1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
116 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
117 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
118 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
119 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
125 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
126 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
127 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
129 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
130 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
131 /// may overshoot this in either case)
132 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
133 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
135 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
136 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
139 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
140 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
141 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
142 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
145 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
146 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
147 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
148 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
149 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
152 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
153 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
155 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
156 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
157 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
160 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
161 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
163 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
164 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
167 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
168 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
171 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
175 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
176 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
177 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
178 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
179 short_channel_id: u64,
181 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
182 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
184 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
185 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
190 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
192 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
193 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
194 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
196 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
197 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
200 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
201 struct ClaimableHTLC {
202 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
204 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
206 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
207 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
208 sender_intended_value: u64,
209 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
211 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
212 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
213 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
214 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
216 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
217 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
220 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
222 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
223 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
224 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
226 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
227 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
232 impl Readable for PaymentId {
233 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
234 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
239 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
241 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
242 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
243 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
245 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
246 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
251 impl Readable for InterceptId {
252 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
253 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
258 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
259 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
260 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
261 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
262 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
265 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
267 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
268 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
269 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
271 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
272 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
276 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
277 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
278 (0, short_channel_id, required),
279 (2, htlc_id, required),
281 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
282 (0, session_priv, required),
287 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
288 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
289 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
290 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
291 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
294 session_priv: SecretKey,
295 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
296 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
297 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
298 payment_id: PaymentId,
301 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
302 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
303 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
305 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
307 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
309 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
312 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
313 payment_id.hash(hasher);
314 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
320 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
322 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
323 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
324 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
325 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
326 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
327 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
331 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
332 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
333 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
334 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
335 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
336 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
338 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
344 struct ReceiveError {
350 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
351 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
353 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
354 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
355 pub enum FailureCode {
356 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
357 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
358 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
359 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
360 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
361 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
362 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
363 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
364 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
365 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
366 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
369 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
370 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
371 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
372 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
373 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
375 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
376 err: msgs::LightningError,
377 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
378 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
380 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
382 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
384 err: LightningError {
386 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
387 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
394 shutdown_finish: None,
398 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
399 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
402 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
404 err: LightningError {
406 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
407 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
413 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
414 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
418 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
421 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
423 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
424 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
428 log_level: Level::Warn,
431 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
433 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
446 shutdown_finish: None,
451 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
452 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
453 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
454 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
455 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
457 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
458 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
459 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
460 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
461 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
462 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
463 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
465 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
469 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
470 struct ClaimingPayment {
472 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
473 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
475 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
476 (0, amount_msat, required),
477 (2, payment_purpose, required),
478 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
481 struct ClaimablePayment {
482 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
483 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
484 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
487 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
488 struct ClaimablePayments {
489 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
490 /// failed/claimed by the user.
492 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
493 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
495 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
496 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
497 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
499 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
500 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
501 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
502 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
505 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
506 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
507 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
508 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
509 enum BackgroundEvent {
510 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel. This is only separated from
511 /// [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the maybe-non-closing variant needs a public
512 /// key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the channel has been force-closed we do not
513 /// need the counterparty node_id.
515 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
516 /// are regenerated on startup.
517 ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
518 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
519 /// channel to continue normal operation.
521 /// In general this should be used rather than
522 /// [`Self::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
524 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
526 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
527 /// are regenerated on startup.
528 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
529 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
530 funding_txo: OutPoint,
531 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
536 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
537 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
538 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
539 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
540 /// event can be generated.
541 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
542 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
543 /// operation of another channel.
545 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
546 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
547 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
548 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
550 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
551 event: events::Event,
552 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
556 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
557 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
558 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
559 (0, event, upgradable_required),
560 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
561 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
562 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
563 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
564 // downgrades to prior versions.
565 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
569 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
570 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
571 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
572 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
573 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
576 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
577 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
578 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
579 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
583 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
584 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
585 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
586 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
587 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
588 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
590 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
591 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
592 channel_id: [u8; 32],
593 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
598 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
600 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
601 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
602 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
603 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
608 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
609 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
613 /// State we hold per-peer.
614 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
615 /// `channel_id` -> `Channel`.
617 /// Holds all funded channels where the peer is the counterparty.
618 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
619 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
621 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
622 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
624 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], OutboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
625 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
627 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
628 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
630 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], InboundV1Channel<Signer>>,
631 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
632 latest_features: InitFeatures,
633 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
634 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
635 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
636 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
637 /// user but which have not yet completed.
639 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
640 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
641 /// for a missing channel.
642 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
643 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
644 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
646 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
647 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
648 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
649 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
651 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
652 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
653 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
654 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
655 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
656 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
657 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
658 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
659 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
660 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
661 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
663 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
664 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
665 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
669 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
670 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
671 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
672 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
673 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
674 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
677 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
678 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
681 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including pending channels.
682 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
683 self.channel_by_id.len() +
684 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
685 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len()
688 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
689 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> bool {
690 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
691 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
692 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
696 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
697 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
699 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
702 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
703 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
704 struct PendingInboundPayment {
705 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
706 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
707 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
708 /// this payment being removed.
710 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
711 user_payment_id: u64,
712 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
713 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
714 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
717 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
718 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
719 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
720 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
721 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
722 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
723 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
724 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
726 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
727 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
735 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
737 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
738 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
739 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
744 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
745 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
746 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
747 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
748 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
749 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
750 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
751 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
752 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
754 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
755 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
764 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
766 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
767 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
768 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
773 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
774 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
775 $vis trait AChannelManager {
776 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
777 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
778 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
779 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
780 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
781 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
782 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
783 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
784 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
785 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
786 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
787 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
788 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
789 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
790 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
791 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
792 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
793 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
796 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
797 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
798 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
799 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
800 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
801 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
803 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
804 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
805 ES::Target: EntropySource,
806 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
807 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
808 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
812 type Watch = M::Target;
814 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
816 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
818 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
820 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
821 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
823 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
825 type Router = R::Target;
827 type Logger = L::Target;
829 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
832 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
833 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
835 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
836 /// to individual Channels.
838 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
839 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
840 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
841 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
843 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
844 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
845 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
846 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
847 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
848 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
849 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
851 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
852 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
853 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
855 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
856 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
857 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
858 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
859 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
861 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
862 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
863 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
864 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
866 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
867 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
868 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
870 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
871 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
872 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
873 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
874 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
876 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
877 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
878 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
879 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
880 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
881 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
882 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
883 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
886 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
887 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
888 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
889 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
890 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
894 // `total_consistency_lock`
896 // |__`forward_htlcs`
898 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
900 // |__`per_peer_state`
902 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
904 // | |__`claimable_payments`
906 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
912 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
914 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
918 // | |__`pending_events`
920 // | |__`pending_background_events`
922 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
924 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
925 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
926 ES::Target: EntropySource,
927 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
928 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
929 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
933 default_configuration: UserConfig,
934 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
935 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
941 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
943 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
945 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
946 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
948 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
949 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
950 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
951 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
953 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
954 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
956 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
957 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
958 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
959 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
960 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
961 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
962 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
963 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
965 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
967 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
968 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
970 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
972 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
973 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
974 /// and via the classic SCID.
976 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
977 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
979 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
981 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
983 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
984 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
985 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
987 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
988 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
990 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
991 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
993 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
994 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
996 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
997 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
998 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
999 /// active channel list on load.
1001 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1002 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1004 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1006 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1007 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1008 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1010 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1011 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1012 /// the handling of the events.
1014 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1015 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1018 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1019 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1020 /// would break backwards compatability.
1021 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1022 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1023 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1025 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1026 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
1028 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1030 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1031 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1032 /// confirmation depth.
1034 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1035 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1036 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1038 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1040 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1042 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
1044 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1046 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1048 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1049 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1050 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1052 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1053 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1055 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1056 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1057 /// keeping additional state.
1058 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1060 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1061 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1062 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1063 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1065 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1066 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1068 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1069 /// are currently open with that peer.
1071 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1072 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1075 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1077 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1078 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1079 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1080 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1081 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
1083 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1084 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1085 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1086 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1087 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1089 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1090 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1092 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1093 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1094 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1095 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1097 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1098 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1099 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1100 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1101 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1103 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1105 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1108 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1109 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1110 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1111 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1112 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1113 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1114 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1115 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1117 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1118 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1120 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1124 signer_provider: SP,
1129 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1131 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1132 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1133 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1134 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1135 pub struct ChainParameters {
1136 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1137 pub network: Network,
1139 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1141 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1142 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1145 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1152 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1153 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1154 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1155 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1156 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1157 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1159 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1160 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1161 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1162 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1163 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1165 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1166 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1169 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1170 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1171 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1172 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1174 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1175 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1176 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1177 _read_guard: read_guard,
1182 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1183 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1184 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1185 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1187 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1188 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1189 should_persist: persist_check,
1190 _read_guard: read_guard,
1195 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1196 fn drop(&mut self) {
1197 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1198 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1203 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1204 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1206 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1208 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1209 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1210 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1211 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1212 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1214 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1215 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1217 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1219 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1220 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1221 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1222 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1223 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1224 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1225 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1226 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1227 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1228 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1229 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1230 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1231 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1233 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1234 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1236 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1237 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1238 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1239 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1241 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1242 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1243 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1244 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1245 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1246 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1249 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1251 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1252 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1255 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1257 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1258 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1260 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1261 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1262 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1263 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1265 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1266 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1267 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1269 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1270 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1271 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1273 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1274 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1275 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1276 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1278 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1279 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1280 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1282 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1283 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1284 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1286 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1287 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1288 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1289 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1290 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1291 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1292 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1293 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1294 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1295 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1296 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1299 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1300 /// to better separate parameters.
1301 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1302 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1303 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1304 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1305 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1306 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1307 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1308 pub features: InitFeatures,
1309 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1310 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1311 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1313 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1315 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1316 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1317 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1318 /// payments to us through this channel.
1319 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1320 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1321 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1322 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1323 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1324 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1325 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1328 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1329 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1330 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1331 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1332 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1333 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1334 /// lifetime of the channel.
1335 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1336 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1337 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1338 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1339 /// our counterparty already.
1341 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1342 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1343 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1344 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1346 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1347 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1348 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1349 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1351 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1352 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1354 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1355 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1357 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1358 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1359 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1360 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1361 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1362 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1363 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1364 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1365 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1368 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1370 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1371 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1372 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1373 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1374 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1375 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1376 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1378 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1379 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1381 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1382 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1383 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1384 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1385 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1386 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1387 /// this value on chain.
1389 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1391 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1393 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1394 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1395 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1396 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1398 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1399 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1400 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1402 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1403 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1404 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1405 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1406 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1408 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1409 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1410 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1411 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1413 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1414 pub balance_msat: u64,
1415 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1416 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1417 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1418 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1420 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1422 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1423 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1424 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1425 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1426 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1427 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1428 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1429 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1431 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1432 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1433 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1434 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1435 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1436 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1437 /// route which is valid.
1438 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1439 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1440 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1441 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1442 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1443 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1445 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1446 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1447 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1448 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1449 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1450 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1451 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1452 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1453 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1455 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1457 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1459 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1460 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1461 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1463 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1464 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1465 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1466 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1467 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1468 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1469 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1471 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1472 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1473 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1474 pub is_outbound: bool,
1475 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1476 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1477 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1478 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1479 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1481 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1482 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1483 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1484 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1486 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1487 pub is_usable: bool,
1488 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1489 pub is_public: bool,
1490 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1491 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1492 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1493 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1494 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1495 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1497 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1498 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1501 impl ChannelDetails {
1502 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1503 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1504 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1506 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1507 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1508 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1509 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1512 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1513 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1514 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1516 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1517 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1518 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1519 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1522 fn from_channel_context<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(context: &ChannelContext<Signer>,
1523 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1525 let balance = context.get_available_balances();
1526 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1527 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1529 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1530 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1531 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1532 features: latest_features,
1533 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1534 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1535 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1536 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1537 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1538 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1539 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1540 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1541 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1542 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1544 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1545 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1546 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1547 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1548 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1549 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1550 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1551 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1552 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1553 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1554 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1555 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1556 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1557 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1558 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1559 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1560 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1561 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1562 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1563 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1564 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1565 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1566 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1567 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1568 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1569 config: Some(context.config()),
1574 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1575 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1576 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1577 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1578 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1580 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1582 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1583 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1584 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1587 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1588 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1589 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1591 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1592 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1593 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1595 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1596 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1597 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1599 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1600 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1604 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1606 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1608 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1609 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1610 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1611 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1613 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1614 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1615 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1618 macro_rules! handle_error {
1619 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1620 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1621 // entering the macro.
1622 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1623 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1627 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1628 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1630 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1631 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1632 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1633 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1637 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1638 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1639 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1640 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1645 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1646 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1648 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1649 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1650 action: err.action.clone()
1654 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1655 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1656 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1657 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1658 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1662 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1667 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1670 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1671 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1672 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1678 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1679 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1680 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1681 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1682 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1683 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1685 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1686 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1687 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1688 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1689 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1691 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1692 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1694 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1698 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1699 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1700 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1702 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1703 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1705 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1706 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1708 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1709 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1710 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1711 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1712 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1713 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1717 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_context: expr, $channel_id: expr, PREFUNDED) => {
1719 // We should only ever have `ChannelError::Close` when prefunded channels error.
1720 // In any case, just close the channel.
1721 ChannelError::Warn(msg) | ChannelError::Ignore(msg) | ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1722 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing prefunded channel {} due to an error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1723 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel_context);
1724 let shutdown_res = $channel_context.force_shutdown(false);
1725 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel_context.get_user_id(),
1726 shutdown_res, None))
1732 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1733 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1737 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1739 $entry.remove_entry();
1747 macro_rules! try_v1_outbound_chan_entry {
1748 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1752 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut().context, $entry.key(), PREFUNDED);
1754 $entry.remove_entry();
1762 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1763 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1767 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1769 $entry.remove_entry();
1777 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1778 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1780 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1781 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1787 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1788 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1789 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1790 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1791 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1793 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1794 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1795 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1796 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1797 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1798 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1799 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1800 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1801 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1802 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1807 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1808 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1809 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1810 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1811 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1812 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1813 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1814 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1815 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1817 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1822 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1823 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1824 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1825 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1826 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1827 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1828 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1829 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1830 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1832 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1837 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1838 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1839 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1840 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1841 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1842 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
1843 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
1844 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1845 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1846 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1847 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1849 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1850 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1851 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1857 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1858 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1860 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1861 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1862 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1863 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1864 updates.announcement_sigs);
1865 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1866 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1869 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
1870 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1871 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1873 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1875 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1876 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1878 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1879 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1880 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1881 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1886 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1887 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
1888 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1889 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1890 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1891 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
1892 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
1895 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1896 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1897 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1900 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1901 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1902 log_bytes!($chan.context.channel_id()[..]));
1903 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
1904 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1905 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
1906 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
1907 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1911 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1917 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
1918 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1919 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1920 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
1922 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
1923 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1925 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1926 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
1927 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
1928 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
1929 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
1930 // filter for uniqueness here.
1931 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
1932 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
1933 in_flight_updates.push($update);
1934 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
1936 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
1937 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
1938 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
1940 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
1941 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
1942 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1946 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1947 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1951 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1952 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1953 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1954 while !processed_all_events {
1955 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1959 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1962 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1963 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1964 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1966 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
1967 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
1968 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
1970 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1971 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1972 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1973 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1977 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1978 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1979 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1980 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1983 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1985 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1986 $event_to_handle = event;
1988 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1989 post_event_actions.push(action);
1994 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1995 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1996 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1997 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2000 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2001 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2002 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2003 processed_all_events = false;
2006 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2007 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2013 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2015 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2016 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2017 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2018 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2019 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2020 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2024 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2026 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2028 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2029 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2031 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2033 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2034 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2035 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2038 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2039 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2040 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2042 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2043 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2044 current_timestamp: u32,
2046 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2047 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2048 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2049 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2051 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2052 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2053 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2058 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2060 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2061 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2062 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2063 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2064 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2065 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2066 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2067 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2069 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2072 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2073 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2075 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2077 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2079 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2081 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2082 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2083 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2084 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2085 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2086 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2087 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2097 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2098 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2099 &self.default_configuration
2102 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2103 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2104 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2107 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2108 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2110 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2112 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2116 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2121 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2123 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2124 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2125 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2126 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2127 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2129 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2130 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2132 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2133 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2134 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2136 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2137 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2138 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2140 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2141 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2142 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2143 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2144 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2145 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2147 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2148 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2149 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2150 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
2151 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2152 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2155 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2156 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2157 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2159 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2161 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2162 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2164 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2166 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2167 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2168 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2169 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2170 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2171 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2175 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2180 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2182 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2183 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2184 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2188 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2195 node_id: their_network_key,
2198 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2201 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2202 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2203 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2204 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2205 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2206 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2207 // the same channel.
2208 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2210 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2212 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2215 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
2216 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2217 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2225 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2226 /// more information.
2227 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2228 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2229 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2230 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2231 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2232 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2233 // the same channel.
2234 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2236 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2238 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2239 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2240 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2241 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
2242 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2243 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2246 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2247 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2248 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2251 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2252 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2253 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
2261 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2262 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2264 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2265 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2267 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2268 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2269 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2270 // really wanted anyway.
2271 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2274 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2275 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2276 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2277 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2279 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2280 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2281 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2282 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2283 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2286 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2292 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2293 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2295 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2296 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2297 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2299 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2300 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2301 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2302 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2303 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2304 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2305 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2306 total_msat: *total_msat,
2309 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2310 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2312 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2313 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2315 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2320 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2321 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2322 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2323 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2324 Some(transaction) => {
2325 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2326 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2331 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2332 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2333 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2334 reason: closure_reason
2338 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2339 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2341 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2342 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2345 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2346 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2348 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2349 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2350 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2352 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
2353 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2354 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2355 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2356 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2358 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2359 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2360 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2361 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2362 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2366 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2367 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2368 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2369 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
2372 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2373 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2374 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2375 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2379 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2383 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2387 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2388 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2389 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2390 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2393 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2397 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2398 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2399 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2401 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2402 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2404 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2405 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2406 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2407 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2409 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2411 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2412 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2413 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2416 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2417 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2418 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2419 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2420 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2421 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2424 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2425 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2426 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2428 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2429 /// the channel being closed or not:
2430 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2431 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2432 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2433 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2434 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2435 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2436 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2438 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2439 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2440 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2441 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2443 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2445 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2446 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2447 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2450 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2451 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2452 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2453 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2454 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2455 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2459 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2460 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2461 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2462 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2463 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2464 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2465 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2466 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2468 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2469 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2470 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2471 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2472 // ignore the result here.
2473 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2477 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2478 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2479 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2480 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2482 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2483 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2484 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2485 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2486 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2487 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2488 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2490 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2492 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2493 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2494 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2495 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2496 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2497 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2498 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2499 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2500 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2501 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2502 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2503 // Prefunded channel has no update
2504 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2505 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2506 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2507 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2508 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2509 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2510 // Prefunded channel has no update
2511 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2513 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2516 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2517 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2518 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2523 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2526 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2528 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2529 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2530 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2531 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2532 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2533 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2534 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2535 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2536 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2537 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2548 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2549 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2550 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2552 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2553 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2554 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2557 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2558 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2559 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2561 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2562 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2563 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2564 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2565 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2568 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2569 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2570 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2571 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2572 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2576 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2577 /// local transaction(s).
2578 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2579 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2580 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2584 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2585 &self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2586 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2587 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2588 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError> {
2589 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2590 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2591 return Err(ReceiveError {
2592 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2594 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2597 // final_expiry_too_soon
2598 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2599 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2601 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2602 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2603 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2604 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2605 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2606 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2607 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2608 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2609 return Err(ReceiveError {
2610 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2611 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2614 if (!allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat) ||
2615 (allow_underpay && hop_data.amt_to_forward >
2616 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2618 return Err(ReceiveError {
2620 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2621 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2625 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2626 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2627 return Err(ReceiveError {
2628 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2629 err_data: Vec::new(),
2630 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2633 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2634 if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2635 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2636 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2637 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2638 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2639 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2640 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2641 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2642 return Err(ReceiveError {
2643 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2644 err_data: Vec::new(),
2645 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2648 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2649 return Err(ReceiveError {
2650 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2651 err_data: Vec::new(),
2652 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2655 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2659 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2661 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2662 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2665 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2666 phantom_shared_secret,
2669 return Err(ReceiveError {
2670 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2671 err_data: Vec::new(),
2672 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2677 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2680 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2681 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2682 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2683 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2684 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2688 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2689 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2690 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2691 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2692 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2694 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2695 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2696 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2697 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2698 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2699 failure_code: $err_code,
2705 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2706 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2709 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2710 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2711 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2713 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2714 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2715 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2716 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2717 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2718 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2719 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2720 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2722 macro_rules! return_err {
2723 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2725 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2726 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2727 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2728 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2729 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2730 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2736 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2738 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2739 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2741 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2742 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2745 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
2746 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2747 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData {
2748 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id }, amt_to_forward,
2749 outgoing_cltv_value,
2752 let next_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
2753 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
2754 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_pk))
2756 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
2757 // inbound channel's state.
2758 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2759 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
2760 next_hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData { format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. }, .. }, ..
2762 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
2766 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2767 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2768 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2769 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2770 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2771 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2772 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2773 // phantom or an intercept.
2774 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2775 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2776 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
2780 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2783 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2785 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2786 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2787 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2788 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2789 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2792 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2793 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2795 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2796 // have no consistency guarantees.
2797 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2801 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2802 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2803 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2804 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2805 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2807 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
2808 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2809 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2810 // we don't have the channel here.
2811 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2813 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
2815 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2816 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2817 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2818 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2819 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2820 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2821 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2822 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2823 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2824 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2825 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2827 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2830 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2831 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2833 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
2834 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2838 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2839 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2840 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2841 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2843 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2850 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2851 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2852 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2853 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2854 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2855 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2857 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2858 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2860 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2861 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2862 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2863 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2864 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2865 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2866 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2867 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2868 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2869 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2875 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2876 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2877 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2878 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2880 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2881 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2883 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2884 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2885 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2887 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2888 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2889 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2890 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2891 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2892 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2893 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2897 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2899 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
2902 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
2903 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
2904 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2905 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2906 macro_rules! return_err {
2907 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2909 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2910 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2911 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2912 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2913 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2914 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2920 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2922 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
2923 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
2926 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2927 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2928 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2929 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2930 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2932 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2935 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2936 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2937 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2939 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2940 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2941 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2944 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2945 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2946 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2947 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2951 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2952 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2953 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2956 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2957 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2958 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2959 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2960 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2961 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2967 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2968 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2969 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2971 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2972 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2973 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2975 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2976 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2977 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2978 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
2979 return Err(LightningError {
2980 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2984 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2985 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2987 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
2988 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2991 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2992 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2993 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2994 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2996 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2997 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2998 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3000 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3001 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3002 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3004 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3005 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3009 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3012 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()));
3014 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3016 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3017 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3018 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3019 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3020 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3023 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3024 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3026 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3027 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3028 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3029 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3030 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3031 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3032 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3033 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3035 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3036 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3037 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3039 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3041 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3048 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3049 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3050 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
3053 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3054 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3055 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3057 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3058 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3059 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3061 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3062 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3063 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3065 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3066 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3068 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3069 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3070 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3071 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3074 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3075 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3076 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3079 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3080 if !chan.get().context.is_live() {
3081 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3083 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3084 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3085 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3087 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3088 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3090 }, onion_packet, None, &self.logger);
3091 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
3092 Some(monitor_update) => {
3093 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3094 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3096 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3097 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3098 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3099 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3100 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3101 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3102 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3110 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3111 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3112 // `channel_by_id` map.
3113 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3114 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3119 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3120 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3122 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3127 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3129 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3130 /// fields for more info.
3132 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3133 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3135 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3137 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3138 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3139 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3140 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3141 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3143 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3144 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3145 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3146 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3147 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3149 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3150 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3151 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3152 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3154 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3156 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3157 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3158 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3160 /// In general, a path may raise:
3161 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3162 /// node public key) is specified.
3163 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3164 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3166 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3167 /// relevant updates.
3169 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3170 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3171 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3173 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3174 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3175 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3176 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3177 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3178 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3179 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3180 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3181 self.pending_outbound_payments
3182 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3183 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3184 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3187 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3188 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3189 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3190 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3191 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3192 self.pending_outbound_payments
3193 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3194 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3195 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3196 &self.pending_events,
3197 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3198 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3202 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3203 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3205 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3206 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3207 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3211 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3212 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3213 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3217 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3218 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3222 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3223 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3224 /// retries are exhausted.
3226 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3227 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3229 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3230 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3231 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3233 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
3234 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3236 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3237 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3238 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3240 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3243 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3244 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3245 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3246 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3247 /// never reach the recipient.
3249 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3250 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3252 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3253 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3255 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3256 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3257 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3258 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3259 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3260 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3261 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3262 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3263 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3266 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3267 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3269 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3272 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3273 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3274 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3275 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3276 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3277 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3278 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3279 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3280 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3281 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3284 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3285 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3286 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3287 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3288 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3290 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3291 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3292 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
3295 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3298 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3299 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3302 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3303 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3304 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3305 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3306 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3307 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3308 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3309 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3313 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3315 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3317 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3318 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3319 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3320 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3321 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3322 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None))
3323 } else { unreachable!(); });
3325 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3326 Err((chan, err)) => {
3327 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3328 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3330 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3331 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3332 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3338 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3340 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3341 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3347 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3350 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3352 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3355 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3356 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3357 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3366 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3367 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3368 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3372 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3374 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3375 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3377 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3378 /// across the p2p network.
3380 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3381 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3383 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3384 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3385 /// keys per-channel).
3387 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3388 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3389 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3391 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3392 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3393 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3395 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3396 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3397 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3398 /// for more details.
3400 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3401 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3402 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3405 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3406 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3407 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3408 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3413 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3414 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3415 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3416 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3417 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3418 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3419 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3420 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3424 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3425 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3427 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3431 let mut output_index = None;
3432 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3433 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3434 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3435 if output_index.is_some() {
3436 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3437 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3440 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3443 if output_index.is_none() {
3444 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3445 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3448 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3452 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3454 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3455 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3456 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3457 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3459 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3460 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3462 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3463 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3465 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3467 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3468 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3469 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3470 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3471 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3472 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3473 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3474 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3475 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3476 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3477 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3478 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3479 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3484 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3485 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3486 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3489 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3490 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3491 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3492 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3496 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3497 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3498 let mut config = channel.context.config();
3499 config.apply(config_update);
3500 if !channel.context.update_config(&config) {
3503 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3505 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3506 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3507 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3515 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3517 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3518 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3519 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3520 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3522 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3523 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3525 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3526 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3528 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3530 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3531 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3532 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3533 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3534 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3535 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3536 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3537 pub fn update_channel_config(
3538 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3539 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3540 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3543 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3544 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3546 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3547 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3549 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3550 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3551 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3552 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3553 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3555 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3556 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3557 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3560 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3563 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3564 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3565 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3566 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3567 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3568 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571 let next_hop_scid = {
3572 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3573 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3574 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3577 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3579 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3580 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3581 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3584 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3586 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3587 err: format!("Funded channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}. Channel may still be opening.",
3588 log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3593 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3594 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3595 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3598 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3599 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3600 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3602 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3604 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3605 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3606 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3607 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3608 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3611 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3612 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3613 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3614 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3615 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3617 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3621 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3622 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3624 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3627 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3628 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3631 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3632 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3633 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3636 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3637 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3638 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3639 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3640 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3641 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3642 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3645 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3646 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3648 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3653 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3655 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3656 /// Will likely generate further events.
3657 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3660 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3661 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3662 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3664 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3665 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3667 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3668 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3669 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3671 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3672 match forward_info {
3673 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3674 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3675 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3676 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3677 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3680 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3681 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3682 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3684 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3685 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3686 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3687 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3688 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3689 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3692 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3693 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3695 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3698 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3699 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3705 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3706 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3708 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3712 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3713 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3715 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3719 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3720 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3721 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3722 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3723 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3725 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3726 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3727 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3728 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3729 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3731 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3733 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3734 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3738 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3739 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
3740 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3741 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
3743 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3744 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3750 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3753 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3756 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3757 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3758 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3759 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3760 // problem, not ours.
3766 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3767 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3769 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3773 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3774 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3775 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3776 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3779 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3780 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3781 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3783 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3787 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3788 match forward_info {
3789 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3790 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3791 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3792 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3793 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3797 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3798 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3799 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3800 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3801 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3802 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3803 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3805 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3806 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3807 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.logger)
3809 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3810 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3812 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3814 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3815 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3816 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3817 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3822 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3823 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3825 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3826 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3827 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3828 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3830 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3831 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3833 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3835 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3836 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3837 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3846 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3847 match forward_info {
3848 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3849 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3850 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3851 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
3852 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3855 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3856 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3857 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3859 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3860 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3861 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3863 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3864 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
3865 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
3868 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3869 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
3872 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3875 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3876 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3877 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3878 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3879 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3880 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3881 phantom_shared_secret,
3883 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3884 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3885 // if routing nodes overpay
3886 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3887 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3889 total_value_received: None,
3890 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3893 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3896 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3898 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3899 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3900 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3901 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3902 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3903 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3905 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3906 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3907 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3908 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3909 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3910 phantom_shared_secret,
3912 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3913 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3915 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3918 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3919 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3920 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3921 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3922 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3925 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3926 ($purpose: expr) => {{
3927 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3928 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
3929 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
3930 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
3932 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3933 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3934 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3936 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3937 .entry(payment_hash)
3938 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3939 .or_insert_with(|| {
3940 committed_to_claimable = true;
3942 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3945 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
3946 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
3947 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_keysend(!is_keysend));
3948 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3950 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3952 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3954 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3955 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3956 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3959 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3961 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3962 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3963 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3964 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3965 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3966 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3967 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3968 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3969 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3970 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3972 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3974 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3975 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3976 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3977 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3978 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3979 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3980 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3981 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3982 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3983 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3984 committed_to_claimable = true;
3986 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3987 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3988 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3989 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3990 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
3991 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
3992 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
3993 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
3994 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3995 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3999 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4000 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4001 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4002 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4003 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4005 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4007 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4008 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4010 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4011 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4012 committed_to_claimable = true;
4015 payment_claimable_generated
4019 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4020 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4021 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4022 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4023 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4024 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4025 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4026 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4028 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4029 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4030 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4031 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4032 Ok(result) => result,
4034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4035 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4038 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4039 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4040 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4042 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4043 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4046 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4047 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4048 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4050 check_total_value!(purpose);
4052 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4053 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4054 check_total_value!(purpose);
4058 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4059 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4060 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4061 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4063 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4064 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4065 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4066 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4067 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4069 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4070 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4072 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4073 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4074 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4076 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4077 if payment_claimable_generated {
4078 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4084 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4085 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4093 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4094 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4095 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4096 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
4097 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
4098 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
4100 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4101 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4103 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4105 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4106 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4107 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4109 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4111 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4112 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4113 events.append(&mut new_events);
4116 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4118 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4119 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4120 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4122 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4123 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4125 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4126 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4127 if background_events.is_empty() {
4128 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4131 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4133 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4134 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4135 // monitor updating completing.
4136 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4138 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4139 let mut updated_chan = false;
4141 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4142 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4143 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4144 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4145 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4147 updated_chan = true;
4148 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4149 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
4151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4156 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4157 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4159 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4160 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4161 // however, ensure that.
4163 log_error!(self.logger,
4164 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4166 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4170 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4173 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4174 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4175 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4176 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4177 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4180 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4181 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4182 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4183 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4184 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4185 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4186 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4188 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4190 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4191 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4194 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4196 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
4197 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4201 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4202 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4203 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4204 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4205 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4206 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4207 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4209 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4212 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4215 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
4216 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4217 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4225 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4227 /// This currently includes:
4228 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4229 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4230 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4232 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4233 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4234 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4236 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4237 /// estimate fetches.
4239 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4240 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4241 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4242 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4243 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4245 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4247 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4248 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4249 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4252 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4253 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4254 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4255 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4256 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4257 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
4258 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4259 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4261 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4262 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
4263 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4264 if needs_close { return false; }
4267 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4268 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4269 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4270 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4271 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4272 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4273 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4274 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4276 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4277 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4278 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4279 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4283 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4285 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4288 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4290 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4291 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4292 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4297 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4299 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4305 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4307 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4308 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4309 counterparty_node_id, log_bytes!(*chan_id));
4310 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4311 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4312 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4313 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4314 channel_id: *chan_id,
4315 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4323 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4324 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4329 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4330 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4331 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4332 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4333 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4334 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4335 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4336 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4337 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4338 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4339 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4340 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4341 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4342 // have no channels to the peer.
4343 let remove_entry = {
4344 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4345 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4348 entry.remove_entry();
4351 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4356 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4357 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4358 // This should be unreachable
4359 debug_assert!(false);
4362 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4363 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4364 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4365 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4366 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4367 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4368 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4371 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4372 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4373 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4375 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4376 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4383 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4384 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4385 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4386 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4387 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4390 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4391 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4394 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
4396 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4397 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4398 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4399 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4400 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4407 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4408 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4409 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4411 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4412 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4413 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4414 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4416 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4417 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4418 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4419 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4420 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4424 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4425 /// reason for the failure.
4427 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4428 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4431 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4432 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4433 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4434 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4435 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4436 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4437 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4442 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4443 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4444 match failure_code {
4445 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4446 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4447 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4448 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4449 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4450 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4455 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4456 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4458 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4460 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4461 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4462 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4463 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4464 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4465 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4466 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4468 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4470 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4471 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4473 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4478 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4479 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4480 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4481 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4482 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4483 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4484 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4485 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4486 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4487 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4489 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4490 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4491 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4492 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4494 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4495 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4496 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4497 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4498 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4502 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4503 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4504 // be surfaced to the user.
4505 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4506 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4507 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4509 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4510 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4511 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4514 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4516 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4520 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4523 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4524 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4525 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4526 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4530 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4531 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4532 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4533 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4534 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4535 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4536 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4537 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4538 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4541 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4542 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4543 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4546 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4547 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4548 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4550 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4551 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4552 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4553 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4554 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4556 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4557 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4558 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4560 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4561 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4562 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4563 push_forward_ev = true;
4565 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4567 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4569 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4570 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4573 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4574 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4575 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4576 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4577 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4578 failed_next_destination: destination,
4584 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4585 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4587 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4588 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4589 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4590 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4592 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4593 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4594 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4595 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4597 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4598 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4599 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4600 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4601 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4602 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4603 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4604 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4609 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4610 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4611 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4612 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4613 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4614 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4615 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4616 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4621 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4622 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4623 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4625 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4626 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4627 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4628 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4633 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4635 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4636 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4637 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4638 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4639 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4640 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4641 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4642 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4643 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4644 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4645 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4646 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4647 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4648 debug_assert!(false);
4652 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4654 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4655 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4656 debug_assert!(false);
4660 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4661 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4663 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4664 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4665 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4666 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4669 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4670 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4671 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4672 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4676 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4677 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4678 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4679 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4681 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4682 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4683 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4684 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4685 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4690 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4691 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4692 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4693 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4694 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4695 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4696 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4698 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4701 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4702 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4703 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4704 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4708 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4709 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4710 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4711 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4715 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4716 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4717 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4721 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4722 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4723 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4726 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4727 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4728 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4729 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4730 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4731 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4733 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4734 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4735 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4736 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4737 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4739 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
4740 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4741 if let Err(e) = res {
4742 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4743 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4744 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4745 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4746 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4753 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4754 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4755 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4759 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4760 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4761 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4762 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4763 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4764 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4765 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4766 // again on restart.
4767 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4768 payment_preimage, update_res);
4770 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4771 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4772 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4773 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4774 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4775 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4779 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4780 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4783 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4785 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4786 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4788 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4789 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4790 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4791 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4792 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4793 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4794 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4797 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4798 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4800 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4801 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
4802 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
4803 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4805 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
4809 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4810 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4811 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4817 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4818 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4819 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4822 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4823 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4825 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4826 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4827 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4828 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4829 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4833 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
4834 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
4836 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4837 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
4838 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
4845 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4846 /// update completion.
4847 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4848 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4849 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4850 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4851 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4852 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4853 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4854 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()),
4855 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4856 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4857 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4858 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4859 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4861 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4863 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4864 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4865 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
4866 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4869 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4870 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4872 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4873 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4874 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4879 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4880 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4881 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4882 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4887 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4888 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4889 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4890 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4891 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4896 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4900 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4906 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4907 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4908 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
4912 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4913 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4914 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4920 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4921 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4923 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4924 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4926 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4927 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4928 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4929 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4930 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4935 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4936 let mut peer_state_lock;
4937 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4938 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4939 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4940 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4942 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4947 let remaining_in_flight =
4948 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
4949 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
4952 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
4953 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
4954 remaining_in_flight);
4955 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4958 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4961 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4963 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4964 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4967 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4968 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4969 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4971 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4972 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4973 /// used to accept such channels.
4975 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4976 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4977 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4978 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4981 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4982 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4984 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4985 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4986 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4988 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4989 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4991 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4992 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4994 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4995 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4997 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4998 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4999 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5000 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5003 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5004 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5006 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5007 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5008 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5009 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5010 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5013 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5014 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
5015 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
5016 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_accept() {
5017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
5020 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
5021 } else if channel.get().context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5022 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5023 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5024 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5025 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5028 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5029 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5032 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5033 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5034 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5035 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5036 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5037 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5038 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5039 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5042 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5043 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
5044 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5048 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5049 node_id: channel.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5050 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5054 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
5060 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5061 /// or 0-conf channels.
5063 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5064 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5065 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5066 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
5067 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5068 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5070 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5071 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5072 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5073 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5074 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5075 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5076 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5080 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5083 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5084 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
5086 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5087 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5088 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5089 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5090 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5091 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5093 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5096 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5097 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5098 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5101 num_unfunded_channels
5104 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5105 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5106 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5109 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5110 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5113 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5114 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5115 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5116 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5118 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5119 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5120 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5121 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5122 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5125 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5127 debug_assert!(false);
5128 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5133 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5134 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5135 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5136 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5137 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5138 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5141 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5142 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5145 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5146 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5147 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5148 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5149 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5152 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5153 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5154 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
5157 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5162 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
5163 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5165 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
5166 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
5168 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5169 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5170 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5171 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5173 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5177 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5178 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
5181 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5182 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5183 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5184 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5185 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5186 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5187 channel_type: channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
5190 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5195 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5196 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5197 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5198 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5200 debug_assert!(false);
5201 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5203 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5205 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5206 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5207 try_v1_outbound_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5208 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5213 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5214 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5215 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5216 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5217 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5219 user_channel_id: user_id,
5224 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5225 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5227 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5228 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5230 debug_assert!(false);
5231 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5236 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5237 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5238 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5239 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5241 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5242 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5243 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5244 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5245 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5246 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5247 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5248 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5249 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None));
5253 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5256 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5257 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5258 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5260 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5261 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5263 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5264 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5265 funding_msg.channel_id))
5267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5268 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5272 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5273 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5274 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5275 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5276 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5277 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5278 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5282 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5284 let chan = e.insert(chan);
5285 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5286 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5287 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5289 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5290 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5291 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5292 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5293 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5294 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5295 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5296 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5304 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5305 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5306 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5307 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5309 debug_assert!(false);
5310 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5315 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5317 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
5318 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
5319 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5320 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5321 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5322 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5323 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5324 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5325 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5326 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5331 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5335 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5337 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5339 debug_assert!(false);
5340 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5342 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5343 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5344 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5345 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5346 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5347 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
5348 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5349 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5350 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5351 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5352 msg: announcement_sigs,
5354 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5355 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5356 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5357 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5358 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5359 // announcement_signatures.
5360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().context.channel_id()));
5361 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5362 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5363 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5370 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5371 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
5376 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5380 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5381 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5382 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5384 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5386 debug_assert!(false);
5387 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5389 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5390 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5391 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5392 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5394 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5395 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5396 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5397 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5400 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5401 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
5402 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5403 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5405 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5406 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5407 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5408 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5409 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5410 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5415 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5416 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5417 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5418 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry).map(|_| ());
5422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5425 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5426 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5427 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5428 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5434 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5438 debug_assert!(false);
5439 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5441 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5442 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5443 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5444 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5446 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5447 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5448 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5449 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5454 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5455 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5456 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5457 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5458 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5459 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5460 } else { (tx, None) }
5462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5465 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5466 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5467 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
5469 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5470 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5471 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5472 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5473 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5477 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5482 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5483 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5484 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5485 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5487 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5488 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5489 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5490 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5492 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5493 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5494 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5496 debug_assert!(false);
5497 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5501 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5502 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5504 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
5505 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
5506 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
5507 chan.get().context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
5508 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
5510 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5511 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5512 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5513 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5514 match pending_forward_info {
5515 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5516 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5517 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5518 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5520 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5521 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5522 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5523 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5524 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5527 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5529 _ => pending_forward_info
5532 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5539 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5540 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5541 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5542 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5544 debug_assert!(false);
5545 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5551 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5553 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5556 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5560 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5561 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5562 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5564 debug_assert!(false);
5565 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5567 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5568 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5569 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5571 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5573 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5578 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5580 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5582 debug_assert!(false);
5583 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5585 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5586 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5587 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5588 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5589 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5590 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5591 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5593 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5596 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5600 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5602 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5604 debug_assert!(false);
5605 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5609 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5611 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5612 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5613 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5614 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5615 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5618 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5623 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5624 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5625 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5626 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5627 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5628 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5629 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5630 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5631 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5632 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5633 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5635 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5636 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5638 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5639 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5640 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5641 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5642 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5643 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5645 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5646 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5647 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5649 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5650 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5651 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5652 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5653 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5654 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5655 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5656 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5657 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5660 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5661 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5664 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5665 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5666 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5667 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5668 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5669 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5670 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5673 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5674 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5675 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5680 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5681 // payments are being processed.
5682 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5683 push_forward_event = true;
5685 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5686 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5693 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5694 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5697 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5698 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5699 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5701 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5705 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5706 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5707 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5708 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5709 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5711 if !forward_ev_exists {
5712 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5714 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5719 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
5720 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other event
5721 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
5722 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
5723 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
5724 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
5725 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
5727 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5728 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
5729 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
5730 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5731 channel_funding_outpoint,
5732 counterparty_node_id,
5737 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5738 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5739 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5740 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5742 debug_assert!(false);
5743 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5744 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5748 let funding_txo = chan.get().context.get_funding_txo();
5749 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5750 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5751 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5752 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan).map(|_| ())
5754 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5759 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5763 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5765 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5767 debug_assert!(false);
5768 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5770 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5771 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5772 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5773 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5774 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5776 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5781 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5783 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5785 debug_assert!(false);
5786 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5788 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5789 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5792 if !chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5793 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5796 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5797 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5798 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5799 msg, &self.default_configuration
5801 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5802 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5803 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5806 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5811 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5812 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5813 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5814 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5816 // It's not a local channel
5817 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5820 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5821 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5822 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5823 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5829 if chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5830 if chan.get().context.should_announce() {
5831 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5832 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5833 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5834 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5836 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5838 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5839 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5840 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5841 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5843 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5844 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5849 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5852 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5854 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5857 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5859 debug_assert!(false);
5860 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5862 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5863 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5864 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5866 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5867 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5868 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5869 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5870 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5871 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5872 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5873 let mut channel_update = None;
5874 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5875 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5876 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5879 } else if chan.get().context.is_usable() {
5880 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5881 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5882 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5883 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5884 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5885 node_id: chan.get().context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5890 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5891 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5892 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5893 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5894 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5895 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5903 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5904 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5907 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5908 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5913 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5914 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5915 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5917 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5918 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5919 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5920 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5921 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5922 match monitor_event {
5923 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5924 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5925 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5926 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5928 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5929 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5930 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5931 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5934 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5935 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5936 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5937 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5939 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5940 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5941 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5942 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5945 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5946 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5947 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5948 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5949 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5950 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5951 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5952 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5953 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5954 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5955 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5959 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5960 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5962 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5964 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
5965 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5966 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5967 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5968 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5975 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5976 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5982 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5983 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5986 has_pending_monitor_events
5989 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5990 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5991 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5993 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5994 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5995 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5998 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5999 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6000 /// update was applied.
6001 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6002 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6003 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6004 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6006 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6007 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6008 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6009 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6012 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6014 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6015 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6016 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
6017 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6018 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6019 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6020 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
6021 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6022 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6024 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6025 has_monitor_update = true;
6027 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
6028 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6029 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6030 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6032 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6034 continue 'peer_loop;
6043 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6044 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6045 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6048 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6049 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6055 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6056 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6057 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6058 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6059 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6060 let mut has_update = false;
6062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6064 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6067 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6068 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
6069 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6070 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6071 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6073 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6074 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6077 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6078 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6079 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6080 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6081 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6086 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6088 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6089 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6090 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6096 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
6097 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6105 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6106 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6112 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6113 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6115 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6116 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6117 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6118 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6119 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6120 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6121 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6122 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6123 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6124 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6125 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6126 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6127 assert!(should_broadcast);
6128 } else { unreachable!(); }
6129 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6130 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6131 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6134 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6138 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6141 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6142 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6144 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6145 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6146 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6147 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6149 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6151 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6152 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6156 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6157 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6159 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6161 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6162 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6164 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6165 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6166 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6167 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6168 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6169 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6170 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6171 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6172 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6173 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6174 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6177 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6178 /// stored external to LDK.
6180 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6181 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6182 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6184 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6185 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6188 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6189 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6190 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6191 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6193 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6194 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6195 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6196 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6197 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6199 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6200 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6201 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6202 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6203 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6205 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6206 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6208 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6209 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6213 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6214 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6216 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6218 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6219 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6221 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6222 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6223 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6224 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6225 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6226 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6227 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6230 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6231 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6233 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6234 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6235 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6238 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6239 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6241 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6242 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6243 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6244 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6246 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6247 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6248 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6249 Some(_) => continue,
6250 None => return scid_candidate
6255 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6257 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6258 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6260 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6261 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6262 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6266 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6267 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6268 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6270 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6271 /// times to get a unique scid.
6272 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6273 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6274 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6276 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6277 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6278 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6279 return scid_candidate
6283 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6284 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6285 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6286 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6288 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6289 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6290 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6291 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6292 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6293 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6294 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6295 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6304 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6305 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6306 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6307 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6308 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6312 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6313 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6314 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6315 events.push_back((event, None));
6319 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6320 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6321 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6325 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6326 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6330 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6331 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6334 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6335 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6336 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6337 /// making progress and then any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6338 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6339 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6341 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6342 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6343 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6344 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6346 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6347 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6348 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6349 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6351 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6355 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6356 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
6357 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
6358 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
6359 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
6360 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
6361 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6365 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6366 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
6367 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
6368 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
6369 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6370 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
6371 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
6373 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
6375 if further_update_exists {
6376 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
6381 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
6382 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6386 log_debug!(self.logger,
6387 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6388 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6392 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6393 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6394 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6398 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6399 for action in actions {
6401 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6402 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6404 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
6410 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6411 /// using the given event handler.
6413 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6414 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6418 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6422 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6424 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6425 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6426 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6427 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6428 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6429 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6433 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6434 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6435 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6436 /// is always placed next to each other.
6438 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6439 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6440 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6441 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6443 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6444 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6445 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6446 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6447 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6448 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6449 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
6451 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6452 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6453 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6454 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6457 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6458 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6460 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6461 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6464 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6465 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6466 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6467 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6468 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6469 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6470 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6474 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6475 events.replace(pending_events);
6484 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6486 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6487 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6488 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6489 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6490 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6491 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6495 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6497 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6498 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6499 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6501 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6505 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6507 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6508 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6509 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6510 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6511 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6512 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6516 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6518 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6519 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6520 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6521 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6522 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6525 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6526 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6529 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6530 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6531 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6532 let new_height = height - 1;
6534 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6535 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6536 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6537 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6538 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6539 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6542 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6546 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6548 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6549 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6550 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6551 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6552 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6553 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6557 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6558 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6559 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6560 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6562 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6563 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6565 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6566 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6567 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6568 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6570 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6571 if height < last_best_block_height {
6572 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6573 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6577 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6578 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6579 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6580 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6582 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6583 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6585 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6586 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6587 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6589 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6591 macro_rules! max_time {
6592 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6594 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6595 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6596 // having an explicit local time source.
6597 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6598 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6599 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6600 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6601 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6607 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6608 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6609 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6610 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6614 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6615 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6616 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6619 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6620 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6621 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6628 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
6630 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
6631 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6632 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
6633 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6634 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6635 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6636 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6641 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6643 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6644 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6645 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6646 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6647 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6648 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6652 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6653 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6655 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6656 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6657 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6658 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6659 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6661 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6662 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6665 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6668 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6669 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6670 let res = f(channel);
6671 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6672 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6673 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6674 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6675 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
6677 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6678 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6679 if channel.context.is_usable() {
6680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6681 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6683 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6688 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6693 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6694 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6697 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
6699 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6700 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6701 msg: announcement_sigs,
6703 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6704 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6707 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6708 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6709 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6714 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6715 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6716 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6717 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6718 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6719 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6720 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6721 // is always consistent.
6722 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6723 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
6724 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
6725 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6726 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6729 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6730 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
6731 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6732 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6733 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
6734 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6735 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6739 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6740 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
6741 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6742 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6743 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6744 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
6745 data: reason_message,
6755 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6756 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6757 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6758 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6759 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6760 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6761 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6762 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6763 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6764 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6766 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6767 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6768 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6772 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6775 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6776 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6777 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6778 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6779 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6780 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6781 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6782 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6783 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6786 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6787 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6788 _ => unreachable!(),
6790 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6791 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6792 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6793 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6799 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6801 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6802 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6806 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6808 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6809 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6811 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6812 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6815 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6816 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6817 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6820 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6821 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6822 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6823 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6826 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6827 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6828 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6829 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6832 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6833 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6835 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6836 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6837 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6838 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6839 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6842 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6843 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6844 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6845 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6848 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6849 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6850 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6851 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6854 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6855 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6856 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6857 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6861 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6862 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6864 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6865 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6866 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6867 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6868 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6869 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6873 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6874 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6875 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6878 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6879 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6880 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6881 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6884 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6886 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6889 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6890 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6891 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6892 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6895 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6896 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6897 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6900 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6901 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6902 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6905 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6906 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6907 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6910 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6911 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6912 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6915 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6917 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6920 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6921 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6922 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6925 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6927 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6930 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6931 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6932 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6935 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6937 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6940 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6941 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6942 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6945 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6946 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6947 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6950 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6952 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6955 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6957 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6960 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6961 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6962 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
6963 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6964 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
6966 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6971 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6972 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6973 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6976 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6977 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6978 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6979 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6981 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6982 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6983 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6984 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6985 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6986 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6987 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6988 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6989 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6990 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6991 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6996 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6997 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6998 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7001 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7002 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7003 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7006 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7008 // V1 Channel Establishment
7009 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7010 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7011 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7012 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7013 // V2 Channel Establishment
7014 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7015 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7016 // Common Channel Establishment
7017 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7018 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7019 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7020 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7021 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7022 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7023 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7024 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7025 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7026 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7027 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7028 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7029 // Channel Operations
7030 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7031 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7032 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7033 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7034 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7035 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7037 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7038 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7039 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7040 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7041 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7042 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7043 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7044 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7045 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7048 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7049 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7050 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7051 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7054 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7056 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7058 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7059 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7063 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7064 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7065 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7071 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7072 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7073 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7074 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7075 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7076 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7079 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7080 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7081 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7082 if inbound_peer_limited {
7085 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7086 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7087 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7088 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7089 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7090 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7091 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7092 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7093 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7098 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7099 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7101 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7102 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7103 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7104 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7109 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7110 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7115 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7117 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7118 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7121 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7122 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7123 let retain = if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
7124 if !chan.context.have_received_message() {
7125 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
7126 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
7127 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
7131 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7132 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7133 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7138 if retain && chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7139 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
7140 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
7141 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
7142 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7151 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7155 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7156 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7158 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
7159 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
7160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7161 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7162 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7165 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7166 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7167 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7169 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7170 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7171 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7175 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7176 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7177 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7178 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7181 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7182 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
7183 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7184 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7192 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7193 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7197 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7198 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7201 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7202 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7205 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7206 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7209 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7210 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7211 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7212 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7215 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7216 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7217 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7218 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7221 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7222 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7223 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7224 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7227 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7228 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7229 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7230 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7233 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7234 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7235 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7236 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7239 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7240 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7241 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7242 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7245 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7246 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7247 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7248 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7251 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7252 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7253 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7254 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7257 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7258 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7259 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7260 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7264 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7265 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7266 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7267 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7270 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7271 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7273 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7274 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7275 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7276 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
7277 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7280 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7281 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7282 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7283 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7286 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7287 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7288 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7289 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7292 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7293 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7294 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7295 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7296 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7297 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
7298 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
7299 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
7300 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
7301 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
7302 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
7303 features.set_payment_secret_required();
7304 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
7305 features.set_wumbo_optional();
7306 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
7307 features.set_channel_type_optional();
7308 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
7309 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
7310 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
7311 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
7316 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7317 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
7319 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
7320 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
7321 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
7322 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
7325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
7326 (2, node_id, required),
7327 (4, features, required),
7328 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
7329 (8, forwarding_info, option),
7330 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7331 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7334 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
7335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7336 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7337 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7338 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
7339 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
7340 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7341 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
7342 (2, self.channel_id, required),
7343 (3, self.channel_type, option),
7344 (4, self.counterparty, required),
7345 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
7346 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
7347 (7, self.config, option),
7348 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
7349 (9, self.confirmations, option),
7350 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
7351 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7352 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7353 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
7354 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7355 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
7356 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7357 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
7358 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
7359 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
7360 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
7361 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
7362 (30, self.is_usable, required),
7363 (32, self.is_public, required),
7364 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7365 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7366 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7367 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7373 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
7374 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7375 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7376 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
7377 (2, channel_id, required),
7378 (3, channel_type, option),
7379 (4, counterparty, required),
7380 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7381 (6, funding_txo, option),
7382 (7, config, option),
7383 (8, short_channel_id, option),
7384 (9, confirmations, option),
7385 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
7386 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
7387 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
7388 (16, balance_msat, required),
7389 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
7390 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
7391 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
7392 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
7393 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
7394 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
7395 (22, confirmations_required, option),
7396 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
7397 (26, is_outbound, required),
7398 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
7399 (30, is_usable, required),
7400 (32, is_public, required),
7401 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
7402 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
7403 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
7404 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7407 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7408 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7409 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7410 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7411 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7415 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7417 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7418 outbound_scid_alias,
7422 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7423 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7425 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7426 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7427 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7428 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
7429 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7430 confirmations_required,
7432 force_close_spend_delay,
7433 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7434 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7435 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7436 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7437 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7438 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7439 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7444 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7445 (2, channels, vec_type),
7446 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7447 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7450 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7452 (0, onion_packet, required),
7453 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7456 (0, payment_data, required),
7457 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7458 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7459 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7461 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7462 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7463 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7464 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7465 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
7469 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7470 (0, routing, required),
7471 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7472 (4, payment_hash, required),
7473 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7474 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7475 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7476 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7480 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7481 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7483 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7485 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7486 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7487 reason.write(writer)?;
7489 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7490 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7493 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7494 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7495 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7496 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7503 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7504 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7505 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7508 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7509 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7510 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7511 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7515 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7516 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7517 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7518 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7519 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7522 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7523 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7524 // messages contained in the variants.
7525 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7526 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7527 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7529 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7530 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7531 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7532 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7533 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7536 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7537 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7538 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7539 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7540 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7542 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7547 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7552 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7553 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7554 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7555 (2, outpoint, required),
7556 (4, htlc_id, required),
7557 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7560 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7561 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7562 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7563 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7564 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7566 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7567 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7568 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7569 (2, self.value, required),
7570 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7571 (4, payment_data, option),
7572 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7573 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7574 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7575 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7581 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7582 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7583 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7584 (0, prev_hop, required),
7585 (1, total_msat, option),
7586 (2, value_ser, required),
7587 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7588 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
7589 (5, total_value_received, option),
7590 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7591 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7592 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
7594 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
7595 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
7596 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7598 if payment_data.is_some() {
7599 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7601 if total_msat.is_none() {
7602 total_msat = Some(value);
7604 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7607 if total_msat.is_none() {
7608 if payment_data.is_none() {
7609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7611 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7613 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7617 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7620 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7621 total_value_received,
7622 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7624 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
7625 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
7630 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7631 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7632 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7635 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7636 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7637 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7638 let mut payment_id = None;
7639 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7640 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7641 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7642 (0, session_priv, required),
7643 (1, payment_id, option),
7644 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7645 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7646 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7647 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7649 if payment_id.is_none() {
7650 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7652 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7654 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7655 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7656 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7658 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7659 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7660 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7661 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7665 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7666 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7667 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7669 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7672 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7673 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7678 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7679 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7681 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7683 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7684 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7685 (0, session_priv, required),
7686 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7687 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7688 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7689 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7690 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7691 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7694 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7696 field.write(writer)?;
7703 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7704 (0, forward_info, required),
7705 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7706 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7707 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7708 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7711 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7713 (0, htlc_id, required),
7714 (2, err_packet, required),
7719 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7720 (0, payment_secret, required),
7721 (2, expiry_time, required),
7722 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7723 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7724 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7727 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7729 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7730 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7731 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7732 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7733 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7734 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7738 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7739 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7741 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7743 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7745 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7746 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7747 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7750 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7753 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7754 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7755 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7756 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7757 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7758 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7759 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7761 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7762 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7763 if !channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7764 unfunded_channels += 1;
7769 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7771 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7772 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7773 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7774 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7775 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
7776 channel.write(writer)?;
7783 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7784 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7785 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7786 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7787 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7788 for forward in pending_forwards {
7789 forward.write(writer)?;
7794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7796 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7797 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7798 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7800 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7801 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7802 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7803 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7804 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7805 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7806 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7807 htlc.write(writer)?;
7809 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7810 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7813 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7814 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7815 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7816 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7817 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7818 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7819 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7822 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7823 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7824 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7825 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7826 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7828 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7829 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7830 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7831 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7832 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7833 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7834 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7839 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7840 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7841 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7842 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7843 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7844 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7845 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7846 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7847 0u64.write(writer)?;
7849 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7850 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7851 event.write(writer)?;
7855 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
7856 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
7857 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
7858 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
7859 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
7860 0u64.write(writer)?;
7862 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7863 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7864 // likely to be identical.
7865 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7866 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7868 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7869 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7870 hash.write(writer)?;
7871 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7874 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7875 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7876 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7877 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7878 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7881 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7882 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7884 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7885 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7886 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7887 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7890 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7891 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7895 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7896 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7897 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7899 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7900 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7901 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7907 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7908 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7909 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7910 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7913 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7914 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7915 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7916 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7917 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7920 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
7921 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7922 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
7923 if !updates.is_empty() {
7924 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
7925 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
7930 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7931 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7932 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7933 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7934 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7935 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7936 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7937 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7938 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7939 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7940 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
7941 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7942 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7949 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7950 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7951 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7952 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7955 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7956 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7957 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7958 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7959 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7960 // check that the event is sane here.
7961 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7962 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7963 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7964 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7970 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7971 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7972 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7973 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7974 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7975 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7978 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7979 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7980 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7981 events.push_back((ev, action));
7982 } else if action.is_some() {
7983 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7990 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7992 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7994 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7995 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7996 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7997 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7998 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7999 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8000 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8001 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8002 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8003 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8004 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8005 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8006 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8008 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8009 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8011 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8012 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8014 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8015 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8016 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8017 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8018 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8019 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8021 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8022 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8024 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8025 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8026 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8027 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8028 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8029 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8033 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8034 pub entropy_source: ES,
8036 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8037 pub node_signer: NS,
8039 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8040 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8042 pub signer_provider: SP,
8044 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8046 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8047 pub fee_estimator: F,
8048 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8050 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8051 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8052 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8053 pub chain_monitor: M,
8055 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8056 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8057 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8058 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8059 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8060 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8062 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8064 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8065 /// deserialization.
8067 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8068 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8069 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8071 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8072 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8074 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8075 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8076 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8077 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8079 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8082 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8083 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8086 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8087 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8089 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8090 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8091 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8092 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8093 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8094 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8098 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8099 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8100 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8101 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8102 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8104 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8105 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8110 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8111 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8112 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8113 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8115 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8116 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8117 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8118 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8119 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8120 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8124 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8125 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8126 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8130 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8131 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8133 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8134 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8135 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8136 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8137 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8142 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8143 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8145 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8146 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8147 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8149 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8151 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8152 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8153 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8154 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8155 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8156 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8157 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8158 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8159 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
8160 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8162 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8163 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8164 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8165 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8166 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8167 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8168 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8169 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8170 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8171 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8172 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8173 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8174 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8175 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8176 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8177 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8180 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8181 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8182 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8183 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8184 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
8186 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8187 let mut found_htlc = false;
8188 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8189 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8192 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8193 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8194 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8195 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8196 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8197 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8198 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8199 log_info!(args.logger,
8200 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8201 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8202 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8206 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8207 log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8208 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8209 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8210 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8212 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8213 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8215 match peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8217 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8218 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8220 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8221 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8222 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel);
8223 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8227 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8228 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8229 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8230 // safely discard the channel.
8231 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8232 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8233 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8234 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8235 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8238 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.context.channel_id()));
8239 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8240 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8241 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8242 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8247 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8248 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8249 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8250 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8251 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8252 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8253 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8255 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8259 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8260 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8261 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8262 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8263 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8264 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8265 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
8266 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
8267 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
8269 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
8272 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8273 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8274 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
8275 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8276 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8277 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
8278 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
8279 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
8281 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
8284 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
8287 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8288 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8289 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
8290 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8291 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8292 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8293 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8294 is_connected: false,
8298 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8299 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
8300 for _ in 0..peer_count {
8301 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8302 let peer_chans = peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
8303 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
8304 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
8305 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
8308 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8309 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
8310 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
8311 for _ in 0..event_count {
8312 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
8313 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
8318 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8319 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
8320 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8322 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
8323 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
8324 // on-startup monitor updates.
8325 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
8328 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8332 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
8333 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8335 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8336 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
8337 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
8338 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
8339 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8343 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8344 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
8345 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
8346 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
8347 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
8348 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
8349 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
8351 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
8352 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8356 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
8357 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
8358 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
8359 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
8360 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
8361 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8362 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8363 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
8364 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
8365 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
8366 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
8367 let mut events_override = None;
8368 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8369 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8370 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
8371 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8372 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
8373 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8374 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
8375 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8376 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
8377 (8, events_override, option),
8378 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
8379 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8380 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
8381 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8383 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
8384 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8387 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
8388 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8391 if let Some(events) = events_override {
8392 pending_events_read = events;
8395 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
8396 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
8399 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
8400 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
8401 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
8402 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
8403 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
8404 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
8406 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
8408 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
8409 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
8410 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
8413 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
8414 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
8415 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
8416 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
8417 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
8419 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
8420 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
8421 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
8423 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
8424 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
8425 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
8426 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
8427 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
8429 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
8430 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8431 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
8432 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
8433 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, log_bytes!($funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8434 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
8435 pending_background_events.push(
8436 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8437 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
8438 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
8439 update: update.clone(),
8442 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
8443 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
8444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8446 max_in_flight_update_id
8450 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8451 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8452 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8453 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
8454 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
8456 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8457 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
8458 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
8459 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
8460 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
8461 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
8462 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
8463 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
8464 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
8467 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
8468 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
8469 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8470 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
8471 log_bytes!(chan.context.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
8472 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
8473 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8474 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8475 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8476 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8477 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8482 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
8483 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
8484 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
8485 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
8486 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
8487 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
8488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
8489 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
8491 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8492 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
8493 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
8495 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
8496 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
8497 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
8498 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8499 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8500 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8501 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8502 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8507 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
8508 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
8511 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
8512 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8513 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8514 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8515 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8516 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8517 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8519 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8520 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8521 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8522 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8523 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8524 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8525 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8528 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8529 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8530 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8531 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8532 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8533 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8534 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8535 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8537 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8538 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8539 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8540 retry_strategy: None,
8541 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8542 payment_params: None,
8543 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8544 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8545 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8546 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8547 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8548 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8549 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8550 total_msat: path_amt,
8551 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8553 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8554 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8559 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8561 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8562 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8563 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8564 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8566 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8567 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8568 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8569 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8570 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8571 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8572 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8573 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8574 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8575 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8576 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8581 !forwards.is_empty()
8583 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8584 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8585 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8586 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8587 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8588 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8589 intercepted_id != ev_id
8596 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8597 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8598 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8599 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8600 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8601 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8602 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8603 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8604 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8605 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8606 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8607 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8608 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8617 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8618 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8619 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8620 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8621 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8622 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8623 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8624 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8628 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8629 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8631 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8632 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8633 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8636 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8637 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8638 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8640 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8641 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8643 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8644 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8646 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8649 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8650 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8651 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8653 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8657 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8658 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8659 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8660 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8661 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8663 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8664 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8665 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8666 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8667 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8668 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8669 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8670 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8672 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8673 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8677 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8679 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8681 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8682 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8684 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8685 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8690 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8691 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8693 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8695 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8697 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8698 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8699 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8704 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8705 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8708 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8709 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8710 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8712 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8713 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8714 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8716 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8717 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8718 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8719 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8720 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8721 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8723 if chan.context.is_usable() {
8724 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8725 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8726 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8727 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
8728 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8734 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8736 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8737 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8738 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8739 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8740 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8741 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8742 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8743 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8744 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8745 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8746 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8748 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8749 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8751 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8752 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8753 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8754 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8756 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8757 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8758 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8759 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8761 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8762 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8763 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8764 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8766 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8767 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8769 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8770 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8771 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8772 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8775 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8776 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8779 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8782 purpose: payment.purpose,
8783 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8789 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8790 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
8791 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
8792 for action in actions.iter() {
8793 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
8794 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
8795 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
8797 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
8798 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8799 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8800 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
8805 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8807 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8808 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8812 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8814 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8815 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8816 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8817 router: args.router,
8819 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8821 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8822 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8823 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8824 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8826 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8827 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8828 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8829 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8830 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8831 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8833 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8838 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8840 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8842 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8843 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8844 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8845 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8846 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8847 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
8848 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8850 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8851 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8852 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8854 logger: args.logger,
8855 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8858 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8859 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8860 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8861 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8862 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8865 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8866 //connection or two.
8868 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8874 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8875 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8876 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8877 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8878 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8879 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8880 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8881 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8882 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
8883 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8884 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8885 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8886 use crate::util::test_utils;
8887 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
8888 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8891 fn test_notify_limits() {
8892 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8893 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8894 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8895 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8896 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8897 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8899 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8900 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8901 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8902 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8903 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8905 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8907 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8908 // to connect messages with new values
8909 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8910 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8911 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8912 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8913 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8914 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8916 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8918 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8919 // ... but the last node should not.
8920 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8921 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8922 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8923 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8925 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8926 // about the channel.
8927 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8928 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8929 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8931 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8933 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8934 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8935 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8936 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8937 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8938 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8940 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8942 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8944 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8945 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8946 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8947 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8948 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8949 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8951 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8952 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8953 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8954 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8955 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8956 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8957 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8958 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8960 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8961 // the channel info has updated.
8962 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8963 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8964 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8965 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8966 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8967 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8971 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8972 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8977 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8978 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8980 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8981 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8982 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8983 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8985 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8986 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8987 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8988 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8989 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8990 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8991 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8992 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8994 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8995 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8996 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8998 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8999 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9000 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9002 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9003 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9004 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9005 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9006 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9008 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9010 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9012 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9013 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9014 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9015 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9016 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9017 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9020 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9022 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9023 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9024 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9026 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9028 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9030 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9031 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9032 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9033 // lightning messages manually.
9034 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9035 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9038 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9039 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9040 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9042 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9045 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9046 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9048 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9050 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9052 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9053 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9054 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9056 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9058 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9060 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9061 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9064 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9065 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9066 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9069 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
9070 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
9071 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
9072 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
9074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9077 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9078 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9079 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9080 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9085 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9086 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9087 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9088 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9095 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9096 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9097 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9100 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9101 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9102 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9103 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9104 // fails as expected.
9105 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9106 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9107 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9108 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9109 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9110 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9113 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9114 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9116 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9117 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9118 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9119 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9121 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9122 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9123 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9125 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9126 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9127 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9128 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9130 let route = find_route(
9131 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9132 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9134 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9135 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9137 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9138 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9139 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9140 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9141 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9143 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9144 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9145 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9147 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9149 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9150 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9151 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9152 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9153 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9154 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9155 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9156 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9157 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9159 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9160 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9162 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9163 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9164 let route = find_route(
9165 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9166 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9168 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9169 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9171 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9173 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9174 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9175 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9177 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9178 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9179 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9180 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9182 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9183 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9184 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9185 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9188 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9189 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9192 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9193 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9194 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9195 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9196 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9197 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9198 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9199 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9200 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9202 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
9203 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9205 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9206 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
9207 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9208 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
9209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9210 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9211 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9212 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9213 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9214 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9216 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9217 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9218 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
9219 final_value_msat: 100_000,
9221 let route = find_route(
9222 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9223 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9225 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
9226 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9227 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
9228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9229 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9231 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9232 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9233 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9235 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9239 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9240 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9241 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9242 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9243 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9244 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9245 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9246 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9247 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9249 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9250 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9254 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
9255 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
9256 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
9257 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9258 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9259 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9260 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9262 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9263 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9265 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9266 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9267 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9268 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9270 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9271 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9272 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9273 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9274 let route = find_route(
9275 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9276 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9279 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9280 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
9281 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
9282 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9283 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
9284 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9287 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9288 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9289 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9290 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9291 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9292 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9295 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
9299 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
9300 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
9301 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
9302 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9303 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
9304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9307 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9309 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9310 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9312 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9313 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9314 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false),
9315 final_value_msat: 10_000,
9317 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9318 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9319 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9320 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9321 let route = find_route(
9322 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9323 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9326 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9327 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9328 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
9329 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
9330 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
9331 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
9332 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
9333 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
9334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9336 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
9338 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9339 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9340 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9341 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
9344 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
9348 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
9349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9352 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9354 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9355 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9356 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9357 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
9359 // Marshall an MPP route.
9360 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
9361 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
9362 route.paths.push(path);
9363 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9364 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
9365 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
9366 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
9367 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
9368 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
9370 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9371 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
9373 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
9374 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
9376 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
9381 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
9382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9385 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9387 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9389 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9390 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9392 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9393 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9395 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9398 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
9399 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
9400 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9401 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
9402 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
9403 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
9406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9409 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
9410 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
9415 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
9416 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
9417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9420 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9422 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
9423 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9425 total_msat: 100_000,
9428 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
9429 // payment verification fails as expected.
9430 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
9431 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
9432 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
9433 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
9435 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
9439 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
9440 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
9444 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
9445 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
9446 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
9447 // the channel is successfully closed.
9448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9451 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9453 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9454 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9455 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9456 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9457 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9459 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9460 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
9462 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
9463 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
9464 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9465 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9468 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9470 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9471 // as it has the funding transaction.
9472 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9473 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9474 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9477 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9479 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9481 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9483 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9484 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9485 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9487 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9490 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
9491 // as it has the funding transaction.
9492 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9493 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9494 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9497 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9498 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9500 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9501 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9502 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9503 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
9505 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9506 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9507 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9508 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
9510 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9511 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
9513 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
9514 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
9515 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
9516 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
9517 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9518 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
9519 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9523 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
9524 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
9525 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
9526 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
9527 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9528 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9529 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9532 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9534 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
9535 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
9536 // closing transaction).
9537 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
9538 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
9539 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9541 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
9542 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
9543 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
9544 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
9545 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
9548 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9550 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
9552 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
9553 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
9554 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
9556 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9558 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9559 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
9562 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9563 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
9564 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9567 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
9568 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
9569 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
9572 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
9574 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9575 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9577 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
9578 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
9580 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
9581 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
9586 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
9587 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
9588 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
9589 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
9590 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9591 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9592 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9593 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9596 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9597 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9598 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9600 // Test the API functions.
9601 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9603 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9605 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9607 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9609 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9611 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9613 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9617 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9618 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9619 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9620 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9621 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9622 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9624 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9627 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9629 let mut funding_tx = None;
9630 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9631 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9632 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9635 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9636 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9637 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9638 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9639 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9641 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9643 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9645 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9647 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9649 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9651 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9654 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9655 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9656 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9657 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9658 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9660 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9661 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9663 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9664 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9665 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9666 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9667 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9668 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9669 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9672 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9673 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9674 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9675 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9676 }, true).unwrap_err();
9678 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9679 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9680 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9681 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9682 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9683 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9684 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9686 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9687 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9689 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9690 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9691 }, true).unwrap_err();
9693 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9694 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9695 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9697 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9699 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9700 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9702 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9703 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9704 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9705 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9706 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9708 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9709 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9710 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9712 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9713 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9714 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9716 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9717 // "protected" and can connect again.
9718 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9719 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9720 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9722 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9724 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9726 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9727 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9731 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9732 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9733 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9734 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9735 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9736 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9738 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9740 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9741 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9743 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9744 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9745 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9746 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9749 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9751 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9752 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9753 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9755 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9756 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9757 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9759 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9760 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9761 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9762 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9766 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9767 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9768 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9771 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9772 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9774 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9776 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9778 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9779 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9781 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9782 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9783 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9784 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9785 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9786 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9789 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9790 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9792 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9793 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9795 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9797 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9798 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9801 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9802 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9803 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9804 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9805 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
9807 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9808 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9810 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9811 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9812 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9813 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9817 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9819 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9820 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9822 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9823 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9826 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9827 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9831 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9835 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
9836 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
9837 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
9838 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
9839 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9840 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
9841 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
9842 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData {
9843 amt_to_forward: 100,
9844 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9845 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9846 keysend_preimage: None,
9847 payment_metadata: None,
9848 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9849 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9853 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
9854 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
9855 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::ReceiveError { err_code, .. }) =
9856 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9857 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
9859 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
9860 } else { panic!(); }
9862 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
9863 let hop_data = msgs::OnionHopData { // This is the same hop_data as above, OnionHopData doesn't implement Clone
9864 amt_to_forward: 100,
9865 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
9866 format: msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode {
9867 keysend_preimage: None,
9868 payment_metadata: None,
9869 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
9870 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
9874 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9875 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
9879 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
9880 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9881 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9882 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9883 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9885 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
9886 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9888 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
9891 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
9892 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9894 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9895 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9897 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9898 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9899 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9900 match &msg_events[0] {
9901 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
9902 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9904 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
9905 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
9906 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
9909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9912 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9913 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9915 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
9916 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
9917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9919 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9923 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9924 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9925 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9926 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9929 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9930 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9931 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9933 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9935 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9936 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9937 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9939 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9940 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9942 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9943 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9948 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9949 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9951 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9952 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9954 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9958 fn test_update_channel_config() {
9959 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9960 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9961 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
9962 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
9963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9964 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9965 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
9967 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9968 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9971 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
9972 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
9973 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
9974 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9977 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9978 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9981 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
9982 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
9985 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
9986 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
9987 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
9988 ..Default::default()
9990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
9991 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9994 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9995 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
9998 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
9999 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10000 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10001 ..Default::default()
10003 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10004 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10005 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10006 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10008 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10009 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10016 use crate::chain::Listen;
10017 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10018 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10019 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10020 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10021 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10022 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10023 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10024 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10025 use crate::util::test_utils;
10026 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
10028 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10029 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10030 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10032 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
10034 use criterion::Criterion;
10036 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10037 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10038 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10039 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10040 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10041 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10042 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10044 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10045 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
10047 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
10048 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
10050 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
10052 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10055 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10056 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10059 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10060 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10061 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10063 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10064 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10066 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10067 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10068 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10069 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10070 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10072 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10073 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10075 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10076 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10077 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10078 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10080 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10081 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10082 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10084 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10085 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10086 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10087 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10088 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10090 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10091 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10092 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10094 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10095 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10097 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10098 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10099 }, false).unwrap();
10100 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10101 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10102 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10105 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10106 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10107 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10109 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10110 } else { panic!(); }
10112 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10113 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10114 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10115 match events_b[0] {
10116 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10117 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10122 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10123 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10124 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10125 match events_a[0] {
10126 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10127 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10132 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10134 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10135 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10136 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10138 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10139 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10140 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10141 match msg_events[0] {
10142 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10143 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10144 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10148 match msg_events[1] {
10149 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10153 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10154 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10155 match events_a[0] {
10156 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10157 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10162 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10163 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10164 match events_b[0] {
10165 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10166 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10171 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
10172 macro_rules! send_payment {
10173 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
10174 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
10175 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
10176 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
10177 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
10178 payment_count += 1;
10179 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
10180 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
10182 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
10183 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
10184 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
10185 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
10186 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
10187 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10188 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
10189 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
10190 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10191 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10192 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
10195 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
10196 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10197 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
10199 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
10200 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
10201 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
10202 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10203 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
10205 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
10208 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
10209 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
10210 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
10211 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10213 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
10217 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
10218 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
10219 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);