1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
237 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
239 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
240 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
241 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
244 /// Number of bytes in the id.
245 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
248 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
254 impl Readable for PaymentId {
255 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
256 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
261 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
262 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
263 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
267 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
269 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
270 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
271 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
273 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
274 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
279 impl Readable for InterceptId {
280 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
281 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
286 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
287 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
288 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
289 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
290 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
293 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
295 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
296 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
297 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
299 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
300 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
304 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
305 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
306 (0, short_channel_id, required),
307 (2, htlc_id, required),
309 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
310 (0, session_priv, required),
315 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
316 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
317 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
318 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
319 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
322 session_priv: SecretKey,
323 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
324 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
325 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
326 payment_id: PaymentId,
329 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
330 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
331 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
335 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
337 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
340 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
341 payment_id.hash(hasher);
342 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
348 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
350 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
351 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
352 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
353 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
354 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
355 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
359 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
360 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
361 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
362 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
363 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
364 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
366 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
372 struct InboundOnionErr {
378 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
379 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
381 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
382 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
383 pub enum FailureCode {
384 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
385 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
386 TemporaryNodeFailure,
387 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
388 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
389 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
390 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
391 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
392 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
393 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
394 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
395 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
396 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
398 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
399 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
400 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
403 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
404 fn into(self) -> u16 {
406 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
407 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
408 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
409 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
414 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
415 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
416 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
417 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
418 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
420 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
421 err: msgs::LightningError,
422 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
423 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
424 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
426 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
428 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
430 err: LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
440 shutdown_finish: None,
441 channel_capacity: None,
445 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
446 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
449 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
451 err: LightningError {
453 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
454 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
460 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
461 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
462 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
466 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
469 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
471 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
472 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
476 log_level: Level::Warn,
479 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
483 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
485 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
486 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
494 shutdown_finish: None,
495 channel_capacity: None,
499 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
500 self.chan_id.is_some()
504 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
505 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
506 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
507 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
508 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
510 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
511 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
512 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
513 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
514 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
515 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
516 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
518 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
522 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
523 struct ClaimingPayment {
525 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
526 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
527 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
528 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
530 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
531 (0, amount_msat, required),
532 (2, payment_purpose, required),
533 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
534 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
535 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
538 struct ClaimablePayment {
539 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
540 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
541 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
544 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
545 struct ClaimablePayments {
546 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
547 /// failed/claimed by the user.
549 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
550 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
552 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
553 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
554 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
557 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
558 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
559 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
562 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
563 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
564 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
566 enum BackgroundEvent {
567 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
568 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
569 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
570 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
572 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
573 /// are regenerated on startup.
574 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
575 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
576 /// channel to continue normal operation.
578 /// In general this should be used rather than
579 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
580 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
581 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
586 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
587 funding_txo: OutPoint,
588 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
590 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
591 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
593 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
594 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
595 channel_id: ChannelId,
600 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
601 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
602 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
603 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
604 /// event can be generated.
605 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
606 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
607 /// operation of another channel.
609 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
610 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
611 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
612 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
614 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
615 event: events::Event,
616 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
620 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
621 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
622 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
623 (0, event, upgradable_required),
624 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
625 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
626 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
627 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
628 // downgrades to prior versions.
629 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
633 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
634 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
635 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
636 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
637 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
641 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
642 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
643 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
647 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
648 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
649 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
650 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
651 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
652 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
654 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
655 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
656 channel_id: ChannelId,
657 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
662 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
663 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
664 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
665 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
666 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
672 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
676 /// State we hold per-peer.
677 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
678 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
680 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
681 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
682 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
684 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
685 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
686 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
687 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
688 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
689 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
690 latest_features: InitFeatures,
691 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
694 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
695 /// user but which have not yet completed.
697 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
698 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
699 /// for a missing channel.
700 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
701 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
704 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
705 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
706 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
707 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
709 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
710 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
711 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
712 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
713 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
714 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
715 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
716 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
717 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
718 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
719 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
720 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
721 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
722 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
723 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
727 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
728 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
729 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
730 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
731 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
732 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
735 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
736 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
737 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
740 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
741 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
742 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
745 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
746 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
747 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
748 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
752 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
753 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
754 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
755 /// The original OpenChannel message.
756 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
757 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
758 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
761 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
762 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
763 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
765 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
766 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
768 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
771 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
772 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
773 struct PendingInboundPayment {
774 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
775 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
776 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
777 /// this payment being removed.
779 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
780 user_payment_id: u64,
781 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
782 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
783 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
786 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
787 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
788 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
789 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
790 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
791 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
792 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
793 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
795 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
796 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
804 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
806 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
807 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
808 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
813 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
814 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
815 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
816 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
817 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
818 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
819 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
820 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
821 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
823 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
824 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
833 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
835 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
836 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
837 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
842 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
843 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
844 $vis trait AChannelManager {
845 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
846 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
847 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
848 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
849 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
850 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
851 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
852 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
853 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
854 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
855 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
856 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
857 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
858 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
859 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
860 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
861 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
862 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
865 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
866 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
867 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
868 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
869 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
870 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
872 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
873 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
874 ES::Target: EntropySource,
875 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
877 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
881 type Watch = M::Target;
883 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
885 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
887 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
889 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
890 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
892 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
894 type Router = R::Target;
896 type Logger = L::Target;
898 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
901 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
902 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
904 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
905 /// to individual Channels.
907 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
908 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
909 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
910 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
912 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
913 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
914 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
915 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
916 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
917 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
918 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
920 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
921 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
922 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
924 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
925 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
926 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
927 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
928 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
930 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
931 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
932 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
933 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
935 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
936 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
937 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
939 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
940 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
941 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
942 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
943 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
945 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
946 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
947 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
948 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
949 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
950 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
951 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
952 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
955 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
956 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
957 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
958 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
959 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
963 // `total_consistency_lock`
965 // |__`forward_htlcs`
967 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
969 // |__`per_peer_state`
971 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
973 // | |__`claimable_payments`
975 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
981 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
983 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
987 // | |__`pending_events`
989 // | |__`pending_background_events`
991 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
993 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
994 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
995 ES::Target: EntropySource,
996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
997 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
998 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1002 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1003 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1004 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1010 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1012 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1014 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1015 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1017 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1018 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1019 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1020 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1023 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1025 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1026 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1027 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1028 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1029 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1030 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1031 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1032 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1034 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1036 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1037 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1039 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1041 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1042 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1043 /// and via the classic SCID.
1045 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1046 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1050 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1052 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1053 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1054 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1056 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1057 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1059 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1060 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1062 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1063 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1065 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1066 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1067 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1068 /// active channel list on load.
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1071 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1073 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1075 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1076 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1077 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1079 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1080 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1081 /// the handling of the events.
1083 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1084 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1087 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1088 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1089 /// would break backwards compatability.
1090 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1091 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1092 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1094 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1095 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1097 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1099 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1100 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1101 /// confirmation depth.
1103 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1104 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1105 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1107 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1109 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1111 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1113 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1115 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1117 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1118 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1119 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1121 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1122 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1124 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1125 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1126 /// keeping additional state.
1127 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1129 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1130 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1131 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1132 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1134 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1135 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1137 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1138 /// are currently open with that peer.
1140 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1141 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1144 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1146 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1147 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1148 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1149 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1150 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1152 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1153 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1154 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1155 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1156 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1158 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1159 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1161 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1162 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1163 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1164 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1165 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1167 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1168 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1170 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1171 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1172 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1173 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1174 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1176 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1178 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1180 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1181 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1182 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1183 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1184 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1185 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1186 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1187 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1188 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1190 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1192 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1193 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1197 signer_provider: SP,
1202 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1204 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1205 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1206 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1208 pub struct ChainParameters {
1209 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1210 pub network: Network,
1212 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1214 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1215 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1218 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1222 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1223 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1226 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1227 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1228 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1229 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1230 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1231 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1233 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1234 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1235 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1236 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1237 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1238 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1240 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1241 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1244 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1245 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1246 /// events to handle.
1248 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1249 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1251 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1252 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1255 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1256 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1257 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1258 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1260 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1261 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1262 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1263 should_persist: move || {
1264 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1265 // processing and return that.
1266 let notify = persist_check();
1267 match (notify, force_notify) {
1268 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1269 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1270 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1271 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1272 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1275 _read_guard: read_guard,
1279 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1280 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1281 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1282 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1283 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1284 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1286 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1287 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1288 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1289 should_persist: persist_check,
1290 _read_guard: read_guard,
1295 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1296 fn drop(&mut self) {
1297 match (self.should_persist)() {
1298 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1299 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1300 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1302 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1303 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1304 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1309 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1310 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1312 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1314 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1315 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1316 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1317 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1318 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1320 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1321 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1323 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1325 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1326 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1327 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1328 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1329 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1330 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1331 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1332 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1333 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1334 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1335 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1336 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1337 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1339 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1340 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1342 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1343 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1344 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1345 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1347 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1348 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1349 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1350 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1351 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1352 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1355 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1357 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1358 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1361 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1363 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1364 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1366 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1367 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1368 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1370 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1371 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1372 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1374 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1375 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1376 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1377 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1379 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1380 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1381 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1383 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1384 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1385 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1387 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1388 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1389 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1390 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1391 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1392 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1393 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1394 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1395 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1396 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1397 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1400 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1401 /// to better separate parameters.
1402 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1403 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1404 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1405 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1406 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1407 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1408 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1409 pub features: InitFeatures,
1410 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1411 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1412 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1414 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1416 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1417 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1418 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1419 /// payments to us through this channel.
1420 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1421 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1422 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1423 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1424 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1425 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1426 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1429 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1431 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1432 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1435 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1436 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1437 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1438 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1439 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1440 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1441 /// lifetime of the channel.
1442 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1443 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1444 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1445 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1446 /// our counterparty already.
1448 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1449 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1450 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1451 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1453 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1454 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1455 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1456 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1458 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1459 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1461 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1462 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1464 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1465 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1466 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1467 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1468 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1469 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1470 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1471 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1472 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1475 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1477 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1478 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1479 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1480 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1481 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1482 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1483 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1485 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1486 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1488 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1489 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1490 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1491 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1492 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1493 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1494 /// this value on chain.
1496 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1498 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1500 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1501 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1502 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1503 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1504 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1505 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1506 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1508 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1509 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1510 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1511 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1512 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1513 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1515 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1516 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1517 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1518 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1519 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1520 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1522 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1523 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1524 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1525 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1526 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1527 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1528 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1529 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1531 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1532 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1533 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1534 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1535 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1536 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1537 /// route which is valid.
1538 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1539 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1540 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1541 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1542 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1543 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1545 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1546 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1547 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1548 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1549 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1550 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1551 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1552 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1553 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1555 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1557 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1558 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1559 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1560 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1561 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1563 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1564 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1565 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1566 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1567 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1568 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1569 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1571 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1572 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1573 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1574 pub is_outbound: bool,
1575 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1576 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1577 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1578 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1579 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1581 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1582 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1583 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1584 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1585 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1586 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1587 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1589 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1590 pub is_usable: bool,
1591 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1592 pub is_public: bool,
1593 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1594 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1595 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1596 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1597 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1598 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1600 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1601 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1604 impl ChannelDetails {
1605 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1606 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1607 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1609 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1610 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1611 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1612 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1615 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1616 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1617 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1619 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1620 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1621 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1622 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1625 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1626 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1627 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1630 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1631 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1633 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1634 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1635 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1637 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1638 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1639 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1640 features: latest_features,
1641 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1642 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1643 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1644 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1645 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1646 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1647 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1648 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1649 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1650 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1652 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1653 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1654 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1655 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1656 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1657 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1658 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1659 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1660 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1661 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1662 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1663 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1665 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1666 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1667 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1668 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1669 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1670 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1671 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1672 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1673 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1674 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1675 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1676 config: Some(context.config()),
1677 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1682 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1683 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1684 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1685 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1686 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1687 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1688 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1689 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1690 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1692 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1694 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1695 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1697 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1698 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1699 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1700 /// to drop the channel.
1704 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1705 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1706 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1707 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1708 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1710 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1711 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1712 payment_id: PaymentId,
1714 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1716 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1717 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1718 payment_id: PaymentId,
1719 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1721 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1722 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1723 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1726 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1727 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1728 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1730 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1731 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1732 payment_id: PaymentId,
1733 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1734 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1735 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1737 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1738 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1739 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1741 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1742 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1743 payment_id: PaymentId,
1744 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1745 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1749 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1751 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1753 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1754 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1755 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1756 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1758 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1759 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1760 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1763 macro_rules! handle_error {
1764 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1765 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1766 // entering the macro.
1767 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1768 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1772 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1773 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1775 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1776 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1777 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1778 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1782 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1783 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1784 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1785 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1786 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1787 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1792 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1793 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1795 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1796 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1797 action: err.action.clone()
1801 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1802 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1803 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1804 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1805 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1809 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1814 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1817 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1818 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1819 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1825 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1826 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1827 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1828 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1829 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1830 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1832 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1833 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1834 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1835 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1836 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1838 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1839 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1841 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1845 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1846 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1847 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1849 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1850 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1852 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1853 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1855 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1856 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1857 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1858 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1859 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1860 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1862 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1863 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1867 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1868 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1870 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1871 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1873 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1874 match $channel_phase {
1875 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1876 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1878 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1879 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1881 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1882 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1888 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1889 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1893 let key = *$entry.key();
1894 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1896 $entry.remove_entry();
1904 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1905 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1909 let key = *$entry.key();
1910 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1912 $entry.remove_entry();
1920 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1921 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1923 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1924 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1930 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1931 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1932 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1933 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1934 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1936 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1937 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1938 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1939 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1940 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1941 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1942 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1943 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1944 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1945 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1950 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1951 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1952 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1953 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1954 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1955 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1956 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1957 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1958 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1960 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1965 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1966 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1967 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1968 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1969 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1970 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1971 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1972 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1973 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1975 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1980 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1981 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1982 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1983 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1984 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1985 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1986 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1987 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1988 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1989 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1990 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1992 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1993 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1994 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2000 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2001 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2003 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2004 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2005 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2006 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2007 updates.announcement_sigs);
2008 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2009 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2012 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2013 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2014 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2016 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2018 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2019 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2021 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2022 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2023 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2024 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2029 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2030 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2031 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2032 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2033 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2034 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2036 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2037 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2038 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2041 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2042 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2043 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2044 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2045 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2046 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2047 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2048 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2052 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2058 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2059 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2060 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2061 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2063 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2064 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2065 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2066 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2068 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2070 debug_assert!(false);
2071 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2072 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2073 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2074 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2075 $chan_entry.remove();
2079 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2080 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2081 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2082 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2083 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2084 // filter for uniqueness here.
2085 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2086 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2087 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2088 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2090 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2091 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2092 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2094 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2095 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2096 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2100 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2101 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2102 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2103 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2105 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2107 debug_assert!(false);
2108 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2109 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2110 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2111 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2112 $chan_entry.remove();
2118 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2119 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2120 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2121 while !processed_all_events {
2122 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2129 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2130 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2131 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2133 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2134 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2135 result = $self.process_background_events();
2137 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2138 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2139 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2140 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2144 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2145 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2146 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2147 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2150 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2152 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2153 $event_to_handle = event;
2155 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2156 post_event_actions.push(action);
2161 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2162 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2163 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2164 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2165 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2166 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2169 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2170 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2171 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2172 processed_all_events = false;
2176 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2177 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2178 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2180 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2181 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2182 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2188 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2190 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2191 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2192 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2193 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2194 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2195 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2199 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2201 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2203 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2204 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2206 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2208 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2209 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2210 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2213 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2214 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2215 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2217 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2218 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2219 current_timestamp: u32,
2221 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2222 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2223 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2224 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2226 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2227 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2228 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2233 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2235 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2236 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2237 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2238 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2239 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2240 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2241 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2242 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2244 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2247 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2248 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2250 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2252 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2254 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2256 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2257 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2258 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2259 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2260 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2262 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2263 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2273 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2274 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2275 &self.default_configuration
2278 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2279 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2280 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2283 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2284 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2286 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2288 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2292 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2297 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2299 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2300 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2301 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2302 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2303 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2305 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2306 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2308 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2309 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2310 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2312 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2313 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2314 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2316 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2317 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2318 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2319 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2320 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2321 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2323 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2324 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2325 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2326 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2327 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2328 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2331 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2332 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2333 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2335 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2338 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2340 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2342 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2343 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2344 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2345 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2346 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2347 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2351 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2356 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2358 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2359 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2362 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2364 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2367 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2370 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2371 node_id: their_network_key,
2374 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2377 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2378 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2379 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2380 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2381 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2382 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2383 // the same channel.
2384 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2386 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2387 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2388 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2391 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2392 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2393 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2394 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2398 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2399 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2400 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2408 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2409 /// more information.
2410 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2411 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2412 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2413 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2414 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2415 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2416 // the same channel.
2417 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2419 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2420 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2421 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2422 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2423 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2424 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2425 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2426 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2434 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2435 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2437 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2438 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2440 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2441 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2442 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2443 // really wanted anyway.
2444 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2447 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2448 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2449 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2452 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2453 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2454 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2455 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2456 let context_to_details = |context| {
2457 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2459 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2461 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2462 .map(context_to_details)
2468 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2469 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2471 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2472 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2473 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2475 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2476 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2477 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2478 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2479 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2480 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2482 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2483 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2484 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2486 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2487 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2488 payment_id: *payment_id,
2489 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2490 total_msat: *total_msat,
2493 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2494 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2496 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2497 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2499 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2504 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2505 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2506 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2507 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2508 Some(transaction) => {
2509 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2510 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2515 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2516 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2517 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2518 reason: closure_reason,
2519 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2520 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2524 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2525 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2527 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2528 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2532 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2533 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2535 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2536 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2538 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2539 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2540 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2541 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2542 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2543 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2544 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2545 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2547 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2548 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2549 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2550 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2551 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2555 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2556 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2557 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2558 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2561 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2562 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2563 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2564 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2568 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2577 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2578 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2580 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2581 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2584 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2585 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2586 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2587 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2590 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2594 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2595 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2596 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2598 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2599 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2601 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2602 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2603 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2604 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2606 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2608 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2609 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2610 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2613 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2614 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2615 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2616 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2617 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2618 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2621 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2622 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2623 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2625 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2626 /// the channel being closed or not:
2627 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2628 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2629 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2630 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2631 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2632 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2633 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2635 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2636 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2637 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2638 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2640 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2642 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2643 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2644 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2647 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2648 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2649 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2650 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2651 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2652 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2656 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2657 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2658 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2659 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2660 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2661 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2662 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2663 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2665 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2666 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2667 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2668 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2669 // ignore the result here.
2670 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2674 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2675 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2676 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2677 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2678 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2679 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2680 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2681 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2684 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2685 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2687 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2689 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2690 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2691 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2692 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2694 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2695 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2696 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2698 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2699 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2700 // Unfunded channel has no update
2701 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2704 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2705 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2706 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2707 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2709 (None, *peer_node_id)
2711 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2714 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2715 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2716 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2721 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2724 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2725 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2726 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2727 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2729 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2730 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2731 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2732 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2733 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2734 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2735 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2746 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2747 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2748 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2750 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2751 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2752 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2755 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2756 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2757 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2759 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2760 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2761 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2762 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2763 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2766 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2767 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2768 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2769 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2770 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2774 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2775 /// local transaction(s).
2776 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2777 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2778 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2782 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2783 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2784 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2785 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2786 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2787 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2788 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2790 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2791 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2795 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2796 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2797 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2798 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2799 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2800 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2801 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2802 err_data: Vec::new(),
2806 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2807 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2808 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2811 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2812 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2813 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2814 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2815 outgoing_cltv_value,
2816 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2820 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2821 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2822 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2823 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2824 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2825 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2826 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2827 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2829 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2831 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2832 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2833 err_data: Vec::new(),
2834 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2837 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2838 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2839 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2840 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2842 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2845 // final_expiry_too_soon
2846 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2847 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2849 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2850 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2851 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2852 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2853 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2854 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2855 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2856 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2857 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2858 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2859 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2862 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2863 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2864 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2866 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2868 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2869 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2873 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2874 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2875 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2876 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2877 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2878 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2879 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2880 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2881 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2882 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2883 err_data: Vec::new(),
2884 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2887 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2888 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2889 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2890 err_data: Vec::new(),
2891 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2894 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2898 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2901 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2902 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2905 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2906 phantom_shared_secret,
2910 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2911 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2912 err_data: Vec::new(),
2913 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2916 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2919 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2920 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2921 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2922 outgoing_cltv_value,
2923 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2927 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2928 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2929 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2930 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2931 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2933 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2934 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2935 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2936 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2937 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2938 failure_code: $err_code,
2944 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2945 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2948 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2949 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2950 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2952 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2953 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2954 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2955 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2956 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2957 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2958 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2959 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2961 macro_rules! return_err {
2962 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2964 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2965 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2966 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2967 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2968 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2969 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2975 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2977 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2978 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2980 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2981 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2984 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2985 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2986 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2987 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2990 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2991 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2992 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
2994 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2995 // inbound channel's state.
2996 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2997 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2998 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3002 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3003 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3004 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3005 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3006 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3007 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3008 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3009 // phantom or an intercept.
3010 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3011 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3012 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3016 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3019 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3021 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3022 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3023 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3024 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3025 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3027 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3028 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3029 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3030 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3033 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3034 // have no consistency guarantees.
3035 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3039 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3040 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3041 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3042 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3043 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3045 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3046 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3047 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3048 // we don't have the channel here.
3049 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3051 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3053 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3054 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3055 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3056 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3057 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3058 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3059 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3060 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3061 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3062 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3063 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3065 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3068 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3069 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3071 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3072 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3076 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3077 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3078 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3079 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3081 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3088 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3089 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3090 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3091 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3092 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3093 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3095 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3096 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3098 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3099 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3100 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3101 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3102 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3103 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3104 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3105 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3106 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3107 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3113 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3114 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3115 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3116 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3118 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3119 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3121 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3122 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3123 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3125 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3126 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3127 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3128 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3129 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3130 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3131 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3135 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3137 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3140 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3141 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3142 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3143 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3144 macro_rules! return_err {
3145 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3147 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3148 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3149 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3150 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3151 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3152 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3158 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3160 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3161 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3164 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3165 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3166 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3167 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3168 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3170 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3173 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3174 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3175 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3176 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3177 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3183 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3184 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3185 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3187 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3188 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3189 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3191 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3192 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3193 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3194 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3195 return Err(LightningError {
3196 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3197 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3200 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3201 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3204 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3207 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3208 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3209 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3210 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3212 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3213 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3214 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3216 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3217 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3218 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3219 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3220 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3221 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3225 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3228 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3230 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3232 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3233 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3234 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3235 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3236 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3239 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3240 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3242 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3243 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3244 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3245 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3246 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3247 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3248 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3249 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3251 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3252 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3253 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3255 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3257 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3264 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3265 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3266 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3267 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3272 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3273 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3274 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3277 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3278 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3280 log_trace!(self.logger,
3281 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3282 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3283 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3284 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3286 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3287 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3288 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3290 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3291 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3293 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3294 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3295 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3296 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3300 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3301 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3302 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3303 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3304 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3305 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3306 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3307 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3308 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3310 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3311 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3312 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3314 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3315 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3317 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3318 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3319 Some(monitor_update) => {
3320 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3321 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3323 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3324 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3325 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3326 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3327 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3328 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3329 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3337 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3340 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3341 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3342 // `channel_by_id` map.
3343 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3344 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3349 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3350 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3352 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3357 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3359 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3360 /// fields for more info.
3362 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3363 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3365 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3367 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3368 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3369 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3370 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3371 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3373 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3374 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3375 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3376 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3377 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3379 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3380 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3381 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3382 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3384 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3386 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3387 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3388 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3390 /// In general, a path may raise:
3391 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3392 /// node public key) is specified.
3393 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3394 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3396 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3397 /// relevant updates.
3399 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3400 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3401 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3403 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3404 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3405 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3406 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3407 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3408 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3409 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3410 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3412 self.pending_outbound_payments
3413 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3414 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3415 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3418 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3419 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3420 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3421 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3423 self.pending_outbound_payments
3424 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3425 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3426 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3427 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3431 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3432 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3434 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3435 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3436 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3440 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3441 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3442 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3446 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3447 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3451 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3452 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3453 /// retries are exhausted.
3455 /// # Event Generation
3457 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3458 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3460 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3461 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3462 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3464 /// # Requested Invoices
3466 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3467 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3468 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3470 /// # Restart Behavior
3472 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3473 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3474 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3476 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3477 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3479 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3482 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3483 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3484 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3485 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3486 /// never reach the recipient.
3488 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3489 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3491 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3492 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3494 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3495 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3496 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3498 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3499 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3500 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3503 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3504 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3506 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3509 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3510 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3511 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3512 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3513 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3514 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3515 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3516 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3519 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3520 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3521 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3522 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3523 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3525 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3526 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3527 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3530 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3533 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3534 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3537 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3538 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3539 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3540 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3541 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3543 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3544 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3548 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3549 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3550 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3552 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3553 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3554 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3555 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3556 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3557 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3558 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3559 } else { unreachable!(); });
3561 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3562 Err((chan, err)) => {
3563 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3564 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3566 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3567 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3568 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3574 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3575 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3577 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3578 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3581 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3582 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3583 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3587 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3588 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3591 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3593 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3596 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3597 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3598 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3600 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3607 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3608 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3609 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3613 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3615 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3616 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3618 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3619 /// across the p2p network.
3621 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3622 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3624 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3625 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3626 /// keys per-channel).
3628 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3629 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3630 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3632 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3633 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3634 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3636 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3637 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3638 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3639 /// for more details.
3641 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3642 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3643 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3646 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3647 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3648 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3649 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3650 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3656 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3657 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3658 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3659 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3660 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3661 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3663 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3667 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3668 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3669 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3670 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3674 let mut output_index = None;
3675 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3676 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3677 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3678 if output_index.is_some() {
3679 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3680 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3683 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3686 if output_index.is_none() {
3687 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3688 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3691 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3695 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3697 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3698 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3699 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3700 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3702 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3703 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3705 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3706 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3708 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3710 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3711 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3712 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3713 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3714 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3715 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3716 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3717 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3718 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3719 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3720 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3721 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3722 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3726 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3727 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3728 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3729 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3730 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3731 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3732 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3733 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3734 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3735 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3739 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3740 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3741 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3742 config.apply(config_update);
3743 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3746 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3747 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3749 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3750 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3751 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3758 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3759 debug_assert!(false);
3760 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3763 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3770 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3772 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3773 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3774 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3775 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3777 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3778 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3780 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3781 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3783 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3785 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3786 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3787 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3788 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3789 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3790 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3791 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3792 pub fn update_channel_config(
3793 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3794 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3795 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3798 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3799 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3801 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3802 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3804 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3805 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3806 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3807 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3808 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3810 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3811 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3812 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3815 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3818 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3819 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3820 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3821 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3822 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3823 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3826 let next_hop_scid = {
3827 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3828 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3829 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3830 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3831 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3832 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3833 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3834 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3835 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3836 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3839 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3841 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3842 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3843 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3845 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3846 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3847 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3852 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3853 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3854 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3857 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3858 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3859 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3861 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3863 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3864 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3865 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3866 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3867 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3870 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3871 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3872 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3873 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3874 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3876 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3880 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3881 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3883 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3886 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3887 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3890 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3891 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3892 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3895 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3896 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3897 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3898 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3899 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3900 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3901 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3902 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3905 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3906 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3907 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3908 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3913 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3915 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3916 /// Will likely generate further events.
3917 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3920 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3921 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3922 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3924 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3925 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3927 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3928 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3929 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3931 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3932 match forward_info {
3933 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3934 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3935 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3936 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3937 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3940 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3941 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3942 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3944 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3945 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3946 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3947 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3948 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3949 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3950 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3953 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3954 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3956 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3959 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3960 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3966 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3967 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3969 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3973 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3974 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3976 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3980 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3981 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3982 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3983 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3984 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3986 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3987 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3988 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3989 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3990 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3992 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3994 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3995 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3999 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4000 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4001 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4002 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4004 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4005 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4011 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4014 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4017 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4018 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4019 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4020 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4021 // problem, not ours.
4027 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4028 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4030 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4034 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4035 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4036 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4037 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4040 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4041 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4042 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4043 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4044 match forward_info {
4045 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4046 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4047 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4048 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4049 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4053 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4054 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4055 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4056 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4057 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4058 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4059 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4060 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4062 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4063 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4064 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4067 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4070 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4072 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4073 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4074 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4075 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4080 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4081 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4083 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4084 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4085 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4086 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4088 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4091 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4093 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4094 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4095 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4102 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4106 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4107 match forward_info {
4108 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4109 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4110 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4111 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4112 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4115 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4116 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4117 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4118 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4119 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4120 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4121 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4123 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4124 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4125 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4129 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4130 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4133 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4136 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4137 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4138 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4139 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4140 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4141 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4142 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4143 phantom_shared_secret,
4145 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4146 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4147 // if routing nodes overpay
4148 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4149 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4151 total_value_received: None,
4152 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4155 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4158 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4160 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4161 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4162 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4163 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4164 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4165 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4167 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4168 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4169 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4170 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4171 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4172 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4173 phantom_shared_secret,
4175 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4176 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4178 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4181 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4182 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4183 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4184 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4185 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4188 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4189 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4190 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4191 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4192 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4193 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4195 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4196 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4197 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4199 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4200 .entry(payment_hash)
4201 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4202 .or_insert_with(|| {
4203 committed_to_claimable = true;
4205 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4208 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4209 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4210 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4211 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4213 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4214 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4215 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4217 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4218 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4219 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4222 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4224 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4225 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4226 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4227 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4228 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4229 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4230 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4232 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4233 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4235 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4237 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4238 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4239 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4240 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4241 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4244 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4245 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4246 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4247 committed_to_claimable = true;
4249 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4250 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4251 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4252 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4253 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4254 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4255 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4256 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4257 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4258 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4262 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4263 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4264 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4265 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4266 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4268 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4270 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4271 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4273 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4274 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4275 committed_to_claimable = true;
4278 payment_claimable_generated
4282 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4283 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4284 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4285 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4286 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4287 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4288 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4289 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4290 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4291 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4292 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4293 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4294 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4295 Ok(result) => result,
4297 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4298 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4301 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4302 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4303 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4305 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4306 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4309 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4310 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4311 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4313 check_total_value!(purpose);
4315 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4316 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4317 check_total_value!(purpose);
4321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4322 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4324 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4326 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4327 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4329 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4330 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4332 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4333 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4335 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4336 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4337 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4339 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4340 if payment_claimable_generated {
4341 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4348 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4356 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4357 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4358 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4359 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4361 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4362 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4364 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4366 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4367 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4368 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4370 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4372 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4373 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4374 events.append(&mut new_events);
4377 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4379 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4380 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4381 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4383 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4385 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4386 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4387 if background_events.is_empty() {
4388 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4391 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4393 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4394 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4395 // monitor updating completing.
4396 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4398 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4399 let mut updated_chan = false;
4401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4402 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4403 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4404 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4405 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4407 updated_chan = true;
4408 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4409 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4411 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4416 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4417 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4419 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4420 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4421 // however, ensure that.
4423 log_error!(self.logger,
4424 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4426 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4428 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4430 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4433 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4434 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4436 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4437 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4438 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4439 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4440 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4446 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4449 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4450 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4451 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4452 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4453 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4456 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4457 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4458 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4459 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4461 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4462 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4464 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4465 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4466 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4467 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4469 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4470 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4472 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4473 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4477 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4478 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4479 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4480 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4481 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4482 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4483 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4485 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4486 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4489 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4492 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4493 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4495 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4500 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4501 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4509 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4511 /// This currently includes:
4512 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4513 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4514 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4516 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4517 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4518 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4519 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4521 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4522 /// estimate fetches.
4524 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4525 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4526 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4527 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4528 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4530 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4531 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4533 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4534 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4535 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4537 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4538 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4539 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4540 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4541 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4542 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4544 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4545 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4546 log_error!(self.logger,
4547 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4548 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4549 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4550 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4551 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4552 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4553 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4554 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4555 channel_id: *chan_id,
4556 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4568 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4569 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4570 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4571 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4572 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4573 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4575 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4576 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4581 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4582 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4584 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4585 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4586 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4587 if needs_close { return false; }
4590 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4591 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4592 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4593 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4594 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4595 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4596 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4597 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4599 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4600 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4601 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4602 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4606 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4608 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4611 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4613 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4614 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4615 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4616 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4620 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4622 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4628 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4630 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4631 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4632 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4633 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4634 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4635 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4636 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4637 channel_id: *chan_id,
4638 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4646 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4647 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4648 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4650 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4651 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4652 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4657 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4658 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4659 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4660 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4661 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4662 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4663 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4664 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4670 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4672 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4673 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4678 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4679 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4680 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4681 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4682 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4683 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4684 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4685 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4686 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4687 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4688 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4689 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4690 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4691 // have no channels to the peer.
4692 let remove_entry = {
4693 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4694 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4697 entry.remove_entry();
4700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4705 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4706 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4707 // This should be unreachable
4708 debug_assert!(false);
4711 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4712 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4713 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4714 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4715 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4716 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4717 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4720 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4721 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4722 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4724 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4725 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4732 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4733 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4734 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4735 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4736 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4739 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4740 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4743 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4745 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4746 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4747 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4748 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4749 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4756 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4757 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4758 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4760 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4761 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4762 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4763 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4765 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4766 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4767 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4768 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4769 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4770 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4773 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4774 /// reason for the failure.
4776 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4777 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4780 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4781 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4782 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4783 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4784 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4785 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4791 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4792 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4793 match failure_code {
4794 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4795 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4796 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4797 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4798 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4799 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4801 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4802 let fail_data = match data {
4803 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4806 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4811 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4812 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4814 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4816 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4817 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4818 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4819 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4820 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4821 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4822 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4824 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4826 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4827 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4829 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4834 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4835 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4836 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4837 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4838 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4839 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4840 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4841 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4842 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4843 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4845 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4846 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4847 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4848 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4850 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4851 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4852 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4853 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4854 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4858 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4859 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4860 // be surfaced to the user.
4861 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4862 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4863 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4865 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4867 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4872 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4873 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4875 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4876 debug_assert!(false);
4877 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4882 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4885 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4886 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4887 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4888 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4892 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4893 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4894 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4895 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4896 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4897 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4898 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4899 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4900 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4903 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4904 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4905 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4908 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4909 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4910 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4912 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4913 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4914 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4915 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4916 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4918 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4919 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4920 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4922 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4923 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4924 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4925 push_forward_ev = true;
4927 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4929 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4931 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4932 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4935 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4936 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4937 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4938 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4939 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4940 failed_next_destination: destination,
4946 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4947 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4949 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4950 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4951 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4952 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4954 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4955 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4956 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4957 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4959 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4960 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4961 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4963 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4964 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4965 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4966 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4967 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4968 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4969 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4970 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4971 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4974 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4975 /// even type numbers.
4979 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4980 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4982 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4983 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4984 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4987 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4988 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4993 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4994 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4995 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4996 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4997 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4998 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4999 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5000 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5005 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5006 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5007 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5008 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5009 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5011 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5012 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5013 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5017 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5018 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5019 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5020 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5021 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5022 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5023 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5024 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5025 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5026 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5027 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5036 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5038 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5039 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5040 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5041 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5042 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5043 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5044 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5045 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5046 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5047 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5048 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5049 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5050 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5051 debug_assert!(false);
5055 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5057 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5058 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5059 debug_assert!(false);
5063 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5064 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5066 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5067 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5068 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5069 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5072 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5073 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5074 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5075 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5079 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5080 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5081 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5082 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5084 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5085 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5086 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5087 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5088 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5093 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5094 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5095 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5096 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5097 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5098 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5099 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5101 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5104 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5105 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5106 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5107 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5111 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5112 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5113 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5114 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5116 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5117 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5118 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5119 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5123 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5124 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5125 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5129 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5130 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5131 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5134 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5137 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5138 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5139 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5140 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5142 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5143 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5144 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5146 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5149 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5150 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5151 if let Err(e) = res {
5152 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5153 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5154 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5155 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5156 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5159 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5160 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5161 // monitor update as a background event.
5162 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5163 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5164 counterparty_node_id,
5165 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5166 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5175 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5176 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5177 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5183 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5184 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5185 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5186 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5187 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5188 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5189 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5190 // again on restart.
5191 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5192 payment_preimage, update_res);
5195 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5196 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5198 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5199 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5200 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5201 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5202 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5203 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5204 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5205 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5206 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5207 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5210 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5211 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5212 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5213 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5214 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5215 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5219 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5220 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5223 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5224 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5225 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5228 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5229 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5230 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5231 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5232 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5234 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5235 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5236 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5238 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5239 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5242 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5243 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5244 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5245 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5246 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5247 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5248 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5249 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5252 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5253 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5255 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5256 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5257 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5258 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5260 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
5261 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5262 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5264 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5265 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5266 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5267 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5274 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5275 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5276 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5282 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5283 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5284 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5287 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5288 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5290 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5291 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5292 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5294 payment_purpose: purpose,
5297 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5299 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5303 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5305 sender_intended_total_msat,
5309 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5310 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5312 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5313 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5314 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5321 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5322 /// update completion.
5323 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5324 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5325 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5326 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5327 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5328 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5330 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5331 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5332 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5333 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5334 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5335 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5337 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5339 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5340 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5341 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5342 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5345 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5346 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5348 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5350 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5355 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5356 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5357 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5358 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5363 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5364 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5365 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5366 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5367 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5372 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5376 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5382 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5383 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5384 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5388 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5389 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5390 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5396 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5397 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5399 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5400 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5402 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5403 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5404 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5405 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5406 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5412 let mut peer_state_lock;
5413 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5414 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5415 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5416 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5418 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5421 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5422 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5423 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5424 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5425 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5428 let remaining_in_flight =
5429 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5430 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5433 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5434 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5435 remaining_in_flight);
5436 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5439 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5442 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5444 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5445 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5448 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5449 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5450 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5452 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5453 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5454 /// used to accept such channels.
5456 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5457 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5458 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5459 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5462 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5463 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5465 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5466 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5467 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5469 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5470 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5472 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5473 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5475 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5476 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5478 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5479 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5480 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5481 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5484 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5487 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5488 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5489 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5490 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5491 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5492 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5493 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5494 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5496 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5497 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5498 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5500 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5501 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5502 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5503 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5504 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5505 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5506 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5508 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5512 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5513 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5514 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5515 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5516 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5517 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5518 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5521 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5522 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5524 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5525 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5526 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5527 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5528 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5529 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5530 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5531 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5534 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5535 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5539 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5540 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5541 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5543 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5544 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5545 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5548 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5553 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5554 /// or 0-conf channels.
5556 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5557 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5558 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5559 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5560 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5561 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5563 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5564 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5565 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5566 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5567 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5568 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5569 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5573 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5576 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5577 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5579 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5580 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5582 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5583 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5584 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5585 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5586 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5588 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5591 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5592 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5593 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5596 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5597 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5602 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5605 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5606 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5607 // likely to be lost on restart!
5608 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5612 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5613 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5616 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5617 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5618 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5619 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5620 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5622 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5623 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5625 debug_assert!(false);
5626 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5628 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5629 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5631 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5632 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5633 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5634 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5635 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5636 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5638 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5639 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5640 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5643 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5644 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5645 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5646 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5647 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5650 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5651 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5656 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5657 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5659 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5660 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5661 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5662 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5663 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5664 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5666 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5667 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5668 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5673 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5674 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5675 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5676 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5677 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5678 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5679 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5682 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5687 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5688 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5689 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5691 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5695 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5696 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5698 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5699 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5700 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5702 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5706 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5707 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5708 // likely to be lost on restart!
5709 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5710 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5711 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5713 debug_assert!(false);
5714 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5718 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5719 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
5720 match phase.get_mut() {
5721 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5722 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
5723 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
5726 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5730 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5733 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5734 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5735 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5736 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5737 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5739 user_channel_id: user_id,
5744 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5745 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5747 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5748 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5750 debug_assert!(false);
5751 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5754 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5755 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5756 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5757 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5758 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
5759 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5761 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5762 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5763 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5764 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5765 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5766 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5767 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5768 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5769 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5773 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
5774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
5776 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5781 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5783 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5784 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5785 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5786 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5787 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5788 funding_msg.channel_id))
5790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5791 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5795 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5796 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5797 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5798 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5799 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5800 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5801 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5805 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5807 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5808 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5809 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5810 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5812 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5813 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5814 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5815 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5816 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5817 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5818 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5819 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5824 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5830 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5831 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5833 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5835 debug_assert!(false);
5836 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5843 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5844 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5845 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5846 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5847 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5848 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5849 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5850 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5851 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5852 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5853 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5854 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5860 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5864 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5868 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5869 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
5870 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
5871 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5872 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5874 debug_assert!(false);
5875 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5877 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5878 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5879 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5880 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5881 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5882 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5883 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5884 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5886 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5887 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5888 msg: announcement_sigs,
5890 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5891 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5892 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5893 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5894 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5895 // announcement_signatures.
5896 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5897 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5898 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5899 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5906 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5907 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5912 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5913 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5917 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5922 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5923 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5924 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5926 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5928 debug_assert!(false);
5929 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5933 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5934 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
5936 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5937 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5938 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5940 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5943 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5944 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5945 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5946 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5948 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5949 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5950 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5951 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5952 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5953 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5957 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5958 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5959 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5960 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5964 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5965 let context = phase.context_mut();
5966 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5967 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5968 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
5969 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
5974 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5977 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5978 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5979 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5980 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5986 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5987 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5988 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5990 debug_assert!(false);
5991 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5993 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5994 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5995 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5996 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5998 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5999 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6000 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6001 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6002 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6007 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6008 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6009 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6010 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6011 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6012 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6013 } else { (tx, None) }
6015 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6016 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6022 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6023 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6024 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6026 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6027 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6030 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6034 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6039 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6040 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6041 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6042 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6044 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6045 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6046 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6047 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6049 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6050 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6052 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6053 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6054 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6056 debug_assert!(false);
6057 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6059 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6061 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6062 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6063 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6064 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6065 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6066 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6067 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6068 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6070 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6071 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6072 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6073 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6074 match pending_forward_info {
6075 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6076 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6077 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6078 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6080 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6081 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6082 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6083 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6084 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6087 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6089 _ => pending_forward_info
6092 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6094 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6095 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6103 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6105 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6107 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6109 debug_assert!(false);
6110 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6114 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6116 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6117 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6118 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6119 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6120 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6121 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6123 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6124 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6125 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6126 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6127 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6128 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6129 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6132 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6133 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6139 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6143 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6144 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6145 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6146 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6147 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6149 debug_assert!(false);
6150 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6152 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6153 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6154 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6156 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6157 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6159 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6160 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6168 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6169 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6170 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6171 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6172 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6174 debug_assert!(false);
6175 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6177 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6178 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6179 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6181 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6182 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6183 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6185 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6186 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6188 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6189 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6193 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6197 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6199 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6201 debug_assert!(false);
6202 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6204 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6205 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6206 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6208 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6209 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6210 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6211 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6212 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6213 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6216 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6217 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6225 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6226 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6227 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6228 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6229 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6230 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6231 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6232 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6233 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6234 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6235 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6237 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6238 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6240 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6241 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6242 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6243 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6244 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6245 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6248 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6249 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6251 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6252 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6253 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6254 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6255 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6256 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6257 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6258 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6259 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6262 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6263 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6265 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6266 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6267 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6268 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6269 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6270 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6271 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6272 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6273 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6276 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6277 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6278 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6283 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6284 // payments are being processed.
6285 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6286 push_forward_event = true;
6288 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6289 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6296 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6300 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6301 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6302 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6304 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6308 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6309 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6310 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6311 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6312 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6314 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6315 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6316 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6317 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6318 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6319 // real by taking more time.
6320 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6321 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6322 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6327 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6328 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6329 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6330 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6331 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6332 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6333 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6335 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6336 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6337 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6338 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6339 channel_funding_outpoint,
6340 counterparty_node_id,
6345 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6346 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6347 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6349 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6350 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6351 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6352 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6354 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6355 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6356 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6362 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6363 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6364 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6365 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6367 debug_assert!(false);
6368 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6369 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6370 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6371 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6373 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6374 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6375 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6376 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6377 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6378 *counterparty_node_id)
6380 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6381 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6382 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6383 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6384 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6385 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6386 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6388 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6390 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6391 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6397 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6401 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6403 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6405 debug_assert!(false);
6406 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6412 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6413 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6415 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6416 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6424 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6425 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6428 debug_assert!(false);
6429 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6431 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6432 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6433 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6435 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6436 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6437 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6440 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6441 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6442 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6443 msg, &self.default_configuration
6444 ), chan_phase_entry),
6445 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6446 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6447 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6450 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6451 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6459 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6460 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6461 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6462 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6464 // It's not a local channel
6465 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6468 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6469 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6470 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6471 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6475 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6477 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6478 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6479 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6480 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6481 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6482 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6483 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6485 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6487 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6488 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6489 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6490 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6492 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6493 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6496 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6497 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6500 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6502 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6505 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6507 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6510 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6512 debug_assert!(false);
6513 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6517 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6519 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6520 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6521 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6522 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6523 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6524 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6525 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6526 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6527 let mut channel_update = None;
6528 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6529 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6530 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6533 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6534 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6535 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6536 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6537 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6538 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6539 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6544 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6545 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6546 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6547 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6548 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6549 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6553 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6554 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6561 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6562 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6563 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6564 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6567 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6568 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6573 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6574 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6575 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6577 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6578 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6579 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6580 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6581 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6582 match monitor_event {
6583 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6584 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6585 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6586 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6589 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6590 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6591 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6594 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6595 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6596 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6597 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6599 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6600 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6601 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6602 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6605 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6606 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6607 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6608 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6609 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6610 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6611 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6612 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6613 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6614 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6619 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6620 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6622 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6624 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6625 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6626 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6628 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6636 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6637 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6643 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6644 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6647 has_pending_monitor_events
6650 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6651 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6652 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6654 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6656 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6659 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6660 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6661 /// update was applied.
6662 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6663 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6664 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6665 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6667 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6668 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6669 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6670 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6672 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6673 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6675 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6676 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6677 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6678 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6680 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6681 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6682 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6683 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6684 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6685 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6687 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6688 has_monitor_update = true;
6690 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6691 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6692 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6693 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6695 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6697 continue 'peer_loop;
6706 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6707 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6708 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6711 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6712 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6718 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6719 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6720 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6721 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6722 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6723 let mut has_update = false;
6725 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6727 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6730 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6731 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6733 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6734 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6735 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6736 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6739 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6742 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6743 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6744 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6745 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6746 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6751 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6753 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6754 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6755 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6761 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6762 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6767 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6773 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6774 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6780 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6781 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6783 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6784 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6785 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6786 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6787 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6788 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6789 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6790 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6791 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6792 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6793 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6794 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6795 assert!(should_broadcast);
6796 } else { unreachable!(); }
6797 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6798 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6799 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6802 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6806 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6809 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6810 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6812 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6813 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6814 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6815 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6817 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6819 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6820 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6824 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6825 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6827 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6829 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6830 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6832 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6833 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6834 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6835 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6836 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6837 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6838 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6839 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6840 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6841 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6842 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6845 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6846 /// stored external to LDK.
6848 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6849 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6850 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6852 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6853 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6856 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6857 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6858 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6859 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6861 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6862 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6863 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6864 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6865 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6867 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6868 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6869 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6870 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6871 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6873 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6874 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6876 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6877 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6881 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6882 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6884 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6886 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6887 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6889 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6890 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6891 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6892 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6893 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6894 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6895 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6898 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6899 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6901 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6902 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6903 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6906 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6907 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6909 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6910 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6911 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6912 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6914 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6915 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6916 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6917 Some(_) => continue,
6918 None => return scid_candidate
6923 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6925 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6926 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6928 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6929 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6930 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6934 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6935 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6936 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6938 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6939 /// times to get a unique scid.
6940 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6941 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6942 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6944 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6945 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6946 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6947 return scid_candidate
6951 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6952 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6953 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6954 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6957 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6958 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6959 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6960 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6961 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6963 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6964 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6965 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6974 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6975 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6976 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6977 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6978 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6982 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6983 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6984 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6985 events.push_back((event, None));
6989 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6990 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6991 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6995 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6996 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7000 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7001 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7004 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7005 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7006 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7007 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7008 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7009 let mut errors = Vec::new();
7011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7012 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7013 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7016 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7017 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7018 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7019 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7021 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7025 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7026 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7027 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7028 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7029 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7030 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7031 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7035 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7036 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7037 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7038 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7039 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7040 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7041 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7042 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
7044 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
7046 if further_update_exists {
7047 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7053 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7058 log_debug!(self.logger,
7059 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7060 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7064 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7065 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7066 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7070 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7071 for action in actions {
7073 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7074 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7076 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7082 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7083 /// using the given event handler.
7085 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7086 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7090 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7094 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7096 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7097 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7098 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7099 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7100 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7101 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7105 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7106 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7107 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7108 /// is always placed next to each other.
7110 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7111 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7112 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7113 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7115 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7116 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7117 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7118 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7119 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7120 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7121 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7123 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7124 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7125 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7126 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7129 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7130 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7132 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7133 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7136 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7138 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7141 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7142 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7146 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7147 events.replace(pending_events);
7156 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7158 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7159 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7160 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7161 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7162 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7163 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7167 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7169 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7170 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7171 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7173 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7177 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7179 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7180 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7181 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7182 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7183 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7188 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7190 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7191 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7192 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7193 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7194 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7197 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7198 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7201 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7202 let _persistence_guard =
7203 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7204 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7205 let new_height = height - 1;
7207 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7208 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7209 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7210 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7211 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7212 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7215 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7219 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7221 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7222 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7223 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7224 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7225 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7226 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7230 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7231 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7232 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7233 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7235 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7236 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7238 let _persistence_guard =
7239 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7240 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7241 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7242 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7244 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7245 if height < last_best_block_height {
7246 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7247 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7251 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7252 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7253 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7254 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7256 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7257 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7259 let _persistence_guard =
7260 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7261 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7262 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7264 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7266 macro_rules! max_time {
7267 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7269 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7270 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7271 // having an explicit local time source.
7272 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7273 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7274 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7275 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7276 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7282 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7283 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7284 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7285 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7289 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7290 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7291 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7293 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7294 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7295 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7296 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7303 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7304 let _persistence_guard =
7305 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7306 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7307 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7308 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7309 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7310 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7311 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7312 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7317 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7319 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7321 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7322 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7323 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7328 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7329 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7331 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7332 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7333 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7334 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7335 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7337 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7338 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7341 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7344 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7345 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7347 // Retain unfunded channels.
7348 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7349 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7350 let res = f(channel);
7351 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7352 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7353 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7354 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7355 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7357 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7358 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7359 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7361 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7362 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7363 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7368 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7373 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7374 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7377 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7379 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7380 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7381 msg: announcement_sigs,
7383 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7384 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7387 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7388 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7389 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7394 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7395 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7396 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7397 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7398 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7399 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7400 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7401 // is always consistent.
7402 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7403 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7404 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7405 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7406 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7409 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7410 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7411 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7412 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7413 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7414 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7415 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7419 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7420 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7421 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7422 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7424 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7425 data: reason_message,
7437 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7438 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7439 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7440 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7441 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7442 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7443 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7444 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7445 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7446 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7448 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7449 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7450 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7454 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7457 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7458 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7459 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7460 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7461 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7462 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7463 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7464 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7465 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7466 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7469 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7470 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7471 _ => unreachable!(),
7473 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7474 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7475 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7476 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7482 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7484 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7485 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7489 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
7490 /// may have events that need processing.
7492 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
7493 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
7495 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7496 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7497 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
7498 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
7501 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7502 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
7503 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
7506 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7507 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7508 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
7511 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7512 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7513 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7514 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7517 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7518 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7519 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7520 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7523 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7524 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7526 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7527 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7528 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7529 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7530 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7533 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7535 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7536 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7539 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7540 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7541 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7542 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7545 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7546 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7547 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7548 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7552 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7553 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7555 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7556 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7557 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7558 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7559 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7560 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7564 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7565 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7566 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7567 // change to the contents.
7568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7569 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7570 let persist = match &res {
7571 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
7572 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
7573 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7575 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7577 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7582 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7583 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7584 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7585 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7588 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7589 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7590 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
7591 // change to the contents.
7592 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7593 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7594 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
7598 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7599 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7600 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7601 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7604 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7606 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7609 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7611 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7614 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7615 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7616 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
7617 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
7618 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
7619 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7620 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7621 let persist = match &res {
7622 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7623 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7625 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7630 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7632 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7635 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7640 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7641 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7642 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7643 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7644 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7645 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7646 let persist = match &res {
7647 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7648 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7649 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7651 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7656 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7657 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7658 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7661 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7662 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7663 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7664 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7665 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7666 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7667 let persist = match &res {
7668 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7669 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7670 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7672 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7677 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7678 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7679 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
7680 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7682 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7683 let persist = match &res {
7684 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7685 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7686 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7688 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7693 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7694 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7695 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7698 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7699 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7700 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7703 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7704 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
7705 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
7706 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
7707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7708 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7709 let persist = match &res {
7710 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7711 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7712 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
7714 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7719 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7720 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7721 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7724 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7725 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7726 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7729 NotifyOption::DoPersist
7734 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7736 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
7737 let persist = match &res {
7738 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
7739 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
7740 Ok(persist) => *persist,
7742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
7747 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
7749 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
7751 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7752 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7754 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7755 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7756 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7759 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7760 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7761 let context = match phase {
7762 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7763 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7764 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7765 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7770 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
7771 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7774 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7778 // Clean up for removal.
7779 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7780 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7783 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7784 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7785 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7786 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7788 // V1 Channel Establishment
7789 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7790 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7791 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7792 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7793 // V2 Channel Establishment
7794 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7795 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7796 // Common Channel Establishment
7797 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7798 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7799 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7800 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7801 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7802 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7803 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7804 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7805 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7806 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7807 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7808 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7809 // Channel Operations
7810 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7811 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7812 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7813 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7814 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7815 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7817 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7818 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7819 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7820 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7823 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7824 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7828 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7829 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7830 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7831 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7834 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7836 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7838 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7839 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7843 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7844 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7845 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7849 let mut res = Ok(());
7851 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7852 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7853 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7854 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7855 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7856 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7857 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7860 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7861 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7862 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7863 if inbound_peer_limited {
7865 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7867 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7868 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7869 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7870 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7871 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7872 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7873 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7874 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7878 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7879 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7880 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7882 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7883 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7884 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7885 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7888 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7891 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7892 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7897 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7900 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7901 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7902 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7903 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7905 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7906 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7907 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7908 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7909 // worry about closing and removing them.
7910 debug_assert!(false);
7914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7915 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7916 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7921 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7922 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7927 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7930 match &msg.data as &str {
7931 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7932 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7934 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7935 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7936 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7937 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7938 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7939 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7940 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7941 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7943 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7944 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7945 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7946 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7947 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7948 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7949 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7953 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7954 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7955 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7956 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7957 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7958 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7960 log_level: Level::Trace,
7970 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7971 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7973 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7974 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7975 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7976 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7977 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7978 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7979 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7980 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
7982 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7983 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7984 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7988 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7989 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7990 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7991 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7992 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7993 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7994 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7995 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7996 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7997 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8005 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8006 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8010 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8011 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8014 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8015 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8018 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8019 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
8022 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8023 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8024 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8025 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8028 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8029 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8030 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8031 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8034 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8035 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8036 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8037 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8040 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8041 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8042 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8043 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8046 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8047 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8048 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8049 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8052 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8053 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8054 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8055 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8058 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8059 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8060 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8061 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8064 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8065 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8066 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8067 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8070 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8071 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8072 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8073 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8077 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8078 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8079 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8080 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8081 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8085 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8086 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8088 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8089 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8090 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8091 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8092 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8095 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8096 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8097 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8098 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8101 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8102 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8103 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8104 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8107 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8108 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8109 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8110 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8111 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8112 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8113 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8114 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8115 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8116 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8117 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8118 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8119 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8120 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8121 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8122 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8123 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8124 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8125 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8126 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8131 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8132 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8134 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8135 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8136 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8137 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8140 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8141 (2, node_id, required),
8142 (4, features, required),
8143 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8144 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8145 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8146 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8149 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8150 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8151 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8152 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8153 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8154 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8155 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8156 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8157 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8158 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8159 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8160 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8161 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8162 (7, self.config, option),
8163 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8164 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8165 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8166 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8167 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8168 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8169 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8170 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8171 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8172 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8173 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8174 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8175 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8176 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8177 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8178 (32, self.is_public, required),
8179 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8180 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8181 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8182 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8183 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8189 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8190 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8191 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8192 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8193 (2, channel_id, required),
8194 (3, channel_type, option),
8195 (4, counterparty, required),
8196 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8197 (6, funding_txo, option),
8198 (7, config, option),
8199 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8200 (9, confirmations, option),
8201 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8202 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8203 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8204 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8205 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8206 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8207 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8208 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8209 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8210 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8211 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8212 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8213 (26, is_outbound, required),
8214 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8215 (30, is_usable, required),
8216 (32, is_public, required),
8217 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8218 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8219 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8220 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8221 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8224 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8225 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8226 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8227 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8228 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8230 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8234 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8236 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8237 outbound_scid_alias,
8241 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8242 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8244 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8245 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8246 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8247 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8248 confirmations_required,
8250 force_close_spend_delay,
8251 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8252 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8253 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8254 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8255 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8256 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8257 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8258 channel_shutdown_state,
8263 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8264 (2, channels, required_vec),
8265 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8266 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8271 (0, onion_packet, required),
8272 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8275 (0, payment_data, required),
8276 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8277 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8278 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8279 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8281 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8282 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8283 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8284 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8285 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8286 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8290 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8291 (0, routing, required),
8292 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8293 (4, payment_hash, required),
8294 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8295 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8296 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8297 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8301 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8302 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8304 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8306 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8307 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8308 reason.write(writer)?;
8310 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8311 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8314 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8315 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8316 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8317 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8324 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8325 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8326 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8329 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8330 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8331 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8332 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8336 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8337 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8338 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8339 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8340 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8343 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8344 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8345 // messages contained in the variants.
8346 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8347 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8348 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8350 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8351 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8352 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8353 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8354 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8357 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8358 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8359 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8360 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8361 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8363 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8368 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8373 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8374 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8375 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8376 (2, outpoint, required),
8377 (4, htlc_id, required),
8378 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8379 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8382 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8383 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8384 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8385 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8386 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8388 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8389 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8390 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8391 (2, self.value, required),
8392 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8393 (4, payment_data, option),
8394 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8395 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8396 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8397 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8403 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8404 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8405 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8406 (0, prev_hop, required),
8407 (1, total_msat, option),
8408 (2, value_ser, required),
8409 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8410 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8411 (5, total_value_received, option),
8412 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8413 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8414 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8416 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8417 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8418 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8420 if payment_data.is_some() {
8421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8423 if total_msat.is_none() {
8424 total_msat = Some(value);
8426 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8429 if total_msat.is_none() {
8430 if payment_data.is_none() {
8431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8433 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8435 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8439 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8442 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8443 total_value_received,
8444 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8446 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8447 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8452 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8453 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8454 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8457 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8458 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8459 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8460 let mut payment_id = None;
8461 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8462 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8463 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8464 (0, session_priv, required),
8465 (1, payment_id, option),
8466 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8467 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8468 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8469 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8471 if payment_id.is_none() {
8472 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8474 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8476 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8477 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8478 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8480 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8481 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8482 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8483 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8487 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8488 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8489 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8491 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8494 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8495 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8500 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8501 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8503 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8505 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8506 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8507 (0, session_priv, required),
8508 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8509 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8510 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8511 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8512 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8513 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8516 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8518 field.write(writer)?;
8525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8526 (0, forward_info, required),
8527 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8528 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8529 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8530 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8533 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8535 (0, htlc_id, required),
8536 (2, err_packet, required),
8541 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8542 (0, payment_secret, required),
8543 (2, expiry_time, required),
8544 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8545 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8546 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8549 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8551 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8552 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8553 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8554 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8555 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8556 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8560 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8561 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8563 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8565 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8567 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8568 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8569 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8572 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8575 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8576 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8579 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8580 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8583 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8584 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8588 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8590 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8592 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8593 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8594 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8595 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8598 channel.write(writer)?;
8604 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8605 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8606 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8607 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8608 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8609 for forward in pending_forwards {
8610 forward.write(writer)?;
8615 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8617 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8618 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8619 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8621 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8622 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8623 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8624 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8625 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8626 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8627 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8628 htlc.write(writer)?;
8630 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8631 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8634 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8635 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8636 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8637 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8638 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8639 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8640 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8643 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8644 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8645 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8646 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8647 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8649 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8650 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8651 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8652 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8653 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8654 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8655 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8660 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8661 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8662 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8663 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8664 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8665 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8666 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8667 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8668 0u64.write(writer)?;
8670 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8671 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8672 event.write(writer)?;
8676 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8677 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8678 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8679 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8680 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8681 0u64.write(writer)?;
8683 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8684 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8685 // likely to be identical.
8686 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8687 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8689 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8690 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8691 hash.write(writer)?;
8692 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8695 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8696 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8697 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8698 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8699 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8702 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8703 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8705 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8706 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8707 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8708 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8711 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8712 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8713 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8714 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8718 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8719 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8720 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8722 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8723 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8724 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8730 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8731 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8732 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8733 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8736 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8737 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8738 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8739 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8740 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8743 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8744 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8745 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8746 if !updates.is_empty() {
8747 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8748 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8753 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8754 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8755 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8756 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8757 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8758 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8759 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8760 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8761 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8762 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8763 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8764 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8765 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8772 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8773 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8774 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8775 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8778 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8779 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8780 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8781 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8782 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8783 // check that the event is sane here.
8784 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8785 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8786 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8787 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8793 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8794 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8795 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8796 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8797 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8798 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8801 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8802 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8803 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8804 events.push_back((ev, action));
8805 } else if action.is_some() {
8806 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8813 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8814 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8815 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8816 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8817 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8818 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8821 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8823 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8825 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8826 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8827 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8828 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8829 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8830 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8831 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8832 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8833 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8834 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8835 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8836 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8837 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8839 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8840 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8842 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8843 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8845 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8846 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8847 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8848 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8849 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8850 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8852 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8853 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8855 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8856 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8857 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8858 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8859 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8860 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8864 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8865 pub entropy_source: ES,
8867 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8868 pub node_signer: NS,
8870 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8871 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8873 pub signer_provider: SP,
8875 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8877 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8878 pub fee_estimator: F,
8879 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8881 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8882 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8883 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8884 pub chain_monitor: M,
8886 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8887 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8888 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8889 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8890 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8891 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8893 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8895 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8896 /// deserialization.
8898 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8899 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8900 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8902 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8903 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8905 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8906 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8907 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8908 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8910 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8913 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8914 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8917 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8918 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8920 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8921 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8922 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8923 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8924 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8925 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8929 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8930 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8931 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8932 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8933 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8935 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8936 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8941 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8942 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8943 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8944 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8946 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8947 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8948 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8950 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8955 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8956 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8957 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8961 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8962 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8964 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8965 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8966 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8967 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8968 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8973 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8974 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8976 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8977 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8978 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8980 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8982 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8983 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8984 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8985 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8986 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8987 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8988 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8989 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8990 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8991 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8993 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8994 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8995 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8996 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8997 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8998 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8999 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9000 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9001 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9002 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9003 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9004 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9005 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9007 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9008 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9009 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9011 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9012 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9013 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9015 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9016 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9017 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9019 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9020 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9021 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9022 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9025 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9026 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9027 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9028 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9029 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9030 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9031 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9033 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9034 let mut found_htlc = false;
9035 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9036 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9039 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9040 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9041 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9042 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9043 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9044 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9045 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9046 log_info!(args.logger,
9047 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9048 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9049 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9053 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9054 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9055 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9056 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9057 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9059 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
9060 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9062 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9064 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9065 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9067 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9068 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9069 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9070 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9074 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9075 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9076 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9077 // safely discard the channel.
9078 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9079 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9080 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9081 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9082 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9083 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9084 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9087 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9088 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9089 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9090 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9091 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9092 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9096 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9097 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9098 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9099 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9100 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9101 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9102 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9104 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9108 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9109 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9110 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9111 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9112 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9113 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9114 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9115 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9116 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9118 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9121 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9122 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9123 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9124 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9125 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9126 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9127 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9128 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9130 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9133 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9136 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9137 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9138 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9139 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9140 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9141 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9142 is_connected: false,
9146 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9147 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9148 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9149 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9150 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9151 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9152 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9153 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9156 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9157 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9158 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9159 for _ in 0..event_count {
9160 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9161 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9166 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9167 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9168 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9170 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9171 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9172 // on-startup monitor updates.
9173 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9174 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9176 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9180 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9181 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9183 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9184 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9185 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9186 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9191 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9192 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9193 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9194 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9195 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9196 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9197 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9199 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9200 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9204 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9205 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9206 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9207 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9208 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9209 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9210 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9211 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9212 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9213 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9214 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9215 let mut events_override = None;
9216 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9217 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9218 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9219 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9220 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9221 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9222 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9223 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9224 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9225 (8, events_override, option),
9226 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9227 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9228 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9229 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9231 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9232 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9235 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9236 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9239 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9240 pending_events_read = events;
9243 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9244 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9247 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9248 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9249 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9250 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9251 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9252 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9254 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9256 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9257 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9258 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9261 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9262 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9263 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9264 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9265 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9267 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9268 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9269 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9271 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9272 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9273 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9274 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9275 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9277 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9278 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9279 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9280 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9281 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9282 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9283 pending_background_events.push(
9284 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9285 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9286 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9287 update: update.clone(),
9290 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9291 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9292 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9293 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9294 pending_background_events.push(
9295 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9296 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9297 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9300 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9301 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9302 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9304 max_in_flight_update_id
9308 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9311 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9312 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9313 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9315 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9316 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9317 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9318 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9319 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9320 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9321 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9322 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9323 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9326 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9327 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9328 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9329 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9330 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9331 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9332 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9333 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9334 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9335 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9336 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9339 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9340 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9341 debug_assert!(false);
9342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9347 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9348 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9349 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9350 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9351 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9352 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9354 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9356 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9357 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9358 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9360 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9361 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9362 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9363 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9364 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9365 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9366 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9367 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9372 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9373 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9375 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9376 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9377 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9378 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9381 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9382 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9383 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9384 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9385 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9386 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9387 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9389 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9390 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9391 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9392 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9393 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9394 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9395 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9399 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9400 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9401 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9402 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9403 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9404 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9405 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9406 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9408 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9409 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9410 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9411 retry_strategy: None,
9412 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9413 payment_params: None,
9414 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9415 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9416 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9417 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9418 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9419 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9420 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9421 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9422 total_msat: path_amt,
9423 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9425 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9426 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9431 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9433 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9434 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9435 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9436 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9438 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9439 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9440 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9441 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9442 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9443 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9444 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9445 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9446 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9447 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9448 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9453 !forwards.is_empty()
9455 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9456 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9457 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9458 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9459 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9460 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9461 intercepted_id != ev_id
9468 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9469 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9470 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9471 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9472 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9473 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9474 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9475 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9476 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9477 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9478 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9480 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9481 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9482 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9484 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9485 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9486 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9493 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9494 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9496 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9498 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9499 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9500 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9501 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9502 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9503 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9504 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9505 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9506 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9507 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9510 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9511 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9512 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9513 // channel still live case here.
9517 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9518 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9523 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9524 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9525 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9526 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9527 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9528 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9529 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9530 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9534 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9535 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9537 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9538 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9539 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9540 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9542 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9543 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9544 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9546 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9547 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9549 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9550 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9552 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9555 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9556 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9557 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9559 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9563 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9564 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9565 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9566 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9567 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9569 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9570 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9571 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9572 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9573 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9574 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9575 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9576 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9578 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9579 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9583 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9585 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9587 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9588 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9590 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9591 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9596 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9597 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9599 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9601 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9603 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9604 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9605 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9606 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9610 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9611 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9614 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9615 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9616 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9617 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9619 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9620 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9621 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9623 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9624 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9625 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9626 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9627 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9628 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9630 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9631 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9632 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9633 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9634 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9635 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9639 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9640 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9641 debug_assert!(false);
9642 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9647 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9649 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9650 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9651 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9652 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9653 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9654 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9655 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9656 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9657 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9658 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9659 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9661 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9662 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9664 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9665 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9666 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9667 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9669 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9670 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9671 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9672 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9674 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9675 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9676 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9677 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9679 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9680 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9681 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9682 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9683 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9684 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9685 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9688 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9689 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9692 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9695 purpose: payment.purpose,
9696 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9697 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9698 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9704 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9705 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9706 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9707 for action in actions.iter() {
9708 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9709 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9710 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9712 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9713 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9714 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9715 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9717 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9718 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9719 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9720 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9726 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9728 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9729 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9733 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9735 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9736 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9737 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9738 router: args.router,
9740 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9742 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9743 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9744 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9745 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9747 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9748 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9749 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9750 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9751 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9752 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9754 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9759 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9761 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9763 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9764 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9765 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9766 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9767 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9769 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9770 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
9772 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9773 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9774 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9776 logger: args.logger,
9777 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9780 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9781 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9782 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9783 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9784 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9787 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9788 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9789 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9790 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9791 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9792 downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
9795 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9796 //connection or two.
9798 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9804 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9805 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9806 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9807 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9808 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9809 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9810 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9811 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9812 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9813 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9814 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9815 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9816 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9817 use crate::util::test_utils;
9818 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9819 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9822 fn test_notify_limits() {
9823 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9824 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9828 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9830 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9831 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9832 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9833 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9834 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9836 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9838 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9839 // to connect messages with new values
9840 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9841 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9842 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9843 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9844 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9845 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9847 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9848 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9849 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9850 // ... but the last node should not.
9851 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9852 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9853 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9854 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9856 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9857 // about the channel.
9858 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9859 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9860 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9862 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9864 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9865 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9866 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9867 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9868 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9869 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9871 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9873 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9875 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9876 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9877 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9878 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9879 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9880 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9882 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9883 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9884 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9885 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9886 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9887 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9889 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9891 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9892 // the channel info has updated.
9893 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9894 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9895 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9896 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
9897 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9898 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9902 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9903 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9909 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9911 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9912 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9913 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9914 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9916 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9917 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9918 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9919 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9920 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9921 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9922 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9923 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9925 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9926 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9927 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9929 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9930 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9931 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9933 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9934 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9935 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9936 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9937 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9939 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9940 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9941 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9943 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9944 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9945 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9946 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9947 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9948 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9951 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9953 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9954 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9955 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9957 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9958 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9959 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9961 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9962 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9963 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9964 // lightning messages manually.
9965 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9966 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9969 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9970 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9971 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9972 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9974 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9975 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9977 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9978 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9980 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9981 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9982 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9984 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9986 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9988 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9990 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9992 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9993 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9996 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9997 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9998 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9999 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10001 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10002 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10003 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10004 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10009 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10010 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10011 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10012 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10014 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10019 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10020 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10021 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10024 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10025 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10026 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10027 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10028 // fails as expected.
10029 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10030 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10031 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10032 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10033 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10034 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10035 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10037 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10038 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10040 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10041 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10042 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10043 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10045 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10046 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10047 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10049 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10050 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10051 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10052 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10053 let route = find_route(
10054 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10055 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10057 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10058 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10062 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10063 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10064 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10066 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10067 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10068 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10072 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10073 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10074 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10075 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10076 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10077 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10078 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10080 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10082 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10085 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10086 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10087 let route = find_route(
10088 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10089 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10091 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10092 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10094 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10096 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10097 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10098 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10100 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10101 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10102 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10103 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10105 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10106 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10107 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10108 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10110 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10115 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10116 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10117 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10118 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10120 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10123 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10125 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10126 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10128 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10129 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10130 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10131 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10135 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10136 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10137 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10139 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10140 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10141 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10144 let route = find_route(
10145 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10146 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10148 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10149 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10150 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10152 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10153 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10154 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10155 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10156 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10158 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10160 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10162 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10163 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10164 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10165 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10166 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10167 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10168 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10169 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10170 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10172 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10173 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10177 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10178 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10179 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10185 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10186 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10188 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10189 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10190 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10191 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10192 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10193 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10194 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10195 let route = find_route(
10196 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10197 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10200 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10201 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10202 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10203 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10204 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10205 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10206 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10208 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10209 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10210 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10211 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10212 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10213 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10214 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10216 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10220 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10221 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10222 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10223 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10224 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10228 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10230 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10231 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10233 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10234 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10235 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10236 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10237 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10238 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10239 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10240 let route = find_route(
10241 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10242 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10245 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10246 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10247 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10248 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10249 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10250 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10251 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10252 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10255 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10256 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10257 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10258 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10259 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10260 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10261 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10263 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10267 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10271 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10273 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10274 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10275 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10276 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10278 // Marshall an MPP route.
10279 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10280 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10281 route.paths.push(path);
10282 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10283 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10284 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10285 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10286 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10287 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10289 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10290 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10292 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10293 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10295 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10300 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10301 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10302 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10306 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10308 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10309 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10311 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10312 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10314 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10317 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10318 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10319 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10320 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10321 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10322 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10325 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10328 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10329 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10334 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10335 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10339 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10341 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10342 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10344 total_msat: 100_000,
10347 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10348 // payment verification fails as expected.
10349 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10350 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10351 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10352 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10354 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10358 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10359 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10363 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10364 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10365 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10366 // the channel is successfully closed.
10367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10372 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10373 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10374 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10375 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10376 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10378 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10379 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10381 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10382 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10383 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10384 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10387 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10389 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10390 // as it has the funding transaction.
10391 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10392 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10393 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10396 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10398 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10400 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10402 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10403 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10404 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10406 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10409 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10410 // as it has the funding transaction.
10411 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10412 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10413 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10416 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10417 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10419 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10420 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10421 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10422 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10424 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10425 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10426 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10427 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10429 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10430 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10432 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10433 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10434 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10435 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10436 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10437 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10438 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10442 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10443 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10444 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10445 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10446 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10447 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10448 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10451 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10453 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10454 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10455 // closing transaction).
10456 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10457 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10458 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10460 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10461 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10462 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10463 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10464 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10467 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10469 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10471 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10472 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10473 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10475 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10477 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10478 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10481 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10482 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10483 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10486 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10487 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10488 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10491 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10493 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10494 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10496 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10497 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10499 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10500 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10505 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10506 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10507 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10508 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10509 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10510 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10511 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10512 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10515 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10516 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10517 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10519 // Test the API functions.
10520 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10522 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10524 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10526 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10528 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10530 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10532 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10536 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10537 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10543 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10545 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10546 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10548 let mut funding_tx = None;
10549 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10550 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10551 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10554 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10555 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10556 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10557 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10558 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10560 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10562 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10564 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10566 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10568 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10570 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10573 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10574 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10575 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10576 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10577 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10579 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10580 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10582 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10583 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10584 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10585 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10586 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10587 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10588 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10591 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10592 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10593 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10594 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10595 }, true).unwrap_err();
10597 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10598 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10599 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10600 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10601 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10602 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10603 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10605 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10606 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10608 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10609 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10610 }, true).unwrap_err();
10612 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10613 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10614 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10615 }, false).unwrap();
10616 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10618 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10619 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10621 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10622 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10623 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10624 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10625 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10627 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10628 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10629 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10631 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10632 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10633 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10635 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10636 // "protected" and can connect again.
10637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10638 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10639 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10641 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10643 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10645 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10646 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10650 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10651 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10655 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10657 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10659 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10660 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10662 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10663 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10664 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10665 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10668 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10670 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10671 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10672 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10674 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10675 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10676 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10678 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10679 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10680 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10681 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10685 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10686 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10687 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10688 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10689 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10690 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10691 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10695 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10697 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10698 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10700 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10701 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10702 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10703 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10704 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10705 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10709 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10711 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10712 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10716 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10717 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10720 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10721 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10722 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10723 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10724 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10726 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10727 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10729 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10730 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10731 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10732 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10738 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10739 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10741 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10742 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10745 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10746 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10750 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10754 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10755 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10756 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10757 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10758 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10759 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10760 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10761 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10763 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10764 payment_metadata: None,
10765 keysend_preimage: None,
10766 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10767 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10769 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10771 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10772 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10773 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10774 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10775 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10777 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10778 } else { panic!(); }
10780 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10781 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10783 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10784 payment_metadata: None,
10785 keysend_preimage: None,
10786 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10787 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10789 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10791 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10792 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10796 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10797 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10798 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10799 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10800 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10802 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10803 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10808 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10809 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10811 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10812 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10814 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10815 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10816 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10817 match &msg_events[0] {
10818 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10819 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10821 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10822 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10823 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10829 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10830 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10832 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10833 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10836 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10840 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10841 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10842 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10843 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10846 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10847 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10848 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10850 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10852 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10853 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10854 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10856 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10857 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10859 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10860 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10865 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10866 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10868 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10869 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10871 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10872 // not have generated any events.
10873 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10877 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10878 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10879 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10880 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10881 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10882 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10883 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10884 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10886 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10887 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10890 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10891 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10892 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10896 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10897 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10900 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10902 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10904 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10905 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10906 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10907 ..Default::default()
10909 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10913 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10914 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10917 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10918 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10919 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10920 ..Default::default()
10922 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10923 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10924 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10925 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10927 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10928 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10931 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10932 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10933 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10934 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10935 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10938 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10939 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10940 ..Default::default()
10942 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10945 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10947 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10952 fn test_payment_display() {
10953 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10954 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10955 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10956 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10957 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10958 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10964 use crate::chain::Listen;
10965 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10966 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10967 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10968 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10969 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10970 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10971 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10972 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10973 use crate::util::test_utils;
10974 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10976 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10977 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10978 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10980 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10982 use criterion::Criterion;
10984 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10985 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10986 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10987 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10988 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10989 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10990 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10992 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10993 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10995 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10996 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10998 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11000 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11003 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11004 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11007 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11008 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11009 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11011 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11012 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11014 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11015 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11016 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11017 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11018 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11020 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11021 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11022 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11024 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11025 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11026 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11027 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11029 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11030 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11031 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11033 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11034 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11035 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11036 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11037 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11039 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11040 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11041 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11043 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11044 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11046 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11047 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11048 }, false).unwrap();
11049 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11050 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11051 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11054 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11055 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11056 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11058 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11059 } else { panic!(); }
11061 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11062 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11063 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11064 match events_b[0] {
11065 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11066 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11071 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11072 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11073 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11074 match events_a[0] {
11075 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11076 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11081 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11083 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11084 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11085 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11087 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11088 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11089 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11090 match msg_events[0] {
11091 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11092 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11093 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11097 match msg_events[1] {
11098 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11102 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11103 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11104 match events_a[0] {
11105 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11106 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11108 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11111 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11112 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11113 match events_b[0] {
11114 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11115 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11120 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11121 macro_rules! send_payment {
11122 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11123 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11124 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11125 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11126 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11127 payment_count += 1;
11128 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11129 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11131 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11132 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11133 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11134 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11135 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11136 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11137 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11138 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11139 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11140 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11141 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11143 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11144 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11145 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11146 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11148 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11149 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11150 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11151 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11152 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11154 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11157 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11158 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11159 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11160 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11162 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11166 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11167 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11168 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);