1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
26 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
40 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
41 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
42 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent};
43 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
44 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
46 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
48 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
49 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
50 use util::config::UserConfig;
51 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
52 use util::{byte_utils, events};
53 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
54 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
55 use util::logger::Logger;
56 use util::errors::APIError;
59 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
60 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
61 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
62 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
63 use std::time::Duration;
64 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
66 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
68 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
70 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
71 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
72 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
74 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
75 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
76 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
77 // before we forward it.
79 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
80 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
81 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
82 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
83 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
85 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
86 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
88 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
89 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
92 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
93 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
97 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
98 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
99 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
100 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
101 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
102 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
103 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
106 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
107 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
108 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
109 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
112 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
115 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
116 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
119 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
121 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
123 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
127 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
131 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
132 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
133 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
134 short_channel_id: u64,
136 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
139 struct ClaimableHTLC {
140 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
142 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
143 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
144 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
145 /// are part of the same payment.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
150 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
151 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
152 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
153 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
156 session_priv: SecretKey,
157 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
158 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
159 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
164 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
165 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
167 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
168 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
173 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
174 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
176 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
184 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
185 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
186 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
187 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
188 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
189 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
190 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
191 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
192 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
193 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
194 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
195 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
197 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
199 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
200 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
201 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
202 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
203 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
205 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
206 err: msgs::LightningError,
207 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
209 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
211 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
213 err: LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
222 shutdown_finish: None,
226 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
228 err: LightningError {
230 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
232 shutdown_finish: None,
236 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
237 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
240 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
242 err: LightningError {
244 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
245 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
251 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
255 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
258 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
262 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
265 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
271 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
273 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
274 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
281 shutdown_finish: None,
286 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
287 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
288 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
289 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
290 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
292 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
293 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
294 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
295 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
296 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
297 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
298 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
300 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
304 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
305 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
306 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
307 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
308 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
309 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
310 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
311 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
312 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
313 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
314 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
315 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
316 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
318 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
319 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
320 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
321 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
324 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
325 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
327 latest_features: InitFeatures,
330 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
331 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
333 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
334 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
335 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
336 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
337 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
338 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
339 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
340 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>>;
342 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
343 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
344 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
345 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
346 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
347 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
348 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
349 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
350 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
352 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
353 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
355 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
356 /// to individual Channels.
358 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
359 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
360 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
361 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
363 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
364 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
365 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
366 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
367 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
368 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
369 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
371 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
372 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
373 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
374 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
377 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
378 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
379 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
380 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
381 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
383 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
384 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
385 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
386 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
387 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
388 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
389 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
391 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
392 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
395 default_configuration: UserConfig,
396 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
402 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
404 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
405 last_block_hash: Mutex<BlockHash>,
406 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
409 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
411 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
412 our_network_key: SecretKey,
414 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
415 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
416 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
418 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
419 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
420 /// are currently open with that peer.
421 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
422 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
424 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
426 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
427 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
428 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
429 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
430 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
437 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
438 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
439 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
440 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
441 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
443 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
444 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
445 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
446 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
447 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
448 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
449 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
451 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
452 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
453 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
454 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
455 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
456 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
459 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
461 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
462 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
465 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
467 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
468 pub struct ChannelDetails {
469 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
470 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
471 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
472 /// lifetime of the channel.
473 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
474 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
475 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
476 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
477 /// The node_id of our counterparty
478 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
479 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
480 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
481 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
482 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
483 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
484 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
485 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
487 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
488 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
489 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
490 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
491 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
492 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
493 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
494 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
495 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
496 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
497 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
498 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
499 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
503 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
504 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
507 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
508 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
509 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
510 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
511 ParameterError(APIError),
512 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
513 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
514 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
517 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
519 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
520 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
521 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
522 /// paths than the ones selected).
523 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
524 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
525 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
526 /// in over-/re-payment.
528 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
529 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
530 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
532 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
533 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
534 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
535 /// with the latest update_id.
536 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
539 macro_rules! handle_error {
540 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
543 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
544 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
546 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
547 // entering the macro.
548 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
551 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
553 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
554 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
555 if let Some(update) = update_option {
556 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
562 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
563 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
565 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
566 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
567 action: err.action.clone()
571 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
572 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
575 // Return error in case higher-API need one
582 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
583 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
586 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
587 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
589 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
590 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
591 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
592 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
593 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
595 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
597 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
602 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
603 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
606 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
607 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
609 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
610 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
611 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
612 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
613 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
617 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
618 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
619 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
620 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
621 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
623 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
624 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
630 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
631 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
632 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
634 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
636 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
637 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
638 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
639 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
640 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
642 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
643 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
644 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
645 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
646 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
647 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
648 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
649 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
650 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
651 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
654 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
655 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
656 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
657 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
659 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
660 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
662 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
663 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
665 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
666 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
667 if !$resend_commitment {
668 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
671 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
673 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
674 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
680 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
681 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
682 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
684 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
685 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
689 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
690 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
691 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
692 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
693 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
696 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
701 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
702 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
704 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
705 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
708 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
710 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
711 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
713 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
715 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
717 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
718 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
720 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
721 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
722 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
723 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
724 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
726 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Self {
727 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
730 default_configuration: config.clone(),
731 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
732 fee_estimator: fee_est,
736 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
737 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
740 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
741 by_id: HashMap::new(),
742 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
743 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
744 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
745 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
747 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
749 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
751 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
753 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
754 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
762 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
764 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
765 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
766 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
767 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
769 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
770 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
772 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
773 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
774 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
775 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
779 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
780 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
781 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
783 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
784 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
785 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
787 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
788 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
790 panic!("RNG is bad???");
793 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
795 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
796 node_id: their_network_key,
802 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
803 let mut res = Vec::new();
805 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
806 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
807 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
808 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
809 res.push(ChannelDetails {
810 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
811 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
812 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
813 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
814 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
815 inbound_capacity_msat,
816 outbound_capacity_msat,
817 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
818 is_live: channel.is_live(),
822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
823 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
824 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
825 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
831 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
832 /// more information.
833 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
834 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
837 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
838 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
840 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
841 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
842 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
843 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
844 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
845 // really wanted anyway.
846 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
849 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
850 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
851 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
853 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
854 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
855 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
857 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
858 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
859 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
860 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
862 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
863 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
864 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
867 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
868 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
869 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
871 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
872 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
877 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
878 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
880 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
881 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
886 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
887 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
888 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
897 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
898 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
899 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
900 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
903 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
904 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
905 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
906 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
907 // ignore the result here.
908 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
912 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
913 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
914 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
915 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
918 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
920 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
921 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
922 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
929 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
930 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
931 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
932 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
933 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
939 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
940 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
941 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
942 for chan in self.list_channels() {
943 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
947 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
948 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
949 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
951 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
952 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
953 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
954 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
955 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
956 failure_code: $err_code,
957 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
962 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
963 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
966 let shared_secret = {
967 let mut arr = [0; 32];
968 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
971 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
973 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
974 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
975 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
976 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
977 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
978 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
979 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
980 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
983 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
984 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
985 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
986 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
987 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
990 let mut channel_state = None;
991 macro_rules! return_err {
992 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
994 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
995 if channel_state.is_none() {
996 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
998 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
999 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1000 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1001 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1002 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1007 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1008 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1009 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1010 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1012 let error_code = match err {
1013 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1014 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1015 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1016 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1017 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1019 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1022 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1023 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1024 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1031 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1034 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1035 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1036 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1037 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1038 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1039 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1040 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1041 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1042 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1043 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1044 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1045 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1049 // final_expiry_too_soon
1050 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1051 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1052 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1053 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1054 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1055 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1057 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1058 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1059 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1061 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1062 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1063 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1066 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1067 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1068 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1069 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1072 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1073 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1074 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1075 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1077 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1078 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1080 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1082 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1083 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1084 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1085 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1088 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1089 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1090 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1092 // Check two things:
1093 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1094 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1095 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1097 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1099 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1100 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1101 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1103 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1105 let blinding_factor = {
1106 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1107 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1108 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1109 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1112 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1114 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1116 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1119 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1120 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1123 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1124 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1125 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1126 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1127 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1131 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1132 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1133 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1134 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1136 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1137 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1138 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1139 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1143 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1144 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1145 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1146 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1147 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1148 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1149 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1150 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1151 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1152 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1154 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1156 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1157 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1159 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1160 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1161 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1162 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1163 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1164 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1165 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1167 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1168 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1170 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1171 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1172 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1174 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1175 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1177 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1178 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1179 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1180 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1181 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1183 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1184 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1186 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1187 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1188 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1189 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1195 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1196 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1197 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1198 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1200 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1201 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1203 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1204 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1205 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1207 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1209 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1214 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1217 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1218 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1219 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1220 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1221 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1225 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1227 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1228 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1229 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1230 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1231 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1232 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1233 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1234 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1235 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1236 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1237 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1240 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1241 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1243 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1249 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1250 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1252 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1253 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1255 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1256 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1257 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1258 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1259 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1261 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1263 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1265 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1266 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1267 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1268 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1269 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1272 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1273 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1275 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1276 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1278 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1279 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1281 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1283 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1284 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1285 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1287 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1288 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1289 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1290 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1291 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1292 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1293 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1294 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1295 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1298 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1299 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1300 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1301 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1302 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1303 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1304 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1312 } else { unreachable!(); }
1316 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1317 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1319 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1324 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1326 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1327 /// fields for more info.
1329 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1330 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1331 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1332 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1333 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1334 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1336 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1338 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1339 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1340 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1342 /// In general, a path may raise:
1343 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1344 /// node public key) is specified.
1345 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1346 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1348 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1349 /// relevant updates.
1351 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1352 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1353 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1355 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1356 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1357 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1358 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1360 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1361 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1362 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1363 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1364 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1365 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1367 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1368 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1369 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1370 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1371 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1373 let mut total_value = 0;
1374 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1375 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1376 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1377 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1378 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1379 continue 'path_check;
1381 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1382 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1383 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1384 continue 'path_check;
1387 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1388 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1390 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1391 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1394 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1395 let mut results = Vec::new();
1396 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1397 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1399 let mut has_ok = false;
1400 let mut has_err = false;
1401 for res in results.iter() {
1402 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1403 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1404 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1405 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1412 if has_err && has_ok {
1413 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1415 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1421 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1423 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1424 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1426 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1428 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1429 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1430 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1431 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1434 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1436 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo, &self.logger)
1437 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1438 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1439 } else { unreachable!(); })
1444 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1445 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1448 Err(_) => { return; }
1452 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1454 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1457 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1458 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1459 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1461 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1467 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1468 if !chan.should_announce() {
1469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1473 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1475 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1477 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1478 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1480 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1481 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1482 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1483 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1484 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1489 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1490 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1491 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1493 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1496 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1497 // smaller than 500:
1498 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1500 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1501 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1502 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1504 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1505 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1507 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1508 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1509 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1510 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1512 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1513 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1514 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1516 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1517 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1520 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1521 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1522 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1523 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1524 rgb, alias, addresses,
1525 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1526 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1528 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1530 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1531 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1532 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1533 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1534 contents: announcement
1539 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1541 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1542 /// Will likely generate further events.
1543 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1544 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1546 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1547 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1548 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1550 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1551 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1553 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1554 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1555 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1556 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1558 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1559 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1560 match forward_info {
1561 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1562 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1563 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1564 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1565 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1567 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1568 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1571 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1572 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1573 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1574 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1575 // problem, not ours.
1582 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1583 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1584 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1585 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1586 match forward_info {
1587 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1588 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1590 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1591 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1592 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1593 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1594 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1595 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1597 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1599 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1600 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1602 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1604 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1605 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1606 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1612 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1614 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1615 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1616 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1617 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1618 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1619 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1620 // this channel currently :/.
1626 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1627 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1629 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1631 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1633 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1636 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1638 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1639 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1640 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1643 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1645 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1646 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1647 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1648 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1649 // messages when we can.
1650 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1651 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1652 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1659 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1660 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1663 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1664 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1665 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1666 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1667 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1668 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1670 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1672 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1673 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1674 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1676 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1678 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1680 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1684 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1685 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1688 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1689 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1690 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1691 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1692 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1693 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1694 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1696 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1704 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1705 match forward_info {
1706 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1707 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1708 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1709 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1710 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1711 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1712 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1715 let mut total_value = 0;
1716 let payment_secret_opt =
1717 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1718 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1719 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1720 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1722 value: amt_to_forward,
1723 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1724 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1726 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1727 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1728 total_value += htlc.value;
1729 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1730 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1732 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1734 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1735 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1736 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1737 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1738 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1739 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire)
1743 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1744 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1745 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1746 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1748 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1751 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1752 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1753 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1754 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1759 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1760 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1761 payment_secret: None,
1762 amt: amt_to_forward,
1766 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1767 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1769 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1770 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1778 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1779 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1782 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1783 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
1786 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1787 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1788 events.append(&mut new_events);
1791 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1792 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1793 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1795 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1796 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1797 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1798 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1799 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1800 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1801 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1802 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1803 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1808 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1810 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1811 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1816 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1817 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1818 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1819 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1820 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1821 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1824 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1825 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1826 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1827 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1828 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1829 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1830 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
1831 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
1833 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1834 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1835 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
1841 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
1842 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
1843 // be surfaced to the user.
1844 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
1845 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
1847 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
1848 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
1849 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
1850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
1851 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
1852 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
1854 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
1859 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1860 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
1861 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
1863 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1864 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1865 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1867 rejected_by_dest: false,
1879 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1880 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1881 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1882 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1883 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1884 /// still-available channels.
1885 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1886 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1887 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1888 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1891 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1892 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1893 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1894 match &onion_error {
1895 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1897 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1899 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1900 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1901 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1902 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1903 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1904 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1905 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1910 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1911 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1912 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1913 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1915 error_code: onion_error_code,
1917 error_data: onion_error_data
1921 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1927 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1928 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1929 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
1930 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1932 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1933 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1934 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1935 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1936 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1937 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1939 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1941 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
1947 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1948 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1949 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1951 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1952 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1954 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1956 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1960 let mut forward_event = None;
1961 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1962 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1964 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1966 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1968 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1969 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1972 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1973 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1974 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1975 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1976 time_forwardable: time
1983 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1984 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1985 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1987 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1988 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1989 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1990 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1991 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1992 /// motivated attackers.
1994 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1995 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1997 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1998 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1999 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2001 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2003 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2004 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
2005 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2006 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2008 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2009 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2010 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2011 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2013 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2014 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2015 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2016 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2017 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2020 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
2021 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
2022 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
2024 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
2028 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2029 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2030 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2035 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2036 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2037 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2038 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2039 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2040 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2041 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2042 self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32,
2044 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2045 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2046 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2048 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2050 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2051 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2052 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2053 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2054 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2055 } else { errs.push(e); }
2057 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2059 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2061 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2066 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2067 // which were generated.
2068 channel_state.take();
2070 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2071 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2072 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2079 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2080 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2081 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2082 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2083 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2089 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2090 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2091 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2092 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2093 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2094 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2095 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2096 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2098 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2102 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2103 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2104 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2105 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2106 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2107 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2108 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2109 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2118 // TODO: Do something with e?
2119 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2120 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2121 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2122 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2123 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2124 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2125 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2129 } else { unreachable!(); }
2132 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2134 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2135 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2136 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2137 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2141 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2142 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2145 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2146 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2147 // why it's missing.
2150 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2152 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2153 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2154 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2160 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2161 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2162 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2165 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2166 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2169 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2170 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2172 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2173 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2174 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2175 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2177 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2178 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2179 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2180 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2181 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2182 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2183 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2184 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2185 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2186 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2188 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2189 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2190 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2191 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2194 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2196 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2197 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2198 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2202 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2206 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2207 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2208 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2210 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2212 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2213 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2214 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2215 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2220 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2221 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2222 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2223 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2229 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2233 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2238 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2239 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2240 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2241 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2244 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2246 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2249 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2250 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2251 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2252 msg: announcement_sigs,
2255 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2259 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2261 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2262 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2264 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2266 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2267 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2271 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2272 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2273 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2276 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2277 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2278 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2279 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2280 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2282 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2284 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2285 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2287 entry.insert(channel);
2293 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2294 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2295 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2296 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2297 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2299 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2302 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2303 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2308 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2309 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2310 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2311 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2312 output_script: output_script,
2313 user_channel_id: user_id,
2318 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2319 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2320 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2324 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2327 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2332 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2333 // lock before watch_channel
2334 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2336 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2337 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2338 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2339 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2340 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2341 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2343 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2344 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2345 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2346 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2347 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2348 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2352 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2353 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2354 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2356 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2359 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2360 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2369 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2370 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2371 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2372 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2373 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2374 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2375 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2376 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2378 let monitor = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
2379 Ok(update) => update,
2380 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2382 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2383 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2385 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2390 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2391 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2392 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2393 user_channel_id: user_id,
2398 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2399 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2400 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2401 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2403 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2404 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2406 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2407 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2408 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2409 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2410 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2411 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2412 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2413 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2414 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2415 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2416 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2417 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2419 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2420 msg: announcement_sigs,
2425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2429 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2430 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2431 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2432 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2434 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2436 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2439 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2440 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2441 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2442 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2446 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2452 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2453 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2454 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2456 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2457 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2462 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2463 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2465 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2466 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2467 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2476 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2477 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2478 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2479 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2480 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2482 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2485 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2486 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2487 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2488 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2493 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2494 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2495 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2496 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2497 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2498 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2499 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2501 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2502 } else { (tx, None) }
2504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2507 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2508 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2509 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2511 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2512 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2513 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2514 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2522 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2523 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2524 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2525 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2527 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2528 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2529 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2530 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2532 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2533 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2535 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2536 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2537 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2538 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2541 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2542 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2543 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2544 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2545 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2546 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2547 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2548 match pending_forward_info {
2549 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2550 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2551 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2552 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2553 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2554 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2555 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2559 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2560 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2561 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2562 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2563 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2564 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2565 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2566 // no problem just calling this
2567 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2568 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2570 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2571 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2572 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2575 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2577 _ => pending_forward_info
2580 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2587 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2588 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2590 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2591 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2593 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2594 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2596 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2601 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2605 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2606 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2607 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2608 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2610 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2611 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2613 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2615 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2620 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2621 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2622 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2623 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2624 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2625 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2626 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2628 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2629 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2630 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2632 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2639 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2640 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2641 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2642 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2644 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2647 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2648 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2649 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2650 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2651 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2652 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2653 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2658 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2659 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2660 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2662 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2663 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2664 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2666 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2667 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2668 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2669 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2670 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2671 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2672 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2673 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2675 commitment_signed: msg,
2679 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2680 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2681 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2687 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2692 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2693 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2694 let mut forward_event = None;
2695 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2696 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2697 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2698 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2700 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2701 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2702 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2703 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2706 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2709 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2714 match forward_event {
2716 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2717 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2718 time_forwardable: time
2726 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2727 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2731 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2733 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2734 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2736 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2737 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
2738 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2739 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
2740 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2741 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2742 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2743 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
2745 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
2747 } else { unreachable!(); }
2750 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2751 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2752 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2756 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2758 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2762 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel")))
2764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2767 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
2769 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id)) => {
2770 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2771 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2773 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2780 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2781 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2782 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2783 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2784 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2785 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2788 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2795 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2796 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2797 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2799 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2801 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2804 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2805 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2808 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2809 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2810 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2812 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2813 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2815 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
2816 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
2817 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
2818 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
2820 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
2821 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2824 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
2825 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2831 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2833 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2834 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2835 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2836 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2837 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2838 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2839 contents: announcement,
2841 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2849 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2854 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2855 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2856 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2858 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
2859 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
2860 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
2861 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
2862 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2863 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2864 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2865 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2866 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2867 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2868 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2869 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2870 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2872 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2873 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2875 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2876 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2879 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2881 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2885 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2886 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2887 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2888 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2893 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2894 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2896 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2902 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2906 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2911 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2912 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2913 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2923 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2924 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2925 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2926 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2927 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
2929 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2930 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2931 let counterparty_node_id;
2932 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2933 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2936 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2937 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
2938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2939 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
2942 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2943 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2945 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2946 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2948 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2949 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2950 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
2952 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2955 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2956 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2957 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2958 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2959 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2960 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2961 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2962 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2972 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
2973 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2974 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2978 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
2979 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
2980 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2982 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
2983 match monitor_event {
2984 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
2985 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2987 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2990 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2993 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
2994 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2995 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2996 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
2997 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2998 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2999 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3000 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3001 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3003 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3015 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3016 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3021 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3022 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3023 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3024 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3025 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3028 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3029 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3030 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3031 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3033 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3034 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3035 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3040 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3041 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3042 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3043 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3044 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3047 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3048 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3049 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3050 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3052 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3053 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3054 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3059 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3060 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3061 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3063 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3064 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3067 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &[(usize, &Transaction)], height: u32) {
3068 let header_hash = header.block_hash();
3069 log_trace!(self.logger, "Block {} at height {} connected", header_hash, height);
3070 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3071 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3072 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3074 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3075 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3076 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3077 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3078 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3079 let res = channel.block_connected(header, txdata, height);
3080 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3081 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3082 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3083 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3084 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3088 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3089 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3090 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3091 msg: funding_locked,
3093 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3094 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3095 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3096 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3097 msg: announcement_sigs,
3100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3102 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3104 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3105 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3106 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3107 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3111 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3112 for &(_, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3113 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3114 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3115 log_trace!(self.logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3116 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3117 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3119 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3120 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3121 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3122 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3123 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3124 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3136 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|&(ref payment_hash, _), htlcs| {
3137 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3138 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3139 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3140 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3141 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3142 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3143 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3144 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3145 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3146 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3147 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3152 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3155 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3156 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3159 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3160 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3162 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3163 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3165 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3166 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3167 // having an explicit local time source.
3168 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3169 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3170 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3171 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3172 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3178 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3179 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3180 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3181 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3183 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3185 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3186 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3187 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3188 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3189 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3190 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3192 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3193 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3204 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3205 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3207 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3208 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.block_hash();
3212 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3213 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3214 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3215 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3216 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3217 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3220 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3221 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3222 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3225 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3226 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3227 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3230 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3231 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3232 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3235 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3236 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3237 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3240 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3241 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3242 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3245 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3246 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3247 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3250 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3251 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3252 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3255 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3256 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3260 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3261 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3262 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3265 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3266 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3267 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3270 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3271 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3272 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3275 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3276 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3277 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3280 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3281 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3282 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3285 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3286 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3287 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3290 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3291 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3292 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3295 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3296 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3297 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3300 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3301 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3302 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3303 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3304 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3306 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3307 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3308 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3309 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3310 if no_connection_possible {
3311 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3312 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3313 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3314 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3315 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3317 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3318 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3319 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3329 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3330 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3331 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3332 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3333 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3334 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3335 // reestablish logic.
3336 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3337 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3338 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3339 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3340 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3342 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3343 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3344 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3348 no_channels_remain = false;
3354 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3362 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3365 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3366 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3367 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3368 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3369 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3370 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3371 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3375 if no_channels_remain {
3376 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3379 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3380 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3382 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3383 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3384 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3389 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3390 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3392 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3395 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3396 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3398 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3399 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3403 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3408 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3409 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3410 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3411 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3412 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3413 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3414 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3415 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3416 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3420 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3421 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3422 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3428 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3431 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3432 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3434 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3435 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3436 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3437 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3441 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3446 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3447 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3449 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3450 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3451 match &self.routing {
3452 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3454 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3455 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3457 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3459 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3460 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3463 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3464 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3465 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3466 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3471 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3472 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3473 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3474 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3475 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3476 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3477 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3479 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3480 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3481 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3483 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3485 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3486 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3487 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3488 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3493 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3494 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3496 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3498 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3500 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3502 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3509 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3510 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3511 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3512 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3513 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3514 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3519 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3520 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3522 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3524 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3526 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3528 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3535 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3536 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3537 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3538 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3539 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3540 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3545 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3548 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3551 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3558 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3559 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3561 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3563 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3565 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3567 path.write(writer)?;
3568 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3569 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3576 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3577 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3578 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3579 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3580 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3581 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3582 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3583 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3585 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3590 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3591 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3593 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3597 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3599 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3600 data.write(writer)?;
3607 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3608 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3609 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3610 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3611 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3612 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3613 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3615 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3620 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3621 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3623 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3625 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3626 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3627 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3629 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3631 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3632 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3639 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3640 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3641 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3642 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3643 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3644 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3645 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3647 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3648 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3649 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3651 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3656 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3657 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3658 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3659 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3660 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3663 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3664 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3666 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3667 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3669 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3670 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3671 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3673 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3674 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3675 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3676 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3677 unfunded_channels += 1;
3680 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3681 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3682 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3683 channel.write(writer)?;
3687 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3688 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3689 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3690 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3691 for forward in pending_forwards {
3692 forward.write(writer)?;
3696 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3697 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3698 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3699 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3700 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3701 htlc.write(writer)?;
3705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3706 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3707 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3708 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3709 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3710 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3713 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3714 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3715 for event in events.iter() {
3716 event.write(writer)?;
3719 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3725 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3727 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3729 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3730 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3731 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3732 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3733 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3734 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3735 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3736 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3737 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
3738 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3739 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3740 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3742 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3746 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3747 /// deserialization.
3748 pub keys_manager: K,
3750 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3752 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3753 pub fee_estimator: F,
3754 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3756 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3757 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3758 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3759 pub chain_monitor: M,
3761 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3762 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3763 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3764 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3765 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3766 /// deserialization.
3768 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3769 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3770 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3772 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3773 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3775 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3776 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3777 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3778 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3780 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3783 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
3784 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3787 impl<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3788 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>
3789 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3790 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3791 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3792 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3795 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
3796 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
3797 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
3798 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
3799 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>) -> Self {
3801 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
3802 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
3807 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3808 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3809 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3810 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>>)
3811 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3812 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3813 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3814 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3817 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3818 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3819 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3823 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
3824 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>)
3825 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Keys=ChanSigner>,
3826 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3827 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3828 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3831 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3832 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3833 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3834 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3835 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3838 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3839 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3840 let last_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3842 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3844 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3845 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3846 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3847 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3848 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3849 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3850 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3851 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3854 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3855 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3856 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3857 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3858 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3859 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3860 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3861 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3862 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3863 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
3864 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3865 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
3866 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3867 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3868 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3869 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3870 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3872 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3873 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3875 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3878 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3882 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3883 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3884 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
3888 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
3889 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3890 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3891 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3892 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3893 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3894 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
3895 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3896 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3898 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3901 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3902 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3903 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3904 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3905 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3906 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
3907 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3908 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3910 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3913 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3914 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
3915 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3916 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3917 let peer_state = PeerState {
3918 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3920 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3923 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3924 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
3925 for _ in 0..event_count {
3926 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
3927 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
3932 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3934 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3936 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3937 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
3938 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3940 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3941 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3942 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3944 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3949 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3951 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3953 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3955 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3957 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
3958 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3959 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3960 logger: args.logger,
3961 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3964 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3965 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3968 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3969 //connection or two.
3971 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))