1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use std::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
202 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
203 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
204 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
205 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
206 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
208 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
209 err: msgs::LightningError,
210 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
212 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
214 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 shutdown_finish: None,
229 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
231 err: LightningError {
233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
240 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
243 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
254 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
258 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
261 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
274 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
289 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
290 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
291 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
292 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
293 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
295 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
296 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
297 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
298 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
299 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
300 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
301 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
303 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
307 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
308 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
309 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
310 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
311 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
312 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
313 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
314 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
315 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
316 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
317 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
318 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
321 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
322 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
323 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
326 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
327 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
328 /// quite some time lag.
329 enum BackgroundEvent {
330 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
331 /// commitment transaction.
332 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
335 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
336 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
338 latest_features: InitFeatures,
341 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
342 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
344 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
346 struct PendingInboundPayment {
347 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
348 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
349 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
350 /// this payment being removed.
352 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
353 user_payment_id: u64,
354 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
355 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
356 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
359 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
360 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
361 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
362 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
363 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
364 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
365 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
366 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
368 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
369 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
370 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
371 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
372 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
373 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
378 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
379 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
381 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
382 /// to individual Channels.
384 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
385 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
386 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
387 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
389 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
390 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
391 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
392 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
393 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
394 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
395 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
397 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
398 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
399 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
400 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
403 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
404 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
405 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
406 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
407 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
409 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
410 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
411 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
412 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
413 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
414 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
415 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
417 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
418 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
421 default_configuration: UserConfig,
422 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
428 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
430 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
438 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
439 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
440 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
441 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
442 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
443 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
445 our_network_key: SecretKey,
446 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
448 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
449 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
450 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
452 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
453 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
454 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
455 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
457 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
458 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
459 /// are currently open with that peer.
460 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
461 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
463 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
465 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
466 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
467 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
468 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
469 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
470 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
471 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
472 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
473 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
475 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
482 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
484 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
485 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
486 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
487 pub struct ChainParameters {
488 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
489 pub network: Network,
491 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
493 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
494 pub best_block: BestBlock,
497 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
498 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
499 pub struct BestBlock {
500 block_hash: BlockHash,
505 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
506 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
508 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
513 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
514 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
515 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
518 /// Returns the best block hash.
519 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
521 /// Returns the best block height.
522 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
525 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
531 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
532 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
533 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
534 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
535 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
536 /// updates are ready for persistence).
538 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
539 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
540 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
541 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
542 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
544 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
545 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
548 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
549 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
550 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
553 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
554 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
556 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
557 persistence_notifier: notifier,
558 should_persist: persist_check,
559 _read_guard: read_guard,
564 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
566 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
567 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
572 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
573 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
575 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
577 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
578 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
579 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
580 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
581 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
583 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
584 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
586 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
588 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
589 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
590 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
591 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
592 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
593 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
594 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
596 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
597 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
599 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
600 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
601 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
602 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
604 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
605 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
606 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
607 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
608 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
609 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
612 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
614 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
615 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
618 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
620 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
622 pub struct ChannelDetails {
623 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
624 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
625 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
626 /// lifetime of the channel.
627 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
628 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
629 /// our counterparty already.
631 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
632 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
633 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
634 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
635 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
636 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
637 /// The node_id of our counterparty
638 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
639 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
640 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
641 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
642 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
643 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
644 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
645 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
647 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
648 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
649 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
650 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
651 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
652 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
653 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
654 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
655 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
656 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
657 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
658 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
659 pub is_outbound: bool,
660 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
661 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
662 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
663 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
664 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
665 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
666 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
667 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
669 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
671 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
673 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
674 /// payments to us through this channel.
675 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
678 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
679 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
681 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
682 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
683 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
684 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
685 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
686 ParameterError(APIError),
687 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
688 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
689 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
692 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
694 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
695 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
696 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
697 /// paths than the ones selected).
698 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
699 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
700 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
701 /// in over-/re-payment.
703 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
704 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
705 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
707 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
708 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
709 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
710 /// with the latest update_id.
711 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
714 macro_rules! handle_error {
715 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
718 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
719 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
721 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
722 // entering the macro.
723 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
726 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
728 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
729 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
730 if let Some(update) = update_option {
731 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
737 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
738 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
740 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
741 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
742 action: err.action.clone()
746 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
747 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
750 // Return error in case higher-API need one
757 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
758 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
761 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
762 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
764 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
765 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
766 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
767 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
768 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
770 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
772 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
777 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
778 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
781 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
782 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
784 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
785 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
786 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
787 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
788 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
790 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
792 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
793 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
794 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
795 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
796 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
798 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
799 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
805 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
806 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
807 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
809 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
811 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
812 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
813 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
814 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
815 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
817 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
818 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
819 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
820 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
821 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
822 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
823 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
824 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
825 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
826 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
829 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
830 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
831 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
832 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
834 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
835 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
837 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
838 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
840 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
841 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
842 if !$resend_commitment {
843 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
846 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
848 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
849 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
855 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
856 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
857 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
859 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
860 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
864 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
865 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
866 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
867 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
868 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
871 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
876 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
877 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
878 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
879 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
880 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
883 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
885 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
886 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
888 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
890 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
892 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
893 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
894 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
895 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
896 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
897 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
900 default_configuration: config.clone(),
901 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
902 fee_estimator: fee_est,
906 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
908 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
909 by_id: HashMap::new(),
910 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
911 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
912 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
913 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
915 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
917 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
918 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
921 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
922 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
924 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
926 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
927 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
928 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
929 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
937 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
938 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
939 &self.default_configuration
942 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
944 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
945 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
946 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
947 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
948 /// otherwise ignored.
950 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
951 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
953 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
954 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
955 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
956 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
960 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
961 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
962 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
965 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
966 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
968 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
969 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
970 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
971 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
974 panic!("RNG is bad???");
977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
980 node_id: their_network_key,
986 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
987 let mut res = Vec::new();
989 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
990 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
991 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
992 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
993 res.push(ChannelDetails {
994 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
995 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
996 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
997 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
998 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
999 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1000 inbound_capacity_msat,
1001 outbound_capacity_msat,
1002 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1003 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1004 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1005 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1006 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1007 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1012 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1013 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1014 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1020 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1021 /// more information.
1022 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1023 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1026 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1027 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1029 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1030 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1032 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1033 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1034 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1035 // really wanted anyway.
1036 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1039 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1040 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1041 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1043 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1044 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1045 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1047 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1048 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1049 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1050 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1052 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1053 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1054 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1057 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1058 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1059 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1061 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1062 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1064 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1067 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1068 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1070 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1071 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1076 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1077 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1078 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1087 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1088 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1089 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1090 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1091 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1093 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1094 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1095 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1096 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1097 // ignore the result here.
1098 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1102 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1104 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1105 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1106 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1107 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1108 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1109 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1112 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1113 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1115 chan.remove_entry().1
1117 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1120 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1121 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1122 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1123 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1129 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1132 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1133 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1134 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1136 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1137 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1138 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1139 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1140 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1141 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1142 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1152 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1153 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1154 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1155 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1156 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1160 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1161 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1162 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1164 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1165 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1166 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1167 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1168 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1169 failure_code: $err_code,
1170 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1175 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1176 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1179 let shared_secret = {
1180 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1181 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1184 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1186 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1187 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1188 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1189 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1190 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1191 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1192 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1193 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1196 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1197 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1198 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1199 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1200 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1203 let mut channel_state = None;
1204 macro_rules! return_err {
1205 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1207 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1208 if channel_state.is_none() {
1209 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1211 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1212 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1213 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1214 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1215 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1220 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1221 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1222 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1223 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1225 let error_code = match err {
1226 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1227 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1228 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1229 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1230 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1232 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1235 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1236 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1237 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1244 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1247 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1248 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1249 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1250 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1251 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1252 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1253 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1254 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1255 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1256 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1257 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1258 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1262 // final_expiry_too_soon
1263 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1264 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1265 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1266 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1267 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1268 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1270 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1271 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1272 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1274 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1275 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1276 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1279 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1280 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1281 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1282 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1285 if payment_data.is_none() {
1286 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1289 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1290 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1291 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1292 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1294 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1295 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1296 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1297 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1299 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1300 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1301 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1302 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1305 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1306 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1307 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1309 // Check two things:
1310 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1311 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1312 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1314 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1316 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1317 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1318 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1320 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1322 let blinding_factor = {
1323 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1324 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1325 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1326 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1329 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1331 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1333 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1336 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1337 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1340 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1341 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1342 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1343 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1344 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1348 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1349 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1350 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1353 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1354 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1355 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1356 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1360 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1361 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1362 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1363 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1364 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1365 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1366 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1367 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1368 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1369 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1371 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1373 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1374 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1376 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1377 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1378 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1379 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1380 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1381 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1382 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1384 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1385 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1387 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1388 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1389 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1391 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1392 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1394 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1395 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1396 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1397 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1398 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1400 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1401 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1403 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1404 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1405 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1406 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1412 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1413 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1414 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1415 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1417 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1418 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1420 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1421 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1422 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1424 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1426 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1431 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1434 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1435 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1436 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1437 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1438 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1442 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1444 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1445 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1447 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1448 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1449 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1450 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1451 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1452 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1453 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1454 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1457 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1458 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1460 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1466 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1467 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1468 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1469 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1470 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1472 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1473 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1474 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1475 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1476 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1478 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1482 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1483 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1484 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1485 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1486 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1490 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1492 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1493 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1495 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1496 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1498 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1500 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1501 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1502 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1504 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1505 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1506 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1507 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1508 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1509 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1510 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1511 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1512 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1515 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1516 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1517 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1518 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1519 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1520 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1521 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1529 } else { unreachable!(); }
1533 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1534 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1536 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1541 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1543 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1544 /// fields for more info.
1546 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1547 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1548 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1549 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1550 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1551 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1553 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1555 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1556 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1557 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1559 /// In general, a path may raise:
1560 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1561 /// node public key) is specified.
1562 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1563 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1565 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1566 /// relevant updates.
1568 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1569 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1570 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1572 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1573 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1574 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1575 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1577 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1578 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1579 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1580 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1581 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1582 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1584 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1585 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1586 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1587 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1588 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1590 let mut total_value = 0;
1591 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1592 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1593 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1594 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1595 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1596 continue 'path_check;
1598 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1599 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1600 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1601 continue 'path_check;
1604 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1605 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1607 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1608 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1611 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1612 let mut results = Vec::new();
1613 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1614 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1616 let mut has_ok = false;
1617 let mut has_err = false;
1618 for res in results.iter() {
1619 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1620 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1621 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1622 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1629 if has_err && has_ok {
1630 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1632 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1638 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1639 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1640 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1641 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1643 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1645 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1647 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1648 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1649 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1650 } else { unreachable!(); })
1653 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1655 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1656 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1659 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1660 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1665 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1666 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1667 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1670 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1671 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1672 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1682 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1683 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1684 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1688 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1690 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1691 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1693 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1695 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1696 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1697 /// keys per-channel).
1699 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1700 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1701 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1703 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1704 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1705 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1706 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1707 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1709 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1710 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1711 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1712 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1716 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1717 let mut output_index = None;
1718 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1719 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1720 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1721 if output_index.is_some() {
1722 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1723 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1726 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1727 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1728 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1731 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1734 if output_index.is_none() {
1735 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1736 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1739 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1743 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1744 if !chan.should_announce() {
1745 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1749 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1751 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1753 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1754 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1756 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1757 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1758 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1759 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1760 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1765 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1766 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1767 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1769 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1772 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1773 // smaller than 500:
1774 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1776 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1777 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1778 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1780 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1781 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1783 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1784 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1785 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1786 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1788 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1789 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1790 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1792 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1793 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1796 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1797 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1798 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1800 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1801 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1802 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1803 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1804 rgb, alias, addresses,
1805 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1806 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1808 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1810 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1811 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1812 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1813 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1814 contents: announcement
1819 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1821 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1822 /// Will likely generate further events.
1823 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1826 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1827 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1828 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1830 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1831 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1833 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1834 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1835 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1836 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1838 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1839 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1840 match forward_info {
1841 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1842 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1843 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1844 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1845 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1846 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1847 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1849 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1850 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1853 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1854 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1855 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1856 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1857 // problem, not ours.
1864 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1865 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1866 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1867 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1868 match forward_info {
1869 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1870 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1872 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1873 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1874 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1875 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1876 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1877 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1878 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1879 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1881 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1883 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1884 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1886 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1888 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1889 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1890 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1896 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1898 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1899 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1900 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1901 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1902 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1903 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1904 // this channel currently :/.
1910 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1911 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1913 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1915 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1917 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1918 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1920 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1922 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1923 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1924 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1927 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1929 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1930 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1931 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1932 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1933 // messages when we can.
1934 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1935 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1936 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1943 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1944 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1947 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1948 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1949 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1950 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1951 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1952 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1954 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1956 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1957 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1958 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1960 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1962 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1964 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1968 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1969 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1973 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1974 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1975 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1976 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1977 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1978 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1980 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1988 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1989 match forward_info {
1990 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1991 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1992 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1993 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1994 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
1995 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
1996 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1997 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1998 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1999 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2001 value: amt_to_forward,
2002 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2003 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2006 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2008 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2009 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2010 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2012 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2013 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2014 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2015 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2016 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2018 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2023 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2024 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2025 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2026 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2027 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2028 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2029 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2030 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2032 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2033 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2036 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2037 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2038 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2039 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2040 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2041 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2042 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2044 let mut total_value = 0;
2045 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2046 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2047 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2048 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2049 total_value += htlc.value;
2050 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2051 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2052 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2053 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2055 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2057 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2059 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2060 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2063 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2064 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2066 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2067 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2069 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2071 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2072 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2074 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2076 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2077 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2084 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2085 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2087 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2088 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2096 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2100 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2101 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2104 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2105 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2106 events.append(&mut new_events);
2109 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2111 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2112 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2114 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2115 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2116 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2117 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2118 if background_events.is_empty() {
2122 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2124 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2125 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2126 // monitor updating completing.
2127 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2134 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2135 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2136 self.process_background_events();
2139 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2140 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2141 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2143 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2145 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2146 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2147 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2148 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2149 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2151 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2152 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2153 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2154 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2155 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2156 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2157 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2158 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2159 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2160 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2161 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2165 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2166 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2168 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2169 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2170 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2174 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2175 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2185 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2186 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2187 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2188 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2189 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2190 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2193 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2194 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2195 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2196 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2197 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2198 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2199 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2200 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2201 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2202 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2203 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2209 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2210 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2211 // be surfaced to the user.
2212 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2213 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2215 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2216 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2217 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2219 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2220 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2222 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2225 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2227 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2228 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2229 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2231 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2232 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2233 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2235 rejected_by_dest: false,
2247 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2248 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2249 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2250 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2251 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2252 /// still-available channels.
2253 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2254 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2255 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2256 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2259 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2260 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2261 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2263 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2265 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2266 match &onion_error {
2267 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2269 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2271 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2272 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2273 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2274 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2275 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2276 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2277 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2282 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2283 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2284 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2285 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2287 error_code: onion_error_code,
2289 error_data: onion_error_data
2293 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2299 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2300 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2301 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2302 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2304 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2305 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2306 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2307 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2308 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2309 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2311 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2313 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2319 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2320 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2321 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2322 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2323 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2324 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2326 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2328 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2332 let mut forward_event = None;
2333 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2334 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2336 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2338 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2340 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2341 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2344 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2345 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2346 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2347 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2348 time_forwardable: time
2355 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2356 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2357 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2359 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2360 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2361 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2362 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2364 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2366 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2367 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2368 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2369 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2371 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2373 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2374 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2375 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2376 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2378 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2379 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2380 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2381 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2383 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2384 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2385 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2386 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2387 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2389 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2390 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2391 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2397 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2398 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2399 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2401 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2402 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2403 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2404 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2405 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2406 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2407 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2409 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2411 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2412 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2413 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2414 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2415 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2416 } else { errs.push(e); }
2418 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2419 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2424 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2425 // which were generated.
2426 channel_state.take();
2428 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2429 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2430 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2437 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2438 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2439 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2440 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2441 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2447 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2448 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2449 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2450 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2451 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2452 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2453 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2454 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2456 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2460 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2462 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2463 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2464 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2465 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2466 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2476 // TODO: Do something with e?
2477 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2478 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2479 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2480 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2481 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2482 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2483 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2487 } else { unreachable!(); }
2490 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2492 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2493 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2494 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2495 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2499 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2500 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2501 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2504 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2505 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2506 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2507 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2510 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2511 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2512 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2513 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2514 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2515 payment_preimage, e);
2519 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2521 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2522 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2523 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2529 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2530 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2531 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2534 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2535 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2538 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2539 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2541 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2542 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2543 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2544 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2546 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2547 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2548 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2549 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2550 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2551 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2552 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2553 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2554 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2555 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2557 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2558 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2559 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2560 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2563 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2564 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2565 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2566 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2567 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2571 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2575 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2576 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2577 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2579 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2581 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2582 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2583 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2584 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2589 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2590 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2591 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2592 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2593 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2598 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2602 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2607 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2608 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2609 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2611 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2612 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2613 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2616 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2617 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2618 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2619 msg: announcement_sigs,
2622 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2626 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2628 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2629 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2631 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2633 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2634 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2638 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2639 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2640 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2643 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2644 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2645 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2646 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2647 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2648 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2650 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2651 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2652 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2654 entry.insert(channel);
2660 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2661 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2662 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2663 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2664 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2665 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2666 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2669 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2670 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2672 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2675 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2676 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2677 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2678 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2680 user_channel_id: user_id,
2685 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2686 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2687 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2688 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2689 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2690 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2691 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2692 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2693 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2695 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2700 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2701 // lock before watch_channel
2702 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2704 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2705 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2706 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2707 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2708 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2709 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2710 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2711 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2712 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2713 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2714 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2716 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2717 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2718 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2719 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2720 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2721 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2725 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2726 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2727 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2731 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2732 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2733 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2742 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2744 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2745 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2746 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2749 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2752 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2753 Ok(update) => update,
2754 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2756 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2757 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2764 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2765 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2769 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2770 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2771 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2772 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2774 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2775 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2777 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2778 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2779 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2780 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2781 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2782 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2783 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2784 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2785 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2786 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2787 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2788 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2790 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2791 msg: announcement_sigs,
2796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2800 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2801 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2802 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2803 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2805 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2807 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2808 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2810 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2811 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2812 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2813 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2817 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2823 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2824 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2825 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2827 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2828 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2833 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2836 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2837 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2838 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2839 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2847 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2848 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2849 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2850 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2851 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2853 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2856 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2857 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2858 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2859 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2864 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2865 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2866 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2867 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2868 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2869 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2870 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2872 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2873 } else { (tx, None) }
2875 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2878 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2879 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2880 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2882 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2883 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2884 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2885 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2893 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2894 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2895 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2896 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2898 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2899 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2900 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2901 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2903 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2906 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2908 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2912 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2913 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2914 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2915 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2916 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2917 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2918 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2919 match pending_forward_info {
2920 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2921 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2922 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2923 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2924 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2925 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2926 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2930 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2931 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2932 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2933 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2934 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2935 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2936 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2937 // no problem just calling this
2938 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2939 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2941 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2942 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2943 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2946 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2948 _ => pending_forward_info
2951 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2958 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2959 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2964 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2965 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2967 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2969 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2972 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2976 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2977 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2979 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2981 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2982 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2984 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2986 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2991 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2992 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2993 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2994 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2995 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2996 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2997 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2999 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3000 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3001 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3010 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3015 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3018 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3019 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3020 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3021 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3022 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3023 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3024 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3029 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3030 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3031 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3033 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3034 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3035 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3037 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3038 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3039 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3040 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3041 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3042 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3043 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3044 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3046 commitment_signed: msg,
3050 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3051 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3052 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3063 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3064 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3065 let mut forward_event = None;
3066 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3067 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3068 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3069 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3071 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3072 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3073 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3074 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3076 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3077 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3078 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3080 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3081 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3082 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3087 match forward_event {
3089 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3090 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3091 time_forwardable: time
3099 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3100 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3104 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3105 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3106 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3107 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3109 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3110 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3111 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3112 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3113 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3114 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3115 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3116 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3118 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3120 } else { unreachable!(); }
3123 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3124 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3125 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3129 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3130 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3131 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3135 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3137 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3140 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3142 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3143 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3146 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3153 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3154 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3155 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3156 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3158 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3161 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3163 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3168 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3169 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3172 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3174 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3175 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3177 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3178 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3181 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3182 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3183 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3185 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3186 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3188 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3189 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3190 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3191 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3193 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3194 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3197 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3198 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3204 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3206 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3207 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3208 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3209 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3210 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3211 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3212 contents: announcement,
3214 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3217 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3222 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3223 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3224 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3225 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3226 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3228 // It's not a local channel
3232 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3234 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3235 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3236 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3238 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3245 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3246 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3247 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3249 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3251 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3252 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3254 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3255 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3256 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3257 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3258 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3259 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3260 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3261 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3262 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3263 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3264 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3265 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3266 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3268 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3269 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3271 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3272 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3275 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3276 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3277 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3281 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3282 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3284 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3289 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3290 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3292 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3298 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3302 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3307 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3309 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3319 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3320 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3321 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3322 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3323 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3325 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3326 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3327 let counterparty_node_id;
3328 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3329 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3330 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3332 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3333 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3334 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3335 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3336 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3338 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3339 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3341 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3342 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3344 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3345 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3346 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3348 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3351 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3352 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3353 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3354 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3355 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3356 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3357 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3358 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3368 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3369 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3370 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3374 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3375 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3376 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3378 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3379 match monitor_event {
3380 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3381 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3383 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3385 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3386 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3389 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3390 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3391 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3392 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3393 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3394 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3395 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3396 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3397 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3399 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3400 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3401 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3405 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3406 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3408 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3417 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3418 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3422 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3423 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3425 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3426 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3427 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3428 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3429 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3430 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3431 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3432 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3433 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3434 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3435 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3436 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3437 assert!(should_broadcast);
3438 } else { unreachable!(); }
3439 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3441 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3445 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3446 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3448 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3451 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3452 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3453 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3454 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3455 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3456 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3457 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3458 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3459 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3460 // never fail a payment too early.
3461 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3463 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3471 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3474 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3475 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3477 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3478 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3479 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3481 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3483 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3484 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3485 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3486 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3487 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3488 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3489 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3492 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3493 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3496 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3497 /// stored external to LDK.
3499 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3500 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3501 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3503 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3504 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3506 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3507 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3508 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3509 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3510 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3512 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3513 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3514 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3515 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3517 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3518 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3519 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3520 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
3521 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3523 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3524 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3525 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3526 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3527 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3529 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3530 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3531 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3533 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3535 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3536 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3538 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3539 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3540 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3541 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3542 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3546 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3547 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3548 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3549 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3550 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3553 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3554 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3555 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3556 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3558 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3559 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3560 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3565 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3566 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3567 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3568 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3569 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3572 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3573 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3574 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3575 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3577 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3578 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3579 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3584 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3586 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3587 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3588 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3592 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3594 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3595 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3596 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3597 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3598 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3601 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3602 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3603 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3606 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3607 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3608 let new_height = height - 1;
3610 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3611 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3612 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3613 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3614 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3615 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3618 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3622 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3624 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3625 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3626 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3627 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3630 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3631 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3632 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3633 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3635 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3636 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3639 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3642 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3643 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3644 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3645 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3647 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3648 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3650 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3652 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3654 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3656 macro_rules! max_time {
3657 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3659 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3660 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3661 // having an explicit local time source.
3662 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3663 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3664 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3665 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3666 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3672 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3673 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3674 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3675 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3676 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3680 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3681 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3682 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3683 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3684 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3685 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3691 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3692 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3693 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3694 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3695 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3696 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3697 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3698 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3703 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3705 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3706 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3707 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3708 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3711 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3712 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3714 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3715 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3716 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3717 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3718 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3720 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3721 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3723 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3725 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3726 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3728 let res = f(channel);
3729 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3730 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3731 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3732 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3733 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3737 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3739 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3740 msg: funding_locked,
3742 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3743 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3744 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3745 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3746 msg: announcement_sigs,
3749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3751 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3753 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3754 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3755 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3757 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3758 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3759 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3760 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3761 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3765 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3766 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3767 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3774 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3775 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3776 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3777 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3778 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3779 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3780 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3781 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3782 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3783 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3784 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3785 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3786 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3791 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3796 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3798 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3803 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3804 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3805 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3807 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3808 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3809 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3810 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3813 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3814 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3816 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3817 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3820 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3821 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3822 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3823 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3824 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3829 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
3830 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3831 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3832 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3833 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3834 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3837 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3838 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3839 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3842 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3844 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3847 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3849 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3852 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3853 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3854 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3857 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3858 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3859 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3862 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3864 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3867 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3869 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3872 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3873 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3874 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3877 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3878 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3879 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3882 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3883 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3884 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3887 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3888 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3889 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3892 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3893 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3894 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3897 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3899 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3902 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3904 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3907 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3908 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3909 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3912 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3914 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3917 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3918 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3919 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3922 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3924 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3925 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3926 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3930 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3931 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3932 if no_connection_possible {
3933 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3934 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3935 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3936 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3937 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3939 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3940 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3941 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3951 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3952 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3953 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3954 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3955 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3956 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3957 // reestablish logic.
3958 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3959 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3960 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3961 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3963 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3964 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3965 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3969 no_channels_remain = false;
3975 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3977 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3978 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3979 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3980 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3981 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3982 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3983 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3984 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3985 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3986 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3987 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3988 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3989 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3990 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3991 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3992 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3993 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3994 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3995 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3999 if no_channels_remain {
4000 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4003 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4004 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4006 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
4007 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
4008 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
4013 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4014 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4019 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4020 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4022 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4023 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4027 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4034 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4035 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4036 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4037 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4038 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4039 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4040 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4045 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4046 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4052 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4055 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4058 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4059 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4060 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4061 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4062 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4066 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4067 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4072 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4073 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4074 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4075 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4076 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4077 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4080 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4083 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4089 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4090 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4095 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4096 let result = *guard;
4104 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4105 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4106 let current_time = Instant::now();
4108 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4109 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4114 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4115 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4116 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4117 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4118 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4120 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4121 let result = *guard;
4122 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4126 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4127 None => return result,
4133 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4135 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4136 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4137 *persistence_lock = true;
4138 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4143 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4144 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4146 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4147 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4148 match &self.routing {
4149 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4151 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4152 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4154 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4156 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4157 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4158 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4161 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4162 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4163 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4164 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4169 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4170 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4171 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4172 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4173 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4174 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4175 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4177 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4178 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4179 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4180 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4182 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4184 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4186 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4187 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4188 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4189 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4194 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4197 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4199 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4201 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4203 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4210 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4211 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4212 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4213 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4214 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4215 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4220 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4221 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4223 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4225 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4227 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4229 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4236 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4237 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4238 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4239 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4240 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4241 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4246 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4250 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4253 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4255 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4256 self.value.write(writer)?;
4257 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4258 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4259 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4263 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4264 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4266 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4267 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4268 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4269 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4270 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4272 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4277 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4280 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4282 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4284 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4286 path.write(writer)?;
4287 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4288 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4295 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4296 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4297 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4298 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4299 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4300 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4301 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4302 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4304 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4309 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4310 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4312 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4316 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4318 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4319 data.write(writer)?;
4326 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4327 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4328 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4329 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4330 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4331 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4332 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4334 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4339 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4340 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4342 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4344 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4345 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4346 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4347 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4349 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4351 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4352 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4359 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4360 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4361 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4362 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4363 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4364 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4365 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4366 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4368 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4369 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4370 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4372 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4377 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4385 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4386 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4387 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4388 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4389 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4392 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4393 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4395 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4396 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4398 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4400 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4401 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4402 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4405 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4406 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4407 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4408 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4409 unfunded_channels += 1;
4412 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4413 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4414 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4415 channel.write(writer)?;
4419 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4420 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4421 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4422 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4423 for forward in pending_forwards {
4424 forward.write(writer)?;
4428 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4429 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4430 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4431 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4432 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4433 htlc.write(writer)?;
4437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4438 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4439 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4440 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4441 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4442 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4445 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4446 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4447 for event in events.iter() {
4448 event.write(writer)?;
4451 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4452 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4453 for event in background_events.iter() {
4455 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4457 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4458 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4463 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4464 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4466 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4467 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4468 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4469 hash.write(writer)?;
4470 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4477 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4479 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4481 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4482 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4483 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4484 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4485 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4486 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4487 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4488 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4489 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4490 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4491 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4493 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4494 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4496 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4497 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4498 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4499 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4500 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4501 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4502 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4503 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4504 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4505 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4509 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4510 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4512 pub keys_manager: K,
4514 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4516 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4517 pub fee_estimator: F,
4518 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4520 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4521 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4522 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4523 pub chain_monitor: M,
4525 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4526 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4527 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4528 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4529 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4530 /// deserialization.
4532 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4533 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4534 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4536 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4537 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4539 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4540 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4541 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4542 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4544 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4547 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4548 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4551 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4552 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4553 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4554 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4555 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4556 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4559 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4560 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4561 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4562 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4563 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4565 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4566 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4571 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4572 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4573 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4574 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4575 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4576 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4577 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4578 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4581 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4582 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4583 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4587 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4588 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4589 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4590 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4591 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4592 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4595 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4596 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4597 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4598 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4599 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4602 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4603 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4604 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4606 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4608 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4609 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4610 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4611 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4612 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4613 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4614 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4615 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4616 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4617 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4618 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4619 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4620 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4621 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4622 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4623 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4624 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4625 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4626 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4627 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4628 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4629 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4630 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4632 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4633 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4635 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4642 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4643 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4644 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4648 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4649 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4650 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4651 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4652 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4653 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4654 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4655 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4656 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4658 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4661 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4662 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4663 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4664 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4665 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4666 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4667 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4668 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4670 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4673 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4674 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4675 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4676 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4677 let peer_state = PeerState {
4678 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4680 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4683 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4684 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4685 for _ in 0..event_count {
4686 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4687 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4692 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4693 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4694 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4695 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4696 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4697 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4701 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4702 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4704 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4705 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4706 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4707 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4712 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4713 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4715 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4717 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4718 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4719 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4721 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4723 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4728 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4730 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4732 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4733 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4736 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4737 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4739 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4741 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4742 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4743 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4744 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4746 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4747 logger: args.logger,
4748 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4751 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4752 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4755 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4756 //connection or two.
4758 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4764 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4766 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4768 use std::time::Duration;
4771 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4772 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4773 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4775 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4776 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4777 thread::spawn(move || {
4779 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4780 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4781 *persistence_lock = true;
4784 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4790 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4791 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4793 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4796 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4801 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4803 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4806 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4813 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4816 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4817 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4818 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4819 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4820 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4821 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4822 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4823 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4824 use routing::router::get_route;
4825 use util::test_utils;
4826 use util::config::UserConfig;
4827 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4829 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4830 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4831 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4833 use std::sync::Mutex;
4837 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4838 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4839 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4840 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4841 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4842 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4843 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4848 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4849 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4852 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4853 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4854 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4856 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4857 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4859 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4860 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4862 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4863 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4865 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4866 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4867 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4868 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4869 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4871 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4873 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4875 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4876 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4877 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4878 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4879 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4881 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4883 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4885 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4886 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4887 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4890 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4891 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4892 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4894 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4895 } else { panic!(); }
4897 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4898 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4900 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4903 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4906 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4907 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4909 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4910 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4912 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4914 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4915 macro_rules! send_payment {
4916 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4917 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4918 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4919 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4921 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4922 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4924 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4925 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4927 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4928 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4929 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4930 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4931 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4932 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4933 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4934 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4937 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4938 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4940 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4941 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4942 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4943 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4944 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4946 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4949 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4950 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4951 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4952 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4954 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4959 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4960 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);