1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
185 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
186 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
188 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
189 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
194 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
196 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
197 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
198 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
200 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
201 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
204 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
205 struct ClaimableHTLC {
206 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
208 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
210 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
211 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
212 sender_intended_value: u64,
213 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
215 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
216 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
217 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
218 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
220 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
221 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
224 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
226 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
227 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
228 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
230 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
231 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 impl Readable for PaymentId {
237 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
238 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
243 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
245 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
246 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
247 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
249 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
250 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
255 impl Readable for InterceptId {
256 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
257 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
262 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
263 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
264 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
265 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
266 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
269 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
271 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
272 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
273 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
276 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
281 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
282 (0, short_channel_id, required),
283 (2, htlc_id, required),
285 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
286 (0, session_priv, required),
291 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
292 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
293 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
294 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
295 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
298 session_priv: SecretKey,
299 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
300 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
301 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
302 payment_id: PaymentId,
305 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
306 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
307 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
309 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
311 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
313 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
316 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
317 payment_id.hash(hasher);
318 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
324 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
326 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
327 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
328 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
329 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
331 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
335 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
336 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
337 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
338 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
339 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
340 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
342 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
348 struct InboundOnionErr {
354 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
355 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
357 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
358 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
359 pub enum FailureCode {
360 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
361 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
362 TemporaryNodeFailure,
363 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
364 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
365 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
366 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
367 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
368 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
369 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
370 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
371 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
372 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
374 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
375 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
376 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
379 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
380 fn into(self) -> u16 {
382 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
383 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
384 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
385 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
390 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
391 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
392 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
393 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
394 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
396 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
397 err: msgs::LightningError,
398 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
399 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
400 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
402 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
404 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
406 err: LightningError {
408 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
409 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
416 shutdown_finish: None,
417 channel_capacity: None,
421 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
422 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
425 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
427 err: LightningError {
429 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
430 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
436 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
437 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
438 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
442 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
445 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
447 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
448 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
452 log_level: Level::Warn,
455 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
457 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
459 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
461 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
462 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
470 shutdown_finish: None,
471 channel_capacity: None,
476 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
477 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
478 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
479 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
480 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
482 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
483 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
484 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
485 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
486 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
487 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
488 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
490 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
494 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
495 struct ClaimingPayment {
497 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
498 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
501 (0, amount_msat, required),
502 (2, payment_purpose, required),
503 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
506 struct ClaimablePayment {
507 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
508 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
509 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
512 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
513 struct ClaimablePayments {
514 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
515 /// failed/claimed by the user.
517 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
518 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
520 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
521 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
522 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
524 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
525 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
526 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
527 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
530 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
531 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
532 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
533 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
534 enum BackgroundEvent {
535 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
536 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
537 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
538 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
540 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
541 /// are regenerated on startup.
542 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
543 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
544 /// channel to continue normal operation.
546 /// In general this should be used rather than
547 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
548 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
549 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
551 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
552 /// are regenerated on startup.
553 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
554 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
555 funding_txo: OutPoint,
556 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
558 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
559 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
561 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
562 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
563 channel_id: [u8; 32],
568 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
569 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
570 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
571 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
572 /// event can be generated.
573 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
574 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
575 /// operation of another channel.
577 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
578 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
579 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
580 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
582 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
583 event: events::Event,
584 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
588 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
589 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
590 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
591 (0, event, upgradable_required),
592 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
593 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
594 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
595 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
596 // downgrades to prior versions.
597 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
601 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
602 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
603 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
604 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
605 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
609 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
610 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
611 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
615 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
616 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
617 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
618 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
619 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
620 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
622 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
623 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
624 channel_id: [u8; 32],
625 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
630 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
632 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
633 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
634 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
635 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
640 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
641 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
645 /// State we hold per-peer.
646 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
647 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
649 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
650 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
651 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
653 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
654 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
656 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
657 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
659 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
660 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
662 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
663 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
664 latest_features: InitFeatures,
665 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
666 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
667 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
668 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
669 /// user but which have not yet completed.
671 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
672 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
673 /// for a missing channel.
674 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
675 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
676 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
678 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
679 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
680 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
681 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
683 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
684 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
685 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
686 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
687 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
688 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
689 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
690 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
691 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
692 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
693 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
694 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
695 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
696 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
697 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
701 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
702 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
703 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
704 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
705 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
706 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
709 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
710 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
713 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
714 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
715 self.channel_by_id.len() +
716 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
717 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
720 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
721 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
722 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
723 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
724 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
728 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
729 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
731 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
734 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
735 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
736 struct PendingInboundPayment {
737 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
738 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
739 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
740 /// this payment being removed.
742 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
743 user_payment_id: u64,
744 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
745 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
746 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
749 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
750 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
751 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
752 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
753 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
754 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
755 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
756 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
758 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
759 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
767 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
769 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
770 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
771 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
776 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
777 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
778 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
779 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
780 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
781 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
782 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
783 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
784 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
786 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
787 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
796 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
798 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
799 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
800 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
805 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
806 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
807 $vis trait AChannelManager {
808 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
809 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
810 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
811 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
812 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
813 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
814 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
815 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
816 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
817 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
818 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
819 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
820 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
821 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
822 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
823 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
824 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
825 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
828 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
829 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
830 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
831 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
832 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
833 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
835 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
836 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
837 ES::Target: EntropySource,
838 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
839 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
840 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
844 type Watch = M::Target;
846 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
848 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
850 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
852 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
853 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
855 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
857 type Router = R::Target;
859 type Logger = L::Target;
861 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
864 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
865 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
867 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
868 /// to individual Channels.
870 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
871 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
872 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
873 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
875 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
876 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
877 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
878 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
879 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
880 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
881 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
883 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
884 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
885 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
887 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
888 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
889 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
890 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
891 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
893 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
894 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
895 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
896 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
898 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
899 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
900 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
902 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
903 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
904 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
905 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
906 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
908 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
909 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
910 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
911 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
912 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
913 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
914 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
915 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
918 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
919 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
920 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
921 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
922 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
926 // `total_consistency_lock`
928 // |__`forward_htlcs`
930 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
932 // |__`per_peer_state`
934 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
936 // | |__`claimable_payments`
938 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
944 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
946 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
950 // | |__`pending_events`
952 // | |__`pending_background_events`
954 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
956 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
957 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
958 ES::Target: EntropySource,
959 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
960 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
965 default_configuration: UserConfig,
966 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
967 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
973 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
975 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
977 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
978 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
980 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
981 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
982 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
983 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
985 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
986 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
988 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
989 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
990 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
991 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
992 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
993 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
994 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
995 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
997 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
999 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1000 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1002 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1004 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1005 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1006 /// and via the classic SCID.
1008 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1009 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1011 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1013 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1015 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1016 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1017 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1019 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1020 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1022 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1023 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1025 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1028 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1029 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1030 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1031 /// active channel list on load.
1033 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1034 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1036 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1038 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1039 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1040 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1042 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1043 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1044 /// the handling of the events.
1046 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1047 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1050 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1051 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1052 /// would break backwards compatability.
1053 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1054 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1055 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1057 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1058 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1060 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1062 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1063 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1064 /// confirmation depth.
1066 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1067 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1068 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1070 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1072 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1074 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1076 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1078 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1080 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1081 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1082 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1084 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1085 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1087 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1088 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1089 /// keeping additional state.
1090 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1092 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1093 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1094 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1095 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1097 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1098 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1100 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1101 /// are currently open with that peer.
1103 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1104 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1107 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1109 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1110 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1111 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1112 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1113 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1115 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1116 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1117 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1118 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1119 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1121 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1122 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1124 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1125 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1126 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1127 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1129 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1130 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1131 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1132 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1133 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1135 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1137 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1139 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1140 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1141 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1142 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1143 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1144 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1145 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1146 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1147 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1149 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1151 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1155 signer_provider: SP,
1160 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1162 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1163 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1164 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1165 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1166 pub struct ChainParameters {
1167 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1168 pub network: Network,
1170 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1172 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1173 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1176 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1183 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1184 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1185 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1186 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1187 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1188 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1190 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1191 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1192 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1193 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1194 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1196 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1197 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1200 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1201 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1202 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1203 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1205 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1206 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1207 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1208 _read_guard: read_guard,
1213 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1214 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1215 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1216 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1218 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1219 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1220 should_persist: persist_check,
1221 _read_guard: read_guard,
1226 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1227 fn drop(&mut self) {
1228 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1229 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1234 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1235 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1237 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1239 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1240 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1241 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1242 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1243 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1245 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1246 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1248 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1250 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1251 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1252 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1253 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1254 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1255 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1256 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1257 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1258 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1259 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1260 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1261 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1262 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1264 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1265 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1267 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1268 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1269 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1270 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1272 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1273 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1274 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1275 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1276 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1277 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1280 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1282 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1283 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1286 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1288 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1289 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1291 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1292 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1293 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1294 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1296 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1297 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1298 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1300 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1301 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1302 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1304 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1305 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1306 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1307 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1309 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1310 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1311 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1313 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1314 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1315 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1317 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1318 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1319 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1320 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1321 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1322 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1323 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1324 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1325 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1326 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1327 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1330 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1331 /// to better separate parameters.
1332 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1333 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1334 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1335 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1336 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1337 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1338 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1339 pub features: InitFeatures,
1340 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1341 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1342 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1344 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1346 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1347 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1348 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1349 /// payments to us through this channel.
1350 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1351 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1352 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1353 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1354 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1355 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1356 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1359 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1361 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1362 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1365 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1366 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1367 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1368 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1369 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1370 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1371 /// lifetime of the channel.
1372 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1373 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1374 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1375 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1376 /// our counterparty already.
1378 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1379 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1380 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1381 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1383 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1384 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1385 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1386 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1388 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1389 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1391 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1392 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1394 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1395 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1396 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1397 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1398 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1399 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1400 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1401 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1402 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1405 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1407 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1408 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1409 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1410 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1411 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1412 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1413 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1415 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1416 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1418 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1419 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1420 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1421 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1422 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1423 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1424 /// this value on chain.
1426 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1428 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1430 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1431 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1432 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1433 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1435 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1436 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1437 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1439 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1440 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1441 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1442 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1443 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1444 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1446 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1447 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1448 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1449 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1450 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1451 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1452 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1453 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1455 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1456 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1457 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1458 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1459 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1460 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1461 /// route which is valid.
1462 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1463 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1464 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1465 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1466 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1467 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1469 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1470 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1471 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1472 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1473 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1474 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1475 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1477 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1479 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1481 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1482 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1483 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1484 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1485 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1487 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1488 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1489 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1490 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1491 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1492 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1493 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1495 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1496 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1497 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1498 pub is_outbound: bool,
1499 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1500 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1501 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1502 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1503 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1505 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1506 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1507 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1508 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1509 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1510 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1511 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1513 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1514 pub is_usable: bool,
1515 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1516 pub is_public: bool,
1517 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1518 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1519 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1520 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1521 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1522 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1524 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1525 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1528 impl ChannelDetails {
1529 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1530 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1531 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1533 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1534 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1535 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1536 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1539 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1540 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1541 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1543 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1544 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1545 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1546 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1549 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, F: Deref>(
1550 context: &ChannelContext<Signer>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1551 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1553 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1555 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1556 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1557 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1559 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1560 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1561 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1562 features: latest_features,
1563 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1564 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1565 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1566 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1567 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1568 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1569 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1570 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1571 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1572 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1574 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1575 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1576 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1577 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1578 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1579 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1580 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1581 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1582 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1583 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1584 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1585 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1586 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1587 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1588 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1589 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1590 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1591 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1592 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1593 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1594 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1595 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1596 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1597 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1598 config: Some(context.config()),
1599 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1604 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1605 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1606 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1607 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1608 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1609 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1610 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1611 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1612 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1614 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1616 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1617 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1619 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1620 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1621 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1622 /// to drop the channel.
1626 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1627 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1628 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1629 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1630 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1632 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1634 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1635 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1636 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1639 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1640 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1641 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1643 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1644 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1645 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1647 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1648 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1649 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1651 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1652 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1656 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1658 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1660 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1661 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1662 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1663 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1665 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1666 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1667 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1670 macro_rules! handle_error {
1671 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1672 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1673 // entering the macro.
1674 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1675 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1679 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1680 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1682 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1683 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1684 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1685 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1689 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1690 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1691 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1692 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1693 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1694 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1699 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1700 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1702 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1703 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1704 action: err.action.clone()
1708 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1709 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1710 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1711 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1712 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1716 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1721 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1724 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1725 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1726 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1732 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1733 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1734 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1735 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1736 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1737 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1739 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1740 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1741 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1742 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1743 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1745 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1746 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1748 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1752 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1753 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1754 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1756 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1757 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1759 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1760 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1762 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1763 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1764 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1765 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1766 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1767 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok(), $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1771 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED) => {
1773 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when unfunded channels error.
1774 // In any case, just close the channel.
1775 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1776 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing unfunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1777 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1778 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1779 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1780 shutdown_res, None, $channel_context.get_value_satoshis()))
1786 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1787 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1791 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1793 $entry.remove_entry();
1801 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1802 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1806 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), UNFUNDED);
1808 $entry.remove_entry();
1816 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1817 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1821 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1823 $entry.remove_entry();
1831 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1832 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1834 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1835 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1841 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1842 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1843 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1844 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1845 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1847 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1848 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1849 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1850 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1851 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1852 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1853 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1854 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1855 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1856 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1861 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1862 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1863 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1864 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1865 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1866 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1867 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1868 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1869 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1871 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1876 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1877 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1878 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1879 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1880 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1881 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1882 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1883 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1884 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1886 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1891 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1892 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1893 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1894 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1895 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1896 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1897 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1898 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1899 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1900 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1901 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1903 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1904 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1905 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1911 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1912 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1914 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1915 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1916 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1917 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1918 updates.announcement_sigs);
1919 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1920 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1923 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1924 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1925 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1927 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1929 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1930 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1932 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1933 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1934 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1935 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1940 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1941 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1942 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1943 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1944 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1945 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1947 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1948 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1949 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1952 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1953 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1954 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1955 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1956 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1957 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1958 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1959 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
1963 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1969 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1970 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1971 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1972 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1974 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1975 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1977 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1978 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1979 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1980 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1981 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1982 // filter for uniqueness here.
1983 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1984 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1985 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1986 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1988 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1989 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1990 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1992 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1993 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1994 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1998 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1999 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
2003 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2004 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2005 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2006 while !processed_all_events {
2007 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2011 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2014 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2015 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2016 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2018 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2019 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2020 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2022 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2023 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2024 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2025 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2029 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2030 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2031 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2032 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2035 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2037 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2038 $event_to_handle = event;
2040 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2041 post_event_actions.push(action);
2046 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2047 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2048 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2049 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2050 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2051 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2054 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2055 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2056 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2057 processed_all_events = false;
2060 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2061 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2067 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2069 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2070 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2071 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2072 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2073 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2078 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2080 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2082 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2083 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2085 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2087 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2088 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2089 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2092 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2093 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2094 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2096 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2097 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2098 current_timestamp: u32,
2100 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2101 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2102 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2103 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2105 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2106 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2107 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2112 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2114 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2115 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2116 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2117 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2118 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2119 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2120 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2121 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2123 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2126 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2127 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2129 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2131 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2133 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2135 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2136 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2137 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2138 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2139 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2140 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2150 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2151 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2152 &self.default_configuration
2155 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2156 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2157 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2160 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2161 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2163 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2165 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2169 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2174 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2176 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2177 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2178 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2179 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2180 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2182 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2183 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2185 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2186 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2187 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2189 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2190 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2191 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2193 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2194 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2195 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2196 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2197 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2198 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2200 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2201 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2202 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2203 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2204 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2209 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2210 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2214 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2215 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2217 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2219 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2220 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2221 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2222 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2223 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2224 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2228 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2233 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2235 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2236 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2239 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2241 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2247 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2248 node_id: their_network_key,
2251 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2254 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2255 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2256 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2257 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2258 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2259 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2260 // the same channel.
2261 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2263 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2265 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2268 // Only `Channels` in the channel_by_id map can be considered funded.
2269 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2270 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2271 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2279 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2280 /// more information.
2281 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2282 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2283 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2284 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2285 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2286 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2287 // the same channel.
2288 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2290 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2291 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2292 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2293 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2294 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2295 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2296 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2297 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2300 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2301 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2302 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2305 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2306 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2307 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2315 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2316 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2318 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2319 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2321 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2322 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2323 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2324 // really wanted anyway.
2325 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2328 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2329 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2330 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2333 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2336 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2337 let chan_context_to_details = |context| {
2338 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2340 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2342 .map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context)
2343 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2344 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2345 .map(chan_context_to_details)
2351 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2352 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2354 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2355 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2356 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2358 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2359 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2360 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2361 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2362 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2363 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2364 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2365 total_msat: *total_msat,
2368 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2369 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2371 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2372 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2374 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2379 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2380 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2381 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2382 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2383 Some(transaction) => {
2384 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2385 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2390 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2391 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2392 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2393 reason: closure_reason,
2394 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2395 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2399 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2400 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2402 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2403 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2408 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2410 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2411 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2413 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2415 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2416 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2417 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2418 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2419 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2421 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2422 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2423 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2424 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2425 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2429 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2430 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2431 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2432 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2435 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2436 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2437 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2438 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2442 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2446 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2449 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2450 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2452 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2453 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2454 // TODO(dunxen): This is still not ideal as we're doing some extra lookups.
2455 // Fix this with https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
2458 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2459 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2460 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2461 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2464 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2468 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2469 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2470 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2472 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2473 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2475 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2476 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2477 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2478 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2480 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2482 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2483 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2484 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2487 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2488 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2489 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2490 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2491 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2492 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2495 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2496 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2497 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2499 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2500 /// the channel being closed or not:
2501 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2502 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2503 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2504 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2505 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2506 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2507 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2509 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2510 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2511 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2512 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2514 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2516 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2517 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2518 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2521 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2522 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2523 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2524 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2525 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2526 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2530 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2531 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2532 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2533 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2534 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2535 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2536 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2537 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2539 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2540 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2541 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2542 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2543 // ignore the result here.
2544 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2548 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2549 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2550 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2551 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2552 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2553 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2554 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2555 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2556 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2557 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2558 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2559 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2561 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2563 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2564 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2565 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2566 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2567 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2568 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2569 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2570 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2571 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2572 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2573 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2574 // Unfunded channel has no update
2575 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2576 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2577 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2578 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2579 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2580 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2581 // Unfunded channel has no update
2582 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2584 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2587 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2588 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2589 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2594 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2597 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2599 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2600 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2602 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2603 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2604 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2605 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2606 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2607 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2608 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2619 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2620 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2621 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2623 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2624 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2625 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2628 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2629 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2630 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2632 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2633 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2634 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2635 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2636 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2639 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2640 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2641 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2642 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2643 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2647 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2648 /// local transaction(s).
2649 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2650 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2651 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2655 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2656 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2657 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2658 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2659 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2660 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2661 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2663 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2664 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2668 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2669 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2670 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2671 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2672 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2673 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2674 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2675 err_data: Vec::new(),
2679 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2680 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2681 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2684 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2685 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2686 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2687 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2688 outgoing_cltv_value,
2689 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2693 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2694 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2695 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2696 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2697 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2698 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2699 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2700 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2702 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2704 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2705 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2706 err_data: Vec::new(),
2707 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2710 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2711 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2712 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2713 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2715 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2718 // final_expiry_too_soon
2719 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2720 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2722 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2723 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2724 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2725 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2726 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2727 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2728 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2729 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2730 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2731 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2732 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2735 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2736 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2737 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2739 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2741 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2742 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2746 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2747 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2748 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2749 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2750 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2751 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2752 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2753 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2754 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2755 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2756 err_data: Vec::new(),
2757 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2760 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2761 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2762 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2763 err_data: Vec::new(),
2764 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2767 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2771 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2774 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2775 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2778 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2779 phantom_shared_secret,
2783 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2784 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2785 err_data: Vec::new(),
2786 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2789 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2792 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2793 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2794 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2795 outgoing_cltv_value,
2796 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2800 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2801 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2802 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2803 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2804 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2806 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2807 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2808 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2809 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2810 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2811 failure_code: $err_code,
2817 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2818 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2821 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2822 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2823 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2825 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2826 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2827 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2828 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2829 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2830 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2831 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2832 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2834 macro_rules! return_err {
2835 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2837 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2838 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2839 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2840 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2841 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2842 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2848 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2850 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2851 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2853 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2854 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2857 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2858 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2859 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
2860 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
2863 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2864 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2865 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2867 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2868 // inbound channel's state.
2869 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2870 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
2871 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2875 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2876 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2877 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2878 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2879 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2880 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2881 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2882 // phantom or an intercept.
2883 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2884 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2885 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2889 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2892 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2894 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2896 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2897 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2898 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2902 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2904 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2905 // have no consistency guarantees.
2906 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2910 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2911 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2912 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2913 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2914 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2916 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2917 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2918 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2919 // we don't have the channel here.
2920 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2922 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2924 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2925 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2926 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2927 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2928 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2929 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2930 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2931 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2932 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2933 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2934 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2936 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2939 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2940 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2942 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2943 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2947 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2948 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2949 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2950 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2952 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2959 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2960 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2961 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2962 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2963 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2964 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2966 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2967 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2969 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2970 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2971 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2972 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2973 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2974 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2975 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2976 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2977 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2978 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2984 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2985 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2986 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2987 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2989 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2990 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2992 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2993 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2994 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2996 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2997 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2998 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2999 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3000 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3001 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3002 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3006 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3008 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3011 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3012 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3013 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3014 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3015 macro_rules! return_err {
3016 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3018 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3019 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3020 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3021 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3022 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3023 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3029 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3031 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3032 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3035 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3036 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3037 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3038 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3039 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3041 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3044 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3045 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3046 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3047 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3048 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3054 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3055 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3056 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3058 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3059 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3060 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3062 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3063 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3064 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3065 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3066 return Err(LightningError {
3067 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3068 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3071 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3072 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3075 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3078 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3079 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3080 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3081 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3083 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3084 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3085 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3087 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3088 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3089 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3091 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3092 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3096 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3099 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3100 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3101 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3103 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3104 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3105 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3106 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3107 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3110 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3111 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3113 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3114 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3115 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3116 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3117 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3118 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3119 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3120 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3122 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3123 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3124 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3126 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3128 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3135 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3136 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3137 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3138 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3143 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3144 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3145 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3148 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3149 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3151 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3152 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3153 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3155 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3156 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3157 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3159 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3160 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3162 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3163 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3164 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3165 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3169 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3170 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3173 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3174 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3175 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3177 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3178 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3179 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3181 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3182 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3184 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3185 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3186 Some(monitor_update) => {
3187 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3188 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3190 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3191 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3192 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3193 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3194 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3195 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3196 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3204 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3205 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3206 // `channel_by_id` map.
3207 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3208 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3213 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3214 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3216 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3221 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3223 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3224 /// fields for more info.
3226 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3227 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3229 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3231 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3232 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3233 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3234 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3235 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3237 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3238 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3239 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3240 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3241 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3243 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3244 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3245 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3246 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3248 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3250 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3251 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3252 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3254 /// In general, a path may raise:
3255 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3256 /// node public key) is specified.
3257 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3258 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3260 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3261 /// relevant updates.
3263 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3264 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3265 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3267 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3268 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3269 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3270 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3271 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3272 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3273 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3274 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3276 self.pending_outbound_payments
3277 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3278 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3279 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3282 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3283 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3284 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3285 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3286 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3287 self.pending_outbound_payments
3288 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3289 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3290 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3291 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3295 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3296 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3297 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3298 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3299 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3300 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3304 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3305 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3306 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3310 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3311 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3315 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3316 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3317 /// retries are exhausted.
3319 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3320 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3322 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3323 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3324 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3326 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3327 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3329 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3330 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3331 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3332 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3333 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3336 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3337 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3338 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3339 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3340 /// never reach the recipient.
3342 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3343 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3345 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3346 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3348 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3349 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3350 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3351 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3352 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3353 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3354 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3357 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3358 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3360 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3363 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3364 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3365 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3366 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3367 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3368 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3369 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3370 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3373 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3374 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3375 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3376 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3377 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3378 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3379 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3380 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3381 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3384 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3387 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3388 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3391 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3392 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3393 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3394 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3395 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3396 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3397 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3398 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3400 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3401 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3402 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3404 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3406 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3407 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3408 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3409 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3410 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3411 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3412 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3413 } else { unreachable!(); });
3415 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3416 Err((chan, err)) => {
3417 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3418 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3420 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3421 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3422 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3428 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3430 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3431 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3436 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3437 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3440 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3441 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3442 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3445 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3446 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3447 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3456 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3457 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3458 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3462 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3464 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3465 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3467 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3468 /// across the p2p network.
3470 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3471 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3473 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3474 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3475 /// keys per-channel).
3477 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3478 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3479 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3481 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3482 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3483 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3485 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3486 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3487 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3488 /// for more details.
3490 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3491 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3492 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3493 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3495 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3496 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3497 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3498 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3503 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3504 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3505 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3506 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3507 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3508 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3509 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3510 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3514 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3515 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3516 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3517 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3521 let mut output_index = None;
3522 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3523 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3524 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3525 if output_index.is_some() {
3526 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3527 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3530 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3533 if output_index.is_none() {
3534 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3535 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3538 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3542 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3544 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3545 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3546 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3547 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3549 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3550 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3552 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3553 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3555 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3557 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3558 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3559 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3560 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3561 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3562 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3563 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3564 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3565 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3566 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3567 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3568 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3569 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3576 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3578 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3579 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3580 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3581 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3582 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3586 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3587 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3588 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3589 config.apply(config_update);
3590 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3593 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3594 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3595 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3596 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3597 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3604 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3605 &mut channel.context
3606 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3607 &mut channel.context
3609 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3610 debug_assert!(false);
3611 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3613 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3614 log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3617 let mut config = context.config();
3618 config.apply(config_update);
3619 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3620 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3621 context.update_config(&config);
3626 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3628 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3629 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3630 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3631 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3633 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3634 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3636 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3637 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3639 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3641 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3642 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3643 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3644 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3645 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3646 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3647 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3648 pub fn update_channel_config(
3649 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3650 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3651 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3654 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3655 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3657 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3658 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3660 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3661 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3662 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3663 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3664 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3666 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3667 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3668 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3671 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3674 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3675 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3676 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3677 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3678 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3679 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3682 let next_hop_scid = {
3683 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3684 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3685 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3686 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3687 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3688 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3690 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3691 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3692 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3695 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3697 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3698 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3699 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3704 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3705 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3706 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3709 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3710 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3711 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3713 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3715 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3716 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3717 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3718 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3719 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3722 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3723 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3724 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3725 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3726 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3728 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3732 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3733 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3735 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3738 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3739 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3740 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3742 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3744 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3747 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3748 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3749 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3750 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3751 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3752 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3753 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3756 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3757 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3759 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3764 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3766 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3767 /// Will likely generate further events.
3768 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3771 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3772 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3773 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3775 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3776 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3778 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3779 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3780 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3782 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3783 match forward_info {
3784 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3785 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3786 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3787 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3788 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3791 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3792 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3793 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3795 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3796 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3797 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3798 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3799 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3800 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3803 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3804 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3806 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3809 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3810 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3816 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3817 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3819 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3823 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3824 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3826 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3830 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3831 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3832 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3833 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3834 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3836 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3837 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3838 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3839 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3840 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3842 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3844 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3845 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3849 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3850 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3851 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3852 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3854 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3855 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3861 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3864 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3867 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3868 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3869 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3870 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3871 // problem, not ours.
3877 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3878 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3880 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3884 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3885 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3886 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3887 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3890 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3891 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3892 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3894 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3897 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3898 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3899 match forward_info {
3900 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3901 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3902 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3903 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3904 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3908 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3909 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3910 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3911 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3912 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3913 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3914 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3916 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3917 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3918 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
3921 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3922 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3924 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3926 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3927 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3928 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3929 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3934 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3935 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3937 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3938 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3939 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3940 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3942 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3945 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3947 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3948 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3949 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3958 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3959 match forward_info {
3960 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3961 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3962 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3963 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3964 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3967 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3968 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
3969 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3970 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
3971 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
3972 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3973 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3975 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
3976 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3977 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3981 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3982 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3985 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3988 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3989 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3990 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3991 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3992 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3993 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3994 phantom_shared_secret,
3996 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3997 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3998 // if routing nodes overpay
3999 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4000 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4002 total_value_received: None,
4003 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4006 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4009 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4011 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4012 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4013 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4014 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4015 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4016 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4018 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4019 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4020 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4021 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4022 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4023 phantom_shared_secret,
4025 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4026 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4028 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4031 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4032 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4033 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4034 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4035 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4038 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4039 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4040 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4041 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4042 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4043 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4045 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4046 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4047 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4049 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4050 .entry(payment_hash)
4051 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4052 .or_insert_with(|| {
4053 committed_to_claimable = true;
4055 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4058 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4059 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4061 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4063 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4065 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4067 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4068 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4069 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4072 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4074 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4075 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4076 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4077 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4078 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4079 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4080 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4082 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4083 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4085 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4087 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4088 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4089 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4090 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4091 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4092 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4093 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4094 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4095 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4096 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4097 committed_to_claimable = true;
4099 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4100 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4101 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4102 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4103 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4104 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4105 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4106 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4107 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4108 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4112 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4113 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4114 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4115 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4116 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4118 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4120 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4121 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4123 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4124 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4125 committed_to_claimable = true;
4128 payment_claimable_generated
4132 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4133 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4134 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4135 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4136 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4137 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4138 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4139 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4141 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4142 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4143 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4144 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4145 Ok(result) => result,
4147 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4148 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4151 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4152 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4153 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4154 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4155 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4156 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4159 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4160 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4161 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4163 check_total_value!(purpose);
4165 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4166 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4167 check_total_value!(purpose);
4171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4172 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4173 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4174 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4176 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4177 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4179 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4180 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4182 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4183 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4185 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4186 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4187 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4189 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4190 if payment_claimable_generated {
4191 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4197 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4198 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4206 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4207 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4208 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4209 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4211 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4212 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4214 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4216 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4217 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4218 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4220 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4222 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4223 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4224 events.append(&mut new_events);
4227 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4229 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4230 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4231 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4233 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4235 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4236 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4237 if background_events.is_empty() {
4238 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4241 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4243 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4244 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4245 // monitor updating completing.
4246 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4248 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4249 let mut updated_chan = false;
4251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4252 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4255 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4256 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4257 updated_chan = true;
4258 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4259 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4266 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4267 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4269 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4270 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4271 // however, ensure that.
4273 log_error!(self.logger,
4274 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4276 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4278 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4279 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4280 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4281 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4282 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4283 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4284 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4286 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4287 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4288 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4289 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4290 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4296 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4299 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4300 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4301 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4302 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4303 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4306 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4307 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4308 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4309 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4311 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4312 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4314 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4315 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4316 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4317 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4319 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4320 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4322 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4323 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4327 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4328 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4329 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4330 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4331 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4332 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4333 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4335 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4336 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4338 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4339 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4342 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4343 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4348 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4349 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4357 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4359 /// This currently includes:
4360 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4361 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4362 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4364 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4365 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4366 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4367 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4369 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4370 /// estimate fetches.
4372 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4373 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4374 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4375 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4376 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4378 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4379 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4381 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4382 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4383 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4386 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4389 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4390 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4391 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4392 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4397 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4398 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4400 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4401 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4402 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4403 if needs_close { return false; }
4406 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4407 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4408 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4409 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4410 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4411 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4412 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4413 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4415 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4416 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4417 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4422 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4424 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4427 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4429 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4430 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4431 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4432 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4436 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4438 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4444 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4446 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4447 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4448 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4449 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4450 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4451 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4452 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4453 channel_id: *chan_id,
4454 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4463 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4465 chan_context: &mut ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
4466 unfunded_chan_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4467 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4469 chan_context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4470 if unfunded_chan_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4471 log_error!(self.logger,
4472 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner",
4473 log_bytes!(&chan_id[..]));
4474 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan_context);
4475 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4476 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_context.force_shutdown(false));
4477 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4478 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4479 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4480 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4481 channel_id: *chan_id,
4482 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4491 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4492 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4493 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4494 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events));
4496 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4497 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4502 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4503 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4504 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4505 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4506 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4507 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4508 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4509 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4510 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4511 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4512 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4514 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4515 // have no channels to the peer.
4516 let remove_entry = {
4517 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4518 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4521 entry.remove_entry();
4524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4529 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4530 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4531 // This should be unreachable
4532 debug_assert!(false);
4535 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4536 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4537 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4538 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4539 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4540 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4541 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4544 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4545 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4546 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4548 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4549 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4556 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4557 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4558 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4559 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4560 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4563 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4564 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4567 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4569 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4570 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4571 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4572 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4573 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4580 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4581 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4582 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4584 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4585 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4586 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4587 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4589 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4590 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4591 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4592 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4593 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4597 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4598 /// reason for the failure.
4600 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4601 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4604 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4605 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4606 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4607 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4608 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4609 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4610 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4615 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4616 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4617 match failure_code {
4618 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4619 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4620 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4621 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4622 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4623 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4625 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4626 let fail_data = match data {
4627 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4630 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4635 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4636 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4638 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4640 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4641 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4642 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4643 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4644 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4645 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4646 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4648 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4650 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4651 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4653 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4658 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4659 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4660 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4661 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4662 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4663 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4664 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4665 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4666 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4667 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4669 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4670 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4671 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4672 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4674 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4675 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4676 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4677 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4678 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4682 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4683 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4684 // be surfaced to the user.
4685 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4686 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4687 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4689 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4690 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4691 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4692 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4693 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4694 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4695 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4696 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4700 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4703 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4704 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4705 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4710 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4711 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4712 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4713 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4714 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4715 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4716 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4717 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4718 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4721 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4722 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4723 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4726 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4727 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4728 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4730 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4731 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4732 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4733 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4734 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4736 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4738 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4740 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4741 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4742 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4743 push_forward_ev = true;
4745 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4747 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4749 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4750 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4753 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4754 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4755 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4756 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4757 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4758 failed_next_destination: destination,
4764 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4765 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4767 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4768 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4769 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4770 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4772 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4773 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4774 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4775 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4777 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
4778 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
4779 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
4781 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4782 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4783 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4784 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4785 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4786 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4787 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
4788 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4789 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
4792 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
4793 /// even type numbers.
4797 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
4798 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
4800 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4801 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4802 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
4805 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
4806 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4811 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4812 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4813 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4814 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4815 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4816 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4817 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4818 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4823 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4824 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4825 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4827 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4828 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4829 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4830 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4833 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
4834 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
4835 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
4836 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
4837 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4838 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
4839 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4840 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
4841 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4842 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4852 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4854 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4855 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4856 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4857 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4858 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4859 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4860 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4861 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4862 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4864 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4865 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4866 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4867 debug_assert!(false);
4871 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4873 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4874 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4875 debug_assert!(false);
4879 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4880 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4882 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4883 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4884 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4885 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4888 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4889 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4890 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4891 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4895 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4896 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4897 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4898 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4900 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4901 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4902 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4903 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4904 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4909 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4910 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4911 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4912 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4913 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4914 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4915 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4917 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4920 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4921 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4922 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4923 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4927 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4928 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4929 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4930 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4932 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
4933 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
4934 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
4935 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4938 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4939 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4940 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4941 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4945 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4946 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4947 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4950 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4951 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4952 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4953 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4954 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4955 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4957 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4958 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4959 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4960 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4961 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4964 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4965 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4966 if let Err(e) = res {
4967 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4968 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4969 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4970 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4971 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4974 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
4975 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
4976 // monitor update as a background event.
4977 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
4978 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
4979 counterparty_node_id,
4980 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
4981 update: monitor_update.clone(),
4989 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4990 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4991 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4997 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4998 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4999 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5000 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5001 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5002 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5003 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5004 // again on restart.
5005 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5006 payment_preimage, update_res);
5009 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5010 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5012 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5013 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5014 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5015 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5016 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5017 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5018 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5019 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5020 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5021 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5024 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5025 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5026 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5027 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5028 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5029 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5033 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5034 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5037 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
5039 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5040 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5041 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5042 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5044 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5045 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5046 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5047 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5048 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5049 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5050 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5053 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5054 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5056 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5057 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5058 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5059 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5061 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5065 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5066 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5067 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5073 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5074 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5075 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5078 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5079 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5081 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5082 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5083 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
5084 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5085 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5089 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5090 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5092 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5093 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5094 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5101 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5102 /// update completion.
5103 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5104 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5105 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5106 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5107 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5108 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5109 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5110 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
5111 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5112 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5113 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5114 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5115 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5117 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5119 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5120 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5121 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5122 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5125 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5126 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5128 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5129 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5130 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5135 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5136 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5137 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5138 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5143 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5144 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5145 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5146 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5147 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5152 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5156 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5162 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5163 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5164 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5168 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5169 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5170 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5176 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5177 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5179 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5180 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5182 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5183 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5184 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5185 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5186 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5192 let mut peer_state_lock;
5193 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5194 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5195 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5196 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5198 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5201 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5202 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5203 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5204 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5205 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5208 let remaining_in_flight =
5209 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5210 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5213 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5214 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5215 remaining_in_flight);
5216 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5219 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5222 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5224 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5225 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5228 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5229 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5230 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5232 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5233 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5234 /// used to accept such channels.
5236 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5237 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5238 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5239 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5242 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5243 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5245 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5246 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5247 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5249 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5250 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5252 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5253 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5255 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5256 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5258 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5259 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5260 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5261 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5264 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5265 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5267 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5268 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5269 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5270 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5271 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5272 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5273 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5274 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5275 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5276 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5277 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5278 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5281 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5282 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5283 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5284 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5289 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5290 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5293 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5294 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5295 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5296 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5297 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5298 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5299 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5300 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5303 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5304 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5305 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5309 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5310 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5311 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5315 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5321 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5322 /// or 0-conf channels.
5324 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5325 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5326 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5327 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5328 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5329 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5331 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5332 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5333 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5334 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5335 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5336 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5337 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5341 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5344 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5345 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5347 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5348 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5349 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5350 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5351 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5352 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5354 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5357 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5358 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5359 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5362 num_unfunded_channels
5365 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5366 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5367 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5370 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5371 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5374 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5375 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5376 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5377 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5379 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5380 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5381 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5382 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5383 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5386 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5388 debug_assert!(false);
5389 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5391 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5392 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5394 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5395 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5396 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5397 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5398 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5399 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5401 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5402 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5403 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5406 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5407 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5409 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5410 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5413 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5414 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5415 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5418 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5419 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5423 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5424 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5426 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5427 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5429 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5430 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5431 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5432 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5434 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5437 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5438 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5439 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5442 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5443 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5444 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5445 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5446 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5447 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5448 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5451 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5456 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5457 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5459 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5461 debug_assert!(false);
5462 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5466 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5467 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5468 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5469 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5471 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5475 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5476 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5477 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5478 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5480 user_channel_id: user_id,
5485 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5486 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5489 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5491 debug_assert!(false);
5492 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5495 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5496 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5497 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5498 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5499 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5500 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5502 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5503 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5504 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5505 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5506 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5507 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5508 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5509 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5510 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5514 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5517 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5518 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5519 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5521 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5522 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5524 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5525 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5526 funding_msg.channel_id))
5528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5529 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5533 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5534 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5535 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5536 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5537 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5538 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5539 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5543 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5545 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5546 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5547 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5548 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5550 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5551 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5552 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5553 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5554 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5555 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5556 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5557 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5565 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5566 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5567 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5568 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5570 debug_assert!(false);
5571 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5574 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5575 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5576 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5578 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5579 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5580 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5581 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5582 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5583 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5584 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5585 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5586 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5587 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5596 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5597 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5598 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5600 debug_assert!(false);
5601 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5603 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5604 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5605 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5607 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5608 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5609 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5610 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5611 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5612 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5613 msg: announcement_sigs,
5615 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5616 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5617 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5618 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5619 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5620 // announcement_signatures.
5621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5622 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5623 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5624 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5631 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5632 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5641 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5642 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5643 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5645 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5647 debug_assert!(false);
5648 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5650 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5651 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5652 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5653 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5654 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5655 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5656 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5657 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5658 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5660 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5661 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", log_bytes!(&msg.channel_id[..]));
5662 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5663 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5664 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5666 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5667 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5668 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5669 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5670 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5673 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5674 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5675 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5676 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5678 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5679 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5680 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5681 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5682 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5683 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5688 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5689 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5690 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5691 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5695 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5698 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5699 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5700 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5707 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5708 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5709 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5711 debug_assert!(false);
5712 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5714 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5717 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5719 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5720 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5721 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5722 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5727 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5728 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5729 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5730 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5731 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5732 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5733 } else { (tx, None) }
5735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5738 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5739 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5740 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5742 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5743 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5746 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5750 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5755 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5756 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5757 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5758 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5760 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5761 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5762 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5763 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5765 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5766 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5767 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5769 debug_assert!(false);
5770 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5774 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5775 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5777 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5778 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5779 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5780 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5781 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5783 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5784 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5785 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5786 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5787 match pending_forward_info {
5788 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5789 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5790 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5791 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5793 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5794 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5795 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5796 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5797 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5800 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5802 _ => pending_forward_info
5805 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
5807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5812 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5813 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5815 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5817 debug_assert!(false);
5818 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5820 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5821 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5822 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5824 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5829 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5833 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5835 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5837 debug_assert!(false);
5838 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5840 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5841 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5842 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5843 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5846 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5851 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5853 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5855 debug_assert!(false);
5856 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5858 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5859 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5860 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5861 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5862 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5863 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5864 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5866 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5873 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5875 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5877 debug_assert!(false);
5878 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5882 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5883 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5884 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5885 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5886 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5887 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5888 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5891 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5896 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5897 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5898 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5899 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5900 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5901 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5902 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5903 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5904 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5905 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5906 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5908 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5909 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5911 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5912 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5913 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5914 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5915 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5916 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5918 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5919 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5920 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5922 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5923 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5924 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5926 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5927 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5928 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5929 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5930 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5933 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5934 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5937 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5938 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5939 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5940 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5941 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5942 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5943 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5946 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5947 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5948 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5953 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5954 // payments are being processed.
5955 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5956 push_forward_event = true;
5958 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5959 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5966 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5967 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5970 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5971 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5972 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5974 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5978 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5979 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5980 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5981 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
5982 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
5984 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
5985 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
5986 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
5987 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
5988 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
5989 // real by taking more time.
5990 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
5991 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5992 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5997 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5998 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
5999 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6000 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6001 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6002 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6003 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6005 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6006 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6007 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6008 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6009 channel_funding_outpoint,
6010 counterparty_node_id,
6015 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6016 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6017 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6018 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6020 debug_assert!(false);
6021 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6022 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6023 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6024 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6026 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
6027 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan);
6028 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6029 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6030 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
6032 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6037 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6041 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6042 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6043 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6045 debug_assert!(false);
6046 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6048 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6049 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6050 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6052 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
6054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6059 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6061 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6063 debug_assert!(false);
6064 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6068 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6070 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6071 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6074 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6075 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
6076 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6077 msg, &self.default_configuration
6079 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6080 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6081 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
6084 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6089 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6090 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6091 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6092 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6094 // It's not a local channel
6095 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6098 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6099 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6100 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6101 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6105 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6107 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6108 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
6109 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6110 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6111 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6112 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6116 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6117 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6118 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6119 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6121 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
6122 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
6125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6127 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6130 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6132 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6135 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6137 debug_assert!(false);
6138 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6142 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6143 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
6144 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6145 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6146 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6147 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6148 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
6149 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6150 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
6151 let mut channel_update = None;
6152 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6153 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6154 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6157 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
6158 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6159 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6160 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6161 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
6162 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6163 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6168 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6169 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6170 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6171 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6172 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6173 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6181 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6182 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6185 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6186 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6191 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6192 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6193 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6195 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6196 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6197 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6198 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6199 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6200 match monitor_event {
6201 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6202 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
6204 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
6206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
6207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6208 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6209 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6212 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6213 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6214 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6215 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6217 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6218 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6219 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6220 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6223 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6225 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6226 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6227 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6228 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6229 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6230 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
6231 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6232 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6233 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6237 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6238 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6240 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6242 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6243 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6244 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6246 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6253 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6254 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6260 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6261 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6264 has_pending_monitor_events
6267 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6268 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6269 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6271 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6272 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6273 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6276 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6277 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6278 /// update was applied.
6279 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6280 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6281 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6282 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6284 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6285 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6286 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6287 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6289 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6290 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6292 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6293 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6294 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6295 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6296 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6297 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6298 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6299 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6300 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6302 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6303 has_monitor_update = true;
6305 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6306 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6307 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6308 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6310 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6312 continue 'peer_loop;
6321 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6322 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6323 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6326 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6327 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6333 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6334 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6335 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6336 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6337 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6338 let mut has_update = false;
6340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6342 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6343 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6345 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6346 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6347 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6348 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6349 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6351 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6352 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6355 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6356 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6357 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6358 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6359 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6364 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6366 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6367 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6368 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6374 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6375 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6383 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6384 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6390 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6391 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6393 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6394 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6395 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6396 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6397 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6398 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6399 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6400 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6401 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6402 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6403 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6404 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6405 assert!(should_broadcast);
6406 } else { unreachable!(); }
6407 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6408 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6409 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6412 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6416 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6419 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6420 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6422 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6423 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6424 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6425 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6427 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6429 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6430 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6434 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6435 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6437 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6439 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6440 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6442 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6443 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6444 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6445 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6446 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6447 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6448 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6449 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6450 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6451 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6452 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6455 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6456 /// stored external to LDK.
6458 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6459 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6460 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6462 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6463 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6466 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6467 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6468 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6469 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6471 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6472 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6473 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6474 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6475 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6477 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6478 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6479 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6480 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6481 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6483 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6484 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6486 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6487 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6491 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6492 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6494 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6496 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6497 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6499 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6500 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6501 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6502 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6503 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6504 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6505 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6508 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6509 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6511 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6512 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6513 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6516 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6517 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6519 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6520 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6521 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6522 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6524 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6525 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6526 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6527 Some(_) => continue,
6528 None => return scid_candidate
6533 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6535 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6536 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6538 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6539 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6540 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6544 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6545 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6546 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6548 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6549 /// times to get a unique scid.
6550 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6551 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6552 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6554 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6555 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6556 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6557 return scid_candidate
6561 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6562 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6563 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6564 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6567 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6568 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6569 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6570 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6571 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6572 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6573 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6582 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6583 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6584 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6585 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6586 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6590 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6591 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6592 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6593 events.push_back((event, None));
6597 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6598 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6599 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6603 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6604 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6608 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6609 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6612 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6613 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6614 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6615 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6616 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6617 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6619 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6620 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6621 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6622 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6624 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6625 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6626 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6627 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6629 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6633 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6634 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6635 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6636 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6637 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6638 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6639 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6643 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6644 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6645 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6646 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6647 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6648 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6649 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6651 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6653 if further_update_exists {
6654 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6660 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6664 log_debug!(self.logger,
6665 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6666 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6670 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6671 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6672 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6676 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6677 for action in actions {
6679 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6680 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6682 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6688 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6689 /// using the given event handler.
6691 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6692 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6696 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6700 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6702 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6703 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6704 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6705 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6706 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6707 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6711 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6712 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6713 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6714 /// is always placed next to each other.
6716 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6717 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6718 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6719 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6721 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6722 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6723 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6724 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6725 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6726 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6727 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6729 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6730 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6731 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6732 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6735 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6736 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6738 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6739 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6742 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6745 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6747 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6748 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6752 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6753 events.replace(pending_events);
6762 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6764 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6765 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6766 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6767 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6768 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6769 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6773 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6775 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6776 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6777 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6779 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6783 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6785 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6786 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6787 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6788 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6789 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6790 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6794 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6796 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6797 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6798 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6799 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6800 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6803 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6804 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6807 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6809 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6810 let new_height = height - 1;
6812 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6813 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6814 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6815 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6816 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6817 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6820 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6824 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6826 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6827 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6828 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6829 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6830 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6831 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6835 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6836 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6837 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6838 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6840 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6841 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6843 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6844 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6845 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6846 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6848 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6849 if height < last_best_block_height {
6850 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6851 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6855 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6856 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6857 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6858 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6860 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6861 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6864 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6865 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6867 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6869 macro_rules! max_time {
6870 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6872 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6873 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6874 // having an explicit local time source.
6875 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6876 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6877 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6878 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6879 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6885 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6886 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6887 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6888 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6892 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6893 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6894 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6895 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6896 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6897 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6898 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6899 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6906 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6908 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6909 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6910 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6911 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6912 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6913 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6914 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6919 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6921 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6922 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6923 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6924 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6925 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6930 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6931 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6933 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6934 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6935 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6936 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6937 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6939 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6940 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6943 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6946 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6947 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6948 let res = f(channel);
6949 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6950 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6951 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6952 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6953 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6955 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6956 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6957 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6958 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6959 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6960 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6961 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6966 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6971 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6972 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6975 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6976 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6977 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6978 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6979 msg: announcement_sigs,
6981 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6982 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6985 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6986 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6987 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6992 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6993 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6994 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6995 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6996 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6997 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6998 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6999 // is always consistent.
7000 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7001 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7002 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7003 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7004 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7007 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7008 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7009 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7010 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7011 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7012 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7013 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7017 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7018 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7019 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7020 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7021 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7022 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7023 data: reason_message,
7033 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7034 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7035 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7036 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7037 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7038 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7039 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7040 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7041 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7042 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7044 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7045 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7046 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7050 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7053 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7054 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7055 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7056 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7057 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7058 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7059 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7060 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7061 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7064 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7065 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7066 _ => unreachable!(),
7068 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7069 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7070 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7071 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7077 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7079 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7080 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7084 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7086 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7087 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7089 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7090 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7093 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7094 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7095 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7098 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7099 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7100 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7101 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7104 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7105 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7106 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7107 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7110 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7111 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7113 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7114 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7115 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7116 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7117 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7120 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7121 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7122 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7123 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7126 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7127 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7128 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7129 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7132 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7133 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7134 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7135 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7139 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7140 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7142 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7143 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7144 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7145 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7146 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7147 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7151 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7156 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7157 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7158 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7159 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7162 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7163 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7167 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7168 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7169 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7170 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7173 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7174 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7175 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7178 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7180 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7183 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7188 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7190 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7193 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7198 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7203 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7205 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7208 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7209 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7210 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7213 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7218 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7219 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7220 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7223 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7224 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7225 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7228 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7229 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7230 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7233 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7234 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7235 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7238 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7239 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7240 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7241 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7242 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7244 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7249 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7250 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7251 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7254 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7255 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7256 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7257 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7260 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7261 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7264 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7265 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7266 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7267 if chan.is_shutdown() {
7268 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7269 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7274 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7275 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7276 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7279 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7280 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7281 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7284 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7286 // V1 Channel Establishment
7287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7288 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7289 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7290 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7291 // V2 Channel Establishment
7292 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7293 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7294 // Common Channel Establishment
7295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7297 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7298 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7299 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7300 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7301 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7302 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7303 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7304 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7305 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7306 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7307 // Channel Operations
7308 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7309 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7310 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7311 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7312 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7313 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7315 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7316 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7317 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7318 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7319 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7320 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7321 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7322 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7323 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7326 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7327 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7328 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7329 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7332 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7334 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7336 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7337 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7341 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7342 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7343 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7347 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7349 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7350 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7351 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7352 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7353 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7354 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7357 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7358 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7360 if inbound_peer_limited {
7363 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7364 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7365 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7366 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7367 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7368 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7369 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7370 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7371 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7376 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7377 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7379 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7380 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7381 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7382 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7387 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7388 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7393 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7395 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7396 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7397 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7398 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7399 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7401 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7402 // (so won't be recovered after a crash) we don't need to bother closing unfunded channels and
7403 // clearing their maps here. Instead we can just send queue channel_reestablish messages for
7404 // channels in the channel_by_id map.
7405 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().for_each(|(_, chan)| {
7406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7407 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7408 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7412 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7416 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7417 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7419 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7420 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7422 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7423 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7424 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7425 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7426 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7427 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7428 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7430 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7431 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7432 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7436 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7437 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7438 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7439 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7440 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7441 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7442 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7443 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7444 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7445 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7453 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7454 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7458 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7459 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7462 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7463 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7466 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7467 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7470 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7471 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7472 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7473 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7476 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7477 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7478 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7479 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7482 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7483 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7484 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7485 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7488 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7489 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7490 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7491 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7494 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7495 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7496 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7497 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7500 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7501 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7502 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7503 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7506 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7507 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7508 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7509 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7512 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7513 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7514 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7515 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7518 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7519 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7520 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7521 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7525 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7526 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7527 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7528 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7529 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7533 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7534 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7536 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7537 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7538 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7539 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7540 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7543 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7544 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7545 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7546 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7549 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7550 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7551 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7552 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7555 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7556 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7557 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7558 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7559 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7560 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7561 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7562 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7563 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7564 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7565 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7566 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7567 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7568 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7569 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7570 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7571 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7572 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7573 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7574 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7579 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7580 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7582 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7583 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7584 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7585 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7588 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7589 (2, node_id, required),
7590 (4, features, required),
7591 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7592 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7593 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7594 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7597 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7598 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7599 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7600 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7601 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7602 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7603 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7604 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7605 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7606 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7607 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7608 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7609 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7610 (7, self.config, option),
7611 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7612 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7613 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7614 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7615 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7616 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7617 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7618 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7619 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7620 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7621 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7622 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7623 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7624 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7625 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7626 (32, self.is_public, required),
7627 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7628 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7629 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7630 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7631 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
7637 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7638 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7639 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7640 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7641 (2, channel_id, required),
7642 (3, channel_type, option),
7643 (4, counterparty, required),
7644 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7645 (6, funding_txo, option),
7646 (7, config, option),
7647 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7648 (9, confirmations, option),
7649 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7650 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7651 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7652 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
7653 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7654 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7655 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7656 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7657 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7658 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7659 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7660 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7661 (26, is_outbound, required),
7662 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7663 (30, is_usable, required),
7664 (32, is_public, required),
7665 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7666 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7667 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7668 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7669 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
7672 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7673 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7674 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7675 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7676 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7678 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
7682 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7684 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7685 outbound_scid_alias,
7689 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7690 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7692 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7693 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7694 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7695 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7696 confirmations_required,
7698 force_close_spend_delay,
7699 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7700 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7701 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7702 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7703 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7704 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7705 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7706 channel_shutdown_state,
7711 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7712 (2, channels, required_vec),
7713 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7714 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7717 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7719 (0, onion_packet, required),
7720 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7723 (0, payment_data, required),
7724 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7725 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7726 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7727 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7729 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7730 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7731 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7732 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7733 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7734 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
7738 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7739 (0, routing, required),
7740 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7741 (4, payment_hash, required),
7742 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7743 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7744 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7745 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7749 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7750 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7752 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7754 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7755 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7756 reason.write(writer)?;
7758 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7759 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7762 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7763 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7764 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7765 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7772 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7773 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7774 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7777 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7778 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7779 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7780 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7784 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7785 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7786 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7787 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7788 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7791 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7792 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7793 // messages contained in the variants.
7794 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7795 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7796 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7798 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7799 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7800 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7801 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7802 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7805 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7806 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7807 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7808 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7809 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7811 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7816 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7821 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7822 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7823 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7824 (2, outpoint, required),
7825 (4, htlc_id, required),
7826 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7829 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7830 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7831 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7832 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7833 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7835 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7836 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7837 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7838 (2, self.value, required),
7839 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7840 (4, payment_data, option),
7841 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7842 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7843 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7844 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7850 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7851 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7852 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7853 (0, prev_hop, required),
7854 (1, total_msat, option),
7855 (2, value_ser, required),
7856 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7857 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7858 (5, total_value_received, option),
7859 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7860 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7861 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7863 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7864 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7865 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7867 if payment_data.is_some() {
7868 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7870 if total_msat.is_none() {
7871 total_msat = Some(value);
7873 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7876 if total_msat.is_none() {
7877 if payment_data.is_none() {
7878 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7880 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7882 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7886 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7889 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7890 total_value_received,
7891 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7893 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7894 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7899 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7900 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7901 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7904 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7905 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7906 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
7907 let mut payment_id = None;
7908 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7909 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7910 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7911 (0, session_priv, required),
7912 (1, payment_id, option),
7913 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7914 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
7915 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7916 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7918 if payment_id.is_none() {
7919 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7921 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7923 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
7924 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7927 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7928 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7929 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7930 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7934 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7935 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7936 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7938 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7941 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7942 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7947 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7948 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7950 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7952 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7953 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7954 (0, session_priv, required),
7955 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7956 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7957 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7958 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
7959 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7960 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7963 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7965 field.write(writer)?;
7972 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7973 (0, forward_info, required),
7974 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7975 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7976 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7977 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7980 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7982 (0, htlc_id, required),
7983 (2, err_packet, required),
7988 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7989 (0, payment_secret, required),
7990 (2, expiry_time, required),
7991 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7992 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7993 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7996 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7998 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7999 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8000 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8001 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8002 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8003 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8007 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8008 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8010 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8012 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8014 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8015 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8016 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8019 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8022 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
8023 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
8024 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8025 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8026 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8027 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8028 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8030 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
8031 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8032 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8033 unfunded_channels += 1;
8038 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
8040 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8043 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8044 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8045 channel.write(writer)?;
8052 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8053 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8054 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8055 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8056 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8057 for forward in pending_forwards {
8058 forward.write(writer)?;
8063 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8065 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8066 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8067 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8069 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8070 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8071 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8072 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8073 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8074 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8075 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8076 htlc.write(writer)?;
8078 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8079 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8082 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8083 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8084 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8085 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8086 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8087 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8088 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8091 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8092 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8093 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8094 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8095 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8097 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8098 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8099 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8100 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8101 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8102 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8103 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8108 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8109 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8110 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8111 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8112 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8113 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8114 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8115 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8116 0u64.write(writer)?;
8118 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8119 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8120 event.write(writer)?;
8124 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8125 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8126 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8127 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8128 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8129 0u64.write(writer)?;
8131 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8132 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8133 // likely to be identical.
8134 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8135 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8137 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8138 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8139 hash.write(writer)?;
8140 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8143 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8144 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8145 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8146 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8147 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8150 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8151 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8153 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8154 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8155 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8156 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8159 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8160 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8164 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8165 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8166 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8168 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8169 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8170 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8176 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8177 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8178 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8179 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8182 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8183 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8184 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8185 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8186 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8189 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8190 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8191 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8192 if !updates.is_empty() {
8193 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8194 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8199 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8200 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8201 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8202 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8203 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8204 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8205 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8206 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8207 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8208 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8209 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8210 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8211 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8218 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8220 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8221 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8224 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8225 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8226 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8227 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8228 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8229 // check that the event is sane here.
8230 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8231 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8232 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8233 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8239 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8240 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8241 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8242 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8243 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8244 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8247 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8248 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8249 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8250 events.push_back((ev, action));
8251 } else if action.is_some() {
8252 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8259 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8260 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8261 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8262 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8263 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8264 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8267 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8269 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8271 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8272 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8273 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8274 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8275 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8276 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8277 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8278 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8279 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8280 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8281 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8282 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8283 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8285 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8286 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8288 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8289 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8291 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8292 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8293 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8294 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8295 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8296 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8298 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8299 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8301 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8302 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8303 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8304 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8305 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8306 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8310 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8311 pub entropy_source: ES,
8313 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8314 pub node_signer: NS,
8316 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8317 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8319 pub signer_provider: SP,
8321 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8323 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8324 pub fee_estimator: F,
8325 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8327 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8328 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8329 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8330 pub chain_monitor: M,
8332 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8333 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8334 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8335 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8336 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8337 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8339 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8341 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8342 /// deserialization.
8344 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8345 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8346 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8348 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8349 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8351 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8352 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8353 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8354 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8356 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8359 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8360 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8363 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8364 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8366 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8368 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8369 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8370 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8371 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8375 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8376 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8377 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8378 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8379 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8381 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8382 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8387 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8388 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8389 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8390 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8392 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8393 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8394 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8395 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8396 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8397 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8401 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8402 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8403 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8407 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8408 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8410 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8412 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8413 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8414 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8419 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8420 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8422 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8423 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8424 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8426 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8428 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8429 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8430 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8431 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8432 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8433 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8434 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8435 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8436 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8437 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8439 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8440 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8441 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8442 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8443 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8444 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8445 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8446 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8447 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8448 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8449 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8450 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8451 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8452 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8453 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8454 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8457 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8458 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8459 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8460 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8461 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8462 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8463 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8465 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8466 let mut found_htlc = false;
8467 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8468 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8471 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8472 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8473 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8474 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8475 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8476 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8477 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8478 log_info!(args.logger,
8479 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8480 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8481 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8485 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8486 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8487 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8488 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8489 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8491 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8492 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8494 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8496 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8497 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8500 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8501 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8502 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8506 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8507 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8508 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8509 // safely discard the channel.
8510 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8511 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8512 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8513 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8514 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8515 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8516 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8519 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8520 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8521 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8522 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8523 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8528 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8529 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8530 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8531 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8532 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8533 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8534 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8536 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8540 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8541 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8542 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8543 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8544 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8545 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8546 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8547 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8548 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8550 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8553 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8554 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8555 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8556 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8557 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8558 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8559 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8560 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8562 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8565 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8568 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8569 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8570 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8571 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8572 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8573 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8574 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8575 is_connected: false,
8579 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8580 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8581 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8582 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8583 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8584 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8585 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8586 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8589 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8590 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8591 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8592 for _ in 0..event_count {
8593 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8594 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8599 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8600 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8601 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8603 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8604 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8605 // on-startup monitor updates.
8606 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8607 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8609 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8613 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8614 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8616 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8617 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8618 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8619 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8624 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8625 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8626 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8627 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8628 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8629 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8630 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8632 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8633 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8637 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8638 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8639 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8640 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8641 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8642 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8643 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8644 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8645 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8646 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8647 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8648 let mut events_override = None;
8649 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8650 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8651 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8652 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8653 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8654 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8655 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8656 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8657 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8658 (8, events_override, option),
8659 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
8660 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8661 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8662 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8664 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8665 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8668 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8669 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8672 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8673 pending_events_read = events;
8676 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8677 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8680 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8681 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8682 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8683 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8684 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8685 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8687 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8689 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8690 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8691 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8694 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8695 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8696 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8697 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8698 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8700 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8701 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8702 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8704 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8705 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8706 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8707 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8708 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8710 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8711 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8712 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8713 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8714 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8715 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8716 pending_background_events.push(
8717 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8718 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8719 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8720 update: update.clone(),
8723 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
8724 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
8725 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
8726 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
8727 pending_background_events.push(
8728 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
8729 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8730 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
8733 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8734 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8737 max_in_flight_update_id
8741 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8744 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8745 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8747 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8748 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8749 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8750 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8751 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8752 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8753 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8754 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8755 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8758 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8759 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8760 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8761 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8762 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8763 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8764 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8765 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8766 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8767 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8768 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8773 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8774 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8775 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8776 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8777 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8778 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8779 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8780 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8782 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8783 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8784 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8786 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8787 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8788 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8789 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8790 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8791 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8792 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8793 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8798 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8799 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8801 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
8802 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
8803 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
8804 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
8807 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8808 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8809 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8810 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8811 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8812 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8813 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8815 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8816 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
8817 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
8818 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8819 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8820 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8821 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8822 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8825 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8826 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8827 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8828 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8829 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8830 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8831 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8832 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8835 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8836 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8837 retry_strategy: None,
8838 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8839 payment_params: None,
8840 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8841 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8842 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8843 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8844 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8845 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8846 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8847 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8848 total_msat: path_amt,
8849 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8851 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8852 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8857 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8859 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8860 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8861 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8862 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8864 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8865 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8866 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8867 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8868 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8869 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8870 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8871 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8872 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8873 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8874 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8879 !forwards.is_empty()
8881 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8882 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8883 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8884 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8885 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8886 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8887 intercepted_id != ev_id
8894 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8895 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8896 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8897 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8898 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8899 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8900 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8901 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8902 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8903 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8904 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8905 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8906 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8913 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
8914 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
8916 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
8918 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
8919 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
8920 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
8921 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
8922 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
8923 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
8924 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
8925 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
8926 monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()))
8929 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
8930 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
8931 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
8932 // channel still live case here.
8936 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
8937 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
8942 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8943 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8944 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8945 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8946 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8947 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8948 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8949 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8953 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8954 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8956 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8957 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8958 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8959 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8961 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8962 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8963 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8965 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8966 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8968 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8969 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8971 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8974 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8975 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8976 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8978 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8982 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8983 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8984 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8985 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8988 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8989 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8990 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8991 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8992 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8993 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8994 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8995 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8997 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8998 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9002 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9004 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9006 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9007 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9009 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9010 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9015 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9016 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9018 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9020 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9022 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9023 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9024 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9025 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9029 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9030 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9031 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9032 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9033 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9034 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9035 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9037 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9038 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9039 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9041 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9042 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9043 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9044 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9045 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9048 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9049 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9050 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9051 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9052 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9053 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9059 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9061 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9062 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9063 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9064 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
9065 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9066 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9067 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9068 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9069 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9070 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9071 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9073 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
9074 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9076 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9077 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9078 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9079 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9081 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9082 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9083 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9084 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9086 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9087 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9088 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9089 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9091 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9092 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9094 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9095 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9096 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9097 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9100 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9101 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9104 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9107 purpose: payment.purpose,
9108 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9114 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9115 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9116 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9117 for action in actions.iter() {
9118 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9119 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9120 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9122 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9123 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9124 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9125 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9127 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9128 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9129 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9130 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9136 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9138 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9139 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9143 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9145 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9146 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9147 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9148 router: args.router,
9150 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9152 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9153 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9154 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9155 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9157 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9158 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9159 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9160 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9161 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9162 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9164 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9169 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9171 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9173 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9174 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9175 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9176 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9177 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9178 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9180 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9181 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9182 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9184 logger: args.logger,
9185 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9188 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9189 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9190 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9191 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9192 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9195 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9196 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9197 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9198 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9199 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9200 downstream_closed, downstream_chan_id);
9203 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9204 //connection or two.
9206 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9212 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9213 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9214 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9215 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9216 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9217 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9218 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9219 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9220 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9221 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9222 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9223 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9224 use crate::util::test_utils;
9225 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9226 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9229 fn test_notify_limits() {
9230 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9231 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9235 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9237 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9238 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9239 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9240 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9241 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9243 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9245 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9246 // to connect messages with new values
9247 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9248 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9249 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9250 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9251 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9252 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9254 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9255 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9256 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9257 // ... but the last node should not.
9258 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9259 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9260 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9261 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9263 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9264 // about the channel.
9265 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9266 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9267 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9269 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9271 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9272 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9273 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9274 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9275 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9276 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9278 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9279 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9280 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9282 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9283 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9284 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9285 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9286 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9287 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9289 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9290 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9291 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9292 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9293 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9294 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9295 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9296 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9298 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9299 // the channel info has updated.
9300 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9301 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9302 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9303 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9304 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9305 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9309 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9310 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9318 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9319 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9320 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9321 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9323 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9324 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9325 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9326 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9327 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9328 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9329 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9330 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9332 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9334 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9336 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9337 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9338 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9342 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9343 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9347 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9348 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9350 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9351 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9352 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9353 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9354 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9355 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9357 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9358 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9360 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9361 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9362 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9364 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9366 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9368 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9369 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9370 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9371 // lightning messages manually.
9372 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9373 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9376 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9377 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9378 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9380 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9381 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9383 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9384 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9386 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9388 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9390 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9391 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9392 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9394 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9396 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9398 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9399 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9402 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9403 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9404 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9407 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9408 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9409 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9410 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9415 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9416 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9417 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9418 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9423 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9424 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9425 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9426 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9428 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9433 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9434 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9435 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9438 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9439 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9440 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9441 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9442 // fails as expected.
9443 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9444 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9445 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9446 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9447 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9448 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9451 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9452 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9456 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9457 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9459 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9460 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9461 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9463 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9464 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9465 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9466 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9468 let route = find_route(
9469 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9470 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9472 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9473 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9475 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9477 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9478 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9479 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9481 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9482 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9483 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9484 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9485 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9487 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9488 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9489 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9491 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9492 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9493 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9494 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9495 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9497 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9498 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9500 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9501 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9502 let route = find_route(
9503 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9504 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9506 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9507 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9509 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9510 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9511 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9512 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9513 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9515 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9516 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9517 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9518 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9522 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9523 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9524 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9527 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9528 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9530 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9531 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9532 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9533 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9534 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9535 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9536 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9537 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9538 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9540 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9541 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9543 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9544 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9545 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9546 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9548 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9549 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9550 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9551 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9552 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9554 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9555 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9556 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9557 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9559 let route = find_route(
9560 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9561 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9563 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9564 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9565 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9567 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9569 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9570 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9577 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9578 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9579 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9580 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9581 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9582 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9583 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9584 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9585 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9587 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9588 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9592 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9593 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9594 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9598 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9600 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9601 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9603 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9604 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9605 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9606 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9608 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9609 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9610 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9611 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9612 let route = find_route(
9613 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9614 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9617 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9618 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9619 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9620 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9621 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9622 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9625 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9626 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9627 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9628 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9629 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9630 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9631 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9633 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9637 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9638 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9639 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9640 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9641 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9647 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9648 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9650 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9651 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9652 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9653 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9655 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9656 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9657 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9658 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9659 let route = find_route(
9660 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9661 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9664 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9665 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9666 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9667 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9668 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9669 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9670 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9671 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9674 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9675 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9676 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9677 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9678 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9679 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9680 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9682 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9686 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9690 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9692 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9693 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9694 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9695 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9697 // Marshall an MPP route.
9698 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9699 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9700 route.paths.push(path);
9701 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9702 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9703 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9704 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9705 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9706 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9708 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9709 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9711 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9712 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9714 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9719 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9720 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9721 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9722 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9723 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9725 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9727 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9728 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9730 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9733 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9736 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9737 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9738 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9739 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9740 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9741 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9744 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9747 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9748 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9753 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9754 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9755 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9756 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9757 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9758 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9760 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9761 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9763 total_msat: 100_000,
9766 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9767 // payment verification fails as expected.
9768 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9769 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9770 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9771 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9773 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9777 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9778 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9782 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9783 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9784 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9785 // the channel is successfully closed.
9786 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9787 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9788 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9789 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9791 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9792 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9793 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9794 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9795 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9797 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9798 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9800 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9801 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9802 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9803 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9806 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9808 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9809 // as it has the funding transaction.
9810 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9811 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9812 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9815 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9817 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9819 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9821 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9822 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9823 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9825 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9828 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9829 // as it has the funding transaction.
9830 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9831 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9832 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9835 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9836 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9838 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9839 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9840 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9841 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9843 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9844 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9845 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9846 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9848 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9849 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9851 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9852 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9853 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9854 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9855 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9856 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9857 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9861 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9862 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9863 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9864 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9865 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9866 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9867 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9870 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9872 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9873 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9874 // closing transaction).
9875 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9876 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9877 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9879 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9880 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9881 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9882 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9883 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9886 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9888 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9890 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9891 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9892 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9894 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9896 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9897 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
9900 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9901 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9902 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9905 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9906 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9907 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9910 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9912 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9913 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9915 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9916 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9918 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9919 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9924 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9925 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9926 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9927 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9928 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9929 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9930 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9931 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9934 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9935 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9936 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9938 // Test the API functions.
9939 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9941 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9943 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9945 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9947 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9949 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9951 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9955 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9956 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9960 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9962 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9964 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9965 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9967 let mut funding_tx = None;
9968 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9969 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9970 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9973 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9974 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9975 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9976 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9977 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9979 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9981 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9983 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9985 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9987 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9989 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9992 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9993 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9994 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9995 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9996 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9998 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9999 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10001 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10002 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10003 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10004 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10005 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10006 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10007 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10010 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10011 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10012 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10013 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10014 }, true).unwrap_err();
10016 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10017 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10018 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10019 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10020 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10021 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10022 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10024 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10025 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10027 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10028 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10029 }, true).unwrap_err();
10031 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10032 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10033 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10034 }, false).unwrap();
10035 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10037 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10038 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10040 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10041 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10042 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10043 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10044 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10046 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10047 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10048 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10050 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10051 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10052 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10054 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10055 // "protected" and can connect again.
10056 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10057 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10058 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10060 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10062 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10064 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10065 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10069 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10070 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10076 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10078 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10079 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10081 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10082 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10083 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10084 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10087 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10089 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10090 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10091 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10093 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10094 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10095 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10097 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10098 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10099 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10100 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10104 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10105 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10106 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10109 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10110 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10111 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10112 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10114 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10116 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10117 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10119 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10120 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10121 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10122 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10124 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10127 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10128 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10130 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10131 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10135 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10136 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10139 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10140 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10141 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10142 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10143 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10145 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10148 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10149 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10150 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10151 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10157 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10158 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10160 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10162 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10164 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10165 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10167 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10169 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10173 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10174 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10175 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10176 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10177 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10178 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10179 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10180 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10182 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10183 payment_metadata: None,
10184 keysend_preimage: None,
10185 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10186 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10188 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10190 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10191 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10192 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10193 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10194 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10196 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10197 } else { panic!(); }
10199 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10200 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10202 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10203 payment_metadata: None,
10204 keysend_preimage: None,
10205 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10206 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10208 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10210 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10211 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10215 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10216 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10217 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10218 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10219 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10221 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10222 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10227 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10228 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10230 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10231 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10233 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10234 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10235 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10236 match &msg_events[0] {
10237 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10238 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10240 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10241 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10242 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10245 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10248 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10249 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10251 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10252 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10255 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10259 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10260 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10261 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10262 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10265 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10266 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10267 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10271 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10272 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10273 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10275 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10276 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10278 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10279 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10281 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10284 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10285 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10287 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10288 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10290 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10294 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10295 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10296 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10297 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10298 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10300 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10301 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10303 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10304 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10305 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10307 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10308 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10309 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10310 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10313 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10314 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10317 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10318 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10319 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10321 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10322 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10323 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10324 ..Default::default()
10326 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10327 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10330 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10331 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10334 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10335 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10336 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10337 ..Default::default()
10339 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10340 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10341 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10344 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10345 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10348 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10349 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10350 let bad_channel_id = [10; 32];
10351 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10352 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10355 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10356 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10357 ..Default::default()
10359 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10362 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10363 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10364 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10371 use crate::chain::Listen;
10372 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10373 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10374 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10375 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10376 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10377 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10378 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10379 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10380 use crate::util::test_utils;
10381 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10383 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10384 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10385 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10387 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10389 use criterion::Criterion;
10391 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10392 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10393 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10394 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10395 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10396 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10397 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10399 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10400 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10402 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10403 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10405 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10407 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10410 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10411 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10414 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10415 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10416 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10418 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10419 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10421 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10422 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10423 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10424 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10425 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10427 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10428 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10429 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10431 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10432 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10433 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10434 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10436 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10437 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10438 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10440 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10441 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10442 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10443 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10444 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10446 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10447 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10448 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10450 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10451 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10453 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10454 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10455 }, false).unwrap();
10456 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10457 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10458 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10461 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10462 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10463 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10465 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10466 } else { panic!(); }
10468 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10469 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10470 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10471 match events_b[0] {
10472 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10473 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10475 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10478 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10479 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10480 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10481 match events_a[0] {
10482 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10483 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10485 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10488 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10490 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10491 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10492 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10494 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10495 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10496 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10497 match msg_events[0] {
10498 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10499 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10500 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10504 match msg_events[1] {
10505 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10509 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10510 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10511 match events_a[0] {
10512 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10513 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10518 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10519 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10520 match events_b[0] {
10521 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10522 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10527 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10528 macro_rules! send_payment {
10529 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10530 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10531 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10532 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10533 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10534 payment_count += 1;
10535 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10536 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10538 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10539 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10540 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10541 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10542 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10543 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10544 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10545 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10546 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10547 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10548 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10550 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10551 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10552 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10553 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10555 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10557 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10558 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10559 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10561 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10564 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10565 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10566 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10567 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10569 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10573 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10574 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10575 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);