1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a "real" SCID, an
96 /// outbound SCID alias, or a phantom node SCID.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
116 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
121 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
122 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
125 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
128 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
129 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
132 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
134 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
148 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
152 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
153 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
154 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 short_channel_id: u64,
158 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
159 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
161 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
162 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
167 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
169 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
170 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
171 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
173 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
174 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
177 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
178 struct ClaimableHTLC {
179 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
181 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
183 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
185 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
189 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
190 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
191 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
192 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
194 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
195 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
200 impl Readable for PaymentId {
201 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
202 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
206 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
210 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
213 session_priv: SecretKey,
214 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
215 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
216 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
217 payment_id: PaymentId,
218 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
219 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
222 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
223 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
224 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
226 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
228 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
233 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
234 payment_id.hash(hasher);
235 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
236 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
237 payment_params.hash(hasher);
242 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
245 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
246 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
248 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
249 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
250 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
251 payment_secret: None,
252 payment_params: None,
257 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
258 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
260 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
268 struct ReceiveError {
274 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
275 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
277 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
282 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
284 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
285 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
286 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
287 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
288 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
290 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
291 err: msgs::LightningError,
292 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
293 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
295 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
297 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
299 err: LightningError {
301 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
302 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
309 shutdown_finish: None,
313 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
315 err: LightningError {
317 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
320 shutdown_finish: None,
324 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
325 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
328 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
330 err: LightningError {
332 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
333 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
339 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
340 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
344 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
347 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
350 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
354 log_level: Level::Warn,
357 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
359 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
361 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
363 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
364 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
377 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
378 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
379 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
380 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
381 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
383 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
384 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
385 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
386 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
389 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
391 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
395 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
396 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
397 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
398 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
399 /// failed/claimed by the user.
401 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
402 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
404 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
405 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
406 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
407 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
410 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
411 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
412 /// quite some time lag.
413 enum BackgroundEvent {
414 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
415 /// commitment transaction.
416 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
419 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
420 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
422 latest_features: InitFeatures,
425 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
426 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
428 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
431 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
432 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
433 struct PendingInboundPayment {
434 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
435 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
436 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
437 /// this payment being removed.
439 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
440 user_payment_id: u64,
441 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
442 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
443 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
447 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
448 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
450 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
453 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
454 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
455 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
456 pending_amt_msat: u64,
457 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
458 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
459 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
461 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
462 starting_block_height: u32,
464 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
465 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
466 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
468 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
469 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
470 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
472 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
473 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
474 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
475 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
476 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
478 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
480 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
481 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
485 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
486 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
488 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
492 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
494 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
498 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
500 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
505 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
507 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
508 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
509 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
510 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
514 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
515 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
516 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
518 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
519 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
520 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
523 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
524 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
527 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
528 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
529 let our_payment_hash;
530 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
531 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
532 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
534 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
535 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
536 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
540 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
544 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
545 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
546 let remove_res = match self {
547 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
548 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
549 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
551 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
555 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
556 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
557 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
558 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
559 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
560 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
567 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
568 let insert_res = match self {
569 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
570 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
571 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
577 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
578 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
579 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
580 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
581 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
588 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
593 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
600 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
601 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
602 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
603 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
604 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
605 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
606 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
608 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
609 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
611 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
612 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
613 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
614 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
615 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
616 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
617 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
618 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
620 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
621 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
623 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
624 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
626 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
627 /// to individual Channels.
629 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
630 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
631 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
632 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
634 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
635 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
636 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
637 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
638 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
639 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
640 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
642 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
643 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
644 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
645 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
648 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
649 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
650 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
651 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
652 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
654 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
655 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
656 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
657 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
658 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
661 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
662 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
663 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
664 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
665 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
669 // `total_consistency_lock`
671 // |__`forward_htlcs`
673 // |__`channel_state`
677 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
679 // | |__`per_peer_state`
681 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
683 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
685 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
689 // | |__`pending_events`
691 // | |__`pending_background_events`
693 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
694 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
695 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
696 K::Target: KeysInterface,
697 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
700 default_configuration: UserConfig,
701 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
702 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
706 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
708 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
710 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
711 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
713 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
714 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
715 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
716 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
717 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
719 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
720 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
721 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
722 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
724 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
725 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
727 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
728 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
729 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
730 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
731 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
732 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
733 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
734 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
736 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
738 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
739 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
741 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
743 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
744 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
745 /// and via the classic SCID.
747 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
748 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
750 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
752 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
754 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
756 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
757 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
758 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
759 /// active channel list on load.
761 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
762 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
764 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
766 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
767 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
768 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
770 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
771 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
772 /// the handling of the events.
775 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
776 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
777 /// would break backwards compatability.
778 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
779 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
780 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
782 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
783 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
785 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
787 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
788 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
789 /// confirmation depth.
791 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
792 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
793 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
795 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
797 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
799 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
801 our_network_key: SecretKey,
802 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
804 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
806 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
807 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
808 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
810 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
811 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
813 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
814 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
815 /// keeping additional state.
816 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
818 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
819 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
820 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
821 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
823 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
824 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
825 /// are currently open with that peer.
826 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
827 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
830 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
831 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
835 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
836 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
837 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
838 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
839 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
840 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
841 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
842 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
843 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
845 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
852 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
854 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
855 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
856 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
857 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
858 pub struct ChainParameters {
859 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
860 pub network: Network,
862 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
864 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
865 pub best_block: BestBlock,
868 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
874 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
875 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
876 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
877 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
878 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
879 /// updates are ready for persistence).
881 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
882 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
883 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
884 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
885 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
887 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
888 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
891 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
892 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
893 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
896 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
897 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
899 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
900 persistence_notifier: notifier,
901 should_persist: persist_check,
902 _read_guard: read_guard,
907 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
909 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
910 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
915 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
916 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
918 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
920 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
921 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
922 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
923 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
924 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
926 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
927 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
929 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
931 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
932 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
933 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
934 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
935 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
936 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
937 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
938 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
939 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
940 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
941 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
942 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
943 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
945 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
946 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
948 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
949 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
950 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
951 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
953 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
954 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
955 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
956 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
957 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
958 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
961 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
963 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
964 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
967 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
969 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
970 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
972 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
973 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
974 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
975 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
977 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
978 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
979 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
980 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
981 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
982 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
983 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
984 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
985 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
986 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
987 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
990 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
991 /// to better separate parameters.
992 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
993 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
994 /// The node_id of our counterparty
995 pub node_id: PublicKey,
996 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
997 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
998 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
999 pub features: InitFeatures,
1000 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1001 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1002 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1004 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1006 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1007 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1008 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1009 /// payments to us through this channel.
1010 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1011 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1012 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1013 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1014 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1015 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1016 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1019 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1020 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1021 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1022 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1023 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1024 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1025 /// lifetime of the channel.
1026 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1027 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1028 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1029 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1030 /// our counterparty already.
1032 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1033 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1034 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1035 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1037 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1038 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1039 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1040 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1042 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1043 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1045 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1046 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1048 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1049 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1050 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1051 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1052 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1053 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1054 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1055 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1056 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1059 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1061 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1062 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1063 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1064 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1065 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1066 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1067 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1069 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1070 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1072 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1073 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1074 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1075 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1076 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1077 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1078 /// this value on chain.
1080 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1082 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1084 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1085 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1086 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1087 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1088 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1089 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1090 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1092 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1093 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1094 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1095 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1097 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1098 pub balance_msat: u64,
1099 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1100 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1101 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1102 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1104 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1106 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1107 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1108 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1109 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1110 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1111 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1112 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1113 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1115 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1116 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1117 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1118 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1119 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1120 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1121 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1123 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1124 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1125 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1126 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1127 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1128 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1129 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1130 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1131 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1133 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1135 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1136 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1137 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1138 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1139 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1140 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1141 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1142 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1143 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1145 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1146 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1147 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1148 pub is_outbound: bool,
1149 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1150 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1151 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1152 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1153 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1155 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1156 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1157 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1158 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1160 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1161 pub is_usable: bool,
1162 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1163 pub is_public: bool,
1164 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1165 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1166 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1167 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1168 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1169 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1171 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1172 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1175 impl ChannelDetails {
1176 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1177 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1178 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1180 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1181 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1182 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1183 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1186 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1187 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1188 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1190 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1191 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1192 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1193 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1197 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1198 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1199 /// states for more.
1200 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1201 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1202 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1203 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1204 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1205 ParameterError(APIError),
1206 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1207 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1208 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1209 /// payment in full.
1211 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1213 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1214 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1215 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1216 /// paths than the ones selected).
1218 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] does *not* need to be called for this payment and
1219 /// [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work for this payment.
1220 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1221 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1222 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1223 /// in over-/re-payment.
1225 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1226 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1227 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1229 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1230 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1231 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1232 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1234 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1235 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1236 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1237 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1238 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1239 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1240 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1241 payment_id: PaymentId,
1245 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1247 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1249 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1250 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1251 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1252 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1254 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1255 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1256 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1259 macro_rules! handle_error {
1260 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1263 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1264 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1266 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1267 // entering the macro.
1268 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1269 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1272 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1274 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1275 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1276 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1277 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1281 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1282 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1283 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1284 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1289 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1290 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1292 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1293 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1294 action: err.action.clone()
1298 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1299 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1302 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1309 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1310 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1311 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1312 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1313 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1314 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1316 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1317 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1318 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1319 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1320 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1322 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1323 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1325 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1329 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1330 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1331 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1333 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1334 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1336 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1337 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1339 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1340 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1341 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1342 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1343 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1344 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1350 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1351 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1355 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1357 $entry.remove_entry();
1365 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1366 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1370 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1372 $entry.remove_entry();
1380 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1381 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1383 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1384 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1390 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1391 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1393 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1394 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1395 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1396 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1397 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1398 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1399 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1400 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1401 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1402 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1403 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1404 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1405 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1406 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1409 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1410 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1411 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1412 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1413 match $action_type {
1414 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1415 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1417 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1418 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1420 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1421 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1422 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1423 if !$resend_commitment {
1424 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1427 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1429 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1430 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1432 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1437 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1438 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1440 $entry.remove_entry();
1444 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1445 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1446 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1448 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1449 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1451 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1452 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1454 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1455 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1457 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1458 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1462 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1463 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1464 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1465 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1466 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1468 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1469 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1470 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1471 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1472 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1473 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1474 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1475 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1476 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1477 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1482 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1483 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1484 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1486 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1487 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1488 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1489 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1490 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1491 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1494 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1499 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1500 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1501 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1502 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $channel_ready: expr, $announcement_sigs: expr) => { {
1503 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1505 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1506 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1507 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1509 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1510 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1511 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or($channel_entry.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
1512 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1515 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1516 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a channel_ready if there have been
1517 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1518 // associated with a channel_ready would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1519 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1520 // channel_ready until it's been updated, so we can't have a channel_ready and a
1521 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1522 assert!($channel_ready.is_none());
1523 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a channel_ready or a
1524 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a channel_ready, we
1525 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1526 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1529 if let Some(msg) = $channel_ready {
1530 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the channel_ready fly
1531 // before it should be allowed to.
1532 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1533 send_channel_ready!($self, $channel_state.pending_msg_events, $channel_entry.get(), msg);
1535 if let Some(msg) = $announcement_sigs {
1536 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1537 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1542 emit_channel_ready_event!($self, $channel_entry.get_mut());
1544 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1545 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1546 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1547 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1548 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1549 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1550 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1551 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1552 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1553 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1554 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1555 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1556 match $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1557 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
1559 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1560 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1561 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1562 let mut order = $order;
1564 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1566 break handle_monitor_update_res!($self, e, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1571 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1572 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1573 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1574 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1579 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1580 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1581 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1582 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1583 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1588 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1592 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1597 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1598 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1599 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1604 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1605 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1606 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1607 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1608 assert!(res.is_ok());
1611 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1615 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1616 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1617 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1619 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1621 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1622 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1627 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1628 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1629 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1630 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1631 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1634 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1636 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1637 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1639 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1641 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1642 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1643 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1644 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1645 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1646 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1647 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1648 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1650 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1651 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1652 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1656 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1658 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1659 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1660 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1661 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1663 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1664 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1665 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1666 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1667 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1668 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1670 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1671 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1674 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1675 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1677 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1679 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1681 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1683 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1684 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1685 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1686 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1694 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1695 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1696 &self.default_configuration
1699 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1700 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1701 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1704 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1705 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1707 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1709 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1713 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1718 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1720 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1721 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1722 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1723 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1724 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1727 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1728 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1730 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1731 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1732 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1734 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1735 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1736 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1737 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1738 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1739 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1741 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1742 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1743 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1744 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1745 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1746 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1750 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1751 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1752 Some(peer_state) => {
1753 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1754 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1755 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1756 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1757 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1758 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1759 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1763 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1768 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1771 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1773 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1774 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1775 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1777 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1778 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1779 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1782 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1784 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1787 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1790 node_id: their_network_key,
1793 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1796 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1797 let mut res = Vec::new();
1799 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1800 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1801 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1802 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1803 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1804 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1805 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1806 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1807 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1808 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1809 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1810 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1811 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1812 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1813 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1814 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1815 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1816 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1817 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1818 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1819 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1821 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1822 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1823 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1824 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1825 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1826 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1827 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1828 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1829 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1830 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1831 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1832 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1833 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1834 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1835 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1836 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1837 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1838 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1839 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1840 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1841 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1842 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1843 config: Some(channel.config()),
1847 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1848 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1849 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1850 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1856 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1857 /// more information.
1858 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1859 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1862 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1863 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1865 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1866 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1869 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1870 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1871 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1872 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1873 // really wanted anyway.
1874 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1877 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1878 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1879 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1880 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1881 Some(transaction) => {
1882 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1886 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1887 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1888 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1889 reason: closure_reason
1893 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1896 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1897 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1902 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1903 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1905 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1906 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1907 Some(peer_state) => {
1908 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1909 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1910 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1912 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1914 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1916 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1917 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1918 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1919 let (result, is_permanent) =
1920 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1922 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1928 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1932 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1933 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1934 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1935 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1939 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1943 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1947 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1948 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
1952 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1956 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1957 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1958 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1960 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1961 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1963 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1964 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1965 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1966 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1968 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1970 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1971 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1972 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1973 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1974 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1977 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1978 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1979 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1981 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1982 /// the channel being closed or not:
1983 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1984 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1985 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1986 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1987 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1988 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1989 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1991 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1993 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1994 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1995 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1996 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1997 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
2001 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2002 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2003 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2004 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2005 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2006 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2007 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
2009 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2010 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2011 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2012 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2013 // ignore the result here.
2014 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2018 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2019 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2020 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2021 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2023 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2024 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2025 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2026 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2027 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2029 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2030 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2032 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2034 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2036 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2039 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2040 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2048 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2051 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2053 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2054 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2055 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2056 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2057 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2058 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2059 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2069 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2070 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2071 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2073 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2074 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2075 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2078 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2079 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2080 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2082 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2083 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2084 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2085 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2086 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2089 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2090 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2093 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2097 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2098 /// local transaction(s).
2099 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2100 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2101 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2105 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2106 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2108 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2109 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2110 return Err(ReceiveError {
2111 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2113 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2116 // final_expiry_too_soon
2117 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2118 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2119 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2120 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2121 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2122 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2123 return Err(ReceiveError {
2125 err_data: Vec::new(),
2126 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2129 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2130 return Err(ReceiveError {
2132 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2133 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2137 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2138 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => {
2139 return Err(ReceiveError {
2140 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2141 err_data: Vec::new(),
2142 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2145 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2146 return Err(ReceiveError {
2147 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2148 err_data: Vec::new(),
2149 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2152 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2153 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2154 return Err(ReceiveError {
2155 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2156 err_data: Vec::new(),
2157 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2159 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2160 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2162 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2163 phantom_shared_secret,
2165 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2166 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2167 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2168 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2169 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2170 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2171 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2172 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2173 return Err(ReceiveError {
2174 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2175 err_data: Vec::new(),
2176 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2180 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2182 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2185 return Err(ReceiveError {
2186 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2187 err_data: Vec::new(),
2188 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2193 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2196 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2197 amt_to_forward: amt_msat,
2198 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2202 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2203 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2204 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2206 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2207 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2208 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2209 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2210 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2211 failure_code: $err_code,
2217 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2218 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2221 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2223 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2224 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2225 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2226 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2227 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2228 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2229 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2230 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2232 macro_rules! return_err {
2233 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2235 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2236 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2237 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2238 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2239 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2245 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2247 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2248 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2250 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2251 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2255 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2256 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2258 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2260 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2261 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2262 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2263 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2264 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2266 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2269 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2270 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2271 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2273 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2274 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2275 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2278 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2279 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2280 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2281 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2282 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2286 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2287 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2288 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2291 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2292 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2293 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2294 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2299 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2300 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2301 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2302 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2303 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2304 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2305 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2306 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2307 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2308 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2309 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2311 if fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id) {
2314 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2317 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2319 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2320 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2322 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2323 // no consistency guarantees.
2324 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2328 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2329 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2330 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2331 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2332 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2334 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2335 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2336 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2337 // we don't have the channel here.
2338 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2340 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2342 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2343 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2344 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2345 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2346 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2347 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2348 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2350 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2351 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2353 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *amt_to_forward, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2354 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2358 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2360 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2367 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2368 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2369 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2370 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2371 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2372 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2374 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2375 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2377 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2378 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2379 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2380 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2381 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2382 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2383 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2384 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2385 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2386 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2392 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2393 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2394 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2395 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2397 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2398 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2400 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2401 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2402 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2404 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2405 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2406 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2408 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2413 pending_forward_info
2416 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2417 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2418 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2420 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2421 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2422 if !chan.should_announce() {
2423 return Err(LightningError {
2424 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2425 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2428 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2429 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2432 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2435 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2436 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2437 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2438 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2439 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2440 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2442 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2443 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2447 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2449 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2450 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2451 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2453 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2454 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2456 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2457 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2458 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2459 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2460 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2461 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2462 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2463 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2466 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2467 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2469 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2475 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2476 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2477 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2478 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2479 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2481 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2482 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2483 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2484 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2485 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2487 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2489 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2491 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2492 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2493 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2494 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2497 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2498 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2499 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2501 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2502 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2504 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2505 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2507 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2508 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2510 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2511 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2513 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2514 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2515 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2518 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2519 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2520 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2522 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2523 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2525 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2526 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2527 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2528 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2529 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2530 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2531 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2532 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2533 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2534 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2536 _ => unreachable!(),
2539 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2541 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2542 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2543 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2544 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2545 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2546 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2555 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2556 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2557 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2558 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2563 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2564 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2566 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2571 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2573 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2574 /// fields for more info.
2576 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2577 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2578 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2579 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2582 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2583 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2584 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2585 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2586 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2588 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2589 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2591 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2592 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2593 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2595 /// In general, a path may raise:
2596 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2597 /// node public key) is specified.
2598 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2599 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2601 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2602 /// relevant updates.
2604 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2605 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2606 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2608 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2609 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2610 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2611 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2614 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2615 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2616 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2618 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2619 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2620 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2621 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2622 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2626 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2627 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2630 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2631 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2632 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2633 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2636 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2637 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2639 err: "Payment already in progress"
2641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2642 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2643 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2644 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2645 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2648 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2649 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2652 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2653 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2656 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2661 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2662 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2663 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2665 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2666 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2668 let mut total_value = 0;
2669 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2670 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2671 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2672 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2673 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2674 continue 'path_check;
2676 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2677 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2678 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2679 continue 'path_check;
2682 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2683 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2685 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2686 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2688 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2689 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2690 total_value = amt_msat;
2693 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2694 let mut results = Vec::new();
2695 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2696 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2697 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2700 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2701 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2702 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2703 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2706 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2707 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2708 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2709 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2711 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2712 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2716 results.push(path_res);
2718 let mut has_ok = false;
2719 let mut has_err = false;
2720 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2721 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2722 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2723 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2724 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2725 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2726 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2730 } else if res.is_err() {
2731 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2732 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2735 if has_err && has_ok {
2736 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2739 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2740 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2741 Some(RouteParameters {
2742 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2743 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2744 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2750 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2751 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2752 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2753 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2754 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2760 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2762 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2763 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2764 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2765 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2766 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2768 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2769 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2770 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2771 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2772 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2773 if path.len() == 0 {
2774 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2775 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2780 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2781 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2782 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2785 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2786 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2787 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2789 let res = match payment {
2790 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2791 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2793 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2794 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2795 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2796 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2799 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2801 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2802 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2803 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2806 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2807 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2808 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2811 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2812 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2813 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2817 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2818 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2823 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2824 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2828 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2831 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2833 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2834 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2835 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2836 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2838 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2839 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2840 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2842 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2843 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2844 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2845 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2846 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2848 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2849 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2850 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2851 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2852 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2854 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2862 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2863 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2864 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2865 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2866 /// never reach the recipient.
2868 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2869 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2871 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2872 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2874 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2876 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2877 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2878 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2880 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2882 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2883 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2885 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2886 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2891 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2892 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2893 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2894 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2895 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2897 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2900 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2901 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2905 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2906 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2908 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2909 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2914 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2916 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2917 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2918 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2921 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2922 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2923 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2924 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2925 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2926 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2929 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2930 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2931 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2932 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2933 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2935 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2937 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2939 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2940 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2941 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2942 } else { unreachable!(); })
2945 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2947 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2948 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2951 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2952 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2957 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2958 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2959 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2962 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2963 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2964 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2967 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2968 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2969 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2978 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2979 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2980 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2984 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2986 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2987 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2989 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2990 /// across the p2p network.
2992 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2993 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2995 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2996 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2997 /// keys per-channel).
2999 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3000 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3001 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3003 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3004 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3005 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3007 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3008 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3009 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3010 /// for more details.
3012 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3013 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3014 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3017 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3018 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3020 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3025 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3026 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
3027 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
3028 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
3029 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
3030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3031 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3035 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3036 let mut output_index = None;
3037 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3038 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3039 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3040 if output_index.is_some() {
3041 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3042 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3045 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3046 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3047 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3050 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3053 if output_index.is_none() {
3054 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3055 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3058 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3062 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3064 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3065 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3066 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3067 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3069 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3070 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3072 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3073 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3075 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3077 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3078 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3079 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3080 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3081 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3082 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3083 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3084 pub fn update_channel_config(
3085 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3086 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3087 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3088 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3089 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3093 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3094 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3097 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3098 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3099 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3100 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3101 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3102 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3104 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3105 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3107 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3111 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3112 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3113 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3116 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3117 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3118 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3119 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3120 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3129 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3131 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3132 /// Will likely generate further events.
3133 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3136 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3137 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3138 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3139 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3141 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3142 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3144 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3145 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3146 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3147 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3148 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3150 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3151 match forward_info {
3152 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3153 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3154 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3155 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3156 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3157 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3159 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3160 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3161 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3162 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3163 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3164 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3167 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3168 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3170 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3173 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3174 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: $err_code, data: $err_data },
3180 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3181 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3183 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3187 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3188 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3190 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3194 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3195 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3196 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id) {
3197 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3198 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3200 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3201 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3202 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3203 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3204 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3206 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3208 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3209 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3213 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3214 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3215 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3216 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3222 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3225 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3228 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3229 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3230 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3231 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3232 // problem, not ours.
3238 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3239 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3241 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3245 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3247 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3250 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3251 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3252 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3253 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3254 match forward_info {
3255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3256 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3258 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3259 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3261 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3262 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3263 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3264 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3265 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3266 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3267 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3269 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3271 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3272 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3274 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3276 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3277 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3278 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data },
3279 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3285 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3287 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3288 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3289 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3290 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3291 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3292 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3293 // this channel currently :/.
3299 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3300 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3302 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3303 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3304 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3306 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3307 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3309 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3311 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3312 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3313 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3316 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3318 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3319 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3320 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3321 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3322 // messages when we can.
3323 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3324 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3325 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3332 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3333 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3336 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3337 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3338 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3339 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3340 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3341 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3343 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3344 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3345 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3346 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3347 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3350 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3354 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3355 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3357 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3361 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3362 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3364 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3365 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3366 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3367 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3368 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3369 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3371 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3378 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3379 match forward_info {
3380 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3381 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3382 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3383 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3384 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3385 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3386 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3388 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3389 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3391 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3394 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3395 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3396 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3397 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3398 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3399 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3400 phantom_shared_secret,
3402 value: amt_to_forward,
3404 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3409 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3410 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3411 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3412 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3413 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3415 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3416 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3417 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3418 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3419 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3420 phantom_shared_secret,
3422 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3423 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3428 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3429 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3430 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3432 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3433 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3434 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3437 let (_, htlcs) = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3438 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3439 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3440 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3442 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3446 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3447 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3448 total_value += htlc.value;
3449 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3450 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3451 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3452 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3453 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3454 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3456 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3458 _ => unreachable!(),
3461 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3462 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3463 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3464 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3465 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3466 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3467 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3470 amount_msat: total_value,
3472 payment_received_generated = true;
3474 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3475 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3477 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3479 payment_received_generated
3483 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3484 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3485 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3486 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3487 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3488 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3489 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3490 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3491 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3492 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3493 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3494 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3495 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3496 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3498 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3502 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3504 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3505 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3506 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3507 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3508 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3509 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3511 amount_msat: amt_to_forward,
3515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3516 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3517 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3523 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3524 if payment_data.is_none() {
3525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3526 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3529 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3530 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3532 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3533 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3534 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3535 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3536 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3538 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3539 if payment_received_generated {
3540 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3546 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3547 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3555 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3556 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason, destination);
3558 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3560 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3561 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3564 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3565 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3566 events.append(&mut new_events);
3569 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3571 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3572 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3574 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3575 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3576 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3577 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3578 if background_events.is_empty() {
3582 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3584 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3585 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3586 // monitor updating completing.
3587 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3594 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3595 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3596 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3597 self.process_background_events();
3600 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3601 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3602 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3603 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3605 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3606 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3608 if !chan.is_live() {
3609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3610 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3611 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3613 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3614 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3616 let mut retain_channel = true;
3617 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3620 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3621 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3625 let ret_err = match res {
3626 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3627 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3628 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3630 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3631 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3632 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3633 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3634 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3635 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3636 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3643 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3644 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3652 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3656 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3657 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3658 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3659 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3660 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3661 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3662 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3664 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3666 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3668 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3669 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3670 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3671 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3672 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3673 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3675 handle_errors.push(err);
3685 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3686 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3687 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3688 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3689 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3690 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3691 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3693 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3694 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3695 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3696 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3697 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3698 if no_remaining_entries {
3699 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3701 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3702 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3703 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3704 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3705 no_remaining_entries = false;
3713 if no_remaining_entries {
3714 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3715 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3717 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3724 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3726 /// This currently includes:
3727 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3728 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3729 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3731 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3732 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3734 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3735 /// estimate fetches.
3736 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3737 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3738 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3739 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3741 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3743 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3744 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3746 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3748 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3749 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3750 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3751 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3752 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3754 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3756 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3758 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3759 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3760 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3761 if needs_close { return false; }
3764 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3765 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3766 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3767 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3768 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3769 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3775 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3776 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3778 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3779 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3780 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3784 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3785 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3790 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3795 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3796 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3797 // This should be unreachable
3798 debug_assert!(false);
3801 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3802 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3803 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3804 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3806 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3807 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3808 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3810 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.into_iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.prev_hop.clone(), payment_hash.clone())));
3818 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3819 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3820 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone()), &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 23, data: Vec::new() }, receiver );
3823 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3824 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3827 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3833 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3834 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3835 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3837 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3838 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3839 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3840 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3842 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3843 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3844 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3845 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3846 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3849 let removed_source = {
3850 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3851 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash)
3853 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3854 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3855 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3856 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3857 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3858 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
3859 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3860 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
3861 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash });
3866 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3867 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3869 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3871 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3872 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3873 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3874 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3875 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3876 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3877 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3879 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3881 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3882 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3884 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3889 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3890 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3891 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3892 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3893 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3894 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3895 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3896 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3897 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3898 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3900 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3901 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3902 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3903 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3905 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3906 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3907 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3908 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3909 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3913 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3914 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3915 // be surfaced to the user.
3916 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
3917 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
3918 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
3920 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3921 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3922 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3923 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3924 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
3926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
3930 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data }, receiver);
3934 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3935 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
3936 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason,destination: HTLCDestination) {
3937 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3939 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
3940 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
3941 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
3942 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
3943 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
3946 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3947 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3948 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3951 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3952 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3953 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3955 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3956 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3957 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3958 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3959 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3960 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3961 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3962 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3963 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3966 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3967 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3970 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3971 all_paths_failed = true;
3972 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3973 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3975 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3984 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3985 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3986 Some(RouteParameters {
3987 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3988 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3989 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3992 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3994 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3995 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3997 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3999 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4001 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4002 if !payment_retryable {
4003 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4005 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4009 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4011 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4017 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4018 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4019 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4020 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4021 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4023 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4024 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4025 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4026 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4033 error_code: onion_error_code,
4035 error_data: onion_error_data
4039 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4045 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4046 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4047 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4048 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4050 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4051 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4052 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4053 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4055 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4056 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4058 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4060 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4063 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4064 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4065 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4066 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4067 network_update: None,
4070 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4073 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4075 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4080 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4081 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4082 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4084 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret, outpoint }) => {
4085 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4086 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
4087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4088 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4089 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4090 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4091 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4093 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4094 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4097 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4099 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4103 let mut forward_event = None;
4104 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4105 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4106 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4108 match forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
4109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4110 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
4112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4113 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
4116 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4117 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4118 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4119 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4120 time_forwardable: time
4123 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4124 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4125 failed_next_destination: destination
4131 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4132 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4134 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4135 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4136 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4138 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4139 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4140 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4141 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4143 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4144 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4145 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4146 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4147 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4148 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4149 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4150 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4154 let removed_source = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
4155 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4156 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4158 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4159 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4160 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4161 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4163 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4164 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4165 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4166 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4167 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4169 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4170 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4171 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4172 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4173 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4174 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4175 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4176 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4177 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4178 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4185 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4190 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4191 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4192 debug_assert!(false);
4196 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4197 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4198 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4199 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4200 if sources.len() != 1 {
4201 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4202 debug_assert!(false);
4208 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4210 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4211 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4214 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4215 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4216 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4220 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4221 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4222 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4223 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4224 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4225 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4226 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4227 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4228 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4230 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4231 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4232 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4233 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4234 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4235 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4237 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4241 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4243 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4244 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4245 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4246 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4247 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(
4248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
4249 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data },
4250 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash } );
4254 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4255 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4257 purpose: payment_purpose,
4258 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4262 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4263 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4264 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4265 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4270 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4271 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4272 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4273 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4274 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4276 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
4280 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4281 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4282 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4283 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4284 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4285 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4287 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4288 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4289 payment_preimage, e);
4290 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4291 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4292 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4293 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4297 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4298 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4299 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4300 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4301 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4302 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4303 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4304 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4305 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4306 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4312 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4314 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4317 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4318 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4319 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4321 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4322 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4323 payment_preimage, e);
4326 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4327 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4329 chan.remove_entry();
4331 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4334 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4337 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4338 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4339 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4340 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4341 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4342 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4343 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4344 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4345 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4346 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4347 pending_events.push(
4348 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4350 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4360 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4362 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4363 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4364 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4365 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4366 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4367 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4368 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4369 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4370 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4371 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4372 pending_events.push(
4373 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4374 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4380 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4384 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4385 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4386 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4388 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4389 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4390 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4391 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4392 pending_events.push(
4393 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4405 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4406 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4407 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4408 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4409 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4410 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4411 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4414 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4415 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4416 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4417 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4418 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4421 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4422 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4423 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4424 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4425 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4426 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4427 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4428 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4429 // again on restart.
4430 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4431 payment_preimage, update_res);
4433 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4434 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4435 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4436 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4439 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4440 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4441 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4442 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4446 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4447 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4448 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4451 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4452 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4453 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4455 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4457 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4467 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4468 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4469 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4472 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4473 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4475 let chan_restoration_res;
4476 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4477 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4478 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4479 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4480 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4481 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4483 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4487 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4488 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4489 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4490 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4491 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4492 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4493 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4495 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4496 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4497 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4502 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4503 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4504 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4507 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4509 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4510 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4511 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4512 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4513 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
4517 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4519 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4520 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4523 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4524 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4525 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4527 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4528 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4529 /// used to accept such channels.
4531 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4532 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4533 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4534 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4537 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4538 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4540 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4541 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4542 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4544 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4545 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4547 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4548 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4550 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4551 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4553 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4554 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4555 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4556 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4559 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4562 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4563 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4564 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4565 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4566 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4567 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4569 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4570 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4573 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4574 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4575 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4576 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4577 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4578 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4581 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4582 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4586 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4587 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4588 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4592 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4598 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4599 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4600 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4603 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4604 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4607 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4608 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4609 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration,
4610 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4613 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4614 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4618 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4619 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4620 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4626 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4627 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4628 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4630 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4631 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4632 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(0),
4635 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4636 pending_events.push(
4637 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4638 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4639 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4640 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4641 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4642 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4647 entry.insert(channel);
4653 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4654 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4655 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4656 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4657 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4659 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4660 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4662 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4663 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4668 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4669 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4670 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4671 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4672 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4674 user_channel_id: user_id,
4679 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4680 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4681 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4682 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4684 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4686 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4689 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4694 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4695 // lock before watch_channel
4696 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4697 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4698 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4699 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4700 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4701 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4702 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4703 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4704 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4705 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4706 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4707 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4710 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4711 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4712 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4713 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4714 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4715 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4716 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4719 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4721 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4722 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4723 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4725 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4726 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4727 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4728 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4729 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4730 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4731 funding_msg.channel_id))
4733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4734 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4737 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4738 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4741 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4742 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4750 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4752 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4753 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4754 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4755 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4757 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4760 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4761 Ok(update) => update,
4762 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4764 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4765 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4767 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4768 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4769 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4770 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4771 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4772 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4773 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4779 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4780 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4787 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4788 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4792 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4793 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4794 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4795 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4797 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4800 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4801 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4802 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4803 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4804 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4805 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4806 msg: announcement_sigs,
4808 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4809 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4810 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4811 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4812 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4813 // announcement_signatures.
4814 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4815 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4816 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4817 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4823 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4831 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4832 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4833 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4835 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4837 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4838 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4839 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4840 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4843 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4844 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4845 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4846 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4849 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4850 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4852 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4853 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4854 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
4855 let (result, is_permanent) =
4856 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
4858 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
4863 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4864 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4865 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4875 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4876 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
4877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
4880 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4884 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4885 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4886 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4887 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4888 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4890 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4891 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4893 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
4894 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4895 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4896 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4901 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4902 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4903 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4904 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4905 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4906 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
4907 } else { (tx, None) }
4909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4912 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4913 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4914 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4916 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4917 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4918 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4923 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4928 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4929 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4930 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4931 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4933 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4934 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4935 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4936 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4938 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4939 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4940 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4944 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4948 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4949 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4950 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4951 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4952 match pending_forward_info {
4953 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4954 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4955 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
4956 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
4958 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4960 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4961 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4962 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4965 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4967 _ => pending_forward_info
4970 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4977 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4979 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4980 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4981 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4983 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4986 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
4988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4991 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
4995 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4996 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4997 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4998 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5000 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5001 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5003 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5010 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5011 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5015 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5016 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5018 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5019 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5020 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5022 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), chan);
5025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5029 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5030 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5031 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5032 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5033 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5034 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5035 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5037 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5038 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5039 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5040 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5041 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5042 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5043 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5048 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5049 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5053 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5054 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5055 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5057 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5059 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5060 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5061 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5062 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5063 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5064 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5066 commitment_signed: msg,
5072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5077 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5078 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5079 let mut forward_event = None;
5080 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5081 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5082 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5083 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
5085 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5086 match forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
5087 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5088 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5089 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5092 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5093 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
5095 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5096 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5097 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
5102 match forward_event {
5104 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5105 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5106 time_forwardable: time
5114 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5115 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5117 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5118 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5119 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5120 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5121 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5122 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5124 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5125 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5126 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5127 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5128 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5129 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5130 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5131 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5132 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5133 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5134 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5135 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5137 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5138 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5139 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5140 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5141 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5142 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5144 } else { unreachable!(); }
5146 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5148 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5152 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5153 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5154 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5155 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5156 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
5158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5161 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5163 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5164 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
5166 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5167 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5168 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2, receiver);
5170 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
5171 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5178 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5180 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5181 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5183 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5184 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5186 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan);
5188 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5193 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5194 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5197 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5198 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5199 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5200 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5202 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5206 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5207 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5208 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5209 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5210 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5211 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5219 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5220 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5221 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5222 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5224 // It's not a local channel
5225 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5228 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5229 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5230 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5232 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5233 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5234 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5235 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5236 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5237 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5239 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5241 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5242 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5243 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5244 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5246 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5247 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5252 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5255 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5256 let chan_restoration_res;
5257 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
5258 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5259 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5261 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5263 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5264 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5266 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5267 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5268 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5269 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5270 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5271 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5272 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5273 let mut channel_update = None;
5274 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5275 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5276 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5279 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5280 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5281 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5282 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5283 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5284 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5285 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5290 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5291 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(
5292 self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5293 responses.mon_update, Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5294 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5295 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5297 (responses.holding_cell_failed_htlcs, need_lnd_workaround)
5299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5302 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
5303 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5305 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5306 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5311 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5312 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5313 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5314 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5315 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5316 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5317 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5318 match monitor_event {
5319 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5320 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5321 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5322 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5325 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5326 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
5329 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5330 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5331 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5332 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5333 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5334 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5335 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5336 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5337 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5338 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5339 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5343 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5344 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5346 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5348 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5349 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5350 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5351 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5352 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5357 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5358 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5364 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5365 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5368 has_pending_monitor_events
5371 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5372 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5373 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5375 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5376 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5379 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5380 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5381 /// update was applied.
5383 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5384 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5385 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5386 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5387 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5388 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5389 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5390 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5392 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5393 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5394 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5395 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5397 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5398 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5399 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5400 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5402 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5404 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5407 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5408 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5409 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5410 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5411 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5412 updates: commitment_update,
5416 has_monitor_update = true;
5417 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5418 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5419 if close_channel { return false; }
5426 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5427 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5428 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5435 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5436 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5437 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5440 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5441 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5447 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5448 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5449 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5450 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5451 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5452 let mut has_update = false;
5454 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5455 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5456 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5457 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5459 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5460 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5461 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5462 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5464 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5465 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5468 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5469 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5470 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5471 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5472 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5477 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5479 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5480 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5481 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5487 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5488 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5495 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5496 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5502 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5503 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5505 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5506 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5507 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5508 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5509 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5510 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5511 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5512 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5513 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5514 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5515 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5516 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5517 assert!(should_broadcast);
5518 } else { unreachable!(); }
5519 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5521 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5525 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5526 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5528 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5529 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5532 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5535 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5536 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5538 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5539 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5540 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5541 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5542 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5543 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5544 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5545 // never fail a payment too early.
5546 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5548 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5556 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5559 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5560 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5562 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5563 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5564 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5566 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5568 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5569 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5573 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5574 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5576 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5578 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5579 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5580 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5581 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5582 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5583 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5586 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5587 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5589 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5592 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5594 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5596 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5597 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5598 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5599 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5600 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5603 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5604 /// stored external to LDK.
5606 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5607 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5608 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5610 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5611 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5614 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5615 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5616 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5617 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5619 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5620 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5621 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5622 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5623 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5625 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5626 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5627 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5628 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5629 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5631 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5632 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5634 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5635 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5639 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5640 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5642 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5644 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5645 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5646 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5647 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5650 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5651 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5653 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5656 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5658 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5660 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5661 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5664 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5665 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5667 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5668 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5669 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5672 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5673 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5675 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5676 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5677 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5678 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5680 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5681 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5682 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5683 Some(_) => continue,
5684 None => return scid_candidate
5689 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5691 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5692 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5694 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5695 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5696 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5700 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5701 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5702 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5703 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5704 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5709 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5710 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5714 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5715 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5719 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5720 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5721 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5722 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5723 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5726 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5727 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5728 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5729 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5731 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5732 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5733 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5734 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5737 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5740 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5741 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5744 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5745 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5746 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5748 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5749 events.replace(pending_events);
5758 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5760 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5761 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5762 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5763 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5766 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5768 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5769 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5770 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5771 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5772 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5774 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5775 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5776 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5777 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5780 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5781 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5782 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5785 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5786 handler.handle_event(&event);
5794 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5796 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5797 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5798 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5799 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5802 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5804 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5805 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
5806 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5807 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5808 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5811 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
5812 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
5815 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5816 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5817 let new_height = height - 1;
5819 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5820 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5821 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5822 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5823 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5824 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5827 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5831 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5833 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5834 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5835 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5836 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5839 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5840 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5841 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5842 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5844 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5845 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5847 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5848 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
5849 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
5851 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5852 if height < last_best_block_height {
5853 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5854 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5858 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5859 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5860 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5861 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5863 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5864 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5866 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5868 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5870 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
5872 macro_rules! max_time {
5873 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5875 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5876 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5877 // having an explicit local time source.
5878 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5879 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5880 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5881 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5882 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5888 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5889 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5890 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5891 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5895 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5896 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5897 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
5898 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5899 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5900 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5906 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5908 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5909 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5910 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5911 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
5912 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5913 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
5918 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5920 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5921 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5922 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5923 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5926 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5927 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5929 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
5930 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5931 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5932 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5933 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5935 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5936 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5938 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5939 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5940 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5941 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5942 let res = f(channel);
5943 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
5944 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5945 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
5946 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5948 }, HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
5950 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
5951 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
5952 if channel.is_usable() {
5953 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5954 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
5955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5956 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5961 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5965 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
5967 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
5968 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5970 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5971 msg: announcement_sigs,
5973 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5974 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
5975 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5977 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5978 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5979 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
5984 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
5985 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5986 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
5987 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
5988 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
5989 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
5990 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
5991 // is always consistent.
5992 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
5993 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
5994 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
5995 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
5996 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
5999 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6000 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6001 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6002 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6003 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6004 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6009 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6010 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6011 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6012 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6013 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6014 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6015 data: reason_message,
6023 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6024 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6025 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6026 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6027 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6028 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6029 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6030 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6031 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6032 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6034 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
6035 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
6036 data: htlc_msat_height_data
6037 }, HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6041 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6046 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6048 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6049 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, reason, destination);
6053 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6054 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6055 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6058 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6059 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6060 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6061 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6064 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6065 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
6067 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6068 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6071 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6072 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6073 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6074 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6075 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6078 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6079 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6080 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6083 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6084 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6085 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6086 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6090 impl<M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
6091 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6092 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6094 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6098 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6100 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6103 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6105 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6108 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6113 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6115 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6118 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6120 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6123 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6125 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6128 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6130 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6133 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6134 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6135 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6138 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6140 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6143 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6145 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6148 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6150 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6153 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6154 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6155 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6158 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6160 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6163 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6164 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6165 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6168 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6169 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6170 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6173 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6174 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6175 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6178 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6183 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6184 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6185 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6188 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6189 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6190 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6191 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6193 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6194 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6195 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6196 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6197 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6198 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6199 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6200 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6201 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6202 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6203 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6206 no_channels_remain = false;
6211 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6213 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6214 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6215 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6216 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6217 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6218 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6219 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6220 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6221 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6222 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6223 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6224 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6225 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6226 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6227 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6228 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6232 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6236 if no_channels_remain {
6237 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6240 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6241 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6245 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6246 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6247 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6251 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6256 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6257 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6259 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6260 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6264 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6269 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6270 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6271 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6272 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6273 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6274 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6275 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6276 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6277 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6282 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6283 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6288 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6289 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6290 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6291 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6292 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6300 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6304 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6307 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6308 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6309 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6310 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6311 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6316 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6317 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6318 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6319 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6322 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6323 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6324 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6332 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6333 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6337 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6338 provided_node_features()
6341 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6342 provided_init_features()
6346 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6347 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6348 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6349 provided_init_features().to_context()
6352 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6353 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6355 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6356 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6357 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6358 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6359 provided_init_features().to_context()
6362 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6363 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6364 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6365 provided_init_features().to_context()
6368 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6369 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6370 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6371 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6372 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6373 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6374 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6375 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6376 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6377 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6378 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6379 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6380 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6381 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6382 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6383 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6384 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6385 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6389 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6390 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6392 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6393 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6394 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6395 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6398 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6399 (2, node_id, required),
6400 (4, features, required),
6401 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6402 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6403 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6404 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6407 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelDetails, {
6408 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6409 (2, channel_id, required),
6410 (3, channel_type, option),
6411 (4, counterparty, required),
6412 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6413 (6, funding_txo, option),
6414 (7, config, option),
6415 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6416 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6417 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6418 (14, user_channel_id, required),
6419 (16, balance_msat, required),
6420 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6421 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6422 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6423 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6424 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6425 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6426 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6427 (26, is_outbound, required),
6428 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6429 (30, is_usable, required),
6430 (32, is_public, required),
6431 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6432 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6435 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6436 (2, channels, vec_type),
6437 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6438 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6441 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6443 (0, onion_packet, required),
6444 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6447 (0, payment_data, required),
6448 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6449 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6451 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6452 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6453 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6457 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6458 (0, routing, required),
6459 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6460 (4, payment_hash, required),
6461 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
6462 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
6466 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6467 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6469 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6471 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6472 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6473 reason.write(writer)?;
6475 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6476 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6479 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6480 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6481 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6482 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6489 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6490 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6491 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6494 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6495 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6496 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6501 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6502 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6503 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6504 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6505 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6508 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6509 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6510 // messages contained in the variants.
6511 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6512 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6513 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6515 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6517 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6518 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6519 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6522 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6524 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6525 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6526 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6528 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6533 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6538 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6539 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6540 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6541 (2, outpoint, required),
6542 (4, htlc_id, required),
6543 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6546 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6547 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6548 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6549 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6550 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6552 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6553 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6554 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6555 (2, self.value, required),
6556 (4, payment_data, option),
6557 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6558 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6564 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6565 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6566 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6568 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6569 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6570 let mut total_msat = None;
6571 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6572 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6573 (0, prev_hop, required),
6574 (1, total_msat, option),
6575 (2, value, required),
6576 (4, payment_data, option),
6577 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6578 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6580 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6582 if payment_data.is_some() {
6583 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6585 if total_msat.is_none() {
6586 total_msat = Some(value);
6588 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6591 if total_msat.is_none() {
6592 if payment_data.is_none() {
6593 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6595 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6597 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6601 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6604 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6611 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6612 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6613 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6616 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6617 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6618 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6619 let mut payment_id = None;
6620 let mut payment_secret = None;
6621 let mut payment_params = None;
6622 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6623 (0, session_priv, required),
6624 (1, payment_id, option),
6625 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6626 (3, payment_secret, option),
6627 (4, path, vec_type),
6628 (5, payment_params, option),
6630 if payment_id.is_none() {
6631 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6633 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6635 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6636 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6637 first_hop_htlc_msat,
6638 path: path.unwrap(),
6639 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6644 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6645 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6650 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6651 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
6653 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6655 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6656 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6657 (0, session_priv, required),
6658 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6659 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6660 (3, payment_secret, option),
6661 (4, *path, vec_type),
6662 (5, payment_params, option),
6665 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6667 field.write(writer)?;
6674 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6675 (0, LightningError) => {
6679 (0, failure_code, required),
6680 (2, data, vec_type),
6684 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6686 (0, forward_info, required),
6687 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6688 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6689 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6692 (0, htlc_id, required),
6693 (2, err_packet, required),
6697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6698 (0, payment_secret, required),
6699 (2, expiry_time, required),
6700 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6701 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6702 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6705 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6707 (0, session_privs, required),
6710 (0, session_privs, required),
6711 (1, payment_hash, option),
6712 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
6715 (0, session_privs, required),
6716 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6717 (2, payment_hash, required),
6718 (4, payment_secret, option),
6719 (6, total_msat, required),
6720 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6721 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6724 (0, session_privs, required),
6725 (2, payment_hash, required),
6729 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6730 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6731 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6732 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6733 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6736 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6737 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6739 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6741 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6743 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6744 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6745 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6749 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
6750 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
6751 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6752 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6753 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6754 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6755 unfunded_channels += 1;
6758 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6759 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6760 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6761 channel.write(writer)?;
6767 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6768 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6769 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
6770 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6771 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6772 for forward in pending_forwards {
6773 forward.write(writer)?;
6778 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6779 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
6780 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6781 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6782 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6783 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6784 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6785 htlc.write(writer)?;
6787 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
6790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6791 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6792 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6793 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6794 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6795 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6798 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6799 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6800 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6801 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6802 for event in events.iter() {
6803 event.write(writer)?;
6806 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6807 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6808 for event in background_events.iter() {
6810 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6812 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6813 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6818 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
6819 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
6820 // likely to be identical.
6821 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6822 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6824 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6825 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6826 hash.write(writer)?;
6827 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6830 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6831 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6832 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6833 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6834 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6837 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6838 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6840 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6841 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6842 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6843 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6846 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6847 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6851 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6852 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6853 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6855 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6856 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6857 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6862 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6863 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6864 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6865 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
6866 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
6867 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
6868 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
6875 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6877 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6879 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6880 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6881 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6882 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6883 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6884 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6885 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6886 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6887 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6888 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6889 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6890 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6891 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6893 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6894 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6896 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6897 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6899 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6900 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6901 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6902 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6903 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6904 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6906 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6907 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6908 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6909 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6910 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6911 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6914 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6915 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6917 pub keys_manager: K,
6919 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6921 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6922 pub fee_estimator: F,
6923 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6925 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6926 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6927 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6928 pub chain_monitor: M,
6930 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6931 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6932 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6933 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6934 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6935 /// deserialization.
6937 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6938 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6939 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6941 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6942 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6944 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6945 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6946 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6947 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6949 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6952 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6953 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6956 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6957 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6958 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6960 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6964 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6965 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6966 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6967 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6968 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6970 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6971 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6976 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6977 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6978 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6979 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
6980 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6981 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6982 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6983 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6986 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6987 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6988 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6992 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6993 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
6994 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6995 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6996 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7000 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, <K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7001 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7003 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7009 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7011 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7012 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7013 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7014 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7015 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7016 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7017 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7018 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7019 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7020 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7021 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7022 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7023 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7024 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7025 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7026 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7027 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7028 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7029 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7030 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7031 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7032 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7033 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7034 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7035 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7036 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7037 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7038 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7039 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7040 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7041 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7042 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7043 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7044 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7045 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7046 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7047 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7048 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7051 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7052 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7053 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7055 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7056 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7058 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7060 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7061 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7062 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7063 // safely discard the channel.
7064 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7065 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7066 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7067 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7068 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7071 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7072 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7073 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7074 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7075 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7076 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7080 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7081 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7082 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7083 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7087 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7088 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7090 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7091 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7092 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7093 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7094 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7095 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7097 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7100 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7102 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7103 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7104 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7105 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7106 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7107 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7109 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7112 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7113 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7114 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7115 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7116 let peer_state = PeerState {
7117 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7119 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7122 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7124 for _ in 0..event_count {
7125 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7126 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7130 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7131 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7132 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7133 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7134 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7135 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7136 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7137 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7141 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7142 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7143 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7144 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7145 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7146 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7150 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7151 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7153 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7155 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7156 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7161 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7162 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7163 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7164 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7165 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7166 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7167 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7169 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7170 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7174 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7175 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7176 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7177 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7178 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7179 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7180 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7181 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7182 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7183 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7184 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7185 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7186 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7187 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7189 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7190 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7193 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7194 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7197 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7198 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7199 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7200 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7201 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7202 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7204 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7206 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7207 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7208 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7209 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7210 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7211 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7212 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7214 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7215 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7216 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7217 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7218 if path.is_empty() {
7219 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7220 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7222 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7223 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7224 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7225 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7226 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7227 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7228 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7229 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7231 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7232 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7233 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7234 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7235 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7237 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7238 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7239 total_msat: path_amt,
7240 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7242 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7243 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7252 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7253 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7255 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7256 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7257 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7258 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7260 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7261 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7264 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7265 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7266 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7267 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7268 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7270 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7271 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7272 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7273 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7274 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7275 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7276 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7277 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7279 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7284 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7286 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7288 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7289 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7291 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7295 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7296 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7298 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7299 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7302 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7304 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7306 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7307 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7308 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7309 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7310 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7314 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7315 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7316 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7317 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7319 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7320 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7321 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7323 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7324 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7325 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7326 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7327 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7328 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7330 if chan.is_usable() {
7331 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7332 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7333 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7334 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7335 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7340 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7342 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7343 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7344 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7345 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7346 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7347 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7348 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7350 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7351 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7352 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7353 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7355 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7356 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7357 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7358 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7360 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7361 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7362 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7363 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7365 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7366 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7367 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7369 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7370 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7373 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7375 purpose: payment_purpose,
7376 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7382 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7384 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7385 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7386 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7388 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7390 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7393 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7395 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7396 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7397 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7399 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7400 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7401 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7402 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7403 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7405 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7411 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7413 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7415 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7416 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7417 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7418 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7420 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7421 logger: args.logger,
7422 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7425 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7426 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7427 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7428 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() }, receiver);
7431 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7432 //connection or two.
7434 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7440 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7441 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7442 use core::time::Duration;
7443 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7444 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7445 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7446 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7447 use crate::ln::msgs;
7448 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7449 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7450 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7451 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7452 use crate::util::test_utils;
7453 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7456 fn test_notify_limits() {
7457 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7458 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7459 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7462 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7464 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7465 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7466 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7467 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7468 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7470 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7472 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7473 // to connect messages with new values
7474 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7475 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7476 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7477 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7479 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7480 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7481 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7482 // ... but the last node should not.
7483 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7484 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7485 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7486 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7488 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7489 // about the channel.
7490 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7491 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7492 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7494 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7496 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7497 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7498 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7499 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7500 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7501 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7503 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7504 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7505 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7507 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7508 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7509 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7510 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7511 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7512 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7514 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7515 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7516 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7517 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7518 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7519 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7520 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7521 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7523 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7524 // the channel info has updated.
7525 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7526 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7527 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7528 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7529 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7530 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7534 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7535 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7541 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7543 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7544 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7545 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7546 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7548 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7549 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7550 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7551 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7552 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7553 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7555 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7556 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7557 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7559 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7560 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7562 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7563 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7564 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7565 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7566 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7568 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7569 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7570 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7572 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7573 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7574 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7575 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7576 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7577 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7578 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7579 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7582 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7583 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7585 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7586 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7587 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7589 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7590 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7591 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7592 // lightning messages manually.
7593 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7594 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7597 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7598 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7599 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
7600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7601 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7602 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
7603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7604 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7605 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
7606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7607 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7608 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7609 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7611 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7612 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
7613 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7615 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
7616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7617 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
7618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7619 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7620 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
7621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7623 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
7624 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
7625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
7628 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
7629 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
7630 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
7631 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
7633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7636 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7637 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7638 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7639 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7644 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
7645 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
7646 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
7647 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
7649 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7654 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
7655 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
7656 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
7657 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
7658 // fails as expected.
7659 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7660 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7661 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7662 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7663 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7664 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7665 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7667 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
7668 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
7669 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
7671 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
7672 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7673 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
7674 final_value_msat: 100_000,
7675 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
7677 let route = find_route(
7678 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7679 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7681 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7683 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7685 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7686 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7689 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7690 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
7691 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
7692 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7693 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7695 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7696 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7697 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7699 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7700 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7702 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7703 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7705 // Finally, claim the original payment.
7706 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7708 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
7709 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7710 let route = find_route(
7711 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
7712 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7714 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7716 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7718 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
7719 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
7720 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
7722 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
7723 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7724 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7726 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7728 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7729 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7732 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7733 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
7735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7736 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7737 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7738 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7739 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7740 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7741 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7743 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7744 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7746 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7747 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7751 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7752 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7753 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7759 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7760 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7761 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7762 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7764 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7765 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7766 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7767 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7768 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7770 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7771 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7772 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7773 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7774 let route = find_route(
7775 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7776 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7779 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7780 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7781 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7782 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7785 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7786 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7787 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7788 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7789 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7790 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7791 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7793 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7797 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7798 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7804 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7805 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7806 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7807 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7809 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7810 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7811 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7812 final_value_msat: 10_000,
7813 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7815 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7816 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7817 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7818 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7819 let route = find_route(
7820 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7821 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
7824 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7825 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7826 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7827 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
7828 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
7829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7831 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7832 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7833 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7834 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7835 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7836 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7837 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7839 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7843 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7844 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7845 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7846 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7847 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7849 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7850 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7851 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7852 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7854 // Marshall an MPP route.
7855 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7856 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7857 route.paths.push(path);
7858 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7859 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7860 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7861 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7862 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7863 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7865 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
7866 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7867 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7868 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7873 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7874 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7880 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7881 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7883 total_msat: 100_000,
7886 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7887 // payment verification fails as expected.
7888 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7889 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7890 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7891 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7893 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7897 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7898 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7902 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
7903 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
7904 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
7905 // the channel is successfully closed.
7906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7909 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7911 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7912 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
7914 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7915 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7917 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
7918 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
7920 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
7921 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
7922 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7923 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7926 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7928 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7929 // as it has the funding transaction.
7930 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7931 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7932 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7934 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7937 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7939 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7941 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7942 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7943 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7945 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
7946 // as it has the funding transaction.
7947 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7948 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7949 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7952 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7953 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
7954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7955 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
7956 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
7957 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
7959 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7960 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7961 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7962 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
7964 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7965 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
7967 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
7968 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
7969 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
7970 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
7971 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7972 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
7973 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7975 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
7976 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
7977 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
7978 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
7979 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7980 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7981 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
7984 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
7986 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
7987 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
7988 // closing transaction).
7989 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
7990 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
7991 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7993 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
7994 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
7995 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7996 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
7997 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8000 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8002 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8004 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8005 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8006 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8008 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8010 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8011 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8015 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8017 use crate::chain::Listen;
8018 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8019 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8020 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8021 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8022 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8023 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8024 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8025 use crate::util::test_utils;
8026 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8027 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8029 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8030 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8031 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8033 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8037 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8038 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8039 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8040 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8041 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8042 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8043 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8048 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8049 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8052 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8053 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8054 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8056 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8057 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8059 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8060 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8062 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8063 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8065 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8066 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8067 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8068 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8069 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8071 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8073 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8075 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8076 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8077 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8078 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8079 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8081 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8083 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8085 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8086 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8087 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8088 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8089 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8092 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8093 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8094 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8096 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8097 } else { panic!(); }
8099 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8100 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8102 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8105 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8108 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8109 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8111 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8112 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8113 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8114 match msg_events[0] {
8115 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8116 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8117 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8121 match msg_events[1] {
8122 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8126 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8129 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8130 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8135 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8136 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8138 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8139 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8141 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8144 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8146 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8147 macro_rules! send_payment {
8148 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8149 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8150 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8151 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8152 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8153 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8154 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8155 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8156 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8157 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8159 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8160 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8162 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8163 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8165 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8166 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8167 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8168 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8169 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8170 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8171 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8172 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8175 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8176 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8177 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8179 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8180 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8181 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8182 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8183 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8185 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8188 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8189 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8190 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8191 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8193 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8198 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8199 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);