1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundOnionErr, NextPacketDetails};
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
57 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
61 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
62 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
63 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
82 use crate::prelude::*;
84 use core::cell::RefCell;
86 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
87 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
88 use core::time::Duration;
91 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
92 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
93 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
95 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
97 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
98 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
99 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
101 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
102 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
103 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
104 // before we forward it.
106 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
107 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
108 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
109 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
110 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
112 /// Routing info for an inbound HTLC onion.
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
115 /// A forwarded HTLC.
117 /// BOLT 4 onion packet.
118 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
119 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
120 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
121 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
122 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
123 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
125 /// An HTLC paid to an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
126 /// At this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually generated by us,
127 /// but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
129 /// Payment secret and total msat received.
130 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
132 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
133 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
134 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
135 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
136 /// Shared secret derived using a phantom node secret key. If this field is Some, the
137 /// payment was sent to a phantom node (one hop beyond the current node), but can be
138 /// settled by this node.
139 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
140 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
141 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
143 /// Incoming keysend (sender provided the preimage in a TLV).
145 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
146 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
147 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
148 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
149 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`] for more info.
151 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
152 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
153 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
156 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
160 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
161 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
162 pub struct BlindedForward {
163 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
164 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
165 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
166 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
167 // Another field will be added here when we support forwarding as a non-intro node.
170 /// Full details of an incoming HTLC, including routing info.
171 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
172 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
173 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
174 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
175 /// Shared secret from the previous hop.
176 /// Used encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC needs to be failed backwards.
177 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
178 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
179 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
180 /// Amount offered by this HTLC.
181 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
182 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
183 /// may overshoot this in either case)
184 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
185 /// Outgoing timelock expiration blockheight.
186 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
187 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
188 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
189 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
192 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
193 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
194 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
195 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
198 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
199 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
200 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
201 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
202 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
205 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
206 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
208 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
209 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
210 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
213 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
214 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
216 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
217 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
220 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
221 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
224 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
230 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
231 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
232 short_channel_id: u64,
233 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
235 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
236 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
238 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
239 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
244 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
246 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
247 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
248 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
250 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
251 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
254 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
255 struct ClaimableHTLC {
256 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
258 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
260 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
261 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
262 sender_intended_value: u64,
263 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
265 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
266 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
267 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
268 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
270 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
271 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
274 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
275 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
276 events::ClaimedHTLC {
277 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
278 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
279 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
280 value_msat: val.value,
281 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
286 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
287 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
289 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
290 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
291 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
294 /// Number of bytes in the id.
295 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
298 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
299 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
304 impl Readable for PaymentId {
305 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
306 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
311 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
312 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
313 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
317 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
319 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
320 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
321 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
323 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
324 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
329 impl Readable for InterceptId {
330 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
331 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
336 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
337 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
338 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
339 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
340 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
343 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
345 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
346 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
347 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
349 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
350 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
354 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
355 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
356 (0, short_channel_id, required),
357 (2, htlc_id, required),
359 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
360 (0, session_priv, required),
365 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
366 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
367 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
368 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
369 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
372 session_priv: SecretKey,
373 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
374 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
375 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
376 payment_id: PaymentId,
379 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
380 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
381 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
383 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
385 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
387 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
390 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
391 payment_id.hash(hasher);
392 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
398 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
400 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
401 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
402 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
403 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
404 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
405 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
409 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
410 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
411 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
412 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
413 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
414 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
416 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
422 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
423 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
425 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
426 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
427 pub enum FailureCode {
428 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
429 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
430 TemporaryNodeFailure,
431 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
432 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
433 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
434 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
435 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
436 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
437 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
438 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
439 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
440 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
442 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
443 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
444 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
447 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
448 fn into(self) -> u16 {
450 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
451 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
452 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
453 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
458 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
459 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
460 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
461 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
462 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
464 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
465 err: msgs::LightningError,
466 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
467 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
468 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
470 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
472 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
474 err: LightningError {
476 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
477 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
484 shutdown_finish: None,
485 channel_capacity: None,
489 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
490 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
493 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
494 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
495 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
496 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
497 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
498 // commitment upon reconnecting.
499 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
501 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
504 err: LightningError { err, action },
505 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
506 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
507 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
511 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
514 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
516 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
517 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
521 log_level: Level::Warn,
524 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
526 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
528 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
530 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
531 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
539 shutdown_finish: None,
540 channel_capacity: None,
544 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
545 self.chan_id.is_some()
549 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
550 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
551 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
552 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
553 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
555 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
556 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
557 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
558 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
559 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
560 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
561 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
563 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
567 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
568 struct ClaimingPayment {
570 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
571 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
572 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
573 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
575 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
576 (0, amount_msat, required),
577 (2, payment_purpose, required),
578 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
579 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
580 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
583 struct ClaimablePayment {
584 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
585 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
586 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
589 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
590 struct ClaimablePayments {
591 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
592 /// failed/claimed by the user.
594 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
595 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
597 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
598 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
599 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
601 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
602 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
603 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
604 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
607 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
608 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
609 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
610 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
612 enum BackgroundEvent {
613 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
614 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
615 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
616 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
618 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
619 /// are regenerated on startup.
620 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
621 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
622 /// channel to continue normal operation.
624 /// In general this should be used rather than
625 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
626 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
627 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
629 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
630 /// are regenerated on startup.
631 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
632 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
633 funding_txo: OutPoint,
634 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
636 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
637 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
639 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
640 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
641 channel_id: ChannelId,
646 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
647 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
648 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
649 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
650 /// event can be generated.
651 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
652 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
653 /// operation of another channel.
655 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
656 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
657 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
658 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
660 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
661 event: events::Event,
662 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
664 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
665 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
666 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
668 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
669 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
670 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
671 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
672 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
674 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
675 /// stored for later processing.
676 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
677 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
678 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
679 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
683 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
684 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
685 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
686 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
687 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
688 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
689 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
690 (4, blocking_action, required),
692 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
693 (0, event, upgradable_required),
694 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
695 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
696 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
697 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
698 // downgrades to prior versions.
699 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
703 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
704 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
705 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
706 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
707 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
710 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
711 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
712 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
713 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
717 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
718 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
719 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
720 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
721 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
722 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
724 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
725 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
726 channel_id: ChannelId,
727 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
732 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
733 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
734 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
735 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
736 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
741 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
742 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
746 /// State we hold per-peer.
747 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
748 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
750 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
751 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
752 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
754 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
755 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
756 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
757 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
758 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
759 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
760 latest_features: InitFeatures,
761 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
762 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
763 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
764 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
765 /// user but which have not yet completed.
767 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
768 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
769 /// for a missing channel.
770 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
771 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
772 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
774 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
775 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
776 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
777 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
779 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
780 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
781 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
782 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
783 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
784 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
785 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
786 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
787 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
788 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
789 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
790 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
791 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
792 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
793 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
797 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
798 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
799 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
800 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
801 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
802 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
805 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
806 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
807 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
810 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
811 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
812 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
815 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
816 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
817 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
818 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
822 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
823 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
824 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
825 /// The original OpenChannel message.
826 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
827 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
828 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
831 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
832 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
833 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
835 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
836 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
838 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
841 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
842 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
843 struct PendingInboundPayment {
844 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
845 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
846 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
847 /// this payment being removed.
849 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
850 user_payment_id: u64,
851 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
852 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
853 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
856 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
857 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
858 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
859 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
860 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
861 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
862 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
863 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
865 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
866 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
867 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
875 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
877 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
878 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
879 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
884 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
885 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
886 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
887 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
888 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
889 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
890 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
891 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
892 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
894 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
895 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
896 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
905 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
907 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
908 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
909 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
914 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
916 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
918 pub trait AChannelManager {
919 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
920 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
921 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
922 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
923 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
924 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
925 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
926 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
927 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
928 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
929 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
930 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
931 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
932 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
933 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
934 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
935 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
936 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
937 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
938 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
939 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
940 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
941 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
942 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
943 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
944 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
945 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
946 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
947 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
948 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
949 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
950 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
951 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
952 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
953 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
954 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
957 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
958 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
960 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
961 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
962 ES::Target: EntropySource,
963 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
964 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
965 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
969 type Watch = M::Target;
971 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
973 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
975 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
977 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
978 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
980 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
982 type Router = R::Target;
984 type Logger = L::Target;
986 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
989 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
990 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
992 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
993 /// to individual Channels.
995 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
996 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
997 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
998 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1000 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1001 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1002 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1003 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1004 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1005 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1006 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1007 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1008 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1010 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1011 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1012 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1014 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1015 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1016 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1017 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1018 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1020 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1021 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1022 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1023 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1025 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1026 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1027 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1029 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1030 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1031 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1032 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1033 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1035 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1036 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1037 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1038 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1039 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1040 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1041 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1042 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1045 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1046 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1047 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1048 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1049 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1053 // `pending_offers_messages`
1055 // `total_consistency_lock`
1057 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1059 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1061 // |__`per_peer_state`
1063 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1065 // |__`claimable_payments`
1067 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1073 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1075 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1079 // |__`pending_events`
1081 // |__`pending_background_events`
1083 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1085 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1086 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1087 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1088 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1089 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1094 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1095 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1096 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1102 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1104 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1106 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1107 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1109 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1110 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1111 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1112 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1114 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1115 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1117 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1118 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1119 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1120 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1121 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1122 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1123 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1124 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1126 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1128 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1129 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1131 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1133 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1134 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1135 /// and via the classic SCID.
1137 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1138 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1140 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1142 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1144 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1145 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1146 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1148 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1149 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1151 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1152 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1154 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1155 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1157 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1158 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1159 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1160 /// active channel list on load.
1162 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1163 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1165 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1167 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1168 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1169 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1171 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1172 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1173 /// the handling of the events.
1175 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1176 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1179 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1180 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1181 /// would break backwards compatability.
1182 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1183 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1184 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1186 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1187 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1189 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1191 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1192 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1193 /// confirmation depth.
1195 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1196 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1197 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1199 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1201 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1203 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1205 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1207 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1209 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1210 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1211 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1213 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1214 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1216 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1217 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1218 /// keeping additional state.
1219 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1221 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1222 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1223 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1224 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1226 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1227 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1229 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1230 /// are currently open with that peer.
1232 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1233 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1236 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1238 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1239 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1241 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1242 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1244 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1245 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1246 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1247 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1248 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1250 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1251 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1255 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1256 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1257 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1259 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1260 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1262 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1263 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1264 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1265 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1266 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1268 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1270 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1272 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1273 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1274 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1275 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1276 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1277 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1278 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1279 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1280 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1281 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1282 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1284 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1285 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1286 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1288 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1290 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1291 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1293 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1297 signer_provider: SP,
1302 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1304 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1305 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1306 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1308 pub struct ChainParameters {
1309 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1310 pub network: Network,
1312 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1314 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1315 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1318 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1322 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1323 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1326 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1327 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1328 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1329 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1330 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1331 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1333 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1334 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1335 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1336 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1337 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1338 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1340 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1341 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1344 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1345 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1346 /// events to handle.
1348 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1349 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1351 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1352 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1355 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1356 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1357 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1358 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1360 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1361 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1362 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1363 should_persist: move || {
1364 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1365 // processing and return that.
1366 let notify = persist_check();
1367 match (notify, force_notify) {
1368 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1369 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1370 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1371 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1372 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1375 _read_guard: read_guard,
1379 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1380 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1381 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1382 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1383 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1384 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1386 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1387 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1388 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1389 should_persist: persist_check,
1390 _read_guard: read_guard,
1395 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1396 fn drop(&mut self) {
1397 match (self.should_persist)() {
1398 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1399 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1400 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1402 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1403 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1404 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1409 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1410 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1412 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1414 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1415 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1416 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1417 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1418 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1420 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1421 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1423 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1425 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1426 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1427 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1428 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1429 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1430 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1431 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1432 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1433 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1434 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1435 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1436 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1437 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1439 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1440 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1442 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1443 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1444 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1445 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1447 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1448 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1449 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1450 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1451 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1452 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1455 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1457 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1458 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1461 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1463 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1464 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1466 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1467 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1468 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1470 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1471 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1472 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1474 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1475 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1476 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1477 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1479 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1480 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1481 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1483 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1484 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1485 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1487 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1488 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1489 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1490 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1491 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1492 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1493 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1494 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1495 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1496 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1497 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1500 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1501 /// to better separate parameters.
1502 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1503 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1504 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1505 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1506 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1507 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1508 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1509 pub features: InitFeatures,
1510 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1511 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1512 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1514 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1516 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1517 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1518 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1519 /// payments to us through this channel.
1520 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1521 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1522 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1523 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1524 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1525 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1526 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1529 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1530 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1531 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1532 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1533 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1534 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1535 /// lifetime of the channel.
1536 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1537 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1538 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1539 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1540 /// our counterparty already.
1542 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1543 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1544 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1545 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1547 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1548 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1549 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1550 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1552 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1553 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1555 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1556 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1558 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1559 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1560 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1561 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1562 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1563 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1564 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1565 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1566 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1569 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1571 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1572 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1573 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1574 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1575 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1576 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1577 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1579 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1580 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1582 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1583 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1584 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1585 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1586 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1587 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1588 /// this value on chain.
1590 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1592 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1594 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1595 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1596 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1597 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1598 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1599 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1600 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1602 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1603 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1604 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1605 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1606 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1607 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1609 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1610 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1611 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1612 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1613 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1615 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1616 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1617 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1618 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1620 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1621 pub balance_msat: u64,
1622 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1623 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1624 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1625 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1627 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1629 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1630 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1631 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1632 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1633 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1634 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1635 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1636 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1638 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1639 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1640 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1641 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1642 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1643 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1644 /// route which is valid.
1645 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1646 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1647 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1648 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1649 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1650 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1652 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1653 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1654 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1655 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1656 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1657 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1658 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1659 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1660 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1662 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1664 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1665 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1666 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1667 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1668 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1670 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1671 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1672 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1673 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1674 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1675 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1676 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1678 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1679 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1680 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1681 pub is_outbound: bool,
1682 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1683 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1684 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1685 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1686 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1688 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1689 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1690 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1691 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1692 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1693 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1694 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1696 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1697 pub is_usable: bool,
1698 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1699 pub is_public: bool,
1700 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1701 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1702 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1703 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1704 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1705 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1707 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1708 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1711 impl ChannelDetails {
1712 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1713 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1714 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1716 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1717 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1718 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1719 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1722 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1723 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1724 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1726 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1727 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1728 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1729 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1732 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1733 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1734 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1737 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1738 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1740 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1741 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1742 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1744 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1745 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1746 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1747 features: latest_features,
1748 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1749 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1750 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1751 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1752 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1753 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1754 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1755 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1756 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1757 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1759 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1760 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1761 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1762 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1763 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1764 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1765 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1766 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1767 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1768 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1769 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1770 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1771 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1772 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1773 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1774 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1775 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1776 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1777 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1778 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1779 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1780 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1781 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1782 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1783 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1784 config: Some(context.config()),
1785 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1790 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1791 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1792 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1793 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1794 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1795 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1796 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1797 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1798 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1800 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1802 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1803 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1805 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1806 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1807 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1808 /// to drop the channel.
1812 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1813 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1814 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1815 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1816 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1818 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1819 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1820 payment_id: PaymentId,
1822 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1824 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1825 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1826 payment_id: PaymentId,
1827 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1829 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1830 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1831 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1834 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1835 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1836 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1838 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1839 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1840 payment_id: PaymentId,
1841 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1842 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1843 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1845 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1846 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1847 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1849 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1850 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1851 payment_id: PaymentId,
1852 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1853 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1857 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1859 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1861 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1862 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1863 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1864 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1866 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1867 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1868 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1871 macro_rules! handle_error {
1872 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1873 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1874 // entering the macro.
1875 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1876 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1880 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1881 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1883 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1884 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1885 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1886 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1890 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1891 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1892 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1893 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1894 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1895 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1900 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1901 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1903 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1904 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1905 action: err.action.clone()
1909 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1910 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1911 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1912 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1913 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1917 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1922 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1925 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1926 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1927 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1933 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1934 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1935 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1936 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1937 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1938 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1940 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1941 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1942 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1943 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1944 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1946 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1947 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1949 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1953 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1954 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1955 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1957 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1958 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1960 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1961 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1963 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1964 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1965 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1966 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1967 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1968 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1970 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1971 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1975 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1976 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1978 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1979 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1981 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1982 match $channel_phase {
1983 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1984 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1986 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1987 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1989 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1990 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1996 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1997 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2001 let key = *$entry.key();
2002 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2004 $entry.remove_entry();
2012 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2013 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2017 let key = *$entry.key();
2018 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2020 $entry.remove_entry();
2028 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2029 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2031 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2032 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2038 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2039 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2040 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2041 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2042 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2044 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2045 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2046 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2047 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2048 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2049 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2050 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2051 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2052 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2053 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2058 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2059 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2060 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2061 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2062 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2063 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2064 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2065 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2066 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2068 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2073 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2074 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2075 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2076 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2077 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2078 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2079 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2080 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2081 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2083 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2088 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2089 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2090 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2091 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2092 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2093 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2094 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2095 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2096 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2097 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2098 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2100 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2101 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2102 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2108 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2109 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2111 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2112 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2113 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2114 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2115 updates.announcement_sigs);
2116 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2117 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2120 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2121 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2122 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2123 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2125 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2126 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2127 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2128 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2129 let mut batch_completed = false;
2130 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2131 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2132 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2133 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2135 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2136 channel_state.2 = true;
2138 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2140 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2142 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2145 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2146 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2147 if batch_completed {
2148 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2149 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2150 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2151 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2152 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2153 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2154 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2155 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2156 chan.set_batch_ready();
2157 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2158 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2162 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2163 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2164 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2169 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2171 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2172 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2174 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2175 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2176 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2177 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2182 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2183 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2184 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2186 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2187 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2188 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2189 panic!("{}", err_str);
2191 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2192 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2193 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2196 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2202 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2203 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2204 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2206 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2207 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2208 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2209 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2210 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2211 // filter for uniqueness here.
2212 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2213 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2214 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2215 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2217 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2218 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2220 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2221 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2222 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2228 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2229 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2230 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2231 while !processed_all_events {
2232 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2239 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2240 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2241 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2243 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2244 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2245 result = $self.process_background_events();
2247 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2248 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2249 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2250 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2254 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2255 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2256 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2257 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2260 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2262 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2263 $event_to_handle = event;
2265 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2266 post_event_actions.push(action);
2271 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2272 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2273 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2274 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2275 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2276 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2279 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2280 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2281 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2282 processed_all_events = false;
2286 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2287 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2288 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2290 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2291 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2292 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2298 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2300 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2301 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2302 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2303 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2304 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2305 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2309 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2311 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2313 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2314 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2316 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2318 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2319 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2320 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2323 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2324 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2325 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2327 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2328 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2329 current_timestamp: u32,
2331 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2332 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2333 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2334 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2336 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2337 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2338 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2343 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2345 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2346 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2347 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2348 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2349 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2350 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2351 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2352 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2354 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2357 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2358 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2360 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2362 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2364 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2366 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2367 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2368 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2369 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2370 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2371 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2372 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2373 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2375 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2385 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2386 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2387 &self.default_configuration
2390 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2391 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2392 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2395 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2396 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2398 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2400 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2404 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2409 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2411 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2412 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2413 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2414 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2415 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2417 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2418 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2420 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2421 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2422 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2424 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2425 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2426 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2428 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2429 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2431 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2432 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2433 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2434 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2435 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2436 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2438 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2439 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2440 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2441 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2442 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2443 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2447 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2448 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2450 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2452 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2453 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2455 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2457 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2458 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2459 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2464 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2465 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2466 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2467 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2468 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2469 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2473 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2478 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2480 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2481 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2482 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2484 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2486 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2492 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2493 node_id: their_network_key,
2496 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2499 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2500 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2501 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2502 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2503 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2504 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2505 // the same channel.
2506 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2508 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2509 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2510 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2511 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2512 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2513 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2514 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2515 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2516 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2520 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2521 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2522 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2530 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2531 /// more information.
2532 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2533 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2534 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2535 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2536 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2537 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2538 // the same channel.
2539 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2541 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2543 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2544 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2545 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2546 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2547 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2548 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2556 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2557 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2559 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2560 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2562 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2563 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2564 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2565 // really wanted anyway.
2566 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2569 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2570 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2572 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2574 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2577 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2578 let context_to_details = |context| {
2579 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2581 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2583 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2584 .map(context_to_details)
2590 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2591 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2593 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2594 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2595 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2597 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2598 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2599 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2600 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2601 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2602 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2604 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2605 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2606 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2608 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2609 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2610 payment_id: *payment_id,
2611 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2612 total_msat: *total_msat,
2615 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2616 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2618 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2619 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2621 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2626 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2627 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2628 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2629 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2630 Some(transaction) => {
2631 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2632 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2637 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2638 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2639 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2640 reason: closure_reason,
2641 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2642 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2646 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2649 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2650 let shutdown_result;
2652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2654 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2655 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2657 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2658 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2660 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2662 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2663 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2664 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2665 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2666 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2667 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2668 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2669 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2671 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2672 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2673 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2674 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2675 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2679 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2680 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2682 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2683 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2684 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2685 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2689 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2690 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2691 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2692 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2696 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2703 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2704 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2706 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2707 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2708 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2709 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2714 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2715 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2716 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2717 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2720 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2721 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2727 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2728 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2729 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2731 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2732 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2734 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2735 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2736 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2737 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2739 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2741 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2742 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2743 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2746 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2747 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2748 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2749 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2750 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2751 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2754 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2755 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2756 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2758 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2759 /// the channel being closed or not:
2760 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2761 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2762 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2763 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2764 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2765 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2766 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2768 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2769 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2770 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2771 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2773 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2775 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2776 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2777 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2780 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2781 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2782 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2783 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2784 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2787 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2788 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2789 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2790 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2791 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2794 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2795 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2796 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2797 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2798 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2801 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2802 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2803 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2804 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2805 // ignore the result here.
2806 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2808 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2809 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2810 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2811 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2812 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2813 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2814 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2815 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2816 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2817 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2818 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2819 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2820 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2823 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2826 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2827 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2830 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2831 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2835 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2836 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2837 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2838 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2840 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2841 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2842 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2843 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2844 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2845 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2847 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2849 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2850 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2851 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2852 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2853 mem::drop(peer_state);
2854 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2856 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2857 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2858 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2860 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2861 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2862 // Unfunded channel has no update
2863 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2866 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2867 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2868 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2869 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2871 (None, *peer_node_id)
2873 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2876 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2877 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2878 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2880 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2881 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2882 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2883 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2884 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2890 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2893 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2894 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2895 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2896 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2898 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2899 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2900 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2901 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2902 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2903 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2904 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2915 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2916 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2917 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2919 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2920 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2921 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2924 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2925 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2926 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2928 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2929 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2930 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2931 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2932 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2935 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2936 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2937 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2938 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2939 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2943 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2944 /// local transaction(s).
2945 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2946 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2947 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2951 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2952 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2954 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
2956 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
2957 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
2960 macro_rules! return_err {
2961 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2963 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2964 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2965 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2966 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2967 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2968 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2974 let NextPacketDetails {
2975 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
2976 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
2977 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
2978 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
2979 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
2982 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
2983 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
2984 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2985 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
2986 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2987 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2988 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2989 // phantom or an intercept.
2990 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2991 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
2992 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
2996 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2999 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3001 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3002 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3003 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3004 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3005 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3009 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3010 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3013 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3014 // have no consistency guarantees.
3015 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3019 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3020 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3021 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3022 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3023 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3025 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3026 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3027 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3028 // we don't have the channel here.
3029 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3031 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3033 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3034 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3035 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3036 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3037 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3038 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3039 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3040 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3041 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3042 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3043 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3045 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3048 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3049 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3051 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3052 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3059 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3061 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3062 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3064 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3065 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3066 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3067 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3068 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3070 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3071 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3077 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3078 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3079 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3080 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3082 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3083 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3085 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3086 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3087 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3089 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3090 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3091 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3092 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3093 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3094 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3095 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3099 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3101 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3104 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3105 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3106 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3107 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3108 macro_rules! return_err {
3109 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3111 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3112 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3113 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3114 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3115 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3116 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3122 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3124 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3125 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3126 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3127 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3130 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3131 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3132 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3133 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3134 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3136 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3139 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3140 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3141 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3142 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3143 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3149 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3150 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3151 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3153 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3154 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3155 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3157 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3158 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3159 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3160 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3161 return Err(LightningError {
3162 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3163 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3166 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3167 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3169 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3170 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3173 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3174 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3175 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3176 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3178 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3179 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3180 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3182 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3183 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3184 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3186 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3187 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3191 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3194 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3196 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3198 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3199 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3200 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3201 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3202 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3205 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3206 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3208 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3209 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3210 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3211 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3212 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3213 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3214 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3215 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3217 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3218 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3219 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3221 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3223 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3230 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3231 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3232 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3233 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3238 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3239 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3240 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3243 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3244 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3246 log_trace!(self.logger,
3247 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3248 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3249 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3250 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3252 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3253 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3254 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3257 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3258 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3259 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3260 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3263 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3264 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3265 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3266 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3267 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3268 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3269 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3270 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3271 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3272 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3274 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3275 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3276 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3278 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3279 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3281 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3282 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3283 Some(monitor_update) => {
3284 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3286 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3287 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3288 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3289 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3290 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3291 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3292 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3300 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3303 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3304 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3305 // `channel_by_id` map.
3306 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3307 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3312 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3313 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3315 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3320 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3322 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3323 /// fields for more info.
3325 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3326 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3328 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3330 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3331 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3332 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3333 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3334 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3336 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3337 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3338 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3339 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3340 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3342 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3343 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3344 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3345 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3347 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3349 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3350 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3351 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3353 /// In general, a path may raise:
3354 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3355 /// node public key) is specified.
3356 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3357 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3358 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3359 /// relevant updates.
3361 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3362 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3363 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3365 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3366 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3367 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3368 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3369 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3370 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3371 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3372 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3374 self.pending_outbound_payments
3375 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3376 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3377 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3380 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3381 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3382 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3383 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3385 self.pending_outbound_payments
3386 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3387 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3388 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3389 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3393 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3394 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3395 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3396 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3397 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3398 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3402 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3403 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3404 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3408 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3409 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3412 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3413 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3414 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3415 self.pending_outbound_payments
3416 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3417 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3418 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3419 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3420 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3424 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3425 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3426 /// retries are exhausted.
3428 /// # Event Generation
3430 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3431 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3433 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3434 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3435 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3437 /// # Requested Invoices
3439 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3440 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3441 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3442 /// once the invoice has been received.
3444 /// # Restart Behavior
3446 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3447 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3448 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3450 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3451 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3452 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3453 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3456 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3457 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3458 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3459 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3460 /// never reach the recipient.
3462 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3463 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3465 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3466 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3468 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3469 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3470 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3472 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3473 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3474 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3477 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3478 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3480 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3483 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3484 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3485 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3487 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3488 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3489 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3490 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3493 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3494 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3495 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3496 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3497 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3499 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3500 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3501 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3504 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3507 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3508 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3511 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3512 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3514 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3515 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3516 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3517 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3518 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3519 let payment_params =
3520 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3522 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3524 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3527 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3528 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3530 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3531 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3532 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3533 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3535 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3536 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3537 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3538 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3539 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3540 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3541 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3542 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3543 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3544 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3546 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3547 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3548 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3549 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3553 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3555 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3556 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3559 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3561 let mut res = Vec::new();
3563 for mut path in route.paths {
3564 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3565 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3566 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3567 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3568 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3571 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3574 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3575 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3577 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3579 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3580 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3585 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3588 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3593 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3594 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3595 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3597 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3598 let used_liquidity =
3599 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3601 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3602 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3604 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3607 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3612 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3613 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3614 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3621 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3622 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3623 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3624 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3625 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3626 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3627 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3628 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3629 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3633 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3634 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3635 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3637 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3638 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3639 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3640 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3641 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3642 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3643 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3644 } else { unreachable!(); });
3646 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3647 Err((chan, err)) => {
3648 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3649 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3651 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3652 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3653 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3659 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3660 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3662 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3663 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3666 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3667 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3668 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3672 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3673 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3674 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3678 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3679 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3680 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3683 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3684 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3685 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3687 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3694 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3695 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3696 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3700 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3702 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3703 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3705 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3706 /// across the p2p network.
3708 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3709 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3711 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3712 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3713 /// keys per-channel).
3715 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3716 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3717 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3719 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3720 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3721 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3723 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3724 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3725 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3726 /// for more details.
3728 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3729 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3730 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3731 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3734 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3736 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3737 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3739 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3740 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3741 /// signature for each channel.
3743 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3744 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3745 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3746 let mut result = Ok(());
3748 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3749 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3750 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3751 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3752 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3757 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3758 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3759 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3763 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3764 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3765 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3766 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3767 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3768 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3769 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3770 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3772 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3773 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3778 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3779 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3780 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3781 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3785 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3786 match states.entry(txid) {
3787 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3788 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3789 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3793 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3796 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3797 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3798 temporary_channel_id,
3799 counterparty_node_id,
3800 funding_transaction.clone(),
3803 let mut output_index = None;
3804 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3805 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3806 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3807 if output_index.is_some() {
3808 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3809 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3812 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3815 if output_index.is_none() {
3816 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3817 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3820 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3821 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3822 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3828 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3829 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3830 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3831 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3832 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3833 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3834 .into_iter().flatten()
3835 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3837 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3838 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3840 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3842 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3843 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3844 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3845 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3846 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3848 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3849 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3850 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3854 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3855 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3861 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3863 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3864 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3865 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3866 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3868 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3869 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3871 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3872 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3874 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3876 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3877 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3878 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3879 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3880 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3881 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3882 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3883 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3884 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3885 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3886 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3887 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3888 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3892 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3893 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3894 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3895 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3898 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3899 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3900 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3901 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3905 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3906 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3907 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3908 config.apply(config_update);
3909 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3912 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3913 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3914 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3915 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3916 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3917 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3924 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3925 debug_assert!(false);
3926 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3928 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3929 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3936 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3938 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3939 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3940 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3941 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3943 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3944 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3946 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3947 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3949 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3951 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3952 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3953 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3954 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3955 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3956 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3957 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3958 pub fn update_channel_config(
3959 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3960 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3961 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3964 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3965 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3967 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3968 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3970 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3971 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3972 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3973 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3974 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3976 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3977 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3978 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3981 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3984 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3985 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3986 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3987 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3988 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3989 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3990 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3992 let next_hop_scid = {
3993 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3994 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3995 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3996 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3997 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3998 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3999 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4000 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4002 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4005 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4007 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4008 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4009 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4012 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4013 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4014 log_error!(self.logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4015 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4022 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4023 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4024 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4027 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4028 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4029 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4030 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4033 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4035 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4036 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4037 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4038 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4039 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4042 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4043 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4044 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4045 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4046 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4048 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4052 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4053 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4055 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4058 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4059 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4062 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4063 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4064 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4067 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4068 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4069 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4070 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4071 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4072 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4073 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4074 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4077 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4078 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4079 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4080 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4085 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4087 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4088 /// Will likely generate further events.
4089 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4090 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4092 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4093 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4094 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4096 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4097 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4099 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4100 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4101 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4103 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4104 match forward_info {
4105 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4106 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4107 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4108 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4109 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4112 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4113 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4114 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4116 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4117 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4118 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4119 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4120 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4122 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4125 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4126 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4128 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4131 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4132 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4138 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4139 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4141 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4145 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4146 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4148 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4152 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4153 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4154 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4155 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4156 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4157 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4158 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4161 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4162 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4163 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4164 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4165 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4167 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4169 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4170 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4174 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4175 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4176 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4177 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4178 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4179 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4181 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4182 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4188 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4191 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4194 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4195 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4196 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4197 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4198 // problem, not ours.
4204 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4205 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4206 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4208 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4213 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4214 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4215 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4220 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4221 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4222 match forward_info {
4223 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4224 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4225 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4226 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4227 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4230 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4231 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4232 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4233 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4234 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4235 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4236 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4237 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4238 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4240 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4241 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4242 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4245 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4246 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4248 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4250 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4251 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4252 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4253 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4258 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4259 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4261 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4263 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4264 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4266 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4269 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4271 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4272 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4273 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4280 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4284 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4285 match forward_info {
4286 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4287 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4288 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4289 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4290 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4293 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4294 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4295 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4296 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4297 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4298 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4299 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4301 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4302 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4303 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4307 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4308 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4311 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4314 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4315 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4316 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4317 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4318 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4319 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4320 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4321 phantom_shared_secret,
4323 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4324 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4325 // if routing nodes overpay
4326 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4327 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4329 total_value_received: None,
4330 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4333 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4336 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4338 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4339 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4340 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4341 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4342 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4343 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4345 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4346 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4347 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4348 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4349 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4350 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4351 phantom_shared_secret,
4353 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4354 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4356 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4359 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4360 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4361 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4362 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4363 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4366 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4367 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4368 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4369 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4370 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4371 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4373 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4374 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4375 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4377 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4378 .entry(payment_hash)
4379 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4380 .or_insert_with(|| {
4381 committed_to_claimable = true;
4383 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4386 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4387 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4388 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4389 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4391 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4392 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4393 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4395 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4396 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4397 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4400 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4402 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4403 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4404 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4405 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4406 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4407 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4408 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4409 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4410 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4411 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4413 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4415 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4416 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4417 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4418 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4419 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4420 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4422 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4423 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4424 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4425 committed_to_claimable = true;
4427 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4428 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4429 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4430 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4431 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4432 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4433 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4434 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4435 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4436 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4440 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4441 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4442 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4443 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4444 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4446 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4448 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4449 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4451 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4452 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4453 committed_to_claimable = true;
4456 payment_claimable_generated
4460 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4461 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4462 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4463 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4464 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4465 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4466 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4467 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4469 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4470 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4471 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4472 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4473 Ok(result) => result,
4475 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4476 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4479 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4480 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4481 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4482 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4483 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4484 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4487 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4488 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4489 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4491 check_total_value!(purpose);
4493 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4494 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4495 check_total_value!(purpose);
4499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4500 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4501 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4502 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4504 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4505 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4506 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4507 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4508 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4509 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4510 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4511 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4513 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4514 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4515 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4517 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4518 if payment_claimable_generated {
4519 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4525 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4526 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4534 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4535 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4536 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4537 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4539 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4540 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4542 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4544 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4545 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4546 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4548 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4550 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4551 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4552 events.append(&mut new_events);
4555 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4557 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4558 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4559 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4561 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4563 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4564 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4565 if background_events.is_empty() {
4566 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4569 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4571 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4572 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4573 // monitor updating completing.
4574 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4576 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4577 let mut updated_chan = false;
4579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4580 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4583 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4584 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4585 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4586 updated_chan = true;
4587 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4588 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4590 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4598 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4599 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4602 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4603 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4604 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4605 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4606 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4607 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4608 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4610 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4611 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4612 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4613 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4614 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4620 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4623 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4624 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4625 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4626 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4627 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4630 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4631 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4632 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4633 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4634 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4636 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4638 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4640 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4642 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4643 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4646 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4648 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4649 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4653 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4654 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4655 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4656 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4657 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4658 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4659 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4661 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4662 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4665 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4668 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4669 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4671 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4676 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4677 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4685 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4687 /// This currently includes:
4688 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4689 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4690 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4692 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4693 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4694 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4695 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4696 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4697 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4698 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4699 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4701 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4702 /// estimate fetches.
4704 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4705 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4706 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4707 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4708 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4710 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4711 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4713 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4714 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4715 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4716 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4718 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4719 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4720 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4721 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4722 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4723 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4725 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4726 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4727 log_error!(self.logger,
4728 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4729 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4730 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4731 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4732 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4733 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4734 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4735 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4736 channel_id: *chan_id,
4737 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4748 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4749 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4750 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4751 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4752 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4753 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4754 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4756 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4757 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4762 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4763 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4765 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4766 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4767 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4768 if needs_close { return false; }
4771 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4772 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4773 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4774 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4775 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4776 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4777 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4778 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4780 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4781 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4782 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4783 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4787 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4789 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4792 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4794 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4795 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4796 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4797 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4801 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4803 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4809 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4811 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4812 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4813 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4814 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4815 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4816 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4817 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4818 channel_id: *chan_id,
4819 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4827 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4828 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4829 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4831 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4832 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4833 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4838 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4839 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4840 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4841 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4842 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4843 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4844 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4845 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4851 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4853 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4854 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4859 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4860 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4861 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4862 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4863 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4864 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4865 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4866 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4867 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4868 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4869 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4871 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4872 // have no channels to the peer.
4873 let remove_entry = {
4874 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4875 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4878 entry.remove_entry();
4881 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4886 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4887 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4888 // This should be unreachable
4889 debug_assert!(false);
4892 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4893 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4894 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4895 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4896 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4897 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4898 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4901 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4902 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4903 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4905 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4906 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4913 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4914 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4915 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4916 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4917 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4920 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4921 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4924 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
4925 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
4928 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
4929 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
4930 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
4931 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
4932 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
4933 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
4934 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
4937 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
4938 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
4941 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4942 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4943 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4944 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4945 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4952 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4953 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4954 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4956 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4957 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4958 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4959 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4961 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4962 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4963 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4964 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4965 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4966 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4969 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4970 /// reason for the failure.
4972 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4973 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4976 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4977 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4978 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4979 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4980 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4981 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4982 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4987 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4988 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4989 match failure_code {
4990 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4991 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4992 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4993 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4994 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4995 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4997 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4998 let fail_data = match data {
4999 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5002 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5007 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5008 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5010 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5012 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5013 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5014 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5015 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5016 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5017 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5018 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5020 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5022 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5023 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5025 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5030 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5031 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5032 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5033 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5034 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5035 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5036 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5037 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5038 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5039 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5041 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5042 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5043 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5044 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5046 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5047 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5048 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5049 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5050 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5054 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5055 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5056 // be surfaced to the user.
5057 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5058 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5059 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5061 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5063 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5066 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5067 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5068 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5069 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5071 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5072 debug_assert!(false);
5073 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5078 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5081 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5082 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5083 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5088 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5089 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5090 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5091 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5092 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5093 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5094 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5095 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5096 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5097 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5100 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5101 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5102 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5105 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5106 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5107 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5109 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5110 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5111 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5112 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5113 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5115 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5117 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5119 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5120 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5121 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5122 push_forward_ev = true;
5124 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5125 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5126 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5129 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5132 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5133 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5134 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5135 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5136 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5137 failed_next_destination: destination,
5143 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5144 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5146 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5147 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5148 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5149 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5151 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5152 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5153 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5154 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5156 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5157 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5158 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5160 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5161 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5162 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5163 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5164 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5165 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5166 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5167 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5168 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5171 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5172 /// even type numbers.
5176 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5177 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5179 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5180 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5181 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5184 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5185 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5190 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5191 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5192 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5193 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5194 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5195 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5196 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5197 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5202 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5203 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5204 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5205 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5206 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5208 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5209 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5210 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5214 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5215 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5216 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5217 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5218 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5219 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5220 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5221 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5222 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5223 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5224 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5233 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5235 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5236 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5237 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5238 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5239 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5240 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5241 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5242 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5243 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5244 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5245 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5246 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5247 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5248 debug_assert!(false);
5252 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5254 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5255 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5256 debug_assert!(false);
5260 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5261 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5263 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5264 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5265 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5266 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5269 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5270 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5271 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5272 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5276 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5277 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5278 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5279 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5280 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5281 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5284 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5285 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5286 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5287 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5288 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5293 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5294 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5295 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5296 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5297 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5298 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5299 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5301 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5304 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5305 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5306 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5307 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5311 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5312 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5313 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5314 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5316 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5317 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5318 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5319 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5321 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5322 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5323 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5324 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5327 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5328 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5329 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5330 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5334 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5335 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5336 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5339 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5340 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5342 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5343 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5344 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5345 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5348 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5349 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5350 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5352 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5355 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5356 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5358 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5359 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5360 // monitor update as a background event.
5361 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5362 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5363 counterparty_node_id,
5364 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5365 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5369 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5370 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5375 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5377 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5379 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5380 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5381 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5382 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5383 blocking_action: blocker,
5385 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5387 debug_assert!(false,
5388 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5391 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5392 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5393 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5394 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5395 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5397 let mut found_blocker = false;
5398 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5399 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5400 // which case we need to only remove the one
5401 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5402 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5403 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5404 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5406 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5409 debug_assert!(false);
5418 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5419 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5420 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5426 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5427 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5428 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5429 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5430 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5431 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5432 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5433 // again on restart.
5434 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5435 payment_preimage, update_res);
5438 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5439 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5441 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5442 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5443 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5444 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5445 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5446 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5447 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5448 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5449 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5450 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5453 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5454 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5455 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5456 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5457 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5458 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5462 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5463 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5466 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5467 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5468 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5471 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5472 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5473 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5474 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5475 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5477 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5478 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5479 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5481 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5482 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5485 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5486 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5487 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5488 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5489 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5490 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5491 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5492 let chan_to_release =
5493 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5494 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5496 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5497 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5498 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5499 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5504 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5505 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5506 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5507 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5508 // in the background.
5509 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5510 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5511 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5512 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5514 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5515 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5516 funding_txo, update, ..
5518 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5519 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5520 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5521 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5523 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5529 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5530 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5531 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5533 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5534 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5536 monitor_update.updates[0],
5537 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5542 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5543 // immediately once we get going.
5544 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5547 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5549 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5552 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5553 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5554 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5555 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5556 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5557 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5561 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5562 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5563 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5566 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5567 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5569 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5570 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5571 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5572 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5574 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5578 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5579 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5580 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5586 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5587 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5588 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5591 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5592 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5593 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5594 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5596 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5598 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5599 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5600 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5602 payment_purpose: purpose,
5605 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5607 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5611 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5613 sender_intended_total_msat,
5617 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5618 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5620 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5621 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5622 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5625 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5626 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5628 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5629 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5630 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5631 Some(blocking_action),
5638 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5639 /// update completion.
5640 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5641 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5642 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5643 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5644 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5645 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5646 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5647 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5648 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5649 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5650 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5651 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5652 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5654 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5656 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5657 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5658 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5659 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5662 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5663 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5665 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5667 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5672 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5673 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5674 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5675 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5680 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5681 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5682 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5683 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5684 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5689 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5693 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5699 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5700 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5701 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5705 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5706 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5707 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5713 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5714 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5716 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5717 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5719 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5720 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5721 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5722 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5723 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5729 let mut peer_state_lock;
5730 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5731 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5732 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5733 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5735 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5738 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5739 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5740 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5741 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5742 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5745 let remaining_in_flight =
5746 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5747 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5750 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5751 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5752 remaining_in_flight);
5753 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5756 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5759 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5761 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5762 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5765 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5766 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5767 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5769 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5770 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5771 /// used to accept such channels.
5773 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5774 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5775 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5776 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5779 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5780 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5782 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5783 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5784 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5786 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5787 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5789 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5790 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5792 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5793 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5795 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5796 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5797 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5798 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5801 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5802 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5804 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5805 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5806 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5807 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5808 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5809 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5810 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5811 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5813 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5814 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5815 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5817 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5818 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5819 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5820 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5821 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5822 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5823 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5825 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5829 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5830 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5831 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5832 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5833 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5834 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5835 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5839 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5841 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5842 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5843 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5844 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5845 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5846 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5847 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5848 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5851 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5852 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5856 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5857 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5858 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5860 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5861 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5862 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5865 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
5870 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5871 /// or 0-conf channels.
5873 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5874 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5875 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5876 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5877 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5878 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5880 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5881 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5882 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5883 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5884 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5885 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5886 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5890 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5893 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5894 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5896 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5897 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
5899 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5900 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5901 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5902 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5903 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5905 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5908 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5909 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5910 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
5914 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
5919 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5922 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5923 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
5924 // likely to be lost on restart!
5925 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
5926 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5929 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5930 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5933 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5934 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5935 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5936 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5937 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5939 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5942 debug_assert!(false);
5943 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5948 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5949 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5950 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5951 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5952 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5953 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5955 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5956 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5957 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5960 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5961 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5963 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5964 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5967 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5968 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5970 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5973 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5974 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5975 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5976 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5977 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5978 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5979 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5980 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5981 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5983 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5984 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5985 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5990 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5991 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5992 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5993 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5994 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5995 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5996 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5999 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6004 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6005 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6006 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6008 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6009 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6012 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6013 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6016 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6017 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6019 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6023 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6024 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6025 // likely to be lost on restart!
6026 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6027 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6028 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6030 debug_assert!(false);
6031 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6033 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6034 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6035 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6037 match phase.get_mut() {
6038 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6039 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6040 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6043 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6047 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6050 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6051 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6052 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6053 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6054 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6056 user_channel_id: user_id,
6061 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6062 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6064 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6065 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6067 debug_assert!(false);
6068 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6071 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6072 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6073 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6074 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6075 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6076 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6078 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6079 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6080 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6081 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6082 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6083 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6084 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6085 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6086 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6090 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6093 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6096 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6097 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6098 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6099 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6100 chan.context.channel_id()
6103 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6104 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6105 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6107 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6108 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6109 chan.context.channel_id()))
6111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6112 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6113 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6114 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6115 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6117 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6118 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6119 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6120 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6121 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6122 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6123 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6128 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6129 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6130 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6132 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6136 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6137 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6138 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6139 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6141 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6142 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6151 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6152 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6153 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6154 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6156 debug_assert!(false);
6157 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6162 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6163 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6164 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6165 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6166 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6167 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6168 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6169 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6172 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6176 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6184 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6185 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6186 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6188 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6190 debug_assert!(false);
6191 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6195 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6197 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6198 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6199 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6200 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6201 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6202 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6203 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6204 msg: announcement_sigs,
6206 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6207 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6208 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6209 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6210 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6211 // announcement_signatures.
6212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6213 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6214 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6215 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6222 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6223 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6228 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6229 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6232 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6233 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6238 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6239 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6240 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6243 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6245 debug_assert!(false);
6246 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6248 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6249 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6250 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6251 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6253 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6254 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6255 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6257 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6260 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6261 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6262 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6263 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6265 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6266 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6267 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6268 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6269 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6270 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6274 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6275 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6276 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6277 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6281 let context = phase.context_mut();
6282 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6283 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6284 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6285 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6289 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6292 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6293 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6294 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6297 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6298 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6304 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6308 debug_assert!(false);
6309 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6311 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6312 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6313 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6314 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6316 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6317 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6318 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6319 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6320 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6321 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6326 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6327 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6328 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6329 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6330 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6331 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6332 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6334 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6335 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6338 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6341 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6342 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6343 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6345 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6346 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6347 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6348 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6349 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6353 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6355 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6356 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6357 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6362 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6363 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6364 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6365 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6367 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6368 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6369 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6370 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6372 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6373 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6375 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6376 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6377 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6379 debug_assert!(false);
6380 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6382 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6383 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6384 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6386 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6387 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6388 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6389 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6390 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6391 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6393 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6394 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6395 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6396 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6397 match pending_forward_info {
6398 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6399 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6400 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6401 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6403 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6404 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6405 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6406 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6407 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6410 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6412 _ => pending_forward_info
6415 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6417 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6418 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6426 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6428 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6429 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6430 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6432 debug_assert!(false);
6433 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6435 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6436 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6437 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6438 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6439 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6440 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6441 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6442 log_trace!(self.logger,
6443 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6445 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6446 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6447 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6449 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6450 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6451 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6452 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6453 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6454 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6455 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6458 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6459 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6465 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6469 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6470 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6471 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6472 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6473 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6475 debug_assert!(false);
6476 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6480 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6482 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6483 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6485 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6486 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6494 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6495 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6496 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6498 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6500 debug_assert!(false);
6501 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6503 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6504 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6505 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6507 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6508 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6509 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6511 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6512 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6514 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6515 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6519 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6523 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6524 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6525 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6527 debug_assert!(false);
6528 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6532 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6533 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6534 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6535 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6536 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6537 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6538 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6539 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6543 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6544 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6547 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6552 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6553 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6554 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6555 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6556 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6557 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6558 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6559 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6560 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6561 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6562 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6564 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6565 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6567 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6568 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6569 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6570 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6571 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6572 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6575 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6576 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6578 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6579 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6580 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6581 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6582 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6583 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6584 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6585 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6586 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6589 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6590 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6593 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6594 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6595 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6596 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6597 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6598 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6599 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6600 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6603 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6604 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6605 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6610 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6611 // payments are being processed.
6612 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6613 push_forward_event = true;
6615 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6616 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6623 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6624 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6627 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6628 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6629 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6631 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6635 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6636 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6637 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6638 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6639 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6641 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6642 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6643 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6644 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6645 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6646 // real by taking more time.
6647 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6648 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6649 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6654 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6655 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6656 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6657 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6658 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6659 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6660 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6662 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6663 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6664 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6665 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6666 channel_funding_outpoint,
6667 counterparty_node_id,
6672 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6673 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6674 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6676 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6677 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6678 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6679 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6681 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6682 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6683 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6689 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6690 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6692 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6694 debug_assert!(false);
6695 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6696 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6697 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6698 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6699 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6700 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6701 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6702 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6703 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6704 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6705 *counterparty_node_id)
6707 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6708 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6709 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6710 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6711 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6712 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6713 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6717 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6718 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6724 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6728 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6732 debug_assert!(false);
6733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6739 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6740 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6742 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6743 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6746 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6751 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6753 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6755 debug_assert!(false);
6756 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6758 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6759 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6760 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6761 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6762 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6763 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6764 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6767 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6768 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6769 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6770 msg, &self.default_configuration
6771 ), chan_phase_entry),
6772 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6773 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6774 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6777 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6778 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6786 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6787 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6788 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6789 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6791 // It's not a local channel
6792 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6796 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6797 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6798 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6802 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6803 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6804 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6805 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6806 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6807 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6808 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6809 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6810 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6812 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6814 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6815 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6816 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6817 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6819 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6820 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6821 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6824 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6828 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6829 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6832 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6834 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6837 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6839 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6842 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6844 debug_assert!(false);
6845 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6846 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6850 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6851 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6852 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6854 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6855 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6856 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6857 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6858 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6859 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6860 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6861 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6862 let mut channel_update = None;
6863 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6865 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6868 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6869 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6870 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6871 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6872 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6873 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6874 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6879 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6880 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6881 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6882 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6883 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6884 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6888 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6889 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6892 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6893 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
6894 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
6895 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
6896 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
6897 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
6898 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
6899 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
6900 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
6902 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
6903 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
6904 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
6905 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
6906 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
6907 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
6908 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
6909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6910 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6911 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6912 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6913 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
6914 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
6915 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
6916 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
6917 next_funding_txid: None,
6920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6921 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
6922 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6928 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
6929 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6930 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6931 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6934 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6935 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6940 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6941 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6942 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6944 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6945 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6946 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6947 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6948 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6949 match monitor_event {
6950 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6951 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
6953 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
6955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6956 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6957 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6958 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6961 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
6962 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6963 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6965 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6966 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6967 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6968 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6971 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6972 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6973 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6974 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6975 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6976 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6977 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6978 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6979 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6980 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6985 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
6986 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6987 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6988 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
6989 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
6997 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6998 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7004 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7005 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7008 has_pending_monitor_events
7011 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7012 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7013 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7015 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7017 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7020 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7021 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7022 /// update was applied.
7023 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7024 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7025 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7027 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7028 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7029 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7030 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7035 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7036 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7037 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7038 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7040 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7041 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7042 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7043 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7044 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7045 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7047 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7048 has_monitor_update = true;
7050 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7051 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7052 continue 'peer_loop;
7061 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7062 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7063 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7069 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7070 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7072 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7073 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7075 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7076 #[cfg(test)] // This is only implemented for one signer method, and should be private until we
7077 // actually finish implementing it fully.
7078 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7081 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7082 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7083 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
7084 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7085 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7086 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7091 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7092 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7097 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_created {
7098 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7103 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7104 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7109 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7110 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7111 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7114 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7115 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7119 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7120 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7121 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7122 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7123 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7129 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7130 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7131 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7132 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7133 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7134 let mut has_update = false;
7135 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7139 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7140 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7141 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7142 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7143 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7145 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7146 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7147 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7148 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7150 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7151 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7154 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7155 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7156 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7158 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7159 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7160 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7161 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7162 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7167 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7169 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7170 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7171 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7177 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7178 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7183 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7189 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7190 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7193 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7194 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7200 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7201 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7203 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7204 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7205 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7206 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7207 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7208 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7209 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7210 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7211 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7212 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7213 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7214 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7215 assert!(should_broadcast);
7216 } else { unreachable!(); }
7217 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7218 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7219 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7222 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7226 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7227 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7228 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7232 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7233 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7234 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7235 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7239 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7242 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7244 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7245 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7246 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7247 &self, description: String
7248 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7249 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7250 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7251 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7252 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7253 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7255 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7256 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7260 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7261 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7265 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7266 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7268 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7269 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7270 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7273 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7274 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7275 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7277 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7278 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7282 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7283 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7284 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7285 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7289 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7290 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7294 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7295 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7297 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7299 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7300 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7301 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7302 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7303 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7304 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7305 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7306 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7307 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7308 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7309 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7310 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7312 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7313 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7315 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7316 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7319 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7320 self.pending_outbound_payments
7321 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7322 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7324 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7329 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7330 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7331 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7333 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7334 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7335 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7336 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7337 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7338 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7339 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7341 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7342 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7346 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7347 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7350 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7351 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7352 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7356 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7357 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7358 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7359 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7363 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7364 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7365 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7369 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7370 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7372 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7373 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7374 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7375 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7376 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7377 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7378 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7379 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7380 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7381 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7382 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7383 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7384 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7385 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7386 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7389 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7390 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7391 let builder = match quantity {
7393 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7395 let builder = match amount_msats {
7397 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7399 let builder = match payer_note {
7401 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7404 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7405 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7407 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7408 self.pending_outbound_payments
7409 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7410 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7412 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7414 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7415 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7416 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7417 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7418 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7421 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7423 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7424 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7425 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7426 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7427 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7428 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7429 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7430 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7431 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7433 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7440 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7443 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7444 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7445 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7449 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7450 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7451 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7452 /// received and no retries will be made.
7454 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7455 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7456 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7457 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7458 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7460 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7461 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7463 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7464 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7465 let payment_paths = vec![
7466 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7468 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7469 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7470 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7472 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7473 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7474 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7476 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7477 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7478 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7480 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7481 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7483 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7484 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7485 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7486 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7487 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7490 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7492 for path in refund.paths() {
7493 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7494 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7495 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7496 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7498 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7504 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7508 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7511 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7512 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7514 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7515 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7516 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7517 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7519 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7521 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7522 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7526 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7527 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7529 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7531 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7532 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7534 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7535 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7536 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7537 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7538 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7539 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7540 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7541 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7542 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7543 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7544 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7547 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7548 /// stored external to LDK.
7550 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7551 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7552 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7554 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7555 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7558 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7559 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7560 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7561 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7563 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7564 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7565 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7566 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7567 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7569 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7570 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7571 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7572 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7573 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7575 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7576 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7578 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7579 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7583 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7584 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7586 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7588 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7589 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7591 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7592 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7593 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7594 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7595 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7596 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7597 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7600 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7601 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7603 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7604 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7605 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7608 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7610 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7611 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7612 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7613 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7616 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7618 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7619 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7620 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7621 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7622 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7624 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7625 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7626 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7628 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7630 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7633 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7634 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7635 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7639 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7640 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7642 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7643 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7644 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7645 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7647 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7648 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7649 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7650 Some(_) => continue,
7651 None => return scid_candidate
7656 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7658 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7659 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7661 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7662 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7663 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7667 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7668 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7669 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7671 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7672 /// times to get a unique scid.
7673 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7674 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7675 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7677 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7678 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7679 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7680 return scid_candidate
7684 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7685 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7686 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7687 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7689 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7690 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7691 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7692 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7693 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7694 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7696 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7697 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7698 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7707 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7708 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7709 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7710 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7711 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7715 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7716 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7717 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7718 events.push_back((event, None));
7722 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7723 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7724 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7728 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7729 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7733 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7734 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7737 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7738 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7739 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7740 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7741 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7743 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7744 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7745 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7746 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7748 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7749 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7750 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7751 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7753 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7757 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7758 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7759 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7760 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7761 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7763 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7767 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7768 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7769 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7770 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7771 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7772 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7773 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7774 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7775 if further_update_exists {
7776 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7781 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7782 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7787 log_debug!(self.logger,
7788 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7789 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7795 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7796 for action in actions {
7798 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7799 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7801 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7807 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7808 /// using the given event handler.
7810 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7811 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7815 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7819 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7821 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7823 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7825 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7830 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7831 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7832 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7833 /// is always placed next to each other.
7835 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7836 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7837 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7838 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7840 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7841 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7842 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7843 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7844 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7845 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7846 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7848 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7849 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7850 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7851 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7854 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7855 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7857 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7858 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7861 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7863 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7864 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7865 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7866 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7867 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7871 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7872 events.replace(pending_events);
7881 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7883 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7884 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7885 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7886 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7887 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7888 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7892 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7894 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7895 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7896 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7898 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7902 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7904 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7905 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7906 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7907 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7908 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7909 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7913 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7915 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7916 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7917 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7918 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7919 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7922 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7923 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7926 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7927 let _persistence_guard =
7928 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7929 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7930 let new_height = height - 1;
7932 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7933 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7934 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7935 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7936 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7937 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7940 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7944 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7946 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7947 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7948 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7950 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7951 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7955 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7956 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7957 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7958 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7960 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7961 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7963 let _persistence_guard =
7964 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7965 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7966 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7967 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7969 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7970 if height < last_best_block_height {
7971 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7972 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7976 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
7977 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7978 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7979 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7981 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7982 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7984 let _persistence_guard =
7985 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7986 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7987 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7989 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7991 macro_rules! max_time {
7992 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7994 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7995 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7996 // having an explicit local time source.
7997 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7998 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7999 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8000 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8001 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8007 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8008 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8009 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8010 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8014 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8015 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8016 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8019 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8020 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8021 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8022 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8023 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8024 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8031 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8032 let _persistence_guard =
8033 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8034 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8035 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8036 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8037 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8038 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8039 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8040 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8045 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8057 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8059 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8060 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8061 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8062 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8063 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8065 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8066 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8068 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8069 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8070 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8071 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8072 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8073 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8075 // Retain unfunded channels.
8076 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8077 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8078 let res = f(channel);
8079 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8080 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8081 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8082 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8083 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8085 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8086 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8087 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8088 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8089 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8090 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8091 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8096 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8101 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8102 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8105 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8107 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8108 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8109 msg: announcement_sigs,
8111 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8112 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8113 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8115 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8116 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8117 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8122 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8123 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8124 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8125 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8126 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8127 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8128 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8129 // is always consistent.
8130 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8131 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8132 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8133 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8134 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8137 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8138 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8139 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8140 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8141 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8142 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8143 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8147 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8148 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8149 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8150 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8151 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8152 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8153 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8154 data: reason_message,
8167 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8168 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8169 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8170 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8171 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8172 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8173 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8174 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8175 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8176 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8178 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8179 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8180 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8184 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8187 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8188 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8189 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8190 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8191 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8192 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8193 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8194 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8195 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8196 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8199 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8200 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8201 _ => unreachable!(),
8203 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8204 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8205 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8206 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8212 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8214 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8215 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8219 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8220 /// may have events that need processing.
8222 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8223 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8225 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8226 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8227 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8228 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8231 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8232 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8233 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8236 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8237 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8238 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8241 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8242 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8243 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8244 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8247 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8248 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8249 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8250 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8253 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8254 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8256 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8257 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8258 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8259 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8260 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8263 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8264 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8265 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8266 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8269 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8270 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8271 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8272 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8275 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8276 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8277 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8278 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8281 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8282 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8283 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8284 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8288 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8289 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8291 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8292 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8293 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8294 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8295 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8296 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8300 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8301 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8302 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8303 // change to the contents.
8304 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8305 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8306 let persist = match &res {
8307 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8308 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8309 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8311 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8313 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8318 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8319 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8320 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8321 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8324 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8325 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8326 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8327 // change to the contents.
8328 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8329 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8330 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8334 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8335 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8336 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8337 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8340 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8341 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8342 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8345 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8347 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8350 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8351 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8352 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8353 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8354 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8356 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8357 let persist = match &res {
8358 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8359 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8361 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8366 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8367 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8368 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8369 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8372 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8373 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8374 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8375 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8378 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8379 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8380 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8381 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8384 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8385 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8386 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8387 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8390 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8392 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8395 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8396 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8397 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8400 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8401 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8402 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8403 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8404 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8405 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8406 let persist = match &res {
8407 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8408 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8409 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8411 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8416 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8417 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8418 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8421 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8422 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8423 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8424 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8425 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8426 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8427 let persist = match &res {
8428 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8429 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8430 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8432 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8437 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8438 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8439 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8440 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8441 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8442 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8443 let persist = match &res {
8444 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8445 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8446 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8448 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8453 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8455 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8458 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8459 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8460 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8463 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8464 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8465 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8466 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8467 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8468 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8469 let persist = match &res {
8470 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8471 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8472 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8474 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8479 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8480 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8481 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8484 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8485 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8486 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8489 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8494 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8495 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8496 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8497 let persist = match &res {
8498 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8499 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8500 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8502 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8507 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8509 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8510 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8511 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8513 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8514 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8515 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8516 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8517 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8518 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8519 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8520 let context = match phase {
8521 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8522 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8523 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8528 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8529 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8532 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8536 // Clean up for removal.
8537 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8538 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8539 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8542 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8543 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8544 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8545 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8547 // V1 Channel Establishment
8548 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8549 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8550 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8551 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8552 // V2 Channel Establishment
8553 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8554 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8555 // Common Channel Establishment
8556 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8557 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8559 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8561 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8564 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8566 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8567 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8568 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8570 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8572 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8573 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8574 // Channel Operations
8575 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8576 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8577 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8580 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8582 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8583 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8584 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8585 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8586 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8587 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8588 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8589 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8590 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8593 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8594 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8595 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8596 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8599 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8601 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8603 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8604 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8608 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8609 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8610 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8614 let mut res = Ok(());
8616 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8617 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8618 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8619 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8620 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8621 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8622 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8625 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8626 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8627 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8628 if inbound_peer_limited {
8630 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8632 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8633 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8634 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8635 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8636 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8637 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8638 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8639 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8643 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8644 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8645 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8647 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8648 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8649 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8650 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8653 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8656 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8657 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8662 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8664 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8665 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8666 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8667 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8668 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8670 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8671 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8672 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8673 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8674 // worry about closing and removing them.
8675 debug_assert!(false);
8679 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8680 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8681 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8686 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8687 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8692 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8695 match &msg.data as &str {
8696 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8697 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8699 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8700 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8701 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8702 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8703 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8704 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8705 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8706 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8707 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8708 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8709 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8710 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8711 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8712 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8713 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8714 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8718 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8719 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8720 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8721 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8722 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8723 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8725 log_level: Level::Trace,
8735 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8736 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8738 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8739 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8740 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8741 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8742 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8743 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8744 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8745 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8747 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8748 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8749 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8753 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8755 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8756 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8759 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8760 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8762 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8770 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8771 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8775 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8776 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8779 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8780 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8783 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8784 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8787 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8788 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8789 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8790 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8793 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8794 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8795 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8796 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8799 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8800 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8801 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8802 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8805 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8806 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8807 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8808 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8811 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8812 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8813 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8814 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8817 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8818 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8819 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8820 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8823 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8824 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8825 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8826 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8829 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8830 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8831 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8832 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8835 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8836 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8837 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8838 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8842 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8843 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8845 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8846 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8847 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8848 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8849 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8850 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8854 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8855 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8856 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8859 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8860 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8863 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8864 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8866 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8867 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8869 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8870 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8873 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8875 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8876 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8877 let payment_paths = vec![
8878 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8880 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8881 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8882 payment_paths, payment_hash
8884 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8885 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8886 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8888 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8889 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8890 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8892 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8893 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8894 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8897 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8898 let payment_paths = vec![
8899 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8901 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8902 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8903 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8904 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8905 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8907 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8908 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8909 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8911 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8912 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8914 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8915 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8916 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8917 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8919 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8920 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8924 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8925 Err(error) => Some(error),
8929 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
8933 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
8934 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8936 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
8938 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
8939 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
8942 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
8943 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
8944 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
8951 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
8952 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
8958 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
8959 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
8963 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8964 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8965 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8966 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8967 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8971 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8972 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8974 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8975 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8976 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8977 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8978 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8981 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8982 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8983 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8984 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8987 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8988 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8989 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8990 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8993 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8994 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8995 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8996 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8999 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9000 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9001 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9002 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9003 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9004 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9005 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9006 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9007 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9008 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9009 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9010 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9011 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9012 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9013 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9014 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9015 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9016 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9017 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9018 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9023 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9024 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9026 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9027 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9028 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9029 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9032 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9033 (2, node_id, required),
9034 (4, features, required),
9035 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9036 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9037 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9038 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9041 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9042 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9043 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9044 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9045 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9046 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9047 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9048 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9049 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9050 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9051 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9052 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9053 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9054 (7, self.config, option),
9055 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9056 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9057 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9058 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9059 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9060 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9061 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9062 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9063 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9064 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9065 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9066 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9067 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9068 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9069 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9070 (32, self.is_public, required),
9071 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9072 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9073 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9074 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9075 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9081 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9082 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9083 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9084 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9085 (2, channel_id, required),
9086 (3, channel_type, option),
9087 (4, counterparty, required),
9088 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9089 (6, funding_txo, option),
9090 (7, config, option),
9091 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9092 (9, confirmations, option),
9093 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9094 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9095 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9096 (16, balance_msat, required),
9097 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9098 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9099 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9100 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9101 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9102 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9103 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9104 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9105 (26, is_outbound, required),
9106 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9107 (30, is_usable, required),
9108 (32, is_public, required),
9109 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9110 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9111 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9112 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9113 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9116 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9117 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9118 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9119 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9120 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9124 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9126 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9127 outbound_scid_alias,
9131 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9132 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9134 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9135 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9136 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9137 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9138 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9139 confirmations_required,
9141 force_close_spend_delay,
9142 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9143 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9144 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9145 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9146 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9147 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9148 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9149 channel_shutdown_state,
9154 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9155 (2, channels, required_vec),
9156 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9157 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9160 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9161 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9164 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9166 (0, onion_packet, required),
9167 (1, blinded, option),
9168 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9171 (0, payment_data, required),
9172 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9173 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9174 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9175 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9177 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9178 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9179 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9180 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9181 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9182 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9186 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9187 (0, routing, required),
9188 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9189 (4, payment_hash, required),
9190 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9191 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9192 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9193 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9197 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9198 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9200 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9202 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9203 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9204 reason.write(writer)?;
9206 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9207 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9210 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9211 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9212 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9213 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9220 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9221 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9222 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9225 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9226 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9227 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9228 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9232 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9233 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9234 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9235 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9236 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9239 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9240 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9241 // messages contained in the variants.
9242 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9243 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9244 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9246 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9247 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9248 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9249 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9250 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9253 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9254 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9255 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9256 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9257 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9259 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9264 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9269 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9270 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9271 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9272 (2, outpoint, required),
9273 (4, htlc_id, required),
9274 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9275 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9278 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9279 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9280 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9281 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9282 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9284 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9285 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9286 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9287 (2, self.value, required),
9288 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9289 (4, payment_data, option),
9290 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9291 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9292 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9293 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9299 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9300 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9301 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9302 (0, prev_hop, required),
9303 (1, total_msat, option),
9304 (2, value_ser, required),
9305 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9306 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9307 (5, total_value_received, option),
9308 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9309 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9310 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9312 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9313 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9314 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9316 if payment_data.is_some() {
9317 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9319 if total_msat.is_none() {
9320 total_msat = Some(value);
9322 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9325 if total_msat.is_none() {
9326 if payment_data.is_none() {
9327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9329 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9331 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9335 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9338 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9339 total_value_received,
9340 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9342 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9343 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9348 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9349 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9350 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9353 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9354 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9355 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9356 let mut payment_id = None;
9357 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9358 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9359 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9360 (0, session_priv, required),
9361 (1, payment_id, option),
9362 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9363 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9364 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9365 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9367 if payment_id.is_none() {
9368 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9370 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9372 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9373 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9374 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9376 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9377 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9378 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9379 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9383 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9384 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9385 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9387 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9390 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9391 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9396 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9399 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9401 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9402 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9403 (0, session_priv, required),
9404 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9405 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9406 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9407 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9408 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9409 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9412 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9414 field.write(writer)?;
9421 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9422 (0, forward_info, required),
9423 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9424 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9425 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9426 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9429 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9431 (0, htlc_id, required),
9432 (2, err_packet, required),
9437 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9438 (0, payment_secret, required),
9439 (2, expiry_time, required),
9440 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9441 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9442 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9445 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9447 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9448 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9449 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9450 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9451 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9452 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9456 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9457 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9459 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9461 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9463 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9464 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9465 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9468 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9470 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9471 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9472 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9475 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9476 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9479 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9480 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9484 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9486 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9487 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9488 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9489 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9490 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9491 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9494 channel.write(writer)?;
9500 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9501 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9502 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9503 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9504 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9505 for forward in pending_forwards {
9506 forward.write(writer)?;
9511 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9513 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9514 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9515 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9517 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9518 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9519 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9520 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9521 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9522 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9523 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9524 htlc.write(writer)?;
9526 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9527 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9530 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9531 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9532 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9533 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9534 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9535 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9536 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9539 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9540 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9541 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9542 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9543 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9545 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9546 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9547 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9548 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9549 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9550 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9551 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9556 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9557 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9558 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9559 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9560 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9561 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9562 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9563 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9564 0u64.write(writer)?;
9566 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9567 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9568 event.write(writer)?;
9572 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9573 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9574 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9575 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9576 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9577 0u64.write(writer)?;
9579 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9580 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9581 // likely to be identical.
9582 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9583 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9585 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9586 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9587 hash.write(writer)?;
9588 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9591 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9592 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9593 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9594 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9595 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9598 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9599 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9601 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9602 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9603 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9604 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9607 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9608 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9609 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9610 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9614 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9615 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9616 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9618 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9619 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9620 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9626 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9627 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9628 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9629 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9632 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9633 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9634 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9635 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9636 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9639 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9640 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9641 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9642 if !updates.is_empty() {
9643 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9644 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9649 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9650 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9651 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9652 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9653 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9654 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9655 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9656 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9657 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9658 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9659 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9660 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9661 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9668 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9669 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9670 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9671 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9674 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9675 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9676 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9677 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9678 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9679 // check that the event is sane here.
9680 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9681 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9682 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9683 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9689 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9690 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9691 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9692 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9693 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9694 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9697 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9698 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9699 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9700 events.push_back((ev, action));
9701 } else if action.is_some() {
9702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9709 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9710 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9711 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9712 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9713 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9714 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9717 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9719 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9721 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9722 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9723 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9724 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9725 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9726 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9727 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9728 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9729 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9730 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9731 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9732 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9733 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9735 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9736 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9738 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9739 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9741 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9742 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9743 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9744 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9745 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9746 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9748 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9749 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9751 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9752 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9753 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9754 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9755 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9756 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9760 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9761 pub entropy_source: ES,
9763 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9764 pub node_signer: NS,
9766 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9767 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9769 pub signer_provider: SP,
9771 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9773 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9774 pub fee_estimator: F,
9775 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9777 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9778 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9779 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9780 pub chain_monitor: M,
9782 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9783 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9784 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9785 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9786 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9787 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9789 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9791 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9792 /// deserialization.
9794 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9795 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9796 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9798 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9799 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9801 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9802 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9803 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9804 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9806 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9809 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9810 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
9813 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9814 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9816 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9817 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9818 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9819 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9820 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9821 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9825 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9826 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9827 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9828 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9829 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
9831 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9832 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9837 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9838 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9839 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9840 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9842 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9843 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9844 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9845 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9846 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9847 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9851 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9852 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9853 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9857 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9858 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9860 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9861 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9862 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9863 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9864 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9865 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9869 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9870 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9872 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9873 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9874 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9876 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9878 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9879 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9880 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9881 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9882 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9883 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9884 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9885 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9886 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9887 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9889 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9890 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9891 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9892 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9893 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9894 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9895 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9896 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9897 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9898 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9899 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9900 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9901 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9903 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9904 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9905 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9907 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9908 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9909 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9911 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9912 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9913 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9915 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9916 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9917 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9919 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
9920 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9921 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9924 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
9925 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9926 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9927 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9928 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9929 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9930 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9932 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9933 let mut found_htlc = false;
9934 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9935 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9938 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9939 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9940 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9941 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9942 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9943 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9944 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9945 log_info!(args.logger,
9946 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9947 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9948 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9952 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9953 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9954 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9955 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9956 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9958 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9959 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9961 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9962 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9963 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9964 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9967 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9968 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9969 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9973 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9974 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9975 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9976 // safely discard the channel.
9977 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9978 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9979 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9980 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9981 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9982 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9983 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9986 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9987 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9988 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9989 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9990 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9991 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9995 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9996 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9997 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9998 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9999 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10000 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10001 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10003 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10007 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10008 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10009 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10010 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10011 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10012 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10013 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10014 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10015 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10017 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10020 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10021 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10022 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10023 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10024 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10025 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10026 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10027 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10029 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10032 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10035 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10036 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10037 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10038 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10039 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10040 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10041 is_connected: false,
10045 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10046 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10047 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10048 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10049 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10050 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10051 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10052 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10055 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10056 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10057 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10058 for _ in 0..event_count {
10059 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10060 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10065 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10066 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10067 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10069 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10070 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10071 // on-startup monitor updates.
10072 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10073 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10075 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10079 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10080 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10082 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10083 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10084 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10085 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10086 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10090 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10091 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10092 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10093 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10094 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10095 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10096 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10098 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10103 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10104 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10105 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10106 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10107 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10108 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10109 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10110 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10111 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10112 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10113 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10114 let mut events_override = None;
10115 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10116 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10117 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10118 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10119 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10120 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10121 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10122 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10123 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10124 (8, events_override, option),
10125 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10126 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10127 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10128 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10130 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10131 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10134 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10135 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10138 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10139 pending_events_read = events;
10142 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10143 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10146 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10147 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10148 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10149 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10150 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10151 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10153 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10155 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10156 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10157 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10160 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10161 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10162 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10163 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10164 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10166 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10167 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10168 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10170 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10171 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10172 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10173 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10174 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10176 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10177 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10178 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10179 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10180 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10181 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10182 pending_background_events.push(
10183 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10184 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10185 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10186 update: update.clone(),
10189 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10190 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10191 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10192 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10193 pending_background_events.push(
10194 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10195 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10196 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10199 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10200 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10201 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10203 max_in_flight_update_id
10207 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10208 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10209 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10210 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10211 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10212 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10214 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10215 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10216 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10217 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10218 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10219 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10220 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10221 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10222 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10225 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10226 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10227 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10228 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10229 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10230 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10231 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10232 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10233 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10234 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10235 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10238 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10239 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10240 debug_assert!(false);
10241 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10246 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10247 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10248 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10249 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10250 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10251 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10253 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10255 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10256 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10257 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10259 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10260 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10261 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10262 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10263 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10264 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10265 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10266 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10271 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10272 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10274 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10275 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10276 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10277 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10280 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10281 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10282 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10283 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10284 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10285 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10286 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10288 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10289 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10290 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10291 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10292 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10293 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10294 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10295 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10298 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10299 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10300 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10301 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10303 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10304 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10305 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10308 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10309 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10310 retry_strategy: None,
10311 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10312 payment_params: None,
10313 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10314 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10315 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10316 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10317 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10318 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10319 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10320 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10321 total_msat: path_amt,
10322 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10323 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10325 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10326 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10331 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10332 match htlc_source {
10333 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10334 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10335 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10336 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10338 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10339 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10340 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10341 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10342 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10343 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10344 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10345 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10346 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10347 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10348 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10353 !forwards.is_empty()
10355 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10356 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10357 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10358 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10359 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10360 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10361 intercepted_id != ev_id
10368 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10369 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10370 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10371 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10372 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10373 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10374 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10375 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10376 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10377 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10378 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10380 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10381 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10382 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10384 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10385 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10386 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10393 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10394 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10396 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10398 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10399 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10400 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10401 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10402 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10403 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10404 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10405 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10406 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10407 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10410 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10411 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10412 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10413 // channel still live case here.
10417 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10418 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10423 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10424 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10425 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10426 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10427 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10428 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10429 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10430 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10434 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10435 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10437 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10438 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10439 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10440 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10442 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10443 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10444 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10446 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10447 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10449 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10450 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10452 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10455 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10456 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10457 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10459 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10463 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10464 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10465 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10466 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10469 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10470 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10471 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10472 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10473 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10474 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10475 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10476 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10478 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10479 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10483 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10485 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10487 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10488 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10490 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10491 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10496 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10497 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10499 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10501 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10503 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10504 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10505 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10506 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10510 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10511 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10512 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10513 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10514 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10515 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10516 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10517 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10519 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10520 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10521 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10523 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10524 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10525 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10526 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10527 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10528 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10530 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10531 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10532 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10533 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10534 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10539 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10540 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10541 debug_assert!(false);
10542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10547 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10549 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10550 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10551 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10552 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10553 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10554 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10555 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10556 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10557 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10558 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10559 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10561 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10562 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10564 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10565 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10566 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10567 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10569 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10570 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10571 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10572 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10574 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10575 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10576 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10577 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10579 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10580 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10581 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10582 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10583 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10584 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10585 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10588 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10589 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10592 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10595 purpose: payment.purpose,
10596 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10597 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10598 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10604 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10605 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10606 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10607 for action in actions.iter() {
10608 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10609 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10610 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10612 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10613 log_trace!(args.logger,
10614 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10615 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10616 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10617 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10618 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10620 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10621 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10622 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10623 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10627 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10628 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10632 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10634 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10635 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10639 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10641 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10642 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10643 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10644 router: args.router,
10646 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10648 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10649 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10650 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10651 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10653 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10654 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10655 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10656 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10657 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10658 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10660 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10662 our_network_pubkey,
10665 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10667 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10669 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10670 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10671 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10672 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10673 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10675 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10676 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10678 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10680 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10682 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10683 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10684 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10686 logger: args.logger,
10687 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10690 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10691 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10692 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10693 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10694 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10697 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10698 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10699 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10700 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10701 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10702 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10705 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10706 //connection or two.
10708 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10714 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10715 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10716 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10717 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10718 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10719 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10720 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10721 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10722 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10723 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10724 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10725 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10726 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10727 use crate::util::test_utils;
10728 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10729 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10732 fn test_notify_limits() {
10733 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10734 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10738 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10740 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10741 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10742 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10743 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10744 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10746 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10748 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10749 // to connect messages with new values
10750 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10751 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10752 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10753 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10754 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10755 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10757 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10758 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10759 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10760 // ... but the last node should not.
10761 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10762 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10763 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10764 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10766 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10767 // about the channel.
10768 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10769 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10770 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10772 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10774 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10775 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10776 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10777 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10778 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10779 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10781 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10782 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10783 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10785 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10786 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10787 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10788 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10789 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10790 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10792 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10793 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10794 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10795 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10796 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10797 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10798 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10799 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10801 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10802 // the channel info has updated.
10803 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10804 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10806 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10807 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10808 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10812 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10813 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10815 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10816 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10817 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10818 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10819 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10821 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10822 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10823 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10824 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10826 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10827 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10828 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10829 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10830 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10831 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10832 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10833 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10835 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10836 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10837 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10839 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10840 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10841 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10843 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10845 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10846 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10847 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10849 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10850 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10851 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10853 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10854 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10855 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10856 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10857 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10858 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10859 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10860 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10861 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10863 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10864 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10865 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10867 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10869 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10871 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10872 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10873 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10874 // lightning messages manually.
10875 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10876 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10879 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10880 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10881 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10882 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10884 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10885 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10887 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10888 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10890 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10891 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10892 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10894 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10895 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10896 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10898 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10902 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10903 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10906 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10907 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10908 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10911 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10912 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10913 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10914 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10919 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10920 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10921 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10922 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10929 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10930 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10931 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10934 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10935 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10936 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10937 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10938 // fails as expected.
10939 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10940 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10941 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10942 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10943 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10944 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10947 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10948 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10951 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10952 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10953 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10955 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10956 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10957 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10959 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10960 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10961 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10962 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10963 let route = find_route(
10964 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10965 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10967 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10968 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10970 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10972 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10973 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10974 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10976 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10977 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10978 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10979 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10980 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10982 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10983 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10984 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10985 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10986 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10987 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10988 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10989 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10990 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10992 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10993 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10995 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10996 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10997 let route = find_route(
10998 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10999 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11001 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11002 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11004 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11005 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11006 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11007 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11008 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11010 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11011 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11012 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11013 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11015 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11017 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11018 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11019 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11020 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11021 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11022 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11025 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11026 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11027 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11028 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11029 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11030 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11031 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11032 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11033 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11035 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11038 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11039 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11040 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11041 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11043 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11044 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11045 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11046 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11047 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11049 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11050 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11051 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11054 let route = find_route(
11055 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11056 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11058 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11059 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11060 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11062 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11063 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11064 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11065 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11066 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11070 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11072 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11073 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11074 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11075 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11076 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11077 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11078 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11079 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11080 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11082 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11083 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11087 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11088 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11089 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11090 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11091 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11092 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11093 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11095 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11096 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11098 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11099 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11100 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11101 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11102 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11103 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11104 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11105 let route = find_route(
11106 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11107 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11110 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11111 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11112 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11113 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11114 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11115 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11118 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11119 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11120 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11121 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11122 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11123 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11124 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11126 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11130 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11131 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11132 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11133 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11134 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11137 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11138 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11140 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11141 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11143 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11144 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11145 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11146 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11147 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11148 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11149 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11150 let route = find_route(
11151 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11152 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11155 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11156 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11157 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11158 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11159 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11160 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11161 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11162 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11165 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11166 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11167 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11168 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11169 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11170 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11171 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11173 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11177 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11181 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11183 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11184 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11185 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11186 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11188 // Marshall an MPP route.
11189 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11190 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11191 route.paths.push(path);
11192 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11193 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11194 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11195 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11196 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11197 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11199 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11200 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11202 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11203 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11205 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11210 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11216 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11218 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11219 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11221 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11222 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11224 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11227 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11228 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11229 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11230 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11231 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11232 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11235 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11238 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11239 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11244 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11245 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11251 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11252 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11254 total_msat: 100_000,
11257 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11258 // payment verification fails as expected.
11259 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11260 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11261 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11262 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11264 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11268 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11269 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11273 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11274 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11275 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11276 // the channel is successfully closed.
11277 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11278 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11279 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11280 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11282 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11283 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11285 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11286 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11288 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11289 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11291 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11292 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11293 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11294 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11297 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11299 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11300 // as it has the funding transaction.
11301 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11302 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11303 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11306 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11308 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11310 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11312 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11313 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11314 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11316 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11319 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11320 // as it has the funding transaction.
11321 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11322 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11323 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11326 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11327 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11329 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11330 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11331 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11332 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11334 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11335 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11336 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11337 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11339 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11340 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11342 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11343 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11344 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11345 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11346 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11347 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11348 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11352 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11353 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11354 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11355 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11356 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11357 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11358 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11361 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11363 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11364 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11365 // closing transaction).
11366 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11367 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11370 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11371 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11372 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11373 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11374 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11377 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11379 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11381 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11382 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11383 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11385 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11387 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11388 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11391 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11392 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11393 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11396 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11397 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11398 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11401 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11402 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11403 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11406 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11407 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11408 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11411 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11413 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11414 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11416 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11417 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11419 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11420 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11425 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11426 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11427 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11428 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11429 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11430 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11431 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11435 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11436 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11437 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11439 // Test the API functions.
11440 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11442 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11444 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11446 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11448 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11450 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11452 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11456 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11457 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11458 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11459 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11460 // the given `channel_id`.
11461 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11462 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11463 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11464 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11466 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11469 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11471 // Test the API functions.
11472 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11474 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11476 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11478 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11480 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11482 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11486 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11487 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11491 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11493 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11495 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11496 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11498 let mut funding_tx = None;
11499 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11500 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11501 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11504 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11505 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11506 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11507 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11508 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11510 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11512 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11514 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11516 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11518 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11520 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11523 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11524 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11525 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11526 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11527 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11529 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11530 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11532 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11533 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11534 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11535 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11536 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11537 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11538 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11541 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11542 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11543 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11544 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11545 }, true).unwrap_err();
11547 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11548 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11549 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11550 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11551 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11552 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11553 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11555 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11556 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11558 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11559 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11560 }, true).unwrap_err();
11562 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11563 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11564 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11565 }, false).unwrap();
11566 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11568 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11569 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11571 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11572 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11573 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11574 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11575 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11577 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11578 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11579 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11581 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11582 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11583 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11585 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11586 // "protected" and can connect again.
11587 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11588 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11589 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11591 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11593 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11595 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11596 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11600 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11601 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11603 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11604 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11605 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11607 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11609 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11610 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11612 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11613 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11614 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11615 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11618 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11620 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11621 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11622 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11624 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11625 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11626 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11628 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11630 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11631 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11635 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11636 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11637 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11640 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11641 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11645 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11647 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11648 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11650 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11651 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11652 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11653 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11654 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11655 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11658 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11659 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11661 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11662 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11666 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11667 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11670 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11671 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11672 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11673 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11674 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11676 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11677 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11679 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11680 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11681 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11682 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11686 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11688 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11689 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11691 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11692 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11693 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11695 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11696 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11700 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11704 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11705 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11706 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11707 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11708 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11709 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11710 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11711 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11713 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11714 payment_metadata: None,
11715 keysend_preimage: None,
11716 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11717 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11719 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11721 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11722 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11723 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11724 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11725 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11726 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11727 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
11729 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11730 } else { panic!(); }
11732 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11733 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11735 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11736 payment_metadata: None,
11737 keysend_preimage: None,
11738 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11739 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11741 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11743 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11744 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11745 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
11746 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
11750 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11751 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11752 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11753 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11754 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11756 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
11757 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11759 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11760 payment_metadata: None,
11761 keysend_preimage: None,
11762 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11763 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11765 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11766 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
11767 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
11769 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11770 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11771 // is not satisfied.
11772 assert!(result.is_ok());
11776 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11777 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11778 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11779 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11780 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11782 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11783 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11788 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11789 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11791 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11792 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11795 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11796 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11797 match &msg_events[0] {
11798 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11799 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11801 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11802 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11803 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11809 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11810 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11812 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11813 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11814 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11816 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11820 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11821 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11822 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11823 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11826 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11827 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11828 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11830 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11832 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
11833 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11834 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11836 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11837 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11839 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11840 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11845 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11846 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11848 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11849 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11851 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11852 // not have generated any events.
11853 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11857 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11858 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11859 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11860 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11861 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11862 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11863 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11864 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11866 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11867 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11868 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11870 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11871 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11873 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11876 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11877 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11880 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11881 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11882 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11884 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11885 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11886 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11887 ..Default::default()
11889 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11890 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11893 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11894 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11897 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11898 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11899 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11900 ..Default::default()
11902 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11903 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11904 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11908 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11911 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11912 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11913 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11914 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11915 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11918 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11919 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11920 ..Default::default()
11922 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11925 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11926 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11927 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11932 fn test_payment_display() {
11933 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11934 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11935 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11936 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11937 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11938 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11942 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11943 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11944 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11945 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11946 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11947 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11949 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11950 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11951 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11952 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11953 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11954 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11955 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11956 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11958 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11959 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11960 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11963 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11964 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11966 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11967 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11969 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11970 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11971 }, false).unwrap();
11972 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11973 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11974 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11976 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11978 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11979 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11980 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11981 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11982 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11983 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11984 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11985 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11986 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11987 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11988 } else { panic!() };
11989 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11990 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11991 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11992 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11994 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11996 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11997 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11998 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12005 use crate::chain::Listen;
12006 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12007 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12008 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12009 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12010 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12011 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12012 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12013 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12014 use crate::util::test_utils;
12015 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12017 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12018 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12019 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12020 use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12022 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12024 use criterion::Criterion;
12026 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12027 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12028 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12029 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12030 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12031 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12032 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12034 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12035 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12037 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12038 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12040 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12042 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12045 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12046 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12049 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12050 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12051 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12053 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12054 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12056 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12057 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12058 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12059 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12060 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12062 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12063 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12064 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12066 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12067 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12068 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12069 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12071 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12072 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12073 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12075 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12076 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12077 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12078 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12079 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12081 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12082 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12083 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12085 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12086 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12088 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12089 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12090 }, false).unwrap();
12091 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12092 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12093 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12096 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12097 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12098 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12100 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12101 } else { panic!(); }
12103 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12104 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12105 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12106 match events_b[0] {
12107 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12108 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12113 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12114 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12115 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12116 match events_a[0] {
12117 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12118 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12120 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12123 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12125 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12126 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12127 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12129 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12130 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12131 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12132 match msg_events[0] {
12133 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12134 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12135 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12139 match msg_events[1] {
12140 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12144 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12145 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12146 match events_a[0] {
12147 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12148 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12153 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12154 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12155 match events_b[0] {
12156 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12157 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12162 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12163 macro_rules! send_payment {
12164 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12165 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12166 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12167 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12168 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12169 payment_count += 1;
12170 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12171 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12173 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12174 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12175 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12176 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12177 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12178 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12179 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12180 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12181 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12182 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12183 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12186 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12187 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12188 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12190 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12191 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12192 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12193 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12194 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12196 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12199 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12200 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12201 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12202 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12204 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12208 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12209 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12210 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);