1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82 crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
88 use crate::prelude::*;
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
124 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125 /// do with the HTLC.
126 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
129 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
136 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
138 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
141 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
147 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
158 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
161 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166 requires_blinded_error: bool,
168 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
172 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
175 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
183 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
188 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
192 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
206 /// the introduction node.
207 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
210 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
211 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
212 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
214 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
215 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
221 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
223 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
224 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
225 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
226 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
227 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
228 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
230 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
231 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
232 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
233 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
236 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
238 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
239 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
240 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
242 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
243 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
244 /// it along another path).
246 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
247 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
248 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
249 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
250 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
251 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
252 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
253 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
254 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
256 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
259 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
261 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
263 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
268 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
269 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
272 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
273 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
274 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
275 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
276 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
279 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
280 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
281 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
283 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
284 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
285 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
288 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
289 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
291 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
292 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
293 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
296 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
297 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
298 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
301 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
306 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
310 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
311 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
313 pub enum BlindedFailure {
314 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
315 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
316 FromIntroductionNode,
317 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
318 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
322 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
323 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
325 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
326 short_channel_id: u64,
327 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
329 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
330 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
331 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
332 channel_id: ChannelId,
334 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
335 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
340 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
342 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
343 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
344 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
346 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
347 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
350 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
351 struct ClaimableHTLC {
352 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
354 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
356 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
357 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
358 sender_intended_value: u64,
359 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
361 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
362 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
363 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
364 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
366 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
367 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
370 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
371 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
372 events::ClaimedHTLC {
373 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
374 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
375 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
376 value_msat: val.value,
377 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
382 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
383 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
385 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
386 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
387 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
390 /// Number of bytes in the id.
391 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
394 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
400 impl Readable for PaymentId {
401 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
402 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
407 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
408 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
409 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
413 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
415 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
416 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
417 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
419 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
420 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
425 impl Readable for InterceptId {
426 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
427 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
432 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
433 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
434 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
435 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
436 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
439 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
441 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
442 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
443 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
445 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
446 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
451 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
452 (0, short_channel_id, required),
453 (2, htlc_id, required),
455 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
456 (0, session_priv, required),
461 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
462 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
463 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
464 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
465 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
468 session_priv: SecretKey,
469 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
470 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
471 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
472 payment_id: PaymentId,
475 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
476 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
477 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
479 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
481 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
483 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
486 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
487 payment_id.hash(hasher);
488 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
494 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
496 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
497 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
498 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
499 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
500 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
501 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
505 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
506 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
507 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
508 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
509 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
510 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
512 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
518 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
519 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
521 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
522 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
523 pub enum FailureCode {
524 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
525 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
526 TemporaryNodeFailure,
527 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
528 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
529 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
530 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
531 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
532 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
533 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
534 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
535 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
536 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
538 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
539 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
540 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
543 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
544 fn into(self) -> u16 {
546 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
547 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
548 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
549 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
554 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
555 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
556 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
557 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
558 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
560 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
561 err: msgs::LightningError,
562 closes_channel: bool,
563 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
565 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
567 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
569 err: LightningError {
571 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
572 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
578 closes_channel: false,
579 shutdown_finish: None,
583 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
584 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
587 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
588 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
589 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
590 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
591 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
592 // commitment upon reconnecting.
593 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
595 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
598 err: LightningError { err, action },
599 closes_channel: true,
600 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
604 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
607 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
609 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
610 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
614 log_level: Level::Warn,
617 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
619 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
621 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
623 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
624 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
631 closes_channel: false,
632 shutdown_finish: None,
636 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
641 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
642 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
643 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
644 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
645 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
647 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
648 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
649 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
650 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
651 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
652 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
653 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
655 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
659 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
660 struct ClaimingPayment {
662 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
663 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
664 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
665 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
668 (0, amount_msat, required),
669 (2, payment_purpose, required),
670 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
671 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
672 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
675 struct ClaimablePayment {
676 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
677 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
678 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
681 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
682 struct ClaimablePayments {
683 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
684 /// failed/claimed by the user.
686 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
687 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
689 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
690 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
691 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
693 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
694 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
695 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
696 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
699 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
700 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
701 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
704 enum BackgroundEvent {
705 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
706 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
707 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
708 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
710 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
711 /// are regenerated on startup.
712 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
713 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
714 /// channel to continue normal operation.
716 /// In general this should be used rather than
717 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
718 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
719 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
724 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
725 funding_txo: OutPoint,
726 channel_id: ChannelId,
727 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
729 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
730 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
732 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
733 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
734 channel_id: ChannelId,
739 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
740 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
741 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
742 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
743 /// event can be generated.
744 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
745 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
746 /// operation of another channel.
748 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
749 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
750 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
751 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
753 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
754 event: events::Event,
755 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
757 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
758 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
759 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
761 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
762 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
763 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
764 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
765 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
767 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
768 /// stored for later processing.
769 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
770 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
771 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
772 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
773 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
777 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
778 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
779 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
780 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
781 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
782 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
783 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
784 (4, blocking_action, required),
785 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
786 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
787 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
789 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
790 (0, event, upgradable_required),
791 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
792 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
793 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
794 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
795 // downgrades to prior versions.
796 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
800 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
801 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
802 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
803 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
804 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
805 channel_id: ChannelId,
808 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
809 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
810 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
811 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
812 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
813 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
814 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
818 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
819 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
820 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
821 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
822 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
823 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
825 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
826 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
827 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
833 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
834 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
835 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
836 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
837 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
842 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
843 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
847 /// State we hold per-peer.
848 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
849 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
851 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
852 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
853 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
855 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
856 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
857 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
858 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
859 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
860 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
861 latest_features: InitFeatures,
862 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
863 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
864 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
865 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
866 /// user but which have not yet completed.
868 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
869 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
870 /// for a missing channel.
871 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
872 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
873 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
875 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
876 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
877 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
878 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
880 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
881 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
882 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
883 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
884 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
885 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
886 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
887 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
888 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
889 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
890 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
891 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
892 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
893 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
894 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
898 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
899 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
900 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
901 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
902 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
903 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
906 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
907 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
908 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
911 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
912 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
913 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
916 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
917 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
918 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
919 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
923 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
924 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
925 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
926 /// The original OpenChannel message.
927 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
928 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
929 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
932 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
933 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
934 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
936 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
937 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
939 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
942 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
943 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
944 struct PendingInboundPayment {
945 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
946 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
947 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
948 /// this payment being removed.
950 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
951 user_payment_id: u64,
952 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
953 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
954 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
957 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
958 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
959 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
960 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
961 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
962 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
963 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
964 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
966 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
967 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
968 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
976 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
978 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
979 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
980 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
985 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
986 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
987 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
988 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
989 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
990 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
991 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
992 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
993 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
995 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
996 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
997 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1006 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1008 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1009 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1010 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1015 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1017 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1019 pub trait AChannelManager {
1020 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1021 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1022 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1023 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1024 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1025 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1026 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1027 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1028 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1029 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1030 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1031 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1032 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1033 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1034 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1035 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1036 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1037 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1038 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1039 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1040 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1041 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1042 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1043 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1045 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1047 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1049 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1051 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1053 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1054 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1055 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1058 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1059 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1061 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1062 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1063 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1064 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1065 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1066 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1070 type Watch = M::Target;
1072 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1074 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1076 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1078 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1079 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1081 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1083 type Router = R::Target;
1085 type Logger = L::Target;
1087 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1090 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1091 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1093 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1094 /// to individual Channels.
1096 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1097 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1098 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1099 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1101 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1102 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1103 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1104 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1105 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1106 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1107 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1108 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1109 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1111 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1112 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1113 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1115 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1116 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1117 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1118 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1119 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1121 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1122 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1123 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1124 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1126 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1127 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1128 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1130 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1131 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1132 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1133 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1134 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1136 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1137 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1138 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1139 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1140 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1141 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1142 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1143 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1146 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1147 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1148 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1149 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1150 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1154 // `pending_offers_messages`
1156 // `total_consistency_lock`
1158 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1160 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1162 // |__`per_peer_state`
1164 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1166 // |__`claimable_payments`
1168 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1172 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1174 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1176 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1180 // |__`pending_events`
1182 // |__`pending_background_events`
1184 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1186 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1187 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1188 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1189 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1190 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1191 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1195 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1196 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1197 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1203 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1207 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1208 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1210 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1211 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1212 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1213 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1215 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1216 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1218 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1219 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1220 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1221 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1222 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1223 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1224 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1225 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1227 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1229 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1230 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1232 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1234 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1235 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1236 /// and via the classic SCID.
1238 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1239 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1241 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1243 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1245 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1246 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1247 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1249 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1250 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1252 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1253 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1255 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1256 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1258 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1259 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1260 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1261 /// active channel list on load.
1263 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1264 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1266 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1268 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1269 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1270 /// the handling of the events.
1272 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1273 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1276 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1277 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1278 /// would break backwards compatability.
1279 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1280 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1281 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1283 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1285 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1287 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1289 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1291 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1292 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1293 /// confirmation depth.
1295 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1296 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1297 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1301 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1303 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1305 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1307 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1309 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1310 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1311 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1313 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1314 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1316 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1317 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1318 /// keeping additional state.
1319 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1321 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1322 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1323 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1324 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1326 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1327 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1329 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1330 /// are currently open with that peer.
1332 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1333 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1336 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1338 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1339 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1340 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1341 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1342 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1344 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1345 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1346 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1347 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1348 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1350 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1351 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1353 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1354 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1355 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1356 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1357 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1359 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1360 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1362 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1363 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1364 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1365 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1366 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1368 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1370 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1372 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1373 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1374 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1375 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1376 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1377 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1378 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1379 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1380 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1381 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1382 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1384 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1385 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1386 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1388 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1390 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1391 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1393 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1397 signer_provider: SP,
1402 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1404 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1405 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1406 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1407 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1408 pub struct ChainParameters {
1409 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1410 pub network: Network,
1412 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1414 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1415 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1418 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1422 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1423 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1426 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1427 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1428 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1429 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1430 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1431 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1433 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1434 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1435 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1436 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1437 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1438 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1440 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1441 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1444 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1445 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1446 /// events to handle.
1448 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1449 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1451 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1452 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1455 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1456 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1457 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1458 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1460 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1461 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1462 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1463 should_persist: move || {
1464 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1465 // processing and return that.
1466 let notify = persist_check();
1467 match (notify, force_notify) {
1468 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1469 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1470 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1471 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1472 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1475 _read_guard: read_guard,
1479 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1480 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1481 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1482 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1483 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1484 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1486 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1487 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1488 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1489 should_persist: persist_check,
1490 _read_guard: read_guard,
1495 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1496 fn drop(&mut self) {
1497 match (self.should_persist)() {
1498 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1499 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1500 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1502 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1503 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1504 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1509 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1510 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1512 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1514 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1515 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1516 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1517 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1518 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1520 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1521 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1523 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1525 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1526 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1527 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1528 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1529 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1530 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1531 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1532 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1533 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1534 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1535 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1536 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1537 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1539 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1540 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1542 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1543 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1544 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1545 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1547 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1548 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1549 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1550 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1551 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1552 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1554 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1556 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1557 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1559 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1561 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1562 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1564 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1565 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1566 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1568 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1569 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1570 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1572 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1573 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1574 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1575 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1577 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1578 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1579 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1581 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1582 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1583 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1585 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1586 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1587 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1588 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1589 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1590 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1591 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1592 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1593 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1594 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1595 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1598 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1599 /// to better separate parameters.
1600 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1601 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1602 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1603 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1604 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1605 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1606 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1607 pub features: InitFeatures,
1608 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1609 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1610 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1612 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1614 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1615 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1616 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1617 /// payments to us through this channel.
1618 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1619 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1620 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1621 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1622 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1623 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1624 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1627 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1629 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1630 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1631 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1632 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1633 /// lifetime of the channel.
1634 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1635 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1636 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1637 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1638 /// our counterparty already.
1639 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1640 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1642 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1643 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1644 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1645 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1647 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1648 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1650 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1651 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1653 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1654 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1655 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1656 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1657 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1658 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1659 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1660 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1661 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1664 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1666 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1667 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1668 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1669 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1670 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1671 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1672 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1674 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1675 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1677 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1678 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1679 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1680 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1681 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1682 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1683 /// this value on chain.
1685 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1687 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1689 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1690 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1691 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1692 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1693 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1694 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1695 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1697 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1698 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1699 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1700 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1701 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1702 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1704 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1705 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1706 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1707 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1708 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1710 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1711 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1712 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1713 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1715 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1716 pub balance_msat: u64,
1717 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1718 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1719 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1720 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1722 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1724 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1725 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1726 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1727 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1728 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1729 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1730 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1731 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1733 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1734 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1735 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1736 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1737 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1738 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1739 /// route which is valid.
1740 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1741 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1742 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1743 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1744 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1745 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1747 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1748 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1749 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1750 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1751 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1752 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1753 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1754 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1755 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1757 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1759 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1760 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1761 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1762 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1763 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1765 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1766 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1767 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1768 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1769 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1770 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1771 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1773 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1774 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1775 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1776 pub is_outbound: bool,
1777 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1778 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1779 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1780 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1781 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1783 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1784 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1785 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1786 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1787 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1788 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1789 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1791 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1792 pub is_usable: bool,
1793 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1794 pub is_public: bool,
1795 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1796 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1797 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1798 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1799 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1800 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1802 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1803 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1806 impl ChannelDetails {
1807 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1808 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1809 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1811 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1812 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1813 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1814 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1817 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1818 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1819 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1821 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1822 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1823 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1824 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1827 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1828 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1829 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1832 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1833 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1835 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1836 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1837 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1839 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1840 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1841 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1842 features: latest_features,
1843 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1844 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1845 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1846 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1847 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1848 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1849 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1850 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1851 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1852 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1854 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1855 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1856 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1857 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1858 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1859 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1860 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1861 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1862 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1863 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1864 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1865 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1866 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1867 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1868 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1869 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1870 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1871 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1872 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1873 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1874 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1875 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1876 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1877 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1878 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1879 config: Some(context.config()),
1880 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1885 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1886 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1887 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1888 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1889 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1890 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1891 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1892 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1893 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1895 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1897 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1898 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1900 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1901 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1902 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1903 /// to drop the channel.
1907 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1908 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1909 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1910 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1911 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1913 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1914 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1915 payment_id: PaymentId,
1917 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1919 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1920 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1921 payment_id: PaymentId,
1922 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1924 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1925 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1926 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1929 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1930 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1931 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1933 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1934 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1935 payment_id: PaymentId,
1936 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1937 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1938 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1940 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1941 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1942 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1944 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1945 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1946 payment_id: PaymentId,
1947 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1948 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1952 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1954 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1956 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1957 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1958 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1959 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1961 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1962 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1963 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1966 macro_rules! handle_error {
1967 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1968 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1969 // entering the macro.
1970 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1971 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1975 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1976 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1978 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1979 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1980 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1981 let logger = WithContext::from(
1982 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1984 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1986 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1987 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1988 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1993 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1996 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1998 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1999 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2000 action: err.action.clone()
2004 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2005 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2006 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2007 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2008 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2012 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2019 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2020 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2021 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2022 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2024 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2025 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2026 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2028 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2029 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2030 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2031 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2032 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2034 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2035 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2037 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2041 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2042 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2043 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2045 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2046 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2048 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2049 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2051 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2052 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2053 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2054 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2055 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2056 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2058 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2063 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2064 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2066 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2067 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2069 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2070 match $channel_phase {
2071 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2072 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2074 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2075 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2077 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2078 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2084 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2085 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2089 let key = *$entry.key();
2090 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2092 $entry.remove_entry();
2100 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2101 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2105 let key = *$entry.key();
2106 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2108 $entry.remove_entry();
2116 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2117 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2119 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2120 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2126 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2127 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2128 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2129 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2130 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2132 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2133 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2134 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2135 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2136 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2137 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2138 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2139 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2140 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2141 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2146 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2147 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2148 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2149 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2150 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2151 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2152 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2153 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2154 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2156 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2161 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2162 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2163 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2164 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2165 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2166 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2167 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2168 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2169 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2171 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2176 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2177 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2178 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2179 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2180 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2181 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2182 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2183 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2184 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2185 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2186 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2187 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2189 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2190 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2191 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2197 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2198 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2200 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2201 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2202 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2203 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2204 updates.announcement_sigs);
2205 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2206 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2209 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2210 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2211 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2212 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2214 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2215 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2216 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2217 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2218 let mut batch_completed = false;
2219 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2220 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2221 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2222 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2224 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2225 channel_state.2 = true;
2227 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2229 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2231 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2234 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2235 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2236 if batch_completed {
2237 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2238 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2239 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2240 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2241 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2242 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2243 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2244 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2245 chan.set_batch_ready();
2246 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2247 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2251 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2252 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2253 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2258 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2260 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2261 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2263 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2264 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2265 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2266 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2271 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2272 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2273 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2274 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2276 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2277 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2278 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2279 panic!("{}", err_str);
2281 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2282 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2283 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2286 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2292 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2293 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2294 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2296 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2297 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2298 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2299 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2300 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2301 // filter for uniqueness here.
2302 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2303 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2304 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2305 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2307 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2308 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2310 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2311 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2312 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2318 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2319 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2320 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2321 while !processed_all_events {
2322 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2329 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2330 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2331 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2333 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2334 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2335 result = $self.process_background_events();
2337 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2338 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2339 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2340 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2344 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2345 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2346 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2347 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2350 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2352 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2353 $event_to_handle = event;
2355 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2356 post_event_actions.push(action);
2361 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2362 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2363 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2364 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2365 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2366 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2369 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2370 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2371 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2372 processed_all_events = false;
2376 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2377 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2378 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2380 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2381 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2382 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2388 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2390 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2391 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2393 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2394 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2395 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2399 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2401 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2403 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2404 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2406 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2408 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2409 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2410 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2413 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2414 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2415 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2417 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2418 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2419 current_timestamp: u32,
2421 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2422 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2423 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2424 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2426 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2427 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2428 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2433 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2435 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2436 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2437 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2438 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2439 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2440 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2441 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2442 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2444 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2447 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2448 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2450 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2452 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2454 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2456 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2457 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2458 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2459 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2460 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2461 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2462 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2463 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2465 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2475 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2476 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2477 &self.default_configuration
2480 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2481 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2482 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2485 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2486 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2488 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2490 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2494 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2499 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2501 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2502 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2503 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2504 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2505 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2507 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2508 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2510 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2511 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2512 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2514 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2515 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2516 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2518 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2519 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2521 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2522 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2523 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2524 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2525 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2526 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2528 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2529 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2530 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2531 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2532 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2537 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2538 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2540 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2542 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2543 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2545 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2547 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2548 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2549 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2554 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2555 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2556 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2557 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2558 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2559 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2563 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2568 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2570 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2571 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2574 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2576 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2579 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2582 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2583 node_id: their_network_key,
2586 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2589 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2590 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2591 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2592 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2593 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2594 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2595 // the same channel.
2596 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2600 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2601 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2602 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2603 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2604 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2605 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2606 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2610 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2611 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2612 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2620 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2621 /// more information.
2622 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2623 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2624 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2625 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2626 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2627 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2628 // the same channel.
2629 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2631 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2632 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2633 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2634 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2635 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2636 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2637 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2638 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2646 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2647 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2649 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2650 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2652 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2653 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2654 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2655 // really wanted anyway.
2656 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2659 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2660 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2661 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2662 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2664 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2665 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2666 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2667 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2668 let context_to_details = |context| {
2669 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2671 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2673 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2674 .map(context_to_details)
2680 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2681 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2683 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2684 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2685 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2687 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2688 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2689 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2690 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2691 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2692 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2694 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2695 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2696 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2698 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2699 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2700 payment_id: *payment_id,
2701 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2702 total_msat: *total_msat,
2705 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2706 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2709 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2711 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2716 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2717 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2719 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2720 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2723 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2726 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2731 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2732 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2733 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2734 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2735 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2736 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2737 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2738 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2740 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2741 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2742 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2743 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2744 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2748 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2749 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2751 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2752 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2753 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2754 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2757 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2758 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2762 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2764 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2765 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2772 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2773 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2774 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2778 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2779 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2785 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2786 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2787 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2789 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2790 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2792 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2793 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2794 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2795 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2797 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2799 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2800 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2801 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2804 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2805 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2806 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2807 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2808 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2809 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2812 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2813 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2814 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2816 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2817 /// the channel being closed or not:
2818 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2819 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2820 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2821 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2822 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2823 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2824 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2826 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2827 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2828 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2829 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2831 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2833 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2834 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2835 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2838 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2839 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2840 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2841 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2842 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2845 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2846 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2847 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2848 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2849 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2852 let logger = WithContext::from(
2853 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2856 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2857 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2858 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2859 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2860 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2861 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2862 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2864 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2865 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2866 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2867 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2868 // ignore the result here.
2869 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2871 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2872 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2873 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2874 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2875 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2876 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2877 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2878 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2879 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2880 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2881 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2882 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2885 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2888 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2889 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2894 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2895 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2896 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2897 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2898 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2899 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2900 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2901 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2904 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2905 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2906 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2910 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2911 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2915 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2916 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2917 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2918 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2921 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2922 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2923 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2924 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2925 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2927 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2929 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2930 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2931 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2932 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2933 mem::drop(peer_state);
2934 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2936 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2937 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2938 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2940 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2941 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2942 // Unfunded channel has no update
2943 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2946 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2947 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2948 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2949 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2951 (None, *peer_node_id)
2953 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2956 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2957 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2958 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2959 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2960 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2961 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2962 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2963 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2964 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2970 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2973 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2975 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2976 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2979 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2980 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2981 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2982 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2983 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2984 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2995 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2996 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2997 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2999 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3000 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3001 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3004 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3005 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3006 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3008 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3009 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3010 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3011 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3012 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3015 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3016 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3017 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3018 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3019 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3023 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3024 /// local transaction(s).
3025 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3026 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3027 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3031 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3032 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3034 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3036 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3037 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3040 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3041 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3042 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3043 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3049 macro_rules! return_err {
3050 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3053 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3054 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3056 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3057 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3058 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3059 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3060 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3061 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3062 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3066 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3067 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3068 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3069 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3070 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3071 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3072 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3073 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3079 let NextPacketDetails {
3080 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3081 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3082 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3083 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3084 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3087 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3088 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3089 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3090 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3091 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3092 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3093 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3094 // phantom or an intercept.
3095 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3096 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3097 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3101 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3104 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3106 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3107 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3108 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3109 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3110 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3114 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3115 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3118 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3119 // have no consistency guarantees.
3120 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3124 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3125 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3126 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3127 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3128 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3130 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3131 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3132 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3133 // we don't have the channel here.
3134 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3136 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3138 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3139 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3140 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3141 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3142 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3143 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3144 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3145 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3146 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3147 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3148 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3150 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3153 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3154 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3156 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3157 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3164 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3166 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3167 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3169 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3170 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3171 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3172 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3173 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3175 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3176 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3182 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3183 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3184 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3185 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3187 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3188 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3190 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3191 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3192 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3194 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3195 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3196 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3197 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3198 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3199 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3200 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3204 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3206 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3209 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3210 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3211 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3212 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3213 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3214 macro_rules! return_err {
3215 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3217 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3218 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3219 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3220 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3221 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3222 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3223 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3224 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3225 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3229 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3230 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3231 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3232 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3233 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3239 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3241 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3242 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3243 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3244 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3247 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3248 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3249 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3250 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3251 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3253 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3256 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3257 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3258 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3259 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3260 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3266 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3267 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3268 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3270 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3271 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3272 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3274 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3275 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3276 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3277 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3278 return Err(LightningError {
3279 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3283 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3284 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3286 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3287 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3288 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3291 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3292 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3293 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3294 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3296 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3297 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3298 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3300 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3301 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3302 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3303 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3304 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3305 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3306 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3310 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3313 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3314 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3315 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3316 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3318 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3319 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3320 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3321 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3322 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3325 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3326 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3328 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3329 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3330 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3331 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3332 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3333 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3334 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3335 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3337 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3338 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3339 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3341 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3343 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3350 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3351 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3352 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3353 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3358 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3359 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3360 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3363 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3364 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3365 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3366 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3368 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3369 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3370 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3372 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3373 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3377 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3378 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3380 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3381 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3382 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3384 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3387 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3389 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3390 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3392 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3393 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3394 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3395 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3396 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3397 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3398 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3399 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3400 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3401 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3403 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3404 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3405 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3406 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3408 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3409 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3411 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3412 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3413 Some(monitor_update) => {
3414 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3416 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3417 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3418 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3419 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3420 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3421 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3422 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3430 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3433 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3434 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3435 // `channel_by_id` map.
3436 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3441 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3442 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3444 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3449 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3451 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3452 /// fields for more info.
3454 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3455 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3457 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3459 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3460 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3461 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3462 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3463 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3465 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3466 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3467 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3468 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3469 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3471 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3472 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3473 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3474 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3476 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3478 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3479 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3480 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3482 /// In general, a path may raise:
3483 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3484 /// node public key) is specified.
3485 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3486 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3487 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3488 /// relevant updates.
3490 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3491 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3492 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3494 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3495 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3496 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3497 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3498 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3499 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3500 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3501 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3502 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3503 self.pending_outbound_payments
3504 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3505 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3506 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3509 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3510 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3511 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3512 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3514 self.pending_outbound_payments
3515 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3516 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3517 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3518 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3522 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3523 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3525 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3526 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3527 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3531 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3532 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3533 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3537 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3538 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3541 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3542 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3544 self.pending_outbound_payments
3545 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3546 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3547 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3548 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3549 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3553 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3554 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3555 /// retries are exhausted.
3557 /// # Event Generation
3559 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3560 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3562 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3563 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3564 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3566 /// # Requested Invoices
3568 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3569 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3570 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3571 /// once the invoice has been received.
3573 /// # Restart Behavior
3575 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3576 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3577 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3579 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3580 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3582 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3585 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3586 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3587 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3588 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3589 /// never reach the recipient.
3591 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3592 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3594 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3595 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3597 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3598 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3599 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3601 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3602 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3603 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3606 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3607 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3609 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3612 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3613 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3614 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3615 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3616 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3617 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3618 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3619 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3622 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3623 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3624 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3625 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3626 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3627 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3628 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3629 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3630 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3633 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3636 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3637 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3640 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3641 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3643 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3644 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3645 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3646 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3647 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3648 let payment_params =
3649 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3651 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3653 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3656 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3657 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3659 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3660 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3661 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3662 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3664 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3665 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3666 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3667 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3668 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3669 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3670 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3671 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3672 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3673 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3675 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3676 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3677 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3678 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3682 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3684 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3685 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3688 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3690 let mut res = Vec::new();
3692 for mut path in route.paths {
3693 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3694 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3695 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3696 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3697 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3700 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3703 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3704 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3706 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3708 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3709 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3714 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3717 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3722 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3723 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3724 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3726 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3727 let used_liquidity =
3728 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3730 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3731 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3733 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3736 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3741 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3742 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3743 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3750 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3751 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3752 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3753 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3754 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3755 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3756 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3757 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3758 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3763 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3764 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3765 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3767 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3768 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3769 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3770 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3771 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3772 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3773 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3774 } else { unreachable!(); });
3776 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3777 Err((chan, err)) => {
3778 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3779 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3780 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3781 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3782 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3788 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3789 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3791 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3792 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3795 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3796 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3797 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3801 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3803 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3809 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3812 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3813 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3815 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3817 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3818 funding_txo, o.get()
3820 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3821 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3822 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3823 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3824 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3825 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3828 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3835 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3836 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3837 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3841 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3843 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3844 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3846 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3847 /// across the p2p network.
3849 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3850 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3852 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3853 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3854 /// keys per-channel).
3856 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3857 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3858 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3860 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3861 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3862 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3864 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3865 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3866 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3867 /// for more details.
3869 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3870 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3871 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3872 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3875 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3877 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3878 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3880 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3881 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3882 /// signature for each channel.
3884 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3885 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3886 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3887 let mut result = Ok(());
3889 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3890 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3891 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3892 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3893 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3898 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3899 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3900 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3904 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3905 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3906 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3907 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3908 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3909 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3910 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3911 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3913 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3914 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3919 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3920 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3921 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3922 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3926 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3927 match states.entry(txid) {
3928 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3929 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3930 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3934 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3937 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3938 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3939 temporary_channel_id,
3940 counterparty_node_id,
3941 funding_transaction.clone(),
3944 let mut output_index = None;
3945 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3946 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3947 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3948 if output_index.is_some() {
3949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3950 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3953 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3956 if output_index.is_none() {
3957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3958 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3961 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3962 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3963 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
3964 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
3965 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
3966 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3972 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3973 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3974 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3975 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3976 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3977 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3978 .into_iter().flatten()
3979 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3981 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3982 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3984 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3986 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3987 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3988 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3989 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3990 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3992 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3993 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3994 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3998 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3999 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4000 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4006 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4008 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4009 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4010 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4011 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4013 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4014 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4016 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4017 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4019 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4021 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4022 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4023 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4024 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4025 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4026 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4027 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4028 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4029 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4030 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4031 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4032 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4033 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4038 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4039 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4040 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4041 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4042 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4043 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4044 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4045 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4046 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4050 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4051 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4052 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4053 config.apply(config_update);
4054 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4057 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4058 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4059 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4060 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4061 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4062 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4069 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4070 debug_assert!(false);
4071 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4073 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4074 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4081 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4083 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4084 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4085 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4086 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4088 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4089 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4091 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4092 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4094 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4096 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4097 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4098 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4099 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4100 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4101 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4102 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4103 pub fn update_channel_config(
4104 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4105 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4106 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4109 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4110 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4112 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4113 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4115 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4116 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4117 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4118 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4119 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4121 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4122 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4123 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4126 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4129 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4130 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4131 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4132 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4133 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4134 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4137 let next_hop_scid = {
4138 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4139 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4140 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4141 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4142 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4143 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4144 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4145 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4146 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4147 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4150 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4152 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4153 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4154 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4157 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4158 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4159 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4160 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4161 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4168 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4169 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4170 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4173 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4174 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4175 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4176 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4179 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4181 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4182 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4183 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4184 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4185 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4188 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4189 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4190 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4191 payment.prev_channel_id,
4192 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4193 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4195 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4199 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4200 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4202 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4205 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4206 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4209 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4210 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4211 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4214 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4215 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4216 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4217 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4218 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4219 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4220 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4221 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4222 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4223 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4226 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4227 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4228 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4229 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4234 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4236 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4237 /// Will likely generate further events.
4238 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4241 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4242 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4243 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4245 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4246 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4248 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4249 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4250 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4251 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4253 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4254 match forward_info {
4255 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4256 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4257 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4258 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4259 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4262 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4263 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4264 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4265 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4267 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4268 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4269 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4270 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4271 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4272 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4273 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4274 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4275 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4278 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4279 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4281 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4284 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4285 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4291 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4292 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4294 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4298 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4299 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4301 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4305 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4306 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4307 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4308 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4309 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4310 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4311 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4314 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4315 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4316 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4317 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4318 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4320 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4322 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4323 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4327 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4328 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4329 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4330 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4331 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4332 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4334 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4335 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4341 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4344 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4347 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4348 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4349 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4350 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4351 // problem, not ours.
4357 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4358 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4359 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4361 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4365 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4367 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4368 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4369 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4374 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4375 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4376 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4377 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4378 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4379 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4380 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4381 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4382 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4383 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4384 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4387 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4388 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4389 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4390 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4391 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4392 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4393 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4394 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4395 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4396 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4397 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4399 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4400 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4401 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4402 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4403 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4404 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4407 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4408 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4409 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4412 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4413 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4415 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4417 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4418 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4419 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4420 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4426 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4427 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4429 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4430 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4431 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4433 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4434 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4435 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4436 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4438 Some((res, htlc_id))
4441 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4442 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4443 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4444 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4446 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4448 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4449 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4450 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4456 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4460 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4461 match forward_info {
4462 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4463 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4464 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4465 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4466 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4469 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4470 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4471 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4472 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4473 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4475 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4476 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4477 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4478 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4479 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4481 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4482 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4483 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4487 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4488 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4491 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4494 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4495 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4496 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4497 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4498 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4499 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4500 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4501 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4502 phantom_shared_secret,
4505 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4506 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4507 // if routing nodes overpay
4508 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4509 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4511 total_value_received: None,
4512 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4515 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4518 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4520 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4521 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4522 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4523 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4524 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4525 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4527 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4528 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4529 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4530 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4531 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4532 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4533 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4534 phantom_shared_secret,
4537 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4538 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4540 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4543 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4544 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4545 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4546 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4547 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4550 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4551 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4552 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4553 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4554 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4555 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4557 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4558 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4559 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4561 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4562 .entry(payment_hash)
4563 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4564 .or_insert_with(|| {
4565 committed_to_claimable = true;
4567 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4570 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4571 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4572 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4573 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4575 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4576 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4577 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4579 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4580 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4584 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4586 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4587 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4588 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4589 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4590 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4591 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4592 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4593 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4594 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4595 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4597 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4599 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4600 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4601 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4602 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4603 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4604 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4606 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4607 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4608 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4609 committed_to_claimable = true;
4611 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4612 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4613 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4614 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4615 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4616 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4617 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4618 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4619 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4623 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4624 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4625 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4626 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4627 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4629 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4631 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4632 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4634 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4635 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4636 committed_to_claimable = true;
4639 payment_claimable_generated
4643 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4644 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4645 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4646 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4647 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4648 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4649 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4650 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4652 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4653 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4654 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4655 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4656 Ok(result) => result,
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4659 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4662 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4663 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4664 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4666 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4667 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4670 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4671 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4672 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4674 check_total_value!(purpose);
4676 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4677 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4678 check_total_value!(purpose);
4682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4683 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4684 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4685 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4687 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4688 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4689 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4690 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4691 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4692 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4693 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4694 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4696 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4697 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4698 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4700 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4701 if payment_claimable_generated {
4702 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4708 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4709 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4717 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4718 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4719 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4720 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4722 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4723 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4725 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4727 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4728 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4729 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4731 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4733 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4734 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4735 events.append(&mut new_events);
4738 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4740 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4741 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4742 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4744 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4746 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4747 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4748 if background_events.is_empty() {
4749 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4752 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4754 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4755 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4756 // monitor updating completing.
4757 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4759 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4760 let mut updated_chan = false;
4762 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4763 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4764 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4765 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4766 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4768 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4769 updated_chan = true;
4770 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4771 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4773 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4781 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4782 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4785 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4787 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4790 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4791 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4793 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4794 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4795 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4796 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4797 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4803 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4806 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4807 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4808 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4809 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4810 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4813 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4814 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4816 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4818 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4819 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4820 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4821 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4822 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4824 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4826 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4827 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4828 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4829 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4831 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4832 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4834 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4835 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4839 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4840 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4841 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4842 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4843 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4844 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4845 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4847 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4848 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4851 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4852 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4853 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4854 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4855 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4857 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4862 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4863 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4871 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4873 /// This currently includes:
4874 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4875 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4876 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4878 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4879 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4880 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4881 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4882 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4883 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4884 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4885 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4887 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4888 /// estimate fetches.
4890 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4891 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4892 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4893 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4894 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4896 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4897 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4899 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4900 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4901 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4902 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4904 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4905 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4906 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4907 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4908 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4909 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4911 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4912 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4913 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4915 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4916 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4917 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4918 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4919 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4920 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4921 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4922 channel_id: *chan_id,
4923 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4935 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4938 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4939 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4940 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4942 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4943 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4948 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4949 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4951 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4952 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4953 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4954 if needs_close { return false; }
4957 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4958 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4959 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4960 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4961 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4962 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4963 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4964 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4966 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4967 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4968 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4969 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4973 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4975 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4978 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4980 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4981 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4982 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4983 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4987 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4989 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4995 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4997 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4998 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4999 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5000 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5001 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5002 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5003 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5004 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5005 channel_id: *chan_id,
5006 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5014 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5015 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5016 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5018 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5019 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5020 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5025 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5026 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5027 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5028 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5029 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5030 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5031 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5032 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5033 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5039 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5041 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5042 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5047 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5048 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5049 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5050 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5051 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5052 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5053 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5054 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5055 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5056 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5057 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5059 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5060 // have no channels to the peer.
5061 let remove_entry = {
5062 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5063 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5066 entry.remove_entry();
5069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5074 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5075 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5076 // This should be unreachable
5077 debug_assert!(false);
5080 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5081 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5082 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5083 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5084 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5085 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5086 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5089 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5090 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5091 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5093 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5094 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5101 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5102 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5103 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5104 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5108 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5109 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5112 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5113 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5116 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5117 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5118 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5119 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5120 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5121 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5122 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5125 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5126 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5129 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5130 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5131 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5132 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5133 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5140 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5141 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5142 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5144 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5145 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5146 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5147 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5149 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5150 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5151 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5152 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5153 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5154 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5157 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5158 /// reason for the failure.
5160 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5161 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5164 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5165 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5166 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5167 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5168 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5169 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5170 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5175 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5176 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5177 match failure_code {
5178 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5179 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5180 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5181 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5182 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5183 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5185 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5186 let fail_data = match data {
5187 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5190 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5195 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5196 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5198 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5200 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5201 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5202 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5203 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5204 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5205 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5206 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5208 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5210 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5211 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5213 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5218 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5219 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5220 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5221 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5222 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5223 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5224 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5225 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5226 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5227 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5229 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5230 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5231 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5232 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5234 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5235 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5236 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5237 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5238 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5242 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5243 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5244 // be surfaced to the user.
5245 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5246 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5247 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5249 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5250 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5251 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5252 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5253 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5254 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5256 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5257 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5259 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5260 debug_assert!(false);
5261 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5266 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5269 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5270 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5271 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5272 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5276 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5277 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5278 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5279 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5280 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5281 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5282 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5283 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5284 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5285 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5288 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5289 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5290 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5293 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5294 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5295 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5297 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5298 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5299 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5300 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5301 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5303 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5304 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5305 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5308 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5309 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5310 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5312 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5313 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5314 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5315 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5316 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5318 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5320 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5321 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5323 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5324 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5328 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5329 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5331 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5335 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5336 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5337 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5338 push_forward_ev = true;
5340 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5341 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5342 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5345 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5348 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5349 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5350 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5351 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5352 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5353 failed_next_destination: destination,
5359 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5360 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5362 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5363 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5364 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5365 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5367 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5368 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5369 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5370 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5372 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5373 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5374 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5376 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5377 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5378 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5379 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5380 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5381 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5382 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5383 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5384 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5387 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5388 /// even type numbers.
5392 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5393 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5395 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5396 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5397 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5400 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5401 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5406 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5407 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5408 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5409 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5410 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5411 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5412 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5413 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5418 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5419 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5420 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5421 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5422 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5424 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5425 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5426 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5430 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5431 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5432 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5433 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5434 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5435 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5436 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5437 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5438 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5439 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5440 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5449 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5451 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5452 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5453 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5454 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5455 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5456 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5457 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5458 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5459 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5460 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5461 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5462 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5463 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5464 debug_assert!(false);
5468 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5470 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5471 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5472 debug_assert!(false);
5476 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5477 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5479 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5480 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5481 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5482 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5485 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5486 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5487 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5488 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5492 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5493 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5494 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5495 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5496 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5497 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5498 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5501 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5502 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5503 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5504 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5505 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5506 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5511 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5512 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5513 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5514 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5515 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5516 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5517 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5519 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5522 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5523 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5524 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5525 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5529 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5530 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5531 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5532 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5534 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5535 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5536 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5537 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5539 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5540 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5541 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5542 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5546 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5547 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5548 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5552 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5553 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5554 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5557 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5558 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5559 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5560 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5561 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5562 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5563 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5564 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5567 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5568 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5569 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5571 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5574 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5575 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5577 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5578 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5579 // monitor update as a background event.
5580 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5581 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5582 counterparty_node_id,
5583 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5584 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5585 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5589 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5590 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5595 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5597 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5599 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5600 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5601 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5602 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5603 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5605 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5607 debug_assert!(false,
5608 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5611 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5612 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5613 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5614 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5615 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5617 let mut found_blocker = false;
5618 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5619 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5620 // which case we need to only remove the one
5621 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5622 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5623 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5624 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5626 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5629 debug_assert!(false);
5638 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5639 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5640 counterparty_node_id: None,
5641 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5644 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5648 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5649 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5650 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5651 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5652 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5653 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5654 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5655 // again on restart.
5656 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5657 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5658 payment_preimage, update_res);
5661 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5662 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5664 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5665 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5666 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5667 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5668 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5669 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5670 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5671 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5672 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5673 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5676 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5677 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5678 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5679 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5680 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5681 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5685 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5686 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5689 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5690 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5691 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5692 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId,
5695 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5696 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5697 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5698 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5699 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5701 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5702 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5703 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5705 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5706 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5709 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5710 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5711 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5712 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5713 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5714 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5715 let claiming_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5716 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5717 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5718 let chan_to_release =
5719 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5720 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5722 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5723 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5724 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5725 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5730 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5731 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5732 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5733 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5734 // in the background.
5735 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5736 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5737 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5738 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5740 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5741 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5742 funding_txo, update, ..
5744 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5745 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5746 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5747 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5749 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5755 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5756 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5757 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5759 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5760 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5762 monitor_update.updates[0],
5763 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5768 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5769 // immediately once we get going.
5770 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5773 *channel_id == claiming_channel_id,
5775 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5778 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5779 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5780 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5782 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5783 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5784 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5788 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5789 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5790 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5793 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5794 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5795 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5796 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5797 total_fee_earned_msat,
5798 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5799 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5800 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5801 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5804 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5808 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5809 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5810 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5816 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5817 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5818 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5821 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5822 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5823 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5824 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5826 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5828 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5829 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5830 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5832 payment_purpose: purpose,
5835 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5837 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5841 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5843 sender_intended_total_msat,
5847 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5848 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5850 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5851 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5852 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5855 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5856 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5858 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5859 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5860 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5861 downstream_channel_id,
5862 Some(blocking_action),
5869 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5870 /// update completion.
5871 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5872 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5873 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5874 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5875 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5876 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5877 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5878 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5879 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5880 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5881 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5882 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5883 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5884 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5886 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5888 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5889 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5890 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5891 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5894 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5895 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5897 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5898 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5899 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5904 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5905 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5906 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5907 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5912 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5913 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5914 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5915 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5916 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5921 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5925 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5931 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5932 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5933 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5937 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5938 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5939 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5945 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5946 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5948 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5949 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5951 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5952 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5953 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5954 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5955 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5961 let mut peer_state_lock;
5962 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5963 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5964 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5967 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5970 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5971 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5972 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5973 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5974 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5977 let remaining_in_flight =
5978 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5979 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5983 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5984 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5985 remaining_in_flight);
5986 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5989 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5992 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5994 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5995 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5998 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5999 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6000 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6002 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6003 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6004 /// used to accept such channels.
6006 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6007 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6008 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6009 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6012 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6013 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6015 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6016 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6017 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6019 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6020 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6022 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6023 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6025 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6026 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6028 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6029 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6030 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6031 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6034 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6036 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6039 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6040 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6041 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6042 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6044 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6045 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6047 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6049 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6050 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6051 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6053 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6054 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6055 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6057 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6058 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6059 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6060 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6061 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6062 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6063 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6064 let err_str = e.to_string();
6065 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6067 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6071 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6072 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6074 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6079 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6080 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6081 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6082 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6083 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6084 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6085 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6089 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6090 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6092 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6094 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6095 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6096 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6097 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6098 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6099 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6100 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6101 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6105 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6106 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6108 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6112 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6113 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6114 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6116 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6117 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6118 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6121 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6126 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6127 /// or 0-conf channels.
6129 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6130 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6131 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6132 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6133 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6134 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6136 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6137 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6138 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6139 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6140 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6141 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6142 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6146 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6149 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6150 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6152 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6153 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6155 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6156 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6157 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6158 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6159 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6161 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6164 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6165 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6166 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6169 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6170 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6175 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6178 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6179 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6180 // likely to be lost on restart!
6181 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6185 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6186 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6189 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6190 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6191 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6192 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6193 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6195 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6196 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6198 debug_assert!(false);
6199 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6201 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6202 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6204 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6205 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6206 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6207 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6208 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6209 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6211 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6212 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6213 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6216 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6217 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6218 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6219 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6220 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6223 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6224 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6229 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6230 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6231 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6232 &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6234 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6236 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6237 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6238 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6239 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6240 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6241 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6244 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6245 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6246 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6251 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6252 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6253 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6254 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6255 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6256 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6257 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6260 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6265 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6266 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6267 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6269 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6270 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6273 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6274 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6276 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6277 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6278 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6280 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6284 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6285 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6286 // likely to be lost on restart!
6287 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6291 debug_assert!(false);
6292 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6296 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6297 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6298 match phase.get_mut() {
6299 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6300 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6301 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6304 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6311 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6312 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6313 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6314 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6315 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6317 user_channel_id: user_id,
6322 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6323 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6326 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6328 debug_assert!(false);
6329 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6332 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6333 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6334 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6335 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6336 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6337 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6338 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6340 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6341 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6342 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6343 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6344 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6345 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6346 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6347 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6348 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6352 Some(mut phase) => {
6353 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6354 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6355 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6357 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6360 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6362 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6363 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6364 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6365 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6366 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6367 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6369 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6370 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6371 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6374 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6376 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6379 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6380 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6381 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6382 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6385 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6386 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6387 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6388 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6390 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6391 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6392 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6393 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6394 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6395 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6396 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6401 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6402 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6403 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6405 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6409 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6410 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6411 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6419 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6420 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6422 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6424 debug_assert!(false);
6425 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6428 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6429 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6430 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6432 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6433 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6434 let logger = WithContext::from(
6436 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6437 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6440 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6442 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6443 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6444 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6445 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6446 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6447 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6448 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6449 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6450 } else { unreachable!(); }
6453 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6454 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6455 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6456 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6457 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6458 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6459 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6463 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6464 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6465 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6466 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6467 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6468 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6479 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6480 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6481 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6482 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6483 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6485 debug_assert!(false);
6486 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6488 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6489 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6490 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6491 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6492 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6493 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6494 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6495 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6496 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6497 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6498 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6499 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6500 msg: announcement_sigs,
6502 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6503 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6504 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6505 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6506 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6507 // announcement_signatures.
6508 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6509 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6510 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6511 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6518 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6519 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6524 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6525 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6529 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6534 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6535 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6536 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6538 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6539 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6541 debug_assert!(false);
6542 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6546 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6547 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6549 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6550 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6551 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6552 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6554 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6557 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6558 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6559 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6560 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6562 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6563 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6564 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6565 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6566 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6567 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6571 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6572 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6573 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6574 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6577 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6578 let context = phase.context_mut();
6579 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6580 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6581 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6582 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6586 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6589 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6590 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6591 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6592 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6594 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6595 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6601 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6602 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6605 debug_assert!(false);
6606 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6608 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6609 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6610 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6611 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6613 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6614 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6615 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6616 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6617 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6618 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6623 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6624 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6625 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6626 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6627 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6628 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6629 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6631 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6632 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6635 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6638 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6639 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6640 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6641 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6643 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6644 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6647 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6652 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6653 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6654 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6659 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6660 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6661 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6662 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6664 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6665 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6666 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6667 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6669 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6670 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6672 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6673 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6674 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6676 debug_assert!(false);
6677 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6679 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6680 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6681 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6683 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6684 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6685 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6686 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6687 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6688 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6690 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6692 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6693 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6694 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6695 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6696 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6697 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6698 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6699 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6703 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6704 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6705 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6706 match pending_forward_info {
6707 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6708 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6710 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6711 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6712 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6713 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6714 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6716 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6717 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6718 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6719 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6720 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6723 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6725 _ => pending_forward_info
6728 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6729 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6731 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6732 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6740 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6742 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6744 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6746 debug_assert!(false);
6747 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6749 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6750 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6751 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6752 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6753 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6754 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6755 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6756 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6758 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6760 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6761 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6762 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6764 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6765 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6766 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6767 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6768 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6769 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6770 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6773 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6774 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6780 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6781 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6782 funding_txo, msg.channel_id
6788 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6789 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6790 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6794 debug_assert!(false);
6795 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6801 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6802 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6804 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6805 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6808 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6813 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6814 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6815 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6816 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6817 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6819 debug_assert!(false);
6820 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6824 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6826 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6827 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6828 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6830 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6831 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6833 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6834 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6842 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6843 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6844 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6846 debug_assert!(false);
6847 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6849 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6850 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6851 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6852 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6853 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6854 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6855 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6856 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6857 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6858 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6859 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6863 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6864 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6872 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6873 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6874 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6875 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6876 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6877 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6878 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6879 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6880 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6881 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6882 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6884 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6885 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6887 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6888 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6889 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6890 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6891 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6892 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6895 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6896 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6898 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6899 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6900 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6902 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6903 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6904 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6905 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6906 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6909 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6910 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6912 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6913 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
6914 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6915 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6916 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6917 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6918 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6919 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
6920 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6921 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6922 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6923 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6926 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6927 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6928 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6933 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6934 // payments are being processed.
6935 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6936 push_forward_event = true;
6938 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6939 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6946 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6947 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6950 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6951 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6952 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6954 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6958 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6959 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6960 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6961 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6962 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6964 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6965 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6966 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6967 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6968 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6969 // real by taking more time.
6970 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6971 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6972 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6977 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6978 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6979 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6980 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6981 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6982 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6983 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6985 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6986 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6987 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6988 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6989 channel_funding_outpoint,
6991 counterparty_node_id,
6996 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6997 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6998 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7000 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7001 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7002 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7003 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7005 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7006 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7007 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7013 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7014 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7016 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7018 debug_assert!(false);
7019 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7020 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7024 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7025 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7026 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7027 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7028 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7029 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7030 *counterparty_node_id)
7032 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7033 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7034 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7035 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7036 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7037 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7038 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7042 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7043 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7046 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7049 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7053 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7055 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7057 debug_assert!(false);
7058 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7060 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7061 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7062 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7063 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7064 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7065 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7066 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7068 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7069 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7072 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7077 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7078 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7079 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7081 debug_assert!(false);
7082 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7084 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7085 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7086 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7087 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7088 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7089 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7090 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7094 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7095 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7096 msg, &self.default_configuration
7097 ), chan_phase_entry),
7098 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7099 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7100 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7103 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7104 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7112 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7113 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7114 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7115 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7117 // It's not a local channel
7118 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7122 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7123 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7124 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7128 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7130 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7131 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7132 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7133 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7134 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7135 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7136 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7138 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7140 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7141 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7142 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7143 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7145 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7146 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7147 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7148 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7151 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7155 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7156 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7159 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7161 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7164 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7166 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7169 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7171 debug_assert!(false);
7172 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7173 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7177 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7180 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7182 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7183 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7184 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7185 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7186 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7187 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7188 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7189 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7190 let mut channel_update = None;
7191 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7192 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7193 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7196 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7197 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7198 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7199 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7200 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7201 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7202 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7207 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7208 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7209 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7210 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7211 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7212 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7216 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7217 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7221 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7223 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7224 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7225 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7226 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7227 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7228 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7230 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7231 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7232 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7233 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7234 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7235 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7236 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7237 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7238 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7239 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7240 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7241 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7242 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7243 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7244 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7245 next_funding_txid: None,
7248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7249 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7250 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7256 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7257 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7258 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7259 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7262 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7263 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7268 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7269 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7270 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7272 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7273 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7274 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7275 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7276 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7277 match monitor_event {
7278 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7279 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7280 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7281 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7282 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7283 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7284 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id);
7286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7287 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7288 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7289 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7292 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_funding_outpoint) => {
7293 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7294 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7296 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7297 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7298 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7299 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7302 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7304 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7305 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7306 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7307 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7308 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7309 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7310 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7311 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7312 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7316 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7317 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7318 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7319 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7327 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7328 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7334 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7335 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7338 has_pending_monitor_events
7341 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7342 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7343 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7345 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7347 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7350 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7351 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7352 /// update was applied.
7353 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7354 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7355 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7357 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7358 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7359 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7360 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7362 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7363 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7365 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7366 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7367 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7368 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7370 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7371 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7372 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7373 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7374 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7375 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7377 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7378 has_monitor_update = true;
7380 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7381 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7382 continue 'peer_loop;
7391 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7392 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7393 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7399 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7400 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7402 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7403 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7405 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7406 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7407 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7410 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7411 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7413 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7414 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7415 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7416 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7421 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7422 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7427 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7428 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7431 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7432 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7433 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7439 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7444 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7445 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7448 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7449 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7453 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7454 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7455 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7456 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7457 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7463 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7464 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7465 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7466 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7467 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7468 let mut has_update = false;
7469 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7473 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7476 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7477 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7479 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7480 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7481 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7482 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7483 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7486 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7489 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7490 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7491 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7493 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7494 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7495 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7496 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7497 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7502 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7503 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7504 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7510 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7511 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7516 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7522 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7523 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7526 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7527 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7533 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7534 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7536 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7537 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7538 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7539 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7540 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7541 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7542 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7543 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7544 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7545 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7546 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7547 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7548 assert!(should_broadcast);
7549 } else { unreachable!(); }
7550 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7551 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7552 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7555 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7559 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7560 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7561 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7565 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7566 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7567 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7568 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7569 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7571 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7575 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7580 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7582 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7584 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7585 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7586 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7587 &self, description: String
7588 ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7589 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7590 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7591 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7592 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7594 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7595 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7596 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7598 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7604 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7605 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7609 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7610 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7612 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7613 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7614 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7617 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7618 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7619 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7621 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7622 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7626 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7627 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7628 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7629 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7630 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7632 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7636 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7637 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7642 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7643 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7644 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7646 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7648 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7649 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7650 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7651 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7652 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7653 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7654 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7655 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7656 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7657 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7658 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7659 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7661 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7662 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7663 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7665 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7666 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7669 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7670 self.pending_outbound_payments
7671 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7672 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7674 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7679 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7680 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7681 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7683 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7684 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7685 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7686 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7687 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7688 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7689 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7691 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7692 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7696 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7697 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7700 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7701 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7702 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7706 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7707 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7708 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7709 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7713 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7714 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7715 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7720 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7721 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7722 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7725 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7726 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7727 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7728 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7729 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7730 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7731 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7732 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7733 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7734 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7735 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7736 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7737 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7738 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7739 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7742 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7743 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7744 let builder = match quantity {
7746 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7748 let builder = match amount_msats {
7750 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7752 let builder = match payer_note {
7754 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7756 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7757 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7759 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7760 self.pending_outbound_payments
7761 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7762 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7764 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7766 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7767 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7768 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7769 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7770 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7773 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7775 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7776 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7777 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7778 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7779 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7780 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7781 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7782 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7783 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7785 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7792 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7795 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7796 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7797 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7801 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7802 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7803 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7804 /// received and no retries will be made.
7808 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7809 /// path for the invoice.
7811 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7812 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7813 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7814 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7815 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7817 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7818 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7820 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7821 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7822 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7823 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7825 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
7826 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7827 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7829 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7830 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7831 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7833 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
7834 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7835 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7837 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7838 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7839 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7841 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7842 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7843 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7844 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7845 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7848 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7850 for path in refund.paths() {
7851 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7852 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7853 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7854 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7856 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7862 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7866 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7869 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7870 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7872 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7873 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7874 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7875 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7877 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7879 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7880 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7884 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7885 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7887 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7889 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7890 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7892 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7893 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7894 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7895 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7896 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7897 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7898 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7899 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7900 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7901 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7902 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7905 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7906 /// stored external to LDK.
7908 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7909 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7910 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7912 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7913 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7916 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7917 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7918 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7919 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7921 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7922 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7923 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7924 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7925 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7927 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7928 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7929 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7930 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7931 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7933 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7934 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7936 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7937 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7941 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7942 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7944 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7946 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7947 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7949 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7950 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7951 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7952 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7953 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7954 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7955 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7958 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7959 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7961 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7962 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7963 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7966 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7968 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7969 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7970 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7971 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7972 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7974 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7976 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7977 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7978 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7981 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7982 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7985 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7986 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7987 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7988 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7989 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7990 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7991 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7993 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7994 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7995 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7996 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7997 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7999 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8001 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8004 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8005 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
8009 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8010 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8012 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8013 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8014 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8015 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8017 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8018 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8019 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8020 Some(_) => continue,
8021 None => return scid_candidate
8026 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8028 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8029 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8031 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8032 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8033 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8037 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8038 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8039 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8041 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8042 /// times to get a unique scid.
8043 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8044 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8045 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8047 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8048 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8049 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8050 return scid_candidate
8054 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8055 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8056 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8057 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8059 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8060 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8061 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8062 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8063 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8064 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8066 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8067 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8068 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8077 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8078 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8079 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8080 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8081 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8085 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8086 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8087 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8088 events.push_back((event, None));
8092 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8093 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8094 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8098 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8099 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8103 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8104 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8107 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8108 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8109 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8110 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8111 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8112 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8113 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8115 let logger = WithContext::from(
8116 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8119 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8120 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8121 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8122 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8123 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8124 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8125 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8126 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8128 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8132 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8133 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8134 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8135 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8136 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8137 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8142 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8144 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8145 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8146 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8147 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8149 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8150 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8151 if further_update_exists {
8152 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8157 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8164 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8165 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8171 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8172 for action in actions {
8174 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8175 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8177 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8183 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8184 /// using the given event handler.
8186 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8187 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8191 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8195 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8197 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8198 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8199 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8200 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8201 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8202 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8206 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8207 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8208 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8209 /// is always placed next to each other.
8211 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8212 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8213 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8214 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8216 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8217 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8218 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8219 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8220 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8221 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8222 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8224 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8225 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8226 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8227 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8230 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8231 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8233 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8234 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8237 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8239 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8240 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8241 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8242 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8243 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8247 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8248 events.replace(pending_events);
8257 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8259 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8261 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8262 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8268 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8270 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8271 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8272 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8274 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8278 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8280 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8281 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8282 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8283 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8284 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8285 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8289 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8291 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8292 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8293 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8294 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8295 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8298 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8299 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8302 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8303 let _persistence_guard =
8304 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8305 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8306 let new_height = height - 1;
8308 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8309 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8310 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8311 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8312 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8313 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8316 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8320 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8322 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8323 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8324 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8326 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8327 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8331 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8332 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8333 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8334 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8336 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8337 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8339 let _persistence_guard =
8340 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8341 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8342 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8343 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8345 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8346 if height < last_best_block_height {
8347 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8348 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8352 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8353 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8354 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8355 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8357 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8358 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8360 let _persistence_guard =
8361 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8362 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8363 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8365 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8367 macro_rules! max_time {
8368 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8370 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8371 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8372 // having an explicit local time source.
8373 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8374 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8375 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8376 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8377 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8383 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8384 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8385 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8386 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8390 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8391 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8392 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8393 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8394 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8395 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8396 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8397 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8398 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8399 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8400 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8407 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8408 let _persistence_guard =
8409 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8410 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8411 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8412 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8413 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8414 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8415 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8416 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8421 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8423 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8424 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8425 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8426 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8427 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8428 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8432 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8433 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8435 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8436 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8437 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8438 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8439 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8441 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8442 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8444 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8445 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8448 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8449 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8451 // Retain unfunded channels.
8452 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8453 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8454 let res = f(channel);
8455 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8456 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8457 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8458 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8459 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8461 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8462 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8463 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8464 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8465 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8466 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8467 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8468 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8473 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8478 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8479 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8482 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8483 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8484 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8485 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8486 msg: announcement_sigs,
8488 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8489 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8490 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8492 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8493 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8494 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8499 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8500 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8501 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8502 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8503 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8504 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8505 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8506 // is always consistent.
8507 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8508 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8509 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8510 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8511 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8514 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8515 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8516 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8517 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8518 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8519 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8520 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8521 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8525 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8526 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8527 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8528 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8529 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8530 data: reason_message,
8543 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8544 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8545 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8546 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8547 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8548 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8549 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8550 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8551 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8552 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8554 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8555 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8556 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8560 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8563 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8564 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8565 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8566 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8567 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8568 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8569 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8570 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8571 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8572 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8573 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8574 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8577 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8578 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8579 _ => unreachable!(),
8581 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8582 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8583 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8584 let logger = WithContext::from(
8585 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8587 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8593 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8595 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8596 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8600 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8601 /// may have events that need processing.
8603 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8604 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8606 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8607 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8608 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8609 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8612 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8613 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8614 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8617 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8618 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8619 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8622 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8623 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8624 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8625 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8628 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8629 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8630 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8631 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8634 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8635 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8637 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8638 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8639 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8640 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8641 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8644 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8645 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8646 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8647 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8650 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8651 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8652 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8653 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8656 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8657 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8658 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8659 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8662 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8663 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8664 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8665 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8669 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8670 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8672 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8673 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8674 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8675 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8676 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8677 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8681 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8682 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8683 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8684 // change to the contents.
8685 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8686 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8687 let persist = match &res {
8688 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8689 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8690 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8692 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8694 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8699 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8700 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8701 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8702 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8705 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8706 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8707 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8708 // change to the contents.
8709 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8710 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8711 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8715 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8716 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8717 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8718 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8721 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8722 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8723 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8726 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8727 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8728 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8731 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8732 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8733 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8734 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8735 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8737 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8738 let persist = match &res {
8739 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8740 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8747 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8748 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8749 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8750 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8753 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8754 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8755 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8756 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8759 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8760 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8761 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8762 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8765 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8766 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8767 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8768 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8771 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8773 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8776 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8777 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8778 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8781 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8782 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8783 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8784 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8785 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8786 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8787 let persist = match &res {
8788 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8789 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8790 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8792 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8797 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8798 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8799 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8802 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8803 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8804 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8805 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8806 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8807 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8808 let persist = match &res {
8809 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8810 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8811 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8813 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8818 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8819 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8820 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8821 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8823 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8824 let persist = match &res {
8825 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8826 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8827 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8829 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8834 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8836 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8839 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8840 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8841 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8844 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8845 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8846 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8847 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8849 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8850 let persist = match &res {
8851 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8852 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8853 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8855 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8860 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8862 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8865 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8866 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8867 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8870 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8875 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8876 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8877 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8878 let persist = match &res {
8879 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8880 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8881 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8883 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8888 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8890 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8891 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8892 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8895 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8896 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8897 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8899 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8902 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8903 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8904 let context = match phase {
8905 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8906 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8907 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8908 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8913 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8921 // Clean up for removal.
8922 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8923 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8926 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8927 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8928 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8929 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8931 // V1 Channel Establishment
8932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8933 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8936 // V2 Channel Establishment
8937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8938 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8939 // Common Channel Establishment
8940 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8941 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8943 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8945 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8946 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8947 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8948 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8949 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8950 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8951 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8952 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8953 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8954 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8958 // Channel Operations
8959 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8960 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8964 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8966 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8967 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8968 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8969 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8970 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8971 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8972 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8973 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8974 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8977 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8978 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8979 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8980 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8983 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8985 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8987 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8988 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8992 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8993 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8994 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8995 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8999 let mut res = Ok(());
9001 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9002 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9003 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9004 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9005 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9006 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9007 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9010 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9011 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9013 if inbound_peer_limited {
9015 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9017 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9018 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9019 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9020 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9021 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9022 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9023 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9024 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9029 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9030 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9032 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9033 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9034 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9035 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9038 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9041 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9042 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9047 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9049 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9050 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9051 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9052 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9053 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9055 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9056 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9058 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9060 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9061 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9066 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9067 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9072 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9075 match &msg.data as &str {
9076 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9077 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9079 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9080 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9081 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9082 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9083 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9084 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9085 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9086 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9087 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9088 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9089 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9090 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9091 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9092 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9093 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9094 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9098 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9099 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9100 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9101 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9102 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9103 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9105 log_level: Level::Trace,
9115 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9116 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9118 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9119 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9122 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9123 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9124 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9125 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9127 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9128 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9129 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9133 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9134 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9135 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9136 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9137 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9138 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9139 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9140 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9141 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9142 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9150 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9151 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9155 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9156 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9159 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9160 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9163 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9164 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9167 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9168 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9169 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9170 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9173 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9174 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9175 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9176 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9179 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9180 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9181 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9182 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9185 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9186 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9187 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9188 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9191 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9192 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9193 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9194 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9197 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9198 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9199 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9200 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9203 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9204 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9205 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9206 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9209 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9210 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9211 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9212 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9215 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9216 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9217 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9218 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9222 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9223 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9225 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9226 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9227 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9228 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9229 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9230 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9234 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9235 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9236 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9239 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9240 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9243 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9244 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9246 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9247 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9249 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9250 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9254 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9255 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9256 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9258 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9260 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9261 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9265 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9266 amount_msats, payment_secret
9268 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9270 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9271 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9275 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9276 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9277 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9280 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9281 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9282 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9283 payment_paths, payment_hash
9285 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9286 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9287 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9289 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9290 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9291 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9294 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9295 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9296 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9297 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9298 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9300 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9301 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9303 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9304 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9305 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9306 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9308 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9309 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9313 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9314 Err(error) => Some(error),
9318 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9319 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9321 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9323 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9324 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9327 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9328 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9329 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9336 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9343 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9344 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9348 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9350 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9351 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9352 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9356 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9357 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9359 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9360 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9361 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9362 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9363 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9366 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9367 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9368 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9369 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9372 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9373 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9374 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9375 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9378 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9379 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9380 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9381 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9384 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9385 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9386 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9387 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9388 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9389 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9390 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9391 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9392 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9393 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9394 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9395 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9396 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9397 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9398 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9399 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9400 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9401 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9402 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9403 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9404 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9409 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9410 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9413 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9414 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9415 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9418 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9419 (2, node_id, required),
9420 (4, features, required),
9421 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9422 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9423 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9424 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9427 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9428 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9429 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9430 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9431 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9432 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9433 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9434 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9435 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9436 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9437 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9438 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9439 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9440 (7, self.config, option),
9441 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9442 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9443 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9444 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9445 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9446 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9447 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9448 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9449 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9450 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9451 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9452 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9453 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9454 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9455 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9456 (32, self.is_public, required),
9457 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9458 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9459 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9460 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9461 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9467 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9468 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9469 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9470 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9471 (2, channel_id, required),
9472 (3, channel_type, option),
9473 (4, counterparty, required),
9474 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9475 (6, funding_txo, option),
9476 (7, config, option),
9477 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9478 (9, confirmations, option),
9479 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9480 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9481 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9482 (16, balance_msat, required),
9483 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9484 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9485 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9486 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9487 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9488 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9489 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9490 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9491 (26, is_outbound, required),
9492 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9493 (30, is_usable, required),
9494 (32, is_public, required),
9495 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9496 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9497 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9498 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9499 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9502 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9503 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9504 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9505 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9506 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9510 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9512 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9513 outbound_scid_alias,
9517 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9518 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9520 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9521 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9522 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9523 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9524 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9525 confirmations_required,
9527 force_close_spend_delay,
9528 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9529 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9530 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9531 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9532 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9533 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9534 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9535 channel_shutdown_state,
9540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9541 (2, channels, required_vec),
9542 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9543 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9546 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9547 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9548 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9551 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9553 (0, onion_packet, required),
9554 (1, blinded, option),
9555 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9558 (0, payment_data, required),
9559 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9560 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9561 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9562 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9563 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9565 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9566 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9567 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9568 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9569 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9570 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9574 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9575 (0, routing, required),
9576 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9577 (4, payment_hash, required),
9578 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9579 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9580 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9581 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9585 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9586 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9588 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9590 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9591 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9592 reason.write(writer)?;
9594 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9595 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9598 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9599 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9600 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9601 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9608 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9609 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9610 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9613 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9614 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9615 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9616 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9620 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9621 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9622 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9623 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9624 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9627 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9628 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9629 // messages contained in the variants.
9630 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9631 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9632 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9634 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9635 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9636 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9637 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9638 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9641 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9642 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9643 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9644 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9645 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9647 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9652 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9657 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9658 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9659 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9662 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9663 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9664 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9665 (2, outpoint, required),
9666 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9667 (4, htlc_id, required),
9668 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9669 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9670 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9671 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9672 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9675 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9676 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9677 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9678 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9681 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9682 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9683 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9684 (2, self.value, required),
9685 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9686 (4, payment_data, option),
9687 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9688 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9689 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9690 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9696 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9697 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9698 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9699 (0, prev_hop, required),
9700 (1, total_msat, option),
9701 (2, value_ser, required),
9702 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9703 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9704 (5, total_value_received, option),
9705 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9706 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9707 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9709 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9710 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9711 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9713 if payment_data.is_some() {
9714 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9716 if total_msat.is_none() {
9717 total_msat = Some(value);
9719 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9722 if total_msat.is_none() {
9723 if payment_data.is_none() {
9724 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9726 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9728 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9732 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9735 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9736 total_value_received,
9737 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9739 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9740 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9745 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9746 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9747 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9750 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9751 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9752 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9753 let mut payment_id = None;
9754 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9755 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9756 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9757 (0, session_priv, required),
9758 (1, payment_id, option),
9759 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9760 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9761 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9762 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9764 if payment_id.is_none() {
9765 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9767 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9769 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9770 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9773 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9774 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9775 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9776 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9780 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9781 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9782 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9784 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9787 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9788 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9793 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9794 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9796 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9798 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9799 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9800 (0, session_priv, required),
9801 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9802 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9803 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9804 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9805 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9806 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9809 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9811 field.write(writer)?;
9818 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9819 (0, forward_info, required),
9820 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9821 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9822 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9823 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9824 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
9825 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9826 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9829 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9830 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9831 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9833 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9837 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9838 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9839 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9840 (0, htlc_id, required),
9841 (2, err_packet, required),
9844 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9845 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9846 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9847 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9848 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9849 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9850 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9851 (0, htlc_id, required),
9852 (1, failure_code, required),
9853 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9854 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9862 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9863 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9864 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9866 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9868 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9869 (0, htlc_id, required),
9870 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9871 (2, err_packet, required),
9872 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9874 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9875 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9876 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9878 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9882 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9883 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9887 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9892 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9893 (0, payment_secret, required),
9894 (2, expiry_time, required),
9895 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9896 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9897 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9900 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9902 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9903 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9904 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9905 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9906 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9907 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9911 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9912 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9914 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9916 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9918 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9919 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9920 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9923 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9925 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9926 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9927 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9930 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9931 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9934 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9935 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9939 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9941 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9942 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9943 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9944 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9945 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9946 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9949 channel.write(writer)?;
9955 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9956 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9957 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9958 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9959 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9960 for forward in pending_forwards {
9961 forward.write(writer)?;
9966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9968 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9969 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9970 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9972 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9973 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9974 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9975 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9976 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9977 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9978 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9979 htlc.write(writer)?;
9981 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9982 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9985 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9986 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9987 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9988 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9989 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9990 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9991 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9994 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9995 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9996 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9997 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9998 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10000 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10001 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10002 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10003 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10004 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10005 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10006 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10011 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10012 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10013 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10014 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10015 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10016 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10017 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10018 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10019 0u64.write(writer)?;
10021 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10022 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10023 event.write(writer)?;
10027 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10028 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10029 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10030 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10031 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10032 0u64.write(writer)?;
10034 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10035 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10036 // likely to be identical.
10037 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10038 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10040 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10041 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10042 hash.write(writer)?;
10043 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10046 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10047 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10048 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10049 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10050 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10053 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10054 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10056 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10057 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10058 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10059 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10062 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10063 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10064 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10065 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10069 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10070 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10071 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10073 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10074 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10075 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10081 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10082 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10083 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10084 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10087 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10088 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10089 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10090 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10091 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10094 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10095 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10096 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10097 if !updates.is_empty() {
10098 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10099 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10104 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10105 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10106 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10107 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10108 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10109 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10110 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10111 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10112 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10113 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10114 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10115 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10116 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10123 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10124 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10125 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10126 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10129 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10130 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10131 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10132 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10133 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10134 // check that the event is sane here.
10135 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10136 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10137 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10138 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10144 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10145 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10146 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10147 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10148 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10149 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10152 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10153 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10154 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10155 events.push_back((ev, action));
10156 } else if action.is_some() {
10157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10164 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10165 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10166 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10167 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10168 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10169 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10172 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10174 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10176 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10177 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10178 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10179 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10180 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10181 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10182 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10183 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10184 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10185 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10186 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10187 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10188 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10190 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10191 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10193 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10194 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10196 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10197 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10198 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10199 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10200 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10201 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10203 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10204 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10206 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10207 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10208 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10209 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10210 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10211 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10215 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10216 pub entropy_source: ES,
10218 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10219 pub node_signer: NS,
10221 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10222 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10224 pub signer_provider: SP,
10226 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10228 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10229 pub fee_estimator: F,
10230 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10232 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10233 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10234 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10235 pub chain_monitor: M,
10237 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10238 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10239 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10240 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10241 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10242 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10244 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10246 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10247 /// deserialization.
10249 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10250 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10251 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10253 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10254 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10256 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10257 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10258 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10259 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10261 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10264 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10265 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10268 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10269 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10271 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10272 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10273 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10274 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10275 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10280 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10281 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10282 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10283 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10284 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10286 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10287 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10292 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10293 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10294 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10295 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10297 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10298 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10299 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10300 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10301 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10302 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10306 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10307 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10308 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10312 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10313 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10315 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10316 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10317 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10318 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10319 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10320 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10324 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10325 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10327 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10328 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10329 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10331 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10333 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10334 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10335 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10336 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10337 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10338 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10339 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10340 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = HashMap::with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10341 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10342 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10343 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10345 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10346 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10347 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10348 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10349 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10350 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10351 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10352 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10353 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10354 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10355 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10356 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10357 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10358 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10359 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10361 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10362 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10363 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10365 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10366 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10367 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10369 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10370 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10371 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10373 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10374 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10375 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10377 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10378 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10379 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10382 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10383 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10384 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10385 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10386 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10387 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10388 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10389 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10391 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10392 let mut found_htlc = false;
10393 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10394 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10397 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10398 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10399 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10400 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10401 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10402 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10403 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10405 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10406 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10407 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10411 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10412 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10413 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10414 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10415 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10417 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10418 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10420 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10421 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10422 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10423 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10425 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10426 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10427 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10428 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10432 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10433 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10434 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10435 // safely discard the channel.
10436 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10437 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10438 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10439 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10440 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10441 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10442 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10443 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10446 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10447 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10448 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10449 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10450 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10451 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10455 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10456 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10457 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10458 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10459 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10461 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10462 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10463 counterparty_node_id: None,
10464 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10465 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10467 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10471 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10472 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10473 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10474 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10475 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10476 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10477 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10478 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10479 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10481 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10484 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10485 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10486 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10487 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10488 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10489 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10490 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10491 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10493 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10496 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10499 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10500 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10501 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10502 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10503 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10504 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10505 is_connected: false,
10509 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10510 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10511 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10512 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10513 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10514 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10515 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10516 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10519 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10520 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10521 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10522 for _ in 0..event_count {
10523 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10524 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10529 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10530 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10531 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10533 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10534 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10535 // on-startup monitor updates.
10536 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10537 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10539 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10543 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10544 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10546 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10547 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10548 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10549 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10550 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10554 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10555 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10556 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10557 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10558 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10559 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10560 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10562 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10563 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10567 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10568 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10569 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10570 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10571 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10572 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10573 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10574 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10575 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10576 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10577 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10578 let mut events_override = None;
10579 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10580 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10581 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10582 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10583 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10584 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10585 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10586 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10587 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10588 (8, events_override, option),
10589 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10590 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10591 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10592 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10594 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10595 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10598 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10599 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10602 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10603 pending_events_read = events;
10606 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10607 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10610 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10611 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10612 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10613 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10614 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10615 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10617 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10619 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10620 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10621 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10624 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10625 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10626 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10627 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10628 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10630 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10631 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10632 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10634 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10635 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10636 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10637 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10638 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10640 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10641 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10642 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10643 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10644 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10645 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10646 pending_background_events.push(
10647 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10648 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10649 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10650 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10651 update: update.clone(),
10654 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10655 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10656 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10657 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10658 pending_background_events.push(
10659 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10660 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10661 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10664 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10665 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10666 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10668 max_in_flight_update_id
10672 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10673 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10674 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10675 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10676 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10677 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10679 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10681 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10682 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10683 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10684 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10685 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10686 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10687 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10688 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10689 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10692 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10693 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10694 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10695 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10696 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10697 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10698 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10699 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10700 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10701 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10705 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10706 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10707 debug_assert!(false);
10708 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10713 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10714 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10715 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10716 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10717 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10718 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10719 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10720 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10721 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10722 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10724 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10725 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10726 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10728 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10729 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
10730 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
10731 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10732 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10733 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10734 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10735 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10740 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10741 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10743 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10744 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10745 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10746 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10749 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10750 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10751 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10752 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10753 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10754 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10755 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10757 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10758 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10759 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10760 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10761 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10762 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10763 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10764 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10768 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10769 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10770 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10771 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10773 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10774 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10775 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10777 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10778 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10779 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10780 retry_strategy: None,
10781 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10782 payment_params: None,
10783 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10784 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10785 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10786 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10787 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10788 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10789 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10790 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10791 total_msat: path_amt,
10792 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10793 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10795 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10796 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10801 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10802 match htlc_source {
10803 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10804 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10805 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10806 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10808 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10809 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10810 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10811 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10812 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10813 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10814 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10815 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10816 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10817 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10818 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10823 !forwards.is_empty()
10825 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10826 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10827 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10828 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
10829 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10830 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10831 intercepted_id != ev_id
10838 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10839 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10840 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10841 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10842 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10843 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10844 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10845 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10846 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10847 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10848 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10850 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10851 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10852 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
10853 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10855 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10856 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10857 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10864 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10865 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10867 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10869 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10870 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10871 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10872 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10873 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10874 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10875 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10876 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10877 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10878 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
10881 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10882 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10883 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10884 // channel still live case here.
10888 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10889 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10894 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10895 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10896 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10897 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10898 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10899 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10900 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10901 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10905 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10906 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10908 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10909 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10910 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10911 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10913 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10914 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10915 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10917 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10918 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10920 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10921 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10923 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10926 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10927 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10928 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10930 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10934 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10935 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10936 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10937 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10940 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10941 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10942 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10943 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10944 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10945 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10946 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10947 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10949 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10950 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10954 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10956 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10958 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10959 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10961 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10962 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10967 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10968 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10970 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10972 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10974 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10975 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10976 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10977 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10981 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10982 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10983 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10984 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10985 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10986 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10987 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10988 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10989 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10991 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10992 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10993 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10995 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10996 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10997 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10998 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10999 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11000 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11002 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11003 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11004 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11005 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11006 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11011 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11012 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11013 debug_assert!(false);
11014 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11019 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11021 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11022 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11023 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11024 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11025 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11026 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11027 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11028 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11029 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11030 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11031 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11033 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11034 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11036 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11037 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11038 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11039 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11041 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11042 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11043 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11044 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11046 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11047 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11048 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11049 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11051 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11052 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11053 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11054 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11055 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11056 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11057 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11058 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11061 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11062 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11065 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11068 purpose: payment.purpose,
11069 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11070 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11071 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11077 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11078 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11079 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11080 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11081 for action in actions.iter() {
11082 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11083 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11084 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11086 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11088 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11089 blocked_channel_id);
11090 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11091 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11092 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11094 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11095 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11096 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11097 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11101 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11102 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11106 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11108 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11109 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11113 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11115 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11116 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11117 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11118 router: args.router,
11120 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11122 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11123 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11124 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11125 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11127 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11128 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11129 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11130 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11131 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11132 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11134 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11136 our_network_pubkey,
11139 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11141 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11143 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11144 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11145 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11146 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11147 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11149 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11150 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11152 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11154 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11156 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11157 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11158 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11160 logger: args.logger,
11161 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11164 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11165 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11166 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11167 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11168 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11171 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11172 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11173 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11174 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11175 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11176 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id);
11179 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11180 //connection or two.
11182 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11188 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11189 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11190 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11191 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11192 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11193 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11194 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11195 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11196 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11197 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11198 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11199 use crate::prelude::*;
11200 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11201 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11202 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11203 use crate::util::test_utils;
11204 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11205 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11208 fn test_notify_limits() {
11209 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11210 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11214 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11216 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11217 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11218 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11220 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11222 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11224 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11225 // to connect messages with new values
11226 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11227 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11228 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11229 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11230 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11231 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11233 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11234 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11235 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11236 // ... but the last node should not.
11237 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11238 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11239 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11240 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11242 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11243 // about the channel.
11244 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11245 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11246 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11248 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11250 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11251 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11252 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11253 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11254 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11255 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11257 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11258 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11259 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11261 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11262 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11263 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11264 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11265 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11266 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11268 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11269 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11270 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11271 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11272 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11273 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11274 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11275 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11277 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11278 // the channel info has updated.
11279 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11280 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11281 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11282 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11283 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11284 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11288 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11289 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11291 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11292 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11293 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11294 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11295 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11297 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11298 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11299 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11300 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11302 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11303 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11304 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11305 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11306 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11307 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11308 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11309 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11311 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11313 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11315 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11316 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11317 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11319 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11321 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11322 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11325 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11326 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11327 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11329 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11330 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11331 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11332 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11333 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11334 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11335 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11336 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11337 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11339 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11340 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11341 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11343 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11345 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11347 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11348 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11349 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11350 // lightning messages manually.
11351 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11352 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11355 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11357 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11358 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11360 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11361 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11363 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11364 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11366 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11370 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11371 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11372 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11374 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11376 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11378 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11379 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11382 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11383 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11384 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11385 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11387 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11388 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11389 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11390 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11395 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11396 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11397 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11398 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11405 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11406 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11407 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11410 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11411 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11412 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11413 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11414 // fails as expected.
11415 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11416 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11417 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11418 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11419 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11420 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11423 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11424 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11426 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11427 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11428 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11429 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11431 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11432 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11433 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11435 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11436 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11437 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11438 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11439 let route = find_route(
11440 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11441 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11443 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11444 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11446 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11447 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11448 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11449 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11452 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11453 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11454 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11455 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11458 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11459 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11460 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11461 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11462 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11463 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11464 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11465 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11466 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11468 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11469 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11471 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11472 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11473 let route = find_route(
11474 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11475 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11477 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11478 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11480 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11481 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11482 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11483 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11484 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11486 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11487 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11488 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11489 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11491 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11492 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11493 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11494 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11495 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11497 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11498 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11501 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11502 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11503 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11504 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11505 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11506 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11509 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11511 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11514 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11515 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11516 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11517 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11519 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11520 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11521 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11522 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11523 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11525 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11526 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11527 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11530 let route = find_route(
11531 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11532 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11534 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11535 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11536 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11538 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11539 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11540 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11541 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11542 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11545 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11546 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11548 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11549 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11550 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11551 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11552 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11553 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11554 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11555 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11556 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11558 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11559 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11563 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11564 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11565 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11571 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11572 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11574 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11575 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11576 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11577 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11578 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11579 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11580 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11581 let route = find_route(
11582 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11583 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11586 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11587 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11588 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11589 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11590 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11591 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11594 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11595 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11596 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11597 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11598 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11599 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11600 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11602 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11606 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11607 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11608 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11609 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11610 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11616 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11617 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11619 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11620 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11621 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11622 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11623 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11624 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11625 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11626 let route = find_route(
11627 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11628 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11631 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11632 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11633 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11634 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11635 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11636 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11637 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11638 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11641 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11642 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11643 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11644 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11645 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11646 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11649 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11653 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11654 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11655 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11656 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11657 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11659 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11660 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11661 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11662 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11664 // Marshall an MPP route.
11665 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11666 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11667 route.paths.push(path);
11668 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11669 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11670 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11671 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11672 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11673 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11675 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11676 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11678 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11679 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11681 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11686 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11690 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11692 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11694 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11695 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11697 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11698 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11700 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11703 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11704 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11705 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11706 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11707 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11708 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11711 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11714 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11715 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11720 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11721 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11727 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11728 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11730 total_msat: 100_000,
11733 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11734 // payment verification fails as expected.
11735 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11736 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11737 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11738 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11740 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11744 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11745 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11749 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11750 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11751 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11752 // the channel is successfully closed.
11753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11756 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11758 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11759 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11760 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11761 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11762 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11764 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11765 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11767 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11768 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11769 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11770 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11773 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11775 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11776 // as it has the funding transaction.
11777 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11778 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11779 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11782 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11784 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11786 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11788 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11789 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11790 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11792 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11795 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11796 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11797 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11798 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11799 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11802 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11803 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11805 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11806 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11807 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11808 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11810 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11811 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11812 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11813 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11815 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11816 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11818 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11819 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11820 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11821 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11822 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11823 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11824 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11828 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11829 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11830 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11831 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11832 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11833 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11834 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11837 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11839 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11840 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11841 // closing transaction).
11842 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11843 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11844 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11846 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11847 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11848 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11849 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11850 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11853 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11855 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11857 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11858 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11859 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11861 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11863 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11864 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11867 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11868 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11869 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11872 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11873 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11874 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11877 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11878 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11879 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11882 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11883 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11884 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11887 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11889 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11890 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11892 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11893 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11895 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11896 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11901 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11902 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11903 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11904 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11905 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11906 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11907 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11911 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11912 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11913 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11915 // Test the API functions.
11916 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11918 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11920 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11922 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11924 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11926 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11928 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11932 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11933 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11934 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11935 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11936 // the given `channel_id`.
11937 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11938 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11939 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11940 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11942 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11945 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11947 // Test the API functions.
11948 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11950 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11952 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11954 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11956 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11958 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11962 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11963 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11967 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11969 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11971 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11972 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11974 let mut funding_tx = None;
11975 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11976 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11977 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11980 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11981 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11982 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11983 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11984 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11986 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11988 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11990 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11992 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11994 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11996 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11999 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12000 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12002 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12003 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12005 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12006 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12008 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12009 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12010 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12011 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12012 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12013 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12014 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12017 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12018 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12019 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12020 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12021 }, true).unwrap_err();
12023 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12024 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12025 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12026 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12027 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12028 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12029 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12031 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12032 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12034 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12035 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12036 }, true).unwrap_err();
12038 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12039 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12040 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12041 }, false).unwrap();
12042 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12044 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12045 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12047 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12048 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12049 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12050 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12051 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12053 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12054 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12055 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12057 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12058 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12059 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12061 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12062 // "protected" and can connect again.
12063 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12064 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12065 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12067 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12069 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12071 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12072 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12076 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12077 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12078 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12079 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12080 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12081 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12083 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12085 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12086 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12088 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12089 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12090 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12091 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12094 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12096 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12097 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12098 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12100 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12101 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12102 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12104 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12105 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12106 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12107 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12111 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12112 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12113 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12116 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12117 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12121 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12123 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12124 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12126 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12127 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12128 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12129 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12130 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12131 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12135 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12137 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12138 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12142 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12143 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12146 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12147 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12148 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12149 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12150 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12152 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12155 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12156 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12157 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12158 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12164 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12165 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12167 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12169 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12171 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12172 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12176 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12180 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12181 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12182 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12183 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12184 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12185 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12186 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12187 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12188 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12189 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12190 payment_metadata: None,
12191 keysend_preimage: None,
12192 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12193 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12195 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12197 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12198 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12199 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12200 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12201 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12202 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12203 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12205 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12206 } else { panic!(); }
12208 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12209 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12210 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12211 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12212 payment_metadata: None,
12213 keysend_preimage: None,
12214 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12215 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12217 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12219 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12220 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12221 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12222 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12226 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12227 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12228 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12229 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12230 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12232 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12233 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12234 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12235 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12236 payment_metadata: None,
12237 keysend_preimage: None,
12238 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12239 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12241 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12242 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12243 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12245 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12246 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12247 // is not satisfied.
12248 assert!(result.is_ok());
12252 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12253 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12254 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12255 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12256 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12258 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12259 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12264 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12265 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12267 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12268 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12270 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12271 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12272 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12273 match &msg_events[0] {
12274 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12275 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12277 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12278 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12279 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12282 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12285 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12286 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12288 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12289 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12292 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12296 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12297 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12298 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12299 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12302 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12303 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12304 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12305 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12306 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12308 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12309 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12310 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12312 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12313 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12315 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12316 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12321 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12322 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12324 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12325 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12327 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12328 // not have generated any events.
12329 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12333 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12334 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12335 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12336 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12337 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12338 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12339 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12340 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12342 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12343 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12344 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12346 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12347 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12348 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12349 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12350 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12352 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12353 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12356 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12357 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12358 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12360 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12361 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12362 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12363 ..Default::default()
12365 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12369 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12370 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12373 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12374 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12375 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12376 ..Default::default()
12378 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12379 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12380 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12381 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12383 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12384 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12387 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12388 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12389 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12390 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12391 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12394 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12395 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12396 ..Default::default()
12398 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12401 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12402 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12403 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12408 fn test_payment_display() {
12409 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12410 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12411 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12412 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12413 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12414 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12418 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12419 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12420 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12421 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12422 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12423 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12425 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12426 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12427 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12428 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12429 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12430 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12431 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12432 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12434 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12435 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12436 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12439 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12440 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12443 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12445 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12446 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12447 }, false).unwrap();
12448 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12449 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12450 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12452 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12454 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12455 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12456 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12457 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12458 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12459 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12460 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12461 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12462 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12463 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12464 } else { panic!() };
12465 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12466 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12467 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12468 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12472 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12473 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12474 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12479 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12480 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12481 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12482 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12485 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12486 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12487 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12489 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12490 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12492 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12493 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12496 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12497 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12498 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12500 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12504 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12505 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12506 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12508 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12513 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12514 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12515 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12516 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12518 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12519 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12520 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12522 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12524 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12525 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12526 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12527 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12529 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12530 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12532 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12538 use crate::chain::Listen;
12539 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12540 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12541 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12542 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12543 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12544 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12545 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12546 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12547 use crate::util::test_utils;
12548 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12550 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12551 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12552 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12553 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12555 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12557 use criterion::Criterion;
12559 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12560 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12561 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12562 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12563 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12564 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12565 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12567 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12568 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12570 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12571 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12573 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12575 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12578 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12579 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12582 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12583 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12584 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12586 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12587 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12589 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12590 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12591 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12592 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12593 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12595 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12596 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12597 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12599 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12600 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12601 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12602 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12604 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12605 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12606 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12608 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12609 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12610 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12611 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12612 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12614 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12615 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12616 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12618 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12619 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12621 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12622 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12623 }, false).unwrap();
12624 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12625 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12626 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12629 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12630 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12631 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12633 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12634 } else { panic!(); }
12636 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12637 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12638 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12639 match events_b[0] {
12640 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12641 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12643 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12646 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12647 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12648 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12649 match events_a[0] {
12650 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12651 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12656 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12658 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12659 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12660 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12662 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12663 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12664 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12665 match msg_events[0] {
12666 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12667 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12668 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12672 match msg_events[1] {
12673 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12677 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12678 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12679 match events_a[0] {
12680 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12681 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12683 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12686 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12687 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12688 match events_b[0] {
12689 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12690 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12695 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12696 macro_rules! send_payment {
12697 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12698 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12699 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12700 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12701 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12702 payment_count += 1;
12703 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12704 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12706 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12707 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12708 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12709 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12710 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12711 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12712 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12713 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12714 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12715 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12716 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12718 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12719 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12720 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12721 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12723 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12724 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12725 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12726 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12727 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12729 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12732 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12733 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12734 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12735 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12737 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12741 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12742 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12743 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);