1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
193 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
194 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
195 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
198 session_priv: SecretKey,
199 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
200 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
201 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
202 payment_id: PaymentId,
203 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
204 payee: Option<Payee>,
207 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
208 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
209 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
211 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
213 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
215 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
218 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
219 payment_id.hash(hasher);
220 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
221 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
229 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
230 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
232 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
233 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
234 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
235 payment_secret: None,
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
244 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
253 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
255 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
260 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
262 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
263 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
264 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
265 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
266 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
268 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
269 err: msgs::LightningError,
270 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
271 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
273 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
275 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
277 err: LightningError {
279 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
280 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 shutdown_finish: None,
291 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
293 err: LightningError {
295 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
298 shutdown_finish: None,
302 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
303 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
306 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
308 err: LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
318 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
322 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
325 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
327 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
329 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
333 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
335 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
336 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
342 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
344 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
345 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
353 shutdown_finish: None,
358 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
359 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
360 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
361 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
362 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
364 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
365 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
366 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
367 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
368 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
369 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
370 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
372 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
376 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
377 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
378 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
379 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
380 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
381 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
382 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
383 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
384 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
385 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
386 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
387 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
389 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
390 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
391 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
392 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
395 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
396 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
397 /// quite some time lag.
398 enum BackgroundEvent {
399 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
400 /// commitment transaction.
401 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
404 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
405 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
407 latest_features: InitFeatures,
410 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
411 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
413 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
415 struct PendingInboundPayment {
416 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
417 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
418 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
419 /// this payment being removed.
421 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
422 user_payment_id: u64,
423 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
424 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
425 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
428 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
429 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
430 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
432 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
435 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
436 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
437 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
438 pending_amt_msat: u64,
439 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
441 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
442 starting_block_height: u32,
444 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
445 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
446 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
448 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
452 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
453 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
455 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
459 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
461 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
466 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
467 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
468 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
469 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
470 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
471 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
474 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
477 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
478 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
479 let remove_res = match self {
480 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
481 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
482 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
483 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
487 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
488 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
489 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
490 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
496 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
497 let insert_res = match self {
498 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
500 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
502 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
505 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
506 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
507 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
513 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
515 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
516 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
517 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
524 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
525 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
526 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
527 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
528 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
529 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
530 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
531 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
533 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
534 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
535 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
536 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
537 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
538 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
539 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
540 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
541 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
543 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
544 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
546 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
547 /// to individual Channels.
549 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
550 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
551 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
552 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
554 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
555 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
556 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
557 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
558 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
559 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
560 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
562 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
563 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
564 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
565 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
568 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
569 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
570 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
571 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
572 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
574 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
575 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
576 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
577 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
578 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
579 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
580 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
581 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
582 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
583 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
586 default_configuration: UserConfig,
587 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
593 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
595 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
596 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
598 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
599 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
600 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
601 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
603 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
604 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
605 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
606 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
607 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
608 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
610 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
611 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
612 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
613 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
614 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
615 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
616 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
617 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
619 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
621 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
622 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
624 our_network_key: SecretKey,
625 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
627 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
628 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
629 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
631 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
632 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
633 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
634 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
636 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
637 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
638 /// are currently open with that peer.
639 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
640 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
643 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
644 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
646 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
647 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
648 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
649 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
650 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
651 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
652 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
653 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
654 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
656 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
663 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
665 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
666 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
667 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
668 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
669 pub struct ChainParameters {
670 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
671 pub network: Network,
673 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
675 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
676 pub best_block: BestBlock,
679 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
685 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
686 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
687 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
688 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
689 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
690 /// updates are ready for persistence).
692 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
693 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
694 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
695 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
696 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
698 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
699 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
702 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
703 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
704 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
707 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
708 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
710 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
711 persistence_notifier: notifier,
712 should_persist: persist_check,
713 _read_guard: read_guard,
718 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
720 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
721 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
726 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
727 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
729 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
731 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
732 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
733 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
734 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
735 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
737 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
738 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
740 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
742 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
743 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
744 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
745 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
746 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
747 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
748 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
750 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
751 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
753 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
754 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
755 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
756 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
758 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
759 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
760 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
761 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
762 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
763 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
766 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
768 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
769 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
772 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
774 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
775 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
776 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
777 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
778 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
779 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
780 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
781 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
782 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
783 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
784 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
787 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
788 /// to better separate parameters.
789 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
790 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
791 /// The node_id of our counterparty
792 pub node_id: PublicKey,
793 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
794 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
795 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
796 pub features: InitFeatures,
797 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
798 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
799 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
801 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
803 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
804 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
805 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
806 /// payments to us through this channel.
807 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
810 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
812 pub struct ChannelDetails {
813 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
814 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
815 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
816 /// lifetime of the channel.
817 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
818 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
819 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
820 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
821 /// our counterparty already.
823 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
824 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
825 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
826 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
827 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
828 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
829 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
830 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
831 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
832 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
833 /// this value on chain.
835 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
837 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
839 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
840 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
841 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
842 pub user_channel_id: u64,
843 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
844 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
845 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
846 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
848 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
849 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
850 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
851 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
852 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
853 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
854 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
855 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
856 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
858 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
859 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
860 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
861 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
862 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
863 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
864 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
865 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
868 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
870 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
871 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
872 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
873 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
874 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
875 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
876 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
877 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
878 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
880 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
881 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
882 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
883 pub is_outbound: bool,
884 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
885 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
886 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
887 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
888 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
890 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
891 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
892 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
893 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
895 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
897 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
901 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
902 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
904 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
905 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
906 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
907 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
908 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
909 ParameterError(APIError),
910 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
911 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
912 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
915 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
917 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
918 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
919 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
920 /// paths than the ones selected).
921 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
922 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
923 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
924 /// in over-/re-payment.
926 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
927 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
928 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
930 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
931 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
932 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
933 /// with the latest update_id.
934 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
937 macro_rules! handle_error {
938 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
941 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
942 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
944 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
945 // entering the macro.
946 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
947 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
950 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
952 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
953 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
954 if let Some(update) = update_option {
955 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
959 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
960 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
961 channel_id, user_channel_id,
962 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
967 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
968 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
970 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
971 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
972 action: err.action.clone()
976 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
977 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
980 // Return error in case higher-API need one
987 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
988 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
989 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
991 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
992 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
994 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
996 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
997 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
999 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1000 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1001 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1002 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1004 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1005 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1006 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1008 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1009 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1010 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1011 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1013 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1014 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1015 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1021 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1022 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1026 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1028 $entry.remove_entry();
1036 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1037 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1041 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1043 $entry.remove_entry();
1051 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1052 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1054 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1055 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1056 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1063 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1064 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1065 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1067 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1069 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1070 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1071 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1072 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1074 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1075 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1076 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1077 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1078 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1079 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1080 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1081 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1082 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1083 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1084 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1087 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1088 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1089 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1090 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1091 match $action_type {
1092 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1093 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1095 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1096 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1098 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1099 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1100 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1101 if !$resend_commitment {
1102 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1105 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1107 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1108 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1113 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1115 $entry.remove_entry();
1119 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1120 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1124 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1125 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1126 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1128 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1129 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1133 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1134 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1135 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1136 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1137 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1140 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1145 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1146 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1147 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1148 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1149 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1150 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1152 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1153 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1155 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1156 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1157 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1158 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1161 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1162 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1163 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1164 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1165 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1166 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1167 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1168 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1169 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1170 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1171 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1172 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1175 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1176 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1177 // before it should be allowed to.
1178 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1179 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1180 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1183 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1184 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1185 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1186 msg: announcement_sigs,
1189 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1192 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1193 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1194 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1195 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1196 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1197 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1198 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1199 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1200 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1201 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1202 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1203 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1204 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1205 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1206 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1207 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1208 let mut order = $order;
1210 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1212 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1216 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1217 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1218 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1219 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1224 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1225 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1226 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1227 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1228 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1233 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1237 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1242 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1243 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1244 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1249 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1250 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1251 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1252 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1253 assert!(res.is_ok());
1256 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1260 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1261 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1262 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1264 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1266 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1267 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1272 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1273 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1274 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1275 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1276 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1279 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1281 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1282 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1284 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1286 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1288 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1289 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1290 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1291 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1292 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1293 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1296 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1297 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1298 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1302 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1304 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1305 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1306 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1307 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1308 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1309 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1311 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1312 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1314 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1315 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1318 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1319 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1321 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1323 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1324 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1325 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1326 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1334 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1335 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1336 &self.default_configuration
1339 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1341 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1342 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1343 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1344 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1345 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1348 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1349 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1351 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1352 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1353 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1355 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1356 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1357 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1358 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1359 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1360 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1362 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1363 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1364 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1365 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1366 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1367 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1371 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1372 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1373 Some(peer_state) => {
1374 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1375 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1376 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1377 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1379 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1382 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1385 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1386 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1388 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1389 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1390 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1391 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1392 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1393 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1395 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1398 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1400 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1401 node_id: their_network_key,
1404 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1407 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1408 let mut res = Vec::new();
1410 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1411 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1412 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1413 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1414 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1415 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1416 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1417 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1418 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1419 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1420 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1421 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1422 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1424 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1425 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1426 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1427 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1428 inbound_capacity_msat,
1429 outbound_capacity_msat,
1430 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1431 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1432 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1433 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1434 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1435 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1436 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1440 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1441 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1442 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1443 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1449 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1450 /// more information.
1451 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1452 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1455 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1456 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1458 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1459 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1461 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1462 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1463 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1464 // really wanted anyway.
1465 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1468 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1469 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1470 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1471 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1472 Some(transaction) => {
1473 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1477 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1478 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1479 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1480 reason: closure_reason
1484 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1485 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1487 let counterparty_node_id;
1488 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1489 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1490 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1491 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1492 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1494 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1496 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1497 Some(peer_state) => {
1498 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1499 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1500 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1502 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1504 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1506 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1507 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1508 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1509 let (result, is_permanent) =
1510 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1512 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1518 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1519 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1523 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1524 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1525 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1526 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1530 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1538 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1539 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1542 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1546 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1547 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1548 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1550 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1551 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1553 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1554 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1555 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1556 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1558 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1560 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1561 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1562 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1563 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1564 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1567 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1568 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1569 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1571 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1572 /// the channel being closed or not:
1573 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1574 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1575 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1576 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1577 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1578 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1579 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1581 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1583 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1584 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1585 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1586 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1587 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1591 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1592 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1593 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1594 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1595 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1597 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1598 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1599 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1600 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1601 // ignore the result here.
1602 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1606 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1607 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1608 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1610 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1611 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1612 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1613 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1614 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1615 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1618 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1619 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1621 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1622 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1623 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1626 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1628 chan.remove_entry().1
1630 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1633 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1634 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1635 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1636 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1637 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1642 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1645 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1646 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1647 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1648 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1649 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1650 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1651 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1652 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1653 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1654 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1655 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1665 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1666 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1667 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1668 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1669 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1673 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1674 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1675 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1677 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1678 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1679 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1680 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1681 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1682 failure_code: $err_code,
1683 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1688 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1689 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1692 let shared_secret = {
1693 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1694 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1697 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1699 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1700 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1701 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1702 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1703 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1704 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1705 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1706 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1709 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1710 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1711 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1712 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1713 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1716 let mut channel_state = None;
1717 macro_rules! return_err {
1718 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1720 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1721 if channel_state.is_none() {
1722 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1724 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1725 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1726 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1727 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1728 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1733 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1734 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1735 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1736 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1738 let error_code = match err {
1739 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1740 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1741 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1742 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1743 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1745 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1748 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1749 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1750 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1757 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1760 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1761 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1762 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1763 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1764 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1765 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1766 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1767 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1768 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1769 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1770 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1771 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1775 // final_expiry_too_soon
1776 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1777 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1778 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1779 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1780 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1781 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1782 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1784 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1785 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1786 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1788 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1789 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1790 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1793 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1794 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1795 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1796 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1797 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1798 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1799 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1800 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1802 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1804 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1805 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1806 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1807 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1808 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1809 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1810 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1811 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1812 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1815 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1817 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1820 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1825 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1826 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1827 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1828 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1830 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1832 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1833 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1834 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1835 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1838 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1839 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1840 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1842 // Check two things:
1843 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1844 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1845 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1847 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1849 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1850 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1851 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1853 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1855 let blinding_factor = {
1856 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1857 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1858 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1859 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1862 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1864 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1866 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1869 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1870 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1873 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1874 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1875 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1876 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1877 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1881 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1882 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1883 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1886 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1887 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1888 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1889 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1893 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1894 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1895 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1896 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1897 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1898 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1899 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1900 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1901 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1902 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1903 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1905 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1908 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1910 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1911 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1912 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1913 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1914 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1917 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1918 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1919 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1920 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1921 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1922 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1923 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1925 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1926 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1928 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1929 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1930 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1931 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1932 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1934 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1935 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1937 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1938 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1939 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1940 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1941 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1943 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1944 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1946 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1947 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1948 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1949 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1955 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1956 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1957 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1958 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1960 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1961 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1963 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1964 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1965 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1967 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1969 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1974 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1977 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1978 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1979 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1981 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1982 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1983 if !chan.should_announce() {
1984 return Err(LightningError {
1985 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1986 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1989 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1990 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1993 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1994 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1995 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1996 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1997 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1998 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2000 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2001 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2005 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2007 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2008 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2010 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2011 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2012 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2013 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2014 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2015 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2016 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2017 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2020 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2021 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2023 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2029 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2030 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2031 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2032 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2033 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2034 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2036 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2037 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2038 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2039 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2040 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2042 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2046 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2047 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2049 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2050 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2051 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2052 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2053 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2054 err: "Payment already completed"
2059 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2060 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2061 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2064 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2065 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2067 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2068 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2070 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2071 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2073 let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2074 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2076 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2077 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2079 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2080 payee: payee.clone(),
2081 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2082 channel_state, chan);
2084 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2085 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2086 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2087 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2088 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2089 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2090 total_msat: total_value,
2092 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2096 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2097 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2098 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2099 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2100 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2101 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2102 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2103 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2104 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2107 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2109 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2110 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2111 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2112 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2113 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2114 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2122 } else { unreachable!(); }
2126 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2127 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2129 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2134 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2136 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2137 /// fields for more info.
2139 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2140 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2141 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2142 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2143 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2144 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2146 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2148 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2149 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2150 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2152 /// In general, a path may raise:
2153 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2154 /// node public key) is specified.
2155 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2156 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2158 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2159 /// relevant updates.
2161 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2162 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2163 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2165 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2166 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2167 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2168 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2170 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2171 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2172 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2173 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2174 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2177 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2178 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2179 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2181 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2182 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2183 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2184 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2185 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2187 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2188 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2190 let mut total_value = 0;
2191 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2192 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2193 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2194 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2195 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2196 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2197 continue 'path_check;
2199 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2200 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2201 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2202 continue 'path_check;
2205 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2206 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2208 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2209 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2211 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2212 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2213 total_value = amt_msat;
2216 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2217 let mut results = Vec::new();
2218 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2219 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2221 let mut has_ok = false;
2222 let mut has_err = false;
2223 for res in results.iter() {
2224 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2225 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2226 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2227 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2234 if has_err && has_ok {
2235 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2237 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2243 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2245 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2246 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2247 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2248 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2250 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2251 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2252 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2253 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2254 if path.len() == 0 {
2255 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2256 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2261 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2262 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2263 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2265 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2266 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2268 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2269 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2270 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2271 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2274 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2276 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2277 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2278 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2281 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2282 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2283 err: "Payment already completed"
2288 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2289 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2293 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2296 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2297 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2298 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2299 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2300 /// never reach the recipient.
2302 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2304 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2305 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2307 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2309 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2310 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2311 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2313 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2315 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2316 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2317 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2322 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2323 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2324 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2325 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2327 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2329 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2331 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2332 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2333 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2334 } else { unreachable!(); })
2337 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2339 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2340 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2343 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2344 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2349 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2351 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2354 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2355 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2356 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2366 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2367 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2368 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2372 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2374 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2375 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2377 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2379 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2380 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2381 /// keys per-channel).
2383 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2384 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2385 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2387 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2388 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2389 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2391 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2392 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2393 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2395 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2396 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2397 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2398 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2402 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2403 let mut output_index = None;
2404 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2405 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2406 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2407 if output_index.is_some() {
2408 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2409 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2412 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2413 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2414 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2417 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2420 if output_index.is_none() {
2421 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2422 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2425 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2429 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2430 if !chan.should_announce() {
2431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2435 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2437 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2439 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2440 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2442 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2443 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2444 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2445 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2446 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2451 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2452 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2453 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2455 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2458 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2459 // smaller than 500:
2460 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2462 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2463 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2464 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2465 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2466 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2467 /// our network addresses.
2469 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2470 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2472 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2473 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2474 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2475 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2477 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2479 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2480 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2483 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2484 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2487 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2488 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2489 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2491 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2492 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2493 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2494 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2495 rgb, alias, addresses,
2496 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2497 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2499 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2500 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2505 let mut announced_chans = false;
2506 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2507 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2508 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2510 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2515 announced_chans = true;
2517 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2518 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2519 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2523 if announced_chans {
2524 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2525 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2526 signature: node_announce_sig,
2527 contents: announcement
2533 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2535 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2536 /// Will likely generate further events.
2537 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2540 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2541 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2542 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2544 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2545 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2547 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2548 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2549 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2550 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2552 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2553 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2554 match forward_info {
2555 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2556 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2557 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2558 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2559 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2560 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2561 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2563 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2564 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2567 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2568 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2569 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2570 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2571 // problem, not ours.
2578 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2579 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2580 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2581 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2582 match forward_info {
2583 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2584 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2586 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2587 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2588 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2589 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2590 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2591 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2592 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2593 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2595 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2597 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2598 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2600 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2602 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2603 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2604 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2610 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2612 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2613 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2614 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2615 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2616 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2617 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2618 // this channel currently :/.
2624 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2625 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2627 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2628 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2629 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2631 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2632 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2634 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2636 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2637 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2638 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2641 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2643 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2644 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2645 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2646 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2647 // messages when we can.
2648 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2649 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2650 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2657 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2658 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2661 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2662 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2663 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2664 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2665 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2666 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2668 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2670 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2671 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2672 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2674 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2675 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2677 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2679 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2683 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2684 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2687 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2688 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2689 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2690 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2691 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2692 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2693 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2694 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2695 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2697 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2705 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2706 match forward_info {
2707 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2708 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2709 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2710 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2711 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2712 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2713 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2714 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2716 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2719 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2720 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2721 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2722 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2723 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2724 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2726 value: amt_to_forward,
2731 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2733 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2734 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2735 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2737 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2738 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2739 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2740 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2741 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2743 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2748 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2749 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2750 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2751 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2752 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2753 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2754 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2755 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2757 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2758 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2759 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2760 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2762 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2763 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2764 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2765 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2766 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2768 amt: amt_to_forward,
2769 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2773 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2774 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2782 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2785 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2786 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2789 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2790 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2791 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2792 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2794 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2795 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2797 let mut total_value = 0;
2798 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2799 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2800 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2801 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2803 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2807 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2808 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2809 total_value += htlc.value;
2810 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2811 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2812 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2813 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2814 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2815 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2817 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2819 _ => unreachable!(),
2822 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2823 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2824 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2825 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2828 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2829 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2831 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2832 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2833 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2834 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2838 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2839 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2841 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2843 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2844 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2851 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2852 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2860 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2861 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2864 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2865 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2868 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2869 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2870 events.append(&mut new_events);
2873 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2875 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2876 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2878 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2879 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2880 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2881 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2882 if background_events.is_empty() {
2886 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2888 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2889 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2890 // monitor updating completing.
2891 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2898 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2899 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2900 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2901 self.process_background_events();
2904 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2905 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2906 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2907 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2908 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2909 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2910 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2912 if !chan.is_live() {
2913 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2914 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2915 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2917 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2918 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2920 let mut retain_channel = true;
2921 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2924 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2925 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2929 let ret_err = match res {
2930 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2931 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2932 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2933 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2936 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2937 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2938 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2939 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2940 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2941 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2942 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2943 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2953 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2957 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2958 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2959 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2960 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2961 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2962 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2963 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2965 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2967 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2969 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2971 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2972 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2974 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2975 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2977 handle_errors.push(err);
2987 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2989 /// This currently includes:
2990 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2991 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2992 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2995 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2996 /// estimate fetches.
2997 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2998 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2999 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3000 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3002 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3004 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3006 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3007 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3008 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3009 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3010 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3011 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3012 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3013 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3015 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3017 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3019 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3020 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3021 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3022 if needs_close { return false; }
3025 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3026 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3027 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3028 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3029 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3030 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3031 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3032 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3037 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3039 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3040 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3041 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3045 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3046 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3055 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3056 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3062 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3063 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3064 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3065 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3066 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3067 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3068 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3070 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3071 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3072 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3073 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3074 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3075 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3076 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3077 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3079 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3080 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3086 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3087 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3088 // be surfaced to the user.
3089 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3090 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3092 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3093 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3094 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3095 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3096 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3097 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3099 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3102 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3104 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3105 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3106 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3108 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3109 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3110 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3111 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3112 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3113 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3114 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3115 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3116 Some(RouteParameters {
3118 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3119 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3122 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3123 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3124 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3126 rejected_by_dest: false,
3127 network_update: None,
3128 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3130 short_channel_id: None,
3140 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3147 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3148 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3149 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3150 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3151 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3152 /// still-available channels.
3153 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3154 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3155 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3156 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3159 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3160 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3161 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3163 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3164 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3165 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3166 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3167 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3168 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3169 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3170 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3173 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3177 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3178 all_paths_failed = true;
3181 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3184 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3185 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3186 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3187 Some(RouteParameters {
3188 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3189 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3190 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3194 match &onion_error {
3195 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3197 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3199 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3200 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3201 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3202 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3203 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3204 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3205 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3206 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3207 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3214 error_code: onion_error_code,
3216 error_data: onion_error_data
3220 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3226 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3227 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3228 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3229 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3231 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3232 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3233 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3234 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3235 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3236 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3237 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3238 network_update: None,
3241 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3244 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3246 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3252 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3253 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3254 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3255 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3256 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3257 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3259 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3260 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3261 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3265 let mut forward_event = None;
3266 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3267 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3269 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3271 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3274 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3277 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3278 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3279 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3280 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3281 time_forwardable: time
3288 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3289 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3290 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3292 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3293 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3294 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3295 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3297 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3299 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3300 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3301 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3302 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3306 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3307 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3308 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3309 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3311 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3312 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3313 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3314 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3316 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3317 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3318 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3319 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3320 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3322 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3323 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3324 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3330 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3331 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3332 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3334 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3335 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3336 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3337 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3338 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3339 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3340 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3342 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3343 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3344 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3345 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3346 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3347 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3348 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3349 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3351 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3352 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3353 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3354 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3355 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3356 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3358 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3363 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3364 // which were generated.
3365 channel_state.take();
3367 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3368 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3369 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3376 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3377 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3378 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3379 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3380 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3382 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3387 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3388 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3389 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3390 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3391 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3392 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3393 payment_preimage, e);
3394 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3395 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3396 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3397 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3400 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3402 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3404 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3405 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3406 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3407 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3408 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3409 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3415 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3417 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3420 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3421 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3422 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3423 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3424 payment_preimage, e);
3426 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3427 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3429 chan.remove_entry();
3431 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3434 } else { unreachable!(); }
3437 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3438 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3439 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3440 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3441 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3442 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3443 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3444 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3445 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3446 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3454 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3457 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3458 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3459 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3460 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3461 let found_payment = if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3462 let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3463 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3465 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3466 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3467 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3469 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3470 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3471 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3472 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3479 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3480 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3481 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3482 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3484 payment_hash: payment_hash
3488 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3491 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3492 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3493 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3494 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3495 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3496 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3497 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3500 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3501 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3502 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3503 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3504 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3507 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3508 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3509 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3510 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3511 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3512 payment_preimage, e);
3514 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3515 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3516 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3517 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3520 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3521 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3522 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3523 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3527 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3528 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3529 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3532 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3533 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3535 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3543 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3544 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3545 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3548 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3551 let chan_restoration_res;
3552 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3553 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3555 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3559 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3563 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3564 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3565 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3566 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3567 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3568 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3569 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3570 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3571 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3574 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3575 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3576 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3578 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3580 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3581 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3582 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3583 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3587 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3588 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3589 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3592 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3593 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3594 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3595 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3596 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3597 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3599 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3600 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3601 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3603 entry.insert(channel);
3609 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3610 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3611 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3613 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3614 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3615 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3616 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3618 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3619 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3625 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3626 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3627 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3629 user_channel_id: user_id,
3634 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3635 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3636 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3637 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3638 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3639 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3640 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3641 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3642 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3644 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3649 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3650 // lock before watch_channel
3651 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3653 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3654 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3655 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3656 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3657 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3658 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3659 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3660 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3661 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3662 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3663 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3665 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3666 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3667 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3668 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3669 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3670 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3674 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3675 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3676 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3677 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3681 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3682 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3691 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3693 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3694 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3695 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3696 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3697 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3698 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3701 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3702 Ok(update) => update,
3703 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3705 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3706 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3707 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3708 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3709 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3710 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3711 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3712 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3722 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3723 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3727 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3728 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3729 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3730 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3732 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3733 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3735 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3736 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3737 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3738 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3739 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3740 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3741 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3742 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3743 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3744 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3745 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3746 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3747 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3748 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3749 msg: announcement_sigs,
3751 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3752 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3753 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3754 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3763 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3764 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3765 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3766 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3767 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3771 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3772 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3775 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3776 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3777 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3778 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3781 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3782 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3784 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3785 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3786 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3787 let (result, is_permanent) =
3788 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3790 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3796 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3797 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3798 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3805 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3808 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3812 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3816 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3817 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3818 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3819 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3820 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3822 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3823 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3825 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3826 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3827 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3828 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3833 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3834 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3835 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3836 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3837 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3838 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3839 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3841 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3842 } else { (tx, None) }
3844 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3847 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3848 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3849 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3851 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3852 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3853 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3854 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3858 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3863 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3864 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3865 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3866 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3868 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3869 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3870 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3871 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3873 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3874 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3876 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3878 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3879 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3882 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3883 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3884 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3885 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3886 match pending_forward_info {
3887 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3888 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3889 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3890 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3891 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3892 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3893 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3894 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3898 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3899 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3900 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3901 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3902 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3903 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3904 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3905 // no problem just calling this
3906 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3907 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3910 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3912 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3913 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3914 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3917 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3919 _ => pending_forward_info
3922 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3924 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3929 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3930 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3931 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3932 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3933 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3934 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3935 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3936 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3938 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3943 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3947 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3948 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3949 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3950 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3951 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3952 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3953 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3955 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3957 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3962 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3963 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3964 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3965 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3967 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3968 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3970 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3971 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3972 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3974 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3977 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3981 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3982 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3983 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3984 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3985 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3986 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3987 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3989 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3990 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3991 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3992 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3993 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3994 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3995 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4000 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4001 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4003 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4004 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4005 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4007 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4008 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4009 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4010 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4011 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4012 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4013 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4014 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4016 commitment_signed: msg,
4022 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4027 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4028 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4029 let mut forward_event = None;
4030 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4031 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4032 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4033 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4035 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4036 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4037 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4038 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4039 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4041 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4042 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4043 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4045 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4046 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4047 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4052 match forward_event {
4054 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4055 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4056 time_forwardable: time
4064 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4065 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4067 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4068 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4069 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4071 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4072 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4074 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4075 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4076 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4077 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4078 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4079 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4080 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4081 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4082 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4083 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4084 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4086 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4087 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4088 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4089 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4090 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4092 } else { unreachable!(); }
4095 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4096 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4097 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4101 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4102 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4103 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4104 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4105 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4107 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4110 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4112 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4113 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4115 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4116 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4118 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4119 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4126 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4127 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4128 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4129 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4130 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4131 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4132 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4134 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4136 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4141 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4142 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4143 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4147 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4150 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4151 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4154 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4155 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4156 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4157 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4158 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4166 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4167 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4168 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4170 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4171 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4173 // It's not a local channel
4174 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4177 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4178 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4179 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4180 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4181 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4182 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4183 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4184 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4186 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4188 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4189 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4190 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4191 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4193 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4196 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4198 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4201 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4202 let chan_restoration_res;
4203 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4207 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4209 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4210 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4212 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4213 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4214 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4215 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4216 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4217 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4218 let mut channel_update = None;
4219 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4221 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4224 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4225 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4226 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4227 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4228 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4229 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4230 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4233 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4234 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4235 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4238 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4243 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4244 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4246 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4247 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4252 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4253 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4254 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4255 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4256 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4257 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4258 match monitor_event {
4259 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4260 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4262 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4265 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4268 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4269 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4270 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4272 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4273 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4274 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4275 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4276 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4277 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4279 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4280 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4285 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4286 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4288 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4290 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4291 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4292 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4293 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4294 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4299 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4300 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4305 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4306 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4309 has_pending_monitor_events
4312 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4313 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4314 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4315 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4316 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4317 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4320 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4321 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4322 /// update was applied.
4324 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4325 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4326 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4327 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4328 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4329 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4330 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4331 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4333 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4334 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4335 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4336 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4337 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4339 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4340 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4341 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4342 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4343 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4345 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4346 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4347 has_monitor_update = true;
4348 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4349 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4350 if close_channel { return false; }
4352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4353 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4354 updates: commitment_update,
4361 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4362 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4363 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4370 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4371 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4372 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4375 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4376 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4382 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4383 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4384 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4385 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4386 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4387 let mut has_update = false;
4389 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4390 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4391 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4392 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4393 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4395 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4396 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4397 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4398 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4400 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4401 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4404 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4405 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4406 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4407 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4408 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4411 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4417 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4419 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4420 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4426 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4427 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4434 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4435 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4441 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4442 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4444 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4445 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4446 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4447 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4448 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4449 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4450 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4451 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4452 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4453 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4454 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4455 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4456 assert!(should_broadcast);
4457 } else { unreachable!(); }
4458 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4460 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4464 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4465 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4467 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4469 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4470 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4471 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4472 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4473 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4474 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4475 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4476 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4477 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4478 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4479 // never fail a payment too early.
4480 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4482 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4490 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4493 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4494 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4496 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4497 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4498 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4500 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4502 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4503 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4504 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4505 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4506 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4507 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4508 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4511 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4512 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4515 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4516 /// stored external to LDK.
4518 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4519 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4520 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4522 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4523 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4525 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4526 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4527 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4528 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4529 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4531 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4532 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4533 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4534 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4536 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4537 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4538 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4539 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4540 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4542 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4543 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4544 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4545 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4546 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4548 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4549 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4550 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4552 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4554 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4555 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4557 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4558 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4559 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4560 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4561 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4564 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4565 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4566 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4567 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4568 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4573 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4574 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4578 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4579 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4581 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4585 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4586 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4587 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4588 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4590 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4591 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4592 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4593 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4596 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4597 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4599 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4600 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4603 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4604 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4605 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4607 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4608 events.replace(pending_events);
4617 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4619 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4620 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4621 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4622 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4625 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4627 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4628 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4630 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4631 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4632 /// restarting from an old state.
4633 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4634 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4635 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4637 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4638 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4639 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4640 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4643 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4644 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4645 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4648 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4649 handler.handle_event(&event);
4657 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4659 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4660 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4661 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4662 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4665 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4667 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4668 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4669 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4670 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4671 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4674 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4675 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4676 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4679 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4680 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4681 let new_height = height - 1;
4683 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4684 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4685 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4686 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4687 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4688 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4691 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4695 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4697 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4698 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4699 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4700 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4703 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4704 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4705 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4706 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4708 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4709 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4711 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4712 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4715 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4716 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4717 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4718 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4720 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4721 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4725 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4727 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4729 macro_rules! max_time {
4730 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4732 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4733 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4734 // having an explicit local time source.
4735 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4736 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4737 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4738 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4739 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4745 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4746 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4747 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4748 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4749 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4752 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4753 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4754 const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4755 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4756 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4757 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4763 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4764 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4765 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4766 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4767 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4768 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4774 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4775 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4776 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4777 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4778 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4779 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4780 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4781 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4786 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4788 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4789 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4790 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4791 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4794 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4795 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4797 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4798 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4799 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4800 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4801 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4803 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4804 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4806 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4808 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4809 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4810 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4811 let res = f(channel);
4812 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4813 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4814 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4815 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4816 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4820 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4822 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4823 msg: funding_locked,
4825 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4828 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4829 msg: announcement_sigs,
4831 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4832 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4833 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4834 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4835 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4838 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4840 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4842 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4843 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4844 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4846 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4847 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4848 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4849 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4850 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4854 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4855 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4856 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4857 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4864 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4865 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4866 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4867 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4868 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4869 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4870 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4871 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4872 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4873 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4874 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4875 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4876 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4881 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4886 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4888 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4889 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4893 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4894 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4895 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4897 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4898 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4899 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4900 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4903 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4904 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4906 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4907 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4910 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4911 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4912 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4913 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4914 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4918 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4919 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4920 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4921 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4925 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4926 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4927 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4928 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4929 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4930 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4933 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4934 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4935 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4938 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4939 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4940 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4943 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4944 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4945 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4948 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4949 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4950 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4953 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4954 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4955 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4958 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4960 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4963 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4964 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4965 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4968 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4970 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4973 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4975 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4978 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4979 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4980 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4983 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4985 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4988 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4989 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4990 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4993 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4995 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4998 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4999 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5000 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5003 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5005 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5008 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5009 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5010 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5013 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5018 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5019 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5020 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5023 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5025 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5026 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5028 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5029 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5030 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5031 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5032 if no_connection_possible {
5033 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5034 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5035 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5036 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5037 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5039 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5040 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5041 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5045 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5052 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5053 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5054 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5055 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5056 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5057 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5058 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5060 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5063 no_channels_remain = false;
5069 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5074 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5076 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5077 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5079 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5080 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5081 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5082 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5083 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5084 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5085 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5086 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5087 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5088 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5089 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5093 if no_channels_remain {
5094 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5097 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5098 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5102 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5103 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5105 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5108 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5109 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5110 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5111 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5112 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5115 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5116 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5121 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5122 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5123 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5124 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5125 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5126 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5127 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5128 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5129 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5133 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5134 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5135 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5141 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5144 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5147 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5148 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5149 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5150 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5151 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5155 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5156 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5161 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5162 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5163 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5164 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5165 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5166 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5169 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5172 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5178 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5179 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5184 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5185 let result = *guard;
5193 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5194 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5195 let current_time = Instant::now();
5197 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5198 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5203 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5204 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5205 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5206 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5207 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5209 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5210 let result = *guard;
5211 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5215 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5216 None => return result,
5222 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5224 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5225 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5226 *persistence_lock = true;
5227 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5232 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5233 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5235 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5237 (0, onion_packet, required),
5238 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5241 (0, payment_data, required),
5242 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5244 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5245 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5246 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5250 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5251 (0, routing, required),
5252 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5253 (4, payment_hash, required),
5254 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5255 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5259 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5260 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5262 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5264 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5265 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5266 reason.write(writer)?;
5268 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5269 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5272 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5273 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5274 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5275 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5282 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5283 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5284 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5287 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5288 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5289 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5290 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5294 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5295 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5296 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5297 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5298 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5301 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5302 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5303 // messages contained in the variants.
5304 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5305 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5306 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5308 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5309 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5310 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5311 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5312 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5315 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5316 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5317 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5318 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5319 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5321 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5326 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5331 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5332 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5333 (2, outpoint, required),
5334 (4, htlc_id, required),
5335 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5338 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5339 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5340 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5341 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5344 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5345 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5346 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5351 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5352 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5353 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5359 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5360 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5361 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5363 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5364 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5365 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5369 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5370 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5371 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5373 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5375 if payment_data.is_some() {
5376 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5378 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5381 if payment_data.is_none() {
5382 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5384 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5388 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5396 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5397 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5398 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5401 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5402 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5403 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5404 let mut payment_id = None;
5405 let mut payment_secret = None;
5406 let mut payee = None;
5407 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5408 (0, session_priv, required),
5409 (1, payment_id, option),
5410 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5411 (3, payment_secret, option),
5412 (4, path, vec_type),
5415 if payment_id.is_none() {
5416 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5418 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5420 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5421 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5422 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5423 path: path.unwrap(),
5424 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5429 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5430 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5435 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5436 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5438 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5440 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5441 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5442 (0, session_priv, required),
5443 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5444 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5445 (3, payment_secret, option),
5446 (4, path, vec_type),
5450 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5452 field.write(writer)?;
5459 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5460 (0, LightningError) => {
5464 (0, failure_code, required),
5465 (2, data, vec_type),
5469 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5471 (0, forward_info, required),
5472 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5473 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5474 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5477 (0, htlc_id, required),
5478 (2, err_packet, required),
5482 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5483 (0, payment_secret, required),
5484 (2, expiry_time, required),
5485 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5486 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5487 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5490 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5492 (0, session_privs, required),
5495 (0, session_privs, required),
5498 (0, session_privs, required),
5499 (2, payment_hash, required),
5500 (4, payment_secret, option),
5501 (6, total_msat, required),
5502 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5503 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5507 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5508 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5509 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5510 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5511 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5514 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5515 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5517 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5519 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5521 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5522 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5523 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5526 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5527 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5528 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5529 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5530 unfunded_channels += 1;
5533 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5534 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5535 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5536 channel.write(writer)?;
5540 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5541 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5542 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5543 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5544 for forward in pending_forwards {
5545 forward.write(writer)?;
5549 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5550 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5551 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5552 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5553 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5554 htlc.write(writer)?;
5558 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5559 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5560 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5561 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5562 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5563 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5566 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5567 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5568 for event in events.iter() {
5569 event.write(writer)?;
5572 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5573 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5574 for event in background_events.iter() {
5576 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5578 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5579 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5584 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5585 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5587 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5588 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5589 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5590 hash.write(writer)?;
5591 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5594 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5595 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5596 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5597 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5598 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5599 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5602 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5603 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5605 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5606 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5607 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5608 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5611 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5615 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5616 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5617 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5619 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5620 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5621 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5626 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5627 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5628 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5635 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5637 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5639 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5640 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5641 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5642 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5643 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5644 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5645 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5646 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5647 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5648 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5649 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5650 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5651 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5653 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5654 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5656 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5657 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5659 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5660 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5661 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5662 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5663 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5664 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5666 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5667 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5668 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5669 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5670 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5671 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5674 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5675 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5677 pub keys_manager: K,
5679 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5681 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5682 pub fee_estimator: F,
5683 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5685 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5686 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5687 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5688 pub chain_monitor: M,
5690 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5691 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5692 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5693 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5694 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5695 /// deserialization.
5697 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5698 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5699 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5701 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5702 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5704 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5705 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5706 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5707 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5709 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5712 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5713 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5716 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5717 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5718 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5719 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5720 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5721 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5724 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5725 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5726 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5727 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5728 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5730 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5731 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5736 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5737 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5738 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5739 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5740 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5741 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5742 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5743 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5746 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5747 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5748 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5752 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5753 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5754 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5756 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5757 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5760 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5761 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5763 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5764 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5765 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5767 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5769 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5770 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5771 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5772 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5773 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5774 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5775 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5776 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5777 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5778 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5779 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5780 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5781 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5782 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5783 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5784 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5785 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5786 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5787 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5788 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5789 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5790 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5791 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5792 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5793 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5794 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5795 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5796 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5797 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5798 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5799 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5800 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5801 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5802 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5803 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5804 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5805 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5806 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5807 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5810 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5811 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5813 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5816 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5817 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5818 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5819 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5820 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5821 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5825 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5826 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5827 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5831 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5832 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5833 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5834 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5835 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5836 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5837 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5838 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5839 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5841 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5844 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5845 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5846 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5847 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5848 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5849 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5850 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5851 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5853 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5856 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5857 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5858 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5859 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5860 let peer_state = PeerState {
5861 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5863 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5866 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5867 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5868 for _ in 0..event_count {
5869 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5870 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5874 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5875 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5876 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5877 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5878 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5879 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5880 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5881 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5885 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5886 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5887 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5888 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5889 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5890 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5894 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5895 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5897 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5898 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5899 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5900 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5905 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5906 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5907 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5908 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5909 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5910 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5911 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5913 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5914 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5918 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5919 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5920 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5921 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5922 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5923 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5925 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5926 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5927 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5928 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5929 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5930 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5932 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5934 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5935 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5936 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5937 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5938 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5939 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5940 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5942 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5943 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5944 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5945 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5946 if path.is_empty() {
5947 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5948 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5950 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5951 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5952 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5953 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5954 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5955 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
5956 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
5957 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5959 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5960 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
5961 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
5962 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5964 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
5965 total_msat: path_amt,
5966 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
5968 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
5969 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
5978 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5979 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5981 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5982 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5985 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5987 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5988 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5989 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5991 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5993 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5998 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6000 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6001 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6003 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6004 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6007 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6008 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6010 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6012 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6013 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6014 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6015 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6017 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6018 logger: args.logger,
6019 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6022 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6023 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6026 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6027 //connection or two.
6029 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6035 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6036 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6037 use core::time::Duration;
6038 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6039 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6040 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6041 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6043 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6044 use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6045 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6046 use util::errors::APIError;
6047 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6049 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6051 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6052 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6054 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6057 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6058 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6060 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6061 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6062 thread::spawn(move || {
6064 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6065 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6066 *persistence_lock = true;
6069 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6075 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6076 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6078 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6081 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6086 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6088 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6091 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6098 fn test_notify_limits() {
6099 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6100 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6104 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6106 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6107 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6108 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6109 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6110 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6112 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6114 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6115 // to connect messages with new values
6116 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6117 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6118 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6119 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6121 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6122 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6123 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6124 // ... but the last node should not.
6125 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6126 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6127 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6128 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6130 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6131 // about the channel.
6132 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6133 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6134 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6136 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6138 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6139 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6140 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6141 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6142 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6143 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6145 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6146 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6147 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6149 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6150 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6151 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6152 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6153 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6154 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6156 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6157 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6158 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6159 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6160 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6161 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6162 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6163 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6165 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6166 // the channel info has updated.
6167 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6168 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6169 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6170 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6171 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6172 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6176 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6177 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6181 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6182 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6185 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6186 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6187 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6188 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6189 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6190 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6193 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6195 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6197 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6198 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6202 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6203 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6204 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6208 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6210 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6211 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6212 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6213 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6214 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6215 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6216 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6217 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6218 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6220 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6221 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6223 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6225 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6227 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6228 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6229 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6230 // lightning messages manually.
6231 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6233 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6234 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6235 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6238 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6240 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6241 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6243 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6245 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6247 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6248 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6249 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6251 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6253 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6255 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6256 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6259 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6260 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6261 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6263 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash } => {
6264 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6265 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6266 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6268 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6273 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6274 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6275 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6276 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6277 // fails as expected.
6278 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6279 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6280 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6281 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6282 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6283 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6285 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6286 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6287 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6289 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6290 let params = RouteParameters {
6291 payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6292 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6293 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6295 let route = find_route(
6296 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6297 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6299 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6301 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6303 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6304 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6307 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6308 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6309 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6311 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6312 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6313 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6314 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6315 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6316 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6317 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6319 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6321 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6322 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6324 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6325 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6326 let route = find_route(
6327 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), ¶ms,
6328 &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6330 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6332 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6333 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6334 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6335 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6336 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6338 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6339 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6340 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6342 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6344 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6345 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6346 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6352 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6353 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6354 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6355 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6356 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6357 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6362 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6363 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6367 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6368 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6369 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6375 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6376 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6377 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6380 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6381 let params = RouteParameters {
6382 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6383 final_value_msat: 10000,
6384 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6386 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6387 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6388 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6389 let route = find_route(
6390 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6391 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6394 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6395 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6396 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6399 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6400 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6401 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6402 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6403 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6404 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6405 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6407 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6411 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6412 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6413 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6414 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6415 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6416 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6418 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6419 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6420 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6421 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6423 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6424 let params = RouteParameters {
6425 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6426 final_value_msat: 10000,
6427 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6429 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6430 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6431 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6432 let route = find_route(
6433 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6434 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6437 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6438 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6439 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6440 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6443 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6444 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6445 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6446 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6447 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6448 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6449 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6451 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6455 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6459 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6461 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6462 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6463 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6464 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6466 // Marshall an MPP route.
6467 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6468 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6469 route.paths.push(path);
6470 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6471 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6472 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6473 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6474 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6475 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6477 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6478 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6479 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
6480 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6485 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6488 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6489 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6490 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6491 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6492 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6493 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6494 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6495 use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6496 use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6497 use util::test_utils;
6498 use util::config::UserConfig;
6499 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6501 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6502 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6503 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6505 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6509 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6510 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6511 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6512 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6513 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6514 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6515 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6520 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6521 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6524 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6525 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6526 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6528 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6529 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6531 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6532 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6534 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6535 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6537 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6538 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6539 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6540 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6541 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6543 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6545 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6547 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6548 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6549 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6550 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6551 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6553 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6555 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6557 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6558 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6559 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6560 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6561 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6564 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6565 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6566 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6568 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6569 } else { panic!(); }
6571 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6572 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6574 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6577 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6580 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6581 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6583 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6584 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6585 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6586 match msg_events[0] {
6587 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6588 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6589 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6593 match msg_events[1] {
6594 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6598 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6600 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6601 macro_rules! send_payment {
6602 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6603 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6604 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6605 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6606 let scorer = Scorer::new(0);
6607 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6608 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6610 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6611 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6613 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6614 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6616 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6617 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6618 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6619 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6620 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6621 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6622 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6623 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6625 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6626 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6627 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6629 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6630 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6631 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6632 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6633 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6635 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6638 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6639 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6640 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6641 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6643 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6648 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6649 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);