.should_announce() {
2428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2432 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2434 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2436 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2437 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2439 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2440 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2441 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2442 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2443 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2448 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2449 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2450 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2452 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2455 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2456 // smaller than 500:
2457 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2459 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2460 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2461 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2462 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2463 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2464 /// our network addresses.
2466 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2467 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2469 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2470 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2471 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2472 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2474 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2476 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2477 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2480 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2481 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2484 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2485 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2486 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2488 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2489 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2490 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2491 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2492 rgb, alias, addresses,
2493 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2494 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2496 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2497 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2499 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2500 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2502 let mut announced_chans = false;
2503 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2504 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2505 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2507 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2512 announced_chans = true;
2514 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2515 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2516 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2520 if announced_chans {
2521 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2522 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2523 signature: node_announce_sig,
2524 contents: announcement
2530 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2532 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2533 /// Will likely generate further events.
2534 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2535 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2537 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2538 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2539 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2541 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2542 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2544 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2545 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2546 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2547 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2549 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2550 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2551 match forward_info {
2552 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2553 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2554 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2555 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2556 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2557 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2558 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2560 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2561 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2564 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2565 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2566 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2567 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2568 // problem, not ours.
2575 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2576 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2577 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2578 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2579 match forward_info {
2580 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2581 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2583 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2584 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2585 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2586 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2587 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2588 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2589 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2590 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2592 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2594 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2595 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2597 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2599 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2600 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2601 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2607 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2609 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2610 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2611 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2612 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2613 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2614 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2615 // this channel currently :/.
2621 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2622 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2624 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2626 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2628 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2629 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2631 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2633 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2634 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2635 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2638 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2640 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2641 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2642 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2643 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2644 // messages when we can.
2645 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2646 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2647 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2654 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2655 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2658 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2659 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2660 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2661 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2662 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2663 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2665 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2666 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2667 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2668 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2669 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2671 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2672 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2674 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2676 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2680 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2681 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2684 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2685 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2687 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2688 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2689 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2690 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2691 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2692 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2694 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2702 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2703 match forward_info {
2704 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2705 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2706 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2707 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2708 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2709 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2710 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2711 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2713 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2716 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2717 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2718 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2719 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2720 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2721 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2723 value: amt_to_forward,
2728 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2730 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2731 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2732 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2734 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2735 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2736 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2737 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2738 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2740 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2745 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2746 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2747 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2748 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2749 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2750 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2751 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2752 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2754 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2755 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2756 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2757 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2759 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2760 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2762 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2763 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2765 amt: amt_to_forward,
2766 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2770 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2771 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2779 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2782 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2783 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2786 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2787 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2788 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2789 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2791 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2792 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2794 let mut total_value = 0;
2795 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2796 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2797 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2798 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2799 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2800 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2804 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2805 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2806 total_value += htlc.value;
2807 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2808 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2809 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2811 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2812 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2814 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2816 _ => unreachable!(),
2819 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2820 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2821 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2822 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2825 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2826 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2828 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2829 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2830 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2831 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2835 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2836 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2838 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2840 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2841 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2848 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2849 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2857 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2861 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2862 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2865 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2866 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2867 events.append(&mut new_events);
2870 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2872 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2873 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2875 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2876 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2877 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2878 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2879 if background_events.is_empty() {
2883 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2885 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2886 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2887 // monitor updating completing.
2888 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2895 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2896 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2897 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2898 self.process_background_events();
2901 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2902 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2903 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2904 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2905 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2906 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2907 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2909 if !chan.is_live() {
2910 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2911 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2912 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2915 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2917 let mut retain_channel = true;
2918 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2921 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2922 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2926 let ret_err = match res {
2927 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2928 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2929 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2930 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2933 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2934 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2935 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2936 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2937 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2938 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2939 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2940 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2950 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2954 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2955 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2956 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2957 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2958 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2959 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2960 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2962 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2964 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2966 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2967 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2968 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2969 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2970 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2971 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2972 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2974 handle_errors.push(err);
2984 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2986 /// This currently includes:
2987 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2988 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2989 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2992 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2993 /// estimate fetches.
2994 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2995 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2996 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2997 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2999 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3001 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3003 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3004 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3005 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3006 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3007 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3008 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3009 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3010 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3012 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3014 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3016 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3017 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3018 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3019 if needs_close { return false; }
3022 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3023 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3024 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3025 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3026 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3027 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3028 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3029 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3033 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3034 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3036 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3038 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3042 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3043 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3052 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3053 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3059 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3060 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3061 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3062 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3063 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3064 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3067 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3068 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3069 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3070 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3071 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3072 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3073 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3074 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3075 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3076 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3077 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3083 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3084 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3085 // be surfaced to the user.
3086 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3087 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3089 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3090 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3091 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3092 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3093 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3094 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3096 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3099 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3101 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3102 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3103 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3105 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3106 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3107 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3108 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3109 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3110 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3111 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path_last_hop.fee_msat)) &&
3112 !payment.get().is_fulfilled()
3114 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3115 Some(RouteParameters {
3117 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3118 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3121 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3122 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3123 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3125 rejected_by_dest: false,
3126 network_update: None,
3127 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3129 short_channel_id: None,
3139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3146 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3147 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3148 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3149 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3150 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3151 /// still-available channels.
3152 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3153 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3154 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3155 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3158 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3159 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3160 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3162 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3163 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3164 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3165 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3166 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3167 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3168 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3169 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path_last_hop.fee_msat)) {
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3173 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3177 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3178 all_paths_failed = true;
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3184 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3185 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3186 Some(RouteParameters {
3187 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3188 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3189 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3193 match &onion_error {
3194 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3196 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3198 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3199 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3200 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3201 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3202 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3203 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3204 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3205 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3206 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3213 error_code: onion_error_code,
3215 error_data: onion_error_data
3219 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3225 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3226 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3227 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3228 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3230 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3231 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3232 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3233 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3234 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3235 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3236 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3237 network_update: None,
3240 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3243 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3245 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3251 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3252 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3253 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3254 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3255 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3256 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3258 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3259 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3260 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3264 let mut forward_event = None;
3265 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3266 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3268 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3269 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3270 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3273 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3276 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3277 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3278 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3279 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3280 time_forwardable: time
3287 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3288 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3289 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3291 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3292 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3293 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3294 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3296 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3298 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3299 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3300 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3301 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3305 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3306 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3307 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3308 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3310 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3311 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3312 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3313 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3315 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3316 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3317 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3318 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3319 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3321 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3322 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3323 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3329 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3330 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3331 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3333 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3334 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3335 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3336 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3338 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3339 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3341 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3342 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3343 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3344 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3345 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3346 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3347 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3348 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3350 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3351 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3352 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3353 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3354 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3355 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3357 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3362 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3363 // which were generated.
3364 channel_state.take();
3366 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3367 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3368 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3375 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3376 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3377 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3378 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3379 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3381 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3385 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3386 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3387 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3388 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3389 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3390 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3391 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3392 payment_preimage, e);
3393 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3394 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3395 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3396 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3399 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3400 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3401 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3402 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3403 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3404 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3405 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3406 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3407 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3408 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3414 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3416 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3419 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3420 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3421 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3422 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3423 payment_preimage, e);
3425 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3426 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3428 chan.remove_entry();
3430 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3433 } else { unreachable!(); }
3436 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3437 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3438 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3439 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3440 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3441 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3442 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3443 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3444 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3445 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3453 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3455 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3456 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3457 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3458 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3459 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3460 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3461 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3462 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3464 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3465 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3466 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3468 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3469 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3470 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
3471 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3478 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3479 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3480 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3481 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3483 payment_hash: payment_hash
3487 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3491 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3492 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3493 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3494 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3495 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3496 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3499 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3500 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3501 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3502 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3503 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3506 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3507 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3508 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3509 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3510 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3511 payment_preimage, e);
3513 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3514 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3515 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3516 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3519 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3520 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3521 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3522 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3526 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3527 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3528 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3531 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3532 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3534 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3542 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3543 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3544 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3547 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3550 let chan_restoration_res;
3551 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3552 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3553 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3554 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3555 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3556 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3558 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3562 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3563 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3564 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3565 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3566 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3567 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3568 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3569 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3570 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3573 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3574 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3575 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3577 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3579 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3580 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3581 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3582 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3586 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3587 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3591 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3592 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3593 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3594 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3595 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3596 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3597 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3598 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3599 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3600 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3602 entry.insert(channel);
3608 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3609 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3610 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3612 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3613 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3614 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3617 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3618 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3620 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3623 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3624 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3625 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3626 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3628 user_channel_id: user_id,
3633 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3634 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3635 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3636 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3637 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3638 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3639 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3640 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3641 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3643 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3648 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3649 // lock before watch_channel
3650 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3652 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3653 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3654 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3655 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3656 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3657 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3658 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3659 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3660 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3661 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3664 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3665 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3666 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3667 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3668 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3669 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3674 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3677 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3679 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3681 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3690 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3692 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3693 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3694 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3695 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3697 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3698 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3700 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3701 Ok(update) => update,
3702 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3704 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3705 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3706 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3707 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3708 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3709 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3710 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3711 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3718 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3721 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3722 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3726 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3727 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3728 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3729 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3730 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3731 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3734 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3735 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3736 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3737 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3738 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3739 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3740 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3741 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3742 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3743 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3744 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3745 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3747 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3748 msg: announcement_sigs,
3750 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3752 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3753 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3762 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3763 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3764 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3765 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3766 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3770 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3771 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3774 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3775 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3776 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3777 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3780 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3781 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3783 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3784 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3785 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3786 let (result, is_permanent) =
3787 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3789 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3795 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3797 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3804 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3807 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3808 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3811 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3815 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3816 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3817 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3819 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3820 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3821 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3822 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3824 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3825 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3827 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3832 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3833 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3834 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3835 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3836 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3837 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3838 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3840 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3841 } else { (tx, None) }
3843 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3846 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3847 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3848 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3850 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3851 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3852 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3857 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3862 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3863 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3864 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3865 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3867 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3868 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3869 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3870 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3872 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3873 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3875 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3876 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3877 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3878 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3881 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3882 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3883 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3884 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3885 match pending_forward_info {
3886 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3887 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3888 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3889 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3890 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3891 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3892 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3893 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3897 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3898 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3899 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3900 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3901 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3902 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3903 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3904 // no problem just calling this
3905 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3906 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3909 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3911 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3912 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3913 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3916 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3918 _ => pending_forward_info
3921 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3923 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3928 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3929 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3930 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3931 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3932 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3933 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3934 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3935 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3937 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3942 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3946 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3947 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3948 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3949 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3951 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3952 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3954 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3956 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3961 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3962 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3964 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3966 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3969 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3970 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3971 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3973 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3980 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3985 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3988 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3989 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3990 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3991 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3992 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3993 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3994 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3999 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4000 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4002 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4003 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4004 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4006 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4007 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4008 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4009 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4010 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4011 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4012 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4013 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4015 commitment_signed: msg,
4021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4026 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4027 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4028 let mut forward_event = None;
4029 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4030 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4031 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4032 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4034 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4035 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4036 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4037 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4038 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4040 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4041 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4042 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4044 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4045 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4046 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4051 match forward_event {
4053 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4054 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4055 time_forwardable: time
4063 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4064 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4066 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4067 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4068 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4070 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4071 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4073 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4074 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4075 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4076 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4077 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4078 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4079 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4080 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4081 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4082 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4083 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4085 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4086 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4087 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4088 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4089 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4091 } else { unreachable!(); }
4094 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4095 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4096 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4100 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4101 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4102 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4103 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4104 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4109 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4111 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4112 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4114 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4115 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4117 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4118 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4125 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4126 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4127 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4130 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4133 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4140 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4141 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4144 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4146 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4149 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4150 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4154 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4155 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4156 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4157 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4165 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4166 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4167 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4169 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4170 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4172 // It's not a local channel
4173 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4176 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4178 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4179 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4180 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4181 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4182 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4183 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4185 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4187 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4188 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4189 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4190 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4195 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4197 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4200 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4201 let chan_restoration_res;
4202 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4203 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4204 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4208 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4209 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4211 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4212 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4213 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4214 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4215 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4216 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4217 let mut channel_update = None;
4218 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4219 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4220 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4223 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4224 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4225 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4226 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4227 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4228 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4229 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4232 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4233 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4234 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4237 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4242 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4243 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4245 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4246 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4251 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4252 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4253 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4254 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4255 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4256 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4257 match monitor_event {
4258 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4259 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4261 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4263 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4264 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4267 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4268 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4269 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4270 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4271 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4272 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4273 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4274 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4275 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4276 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4278 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4279 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4280 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4284 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4285 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4287 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4289 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4290 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4291 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4292 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4293 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4298 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4299 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4304 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4305 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4308 has_pending_monitor_events
4311 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4312 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4313 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4314 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4315 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4316 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4319 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4320 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4321 /// update was applied.
4323 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4324 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4325 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4326 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4327 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4328 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4329 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4330 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4332 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4333 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4334 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4335 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4336 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4338 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4339 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4340 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4341 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4342 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4344 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4345 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4346 has_monitor_update = true;
4347 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4348 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4349 if close_channel { return false; }
4351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4352 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4353 updates: commitment_update,
4360 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4361 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4362 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4369 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4370 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4371 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4374 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4375 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4381 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4382 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4383 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4384 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4385 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4386 let mut has_update = false;
4388 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4389 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4390 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4391 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4392 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4394 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4395 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4396 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4397 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4399 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4400 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4403 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4404 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4405 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4406 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4407 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4410 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4411 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4416 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4418 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4419 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4425 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4426 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4433 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4434 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4440 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4441 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4443 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4444 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4445 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4446 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4447 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4448 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4449 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4450 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4451 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4452 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4453 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4454 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4455 assert!(should_broadcast);
4456 } else { unreachable!(); }
4457 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4459 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4463 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4464 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4466 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4469 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4470 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4472 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4473 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4474 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4475 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4476 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4477 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4478 // never fail a payment too early.
4479 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4481 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4489 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4492 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4493 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4495 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4496 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4497 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4499 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4501 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4502 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4503 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4504 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4505 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4506 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4507 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4510 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4511 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4514 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4515 /// stored external to LDK.
4517 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4518 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4519 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4521 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4522 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4524 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4525 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4526 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4527 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4528 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4530 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4531 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4532 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4533 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4535 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4536 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4537 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4538 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4539 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4541 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4542 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4543 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4544 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4545 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4547 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4548 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4549 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4551 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4553 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4554 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4556 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4557 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4558 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4559 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4560 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4563 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4564 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4565 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4566 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4567 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4572 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4573 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4577 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4578 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4579 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4580 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4581 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4584 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4585 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4586 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4587 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4589 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4590 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4591 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4592 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4595 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4596 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4598 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4599 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4602 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4603 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4604 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4606 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4607 events.replace(pending_events);
4616 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4618 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4619 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4620 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4621 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4624 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4626 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4627 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4629 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4630 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4631 /// restarting from an old state.
4632 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4633 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4634 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4636 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4637 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4638 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4639 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4642 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4643 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4644 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4647 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4648 handler.handle_event(&event);
4656 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4658 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4659 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4660 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4661 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4664 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4666 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4667 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4668 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4669 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4670 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4673 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4674 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4675 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4678 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4679 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4680 let new_height = height - 1;
4682 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4683 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4684 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4685 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4686 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4687 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4690 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4694 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4696 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4697 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4698 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4699 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4702 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4703 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4704 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4705 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4707 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4708 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4711 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4714 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4715 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4716 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4717 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4719 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4720 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4724 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4726 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4728 macro_rules! max_time {
4729 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4731 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4732 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4733 // having an explicit local time source.
4734 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4735 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4736 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4737 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4738 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4744 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4745 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4746 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4747 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4748 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4751 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4752 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4753 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4754 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4755 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4756 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4762 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4763 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4764 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4765 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4766 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4767 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4773 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4775 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4776 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4777 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4778 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4779 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4780 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4785 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4787 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4788 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4789 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4793 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4794 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4796 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4797 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4798 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4799 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4800 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4802 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4803 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4805 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4806 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4807 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4808 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4809 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4810 let res = f(channel);
4811 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4812 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4813 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4814 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4815 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4819 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4820 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4821 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4822 msg: funding_locked,
4824 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4825 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4826 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4827 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4828 msg: announcement_sigs,
4830 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4832 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4833 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4834 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4837 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4839 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4841 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4842 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4843 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4845 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4846 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4847 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4848 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4849 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4853 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4854 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4855 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4856 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4863 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4864 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4865 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4866 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4867 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4868 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4869 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4870 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4871 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4872 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4873 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4874 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4875 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4880 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4885 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4887 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4892 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4893 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4894 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4896 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4897 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4898 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4899 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4902 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4903 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4905 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4906 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4909 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4910 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4911 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4912 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4913 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4917 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4918 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4919 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4920 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4924 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4925 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4926 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4927 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4928 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4932 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4934 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4937 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4939 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4942 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4943 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4944 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4947 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4949 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4952 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4954 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4957 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4958 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4959 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4962 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4964 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4967 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4968 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4969 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4972 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4974 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4977 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4979 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4982 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4983 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4984 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4987 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4988 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4989 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4992 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4994 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4997 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4999 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5002 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5004 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5007 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5008 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5009 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5012 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5017 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5018 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5019 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5022 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5023 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5024 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5025 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5027 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5028 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5029 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5030 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5031 if no_connection_possible {
5032 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5033 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5034 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5035 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5036 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5038 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5039 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5040 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5044 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5051 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5052 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5053 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5054 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5055 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5056 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5057 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5059 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5062 no_channels_remain = false;
5068 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5070 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5074 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5076 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5077 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5081 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5082 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5083 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5084 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5085 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5086 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5092 if no_channels_remain {
5093 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5096 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5097 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5101 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5102 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5107 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5108 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5110 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5111 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5115 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5122 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5123 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5124 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5125 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5126 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5127 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5128 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5132 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5133 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5134 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5140 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5143 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5146 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5147 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5148 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5149 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5150 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5154 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5155 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5160 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5161 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5162 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5163 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5164 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5165 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5168 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5171 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5177 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5178 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5183 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5184 let result = *guard;
5192 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5193 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5194 let current_time = Instant::now();
5196 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5197 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5202 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5203 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5204 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5205 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5206 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5208 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5209 let result = *guard;
5210 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5214 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5215 None => return result,
5221 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5223 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5224 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5225 *persistence_lock = true;
5226 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5231 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5232 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5234 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5236 (0, onion_packet, required),
5237 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5240 (0, payment_data, required),
5241 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5243 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5244 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5245 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5249 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5250 (0, routing, required),
5251 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5252 (4, payment_hash, required),
5253 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5254 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5258 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5259 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5261 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5263 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5264 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5265 reason.write(writer)?;
5267 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5268 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5271 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5272 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5273 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5274 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5281 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5282 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5283 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5286 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5287 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5288 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5289 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5293 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5294 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5295 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5296 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5297 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5300 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5301 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5302 // messages contained in the variants.
5303 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5304 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5305 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5307 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5308 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5309 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5310 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5311 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5314 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5315 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5316 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5317 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5318 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5320 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5325 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5330 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5331 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5332 (2, outpoint, required),
5333 (4, htlc_id, required),
5334 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5337 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5338 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5339 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5340 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5343 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5344 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5345 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5350 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5351 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5352 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5358 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5359 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5360 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5362 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5363 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5364 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5368 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5369 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5370 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5372 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5374 if payment_data.is_some() {
5375 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5377 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5380 if payment_data.is_none() {
5381 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5383 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5387 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5395 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5396 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5397 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5400 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5401 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5402 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5403 let mut payment_id = None;
5404 let mut payment_secret = None;
5405 let mut payee = None;
5406 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5407 (0, session_priv, required),
5408 (1, payment_id, option),
5409 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5410 (3, payment_secret, option),
5411 (4, path, vec_type),
5414 if payment_id.is_none() {
5415 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5417 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5419 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5420 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5421 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5422 path: path.unwrap(),
5423 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5428 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5429 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5434 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5435 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5437 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5439 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5440 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5441 (0, session_priv, required),
5442 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5443 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5444 (3, payment_secret, option),
5445 (4, path, vec_type),
5449 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5451 field.write(writer)?;
5458 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5459 (0, LightningError) => {
5463 (0, failure_code, required),
5464 (2, data, vec_type),
5468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5470 (0, forward_info, required),
5471 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5472 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5473 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5476 (0, htlc_id, required),
5477 (2, err_packet, required),
5481 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5482 (0, payment_secret, required),
5483 (2, expiry_time, required),
5484 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5485 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5486 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5489 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5491 (0, session_privs, required),
5494 (0, session_privs, required),
5497 (0, session_privs, required),
5498 (2, payment_hash, required),
5499 (4, payment_secret, option),
5500 (6, total_msat, required),
5501 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5502 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5506 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5507 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5508 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5509 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5510 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5514 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5516 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5518 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5520 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5521 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5522 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5525 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5526 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5527 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5528 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5529 unfunded_channels += 1;
5532 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5533 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5534 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5535 channel.write(writer)?;
5539 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5540 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5541 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5542 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5543 for forward in pending_forwards {
5544 forward.write(writer)?;
5548 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5549 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5550 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5551 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5552 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5553 htlc.write(writer)?;
5557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5558 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5559 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5560 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5561 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5562 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5565 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5566 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5567 for event in events.iter() {
5568 event.write(writer)?;
5571 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5572 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5573 for event in background_events.iter() {
5575 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5577 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5578 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5583 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5584 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5586 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5587 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5588 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5589 hash.write(writer)?;
5590 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5593 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5594 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5595 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5596 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5597 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5598 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5601 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5602 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5604 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5605 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5606 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5607 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5610 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5614 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5615 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5616 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5618 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5619 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5620 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5625 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5626 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5627 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5634 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5636 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5638 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5639 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5640 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5641 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5642 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5643 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5644 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5645 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5646 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5647 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5648 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5649 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5650 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5652 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5653 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5655 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5656 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5658 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5659 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5660 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5661 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5662 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5663 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5665 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5666 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5667 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5668 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5669 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5670 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5673 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5674 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5676 pub keys_manager: K,
5678 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5680 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5681 pub fee_estimator: F,
5682 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5684 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5685 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5686 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5687 pub chain_monitor: M,
5689 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5690 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5691 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5692 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5693 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5694 /// deserialization.
5696 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5697 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5698 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5700 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5701 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5703 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5704 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5705 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5706 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5708 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5711 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5712 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5715 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5716 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5717 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5718 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5719 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5720 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5723 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5724 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5725 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5726 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5727 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5729 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5730 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5735 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5736 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5737 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5738 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5739 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5740 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5741 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5742 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5745 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5746 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5747 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5751 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5752 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5753 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5754 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5755 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5759 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5760 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5762 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5763 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5764 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5766 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5768 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5769 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5770 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5771 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5772 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5773 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5774 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5775 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5776 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5777 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5778 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5779 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5780 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5781 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5782 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5783 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5784 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5785 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5786 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5787 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5788 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5789 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5790 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5791 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5792 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5793 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5794 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5795 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5796 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5797 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5798 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5799 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5800 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5801 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5802 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5803 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5804 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5805 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5806 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5809 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5810 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5812 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5815 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5816 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5817 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5818 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5819 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5820 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5824 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5825 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5826 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5830 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5831 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5832 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5833 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5834 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5835 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5836 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5837 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5838 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5840 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5843 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5844 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5845 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5846 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5847 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5848 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5849 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5850 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5852 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5855 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5856 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5857 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5858 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5859 let peer_state = PeerState {
5860 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5862 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5865 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5866 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5867 for _ in 0..event_count {
5868 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5869 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5873 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5874 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5875 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5876 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5877 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5878 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5879 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5880 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5884 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5885 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5886 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5887 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5888 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5889 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5893 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5894 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5896 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5897 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5898 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5899 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5900 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5904 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5905 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5906 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5907 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5908 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5909 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5910 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5912 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5913 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5917 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5918 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5919 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5920 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5921 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5922 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5924 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5925 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5926 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5927 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5928 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5929 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5931 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5933 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5934 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5935 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5936 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5937 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5938 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5939 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5941 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5942 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5943 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5944 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5945 if path.is_empty() {
5946 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5947 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5949 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5950 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5951 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5952 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5954 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, path_amt);
5955 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5956 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5958 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5959 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5960 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5961 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5963 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5964 total_msat: path_amt,
5965 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5967 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5968 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
5977 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5978 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5980 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5981 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5984 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5986 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5987 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5988 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5990 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5992 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5997 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5999 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6000 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6002 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6003 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6006 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6007 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6009 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6011 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6012 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6013 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6014 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6016 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6017 logger: args.logger,
6018 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6021 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6022 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6025 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6026 //connection or two.
6028 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6034 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6035 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6036 use core::time::Duration;
6037 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6038 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6039 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6040 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6042 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6043 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6044 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6045 use util::errors::APIError;
6046 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6048 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6050 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6051 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6053 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6056 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6057 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6059 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6060 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6061 thread::spawn(move || {
6063 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6064 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6065 *persistence_lock = true;
6068 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6074 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6075 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6077 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6080 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6085 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6087 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6090 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6097 fn test_notify_limits() {
6098 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6099 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6103 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6105 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6106 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6107 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6108 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6109 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6111 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6113 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6114 // to connect messages with new values
6115 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6116 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6117 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6118 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6120 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6121 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6122 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6123 // ... but the last node should not.
6124 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6125 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6126 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6127 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6129 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6130 // about the channel.
6131 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6132 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6133 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6135 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6137 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6138 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6139 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6140 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6141 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6142 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6144 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6145 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6146 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6148 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6149 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6150 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6151 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6152 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6153 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6155 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6156 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6157 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6158 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6159 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6160 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6161 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6162 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6164 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6165 // the channel info has updated.
6166 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6167 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6168 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6169 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6170 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6171 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6175 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6176 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6182 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6184 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6185 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6186 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6187 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6188 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6189 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6190 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6192 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6193 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6194 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6196 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6197 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6199 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6200 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6201 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6203 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6209 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6210 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6211 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6212 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6213 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6214 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6215 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6216 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6217 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6219 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6220 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6222 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6223 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6224 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6226 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6227 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6228 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6229 // lightning messages manually.
6230 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6232 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6234 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6236 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6237 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6239 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6240 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6242 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6243 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6244 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6246 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6247 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6248 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6250 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6252 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6254 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6255 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6259 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6262 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6263 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6264 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6265 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6272 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6273 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6274 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6275 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6276 // fails as expected.
6277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6280 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6282 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6284 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6285 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6286 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6288 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6289 let params = RouteParameters {
6290 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6291 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6292 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6294 let route = find_route(
6295 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6296 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6298 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6303 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6304 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6307 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6308 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6310 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6311 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6312 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6313 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6314 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6315 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6316 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6317 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6318 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6320 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6321 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6323 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6324 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6325 let route = find_route(
6326 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6327 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6329 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6331 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6332 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6333 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6334 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6335 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6337 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6338 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6339 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6343 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6344 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6347 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6348 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6351 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6352 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6353 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6354 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6355 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6356 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6357 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6358 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6359 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6361 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6362 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6366 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6367 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6368 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6369 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6372 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6374 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6375 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6376 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6377 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6379 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6380 let params = RouteParameters {
6381 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6382 final_value_msat: 10000,
6383 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6385 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6386 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6387 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6388 let route = find_route(
6389 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6390 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6393 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6394 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6395 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6398 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6399 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6400 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6401 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6402 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6403 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6406 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6410 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6411 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6412 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6415 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6417 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6418 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6419 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6420 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6422 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6423 let params = RouteParameters {
6424 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6425 final_value_msat: 10000,
6426 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6428 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6429 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6430 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6431 let route = find_route(
6432 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6433 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6436 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6437 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6438 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6439 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6442 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6443 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6444 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6445 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6446 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6447 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6448 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6450 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6454 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6458 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6460 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6461 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6462 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6463 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6465 // Marshall an MPP route.
6466 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6467 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6468 route.paths.push(path);
6469 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6470 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6471 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6472 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6473 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6474 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6476 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6477 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6478 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6479 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6484 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6487 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6488 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6489 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6490 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6491 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6492 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6493 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6494 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6495 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6496 use util::test_utils;
6497 use util::config::UserConfig;
6498 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6500 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6501 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6502 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6504 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6508 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6509 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6510 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6511 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6512 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6513 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6514 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6519 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6520 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6523 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6524 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6525 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6527 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6528 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6530 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6531 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6533 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6534 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6536 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6537 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6538 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6539 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6540 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6542 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6544 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6546 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6547 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6548 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6549 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6550 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6552 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6554 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6556 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6557 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6558 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6559 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6560 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6563 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6564 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6565 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6567 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6568 } else { panic!(); }
6570 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6571 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6573 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6576 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6579 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6580 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6582 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6583 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6584 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6585 match msg_events[0] {
6586 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6587 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6588 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6592 match msg_events[1] {
6593 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6597 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6599 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6600 macro_rules! send_payment {
6601 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6602 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6603 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6604 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6605 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6606 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6607 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6609 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6610 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6612 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6613 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6615 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6616 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6617 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6618 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6619 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6620 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6621 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6622 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6624 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6625 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6626 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6628 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6629 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6630 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6631 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6632 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6634 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6637 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6638 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6639 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6640 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6642 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6647 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6648 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);